David “dwizzzle” Weston
Securing Windows
Defender Application
Guard
Microsoft, Windows and Devices
Device Security Group Manager
Saruhan “manbun” Karademir
Information Security
Microsoft, Windows and Devices
Eliminate entire classes of vulnerabilities
Break exploitation techniques
Contain damage & prevent persistence
Limit the window of opportunity to exploit
…
Edge
Manager
AppContainer
Content
AppContainer
Store App
AppContainer
Adobe Flash
AppContainer
Win32
Process
User Mode Font
Driver Host
AppContainer
• UWP apps all run within an
AC
• Edge uses a multi-AC design
for isolation
• Office Protected view in n AC
• Flash Runs in a separate AC
• Win32k system call filtering is
enabled for Edge
Windows 10 Fall Creators
Update
• New AppContainer profile
(LPAC) reduces broker
surface by 90%!
• Edge refactored to remove
most of GDI
System Call Filter
AppContainer
Properties
Security boundary Microsoft will address vulnerabilities that can violate AC security boundary
Capability-based resource access Network, file, registry, and device access are restricted (both read and write)
Locked down process No symbolic links, reduced attack surface, and various mitigations on by default
2 2 1 6 5 5 6 5 14 15
Kernel exploitation trends
Ubiquitous user-mode sandboxing has driven
attackers to kernel attack surface
Windows kernel is a “target rich” environment
User-mode sandbox isolation leaves a large
kernel attack surface (~2000 system calls)
Windows not well suited to software kernel
filtering (e.g. seccomp-bpf)
Most applications have legacy dependency on
kernel limiting effectiveness of filtering
Kernel attacks are the top path for sandbox escape
Privileged Access Workstation
Strong kernel isolation for applications running
in the guest
Separate identity and resource infrastructure
Can be extended to arbitrary application
scenarios
Qubes OS
Desktop PAW
Locked down host
V-Switch V-Switch
Strengths
Weaknesses
High resource requirements
Difficult experience for non-technical users
Expensive configuration
• Lightest weight container.
• Application isolated using
file system and registry
virtualization.
• Used for centennial as a
bridge
• No Security guarantees
• Container providing an
isolated the user session
• Shares kernel
• Used to achieve higher
density in cloud and
server deployments.
• No a security boundary
• Container that uses a
lightweight VM
• Hypervisor boundary.
• Used in hostile multi-tenant
hosting.
• Commercially known as a
“Hyper-V container”
• Container that uses a
lightweight VM
• Resistant to kernel
attacks Runs a
separate kernel from
the host.
Resource sharing between
guest and host
VM accesses a file, data is
transferred into physical pages
of the guest
Pages are backed by private
virtual memory on the host.
Direct Map
Physically-backed VMs statically
mapped
VA backed VMs have “hot hint”
indicate set of physical pages
should be mapped into the
guest
Reduces number of memory
intercepts generated by the
guest.
Memory Enlightenment
No scheduler in the hypervisor
Remove extra scheduling layer
Take advantage of the existing
NT scheduler features
Improved CPU resource
tracking/management
Root schedules all VP-backing
threads
Integrated Scheduler
BlueHat v17 || Securing Windows Defender Application Guard
BlueHat v17 || Securing Windows Defender Application Guard
BlueHat v17 || Securing Windows Defender Application Guard
BlueHat v17 || Securing Windows Defender Application Guard
Networking Interaction
Settings
Mirroring
Host User Mode
VM Worker
Process
Hyper-V Container
System
Processes
Microsoft
Edge
StorVSP
Host Storage Guest Storage
C:
HVSIMgr
Process
Host Storage
Guest Storage
C:
Host Storage
Guest Storage
C:
Host Storage
Guest Storage
C:
BlueHat v17 || Securing Windows Defender Application Guard
Storage Interaction
Settings
Mirroring
Host User Mode
VMSwitch
Hyper-V Container
System
Processes
WinNAT
Network
Adapter(s)
HVSIMgr
Process
Microsoft
Edge
Host User Mode
VMSwitch
Hyper-V Container
System
Processes
WinNAT
Network
Adapter(s)
HVSIMgr
Process
Microsoft
Edge
Host User Mode
VMSwitch
Hyper-V Container
System
Processes
WinNAT
LSASS
Network
Adapter(s)
LSASS
HVSIMgr
Process
DNS
Client
Microsoft
Edge
DNS
Client
Host User Mode
VMSwitch
Hyper-V Container
System
Processes
WinNAT
LSASS
Network
Adapter(s)
LSASS
HVSIMgr
Process
DNS
Client
Microsoft
Edge
DNS
Client
QueryContextAttributesEx(
PCtxtHandle ContextHandle,
ULONG Attribute,
ULONG BufferLength,
Host User Mode
VMSwitch
Hyper-V Container
System
Processes
WinNAT
LSASS
Network
Adapter(s)
LSASS
HVSIMgr
Process
DNS
Client
Microsoft
Edge
DNS
Client
QueryContextAttributesEx(
PCtxtHandle ContextHandle,
ULONG Attribute,
ULONG BufferLength,
typedef struct
PCtxtHandle
{
ULONG_PTR dwLower ;
ULONG_PTR dwUpper ;
}
BlueHat v17 || Securing Windows Defender Application Guard
Host User Mode
WinNAT
Network
Adapter(s)
HVSIMgr
Process
HVSIRPCD
Process
Hyper-V Container
System
Processes
LSASS
Microsoft
Edge
DNS
Client
VMSwitch
LSASS
DNS
Client
Mitigations
• Win32K Blocked
• CFG Strict
• Image load
Restrictions
• Microsoft-only
• No Remote
• ACG
• No Child Process
creation
Storage Networking
Settings
Mirroring
Host User Mode
Hyper-V Container
System
Processes
Microsoft
Edge
System Processes
HVSIMgr
Process
Microsoft
Edge
VM Worker
Process
RDP Server
User Session
• Limited Codec SupportAudio
• Only Text and ImagesClipboard
• Limited by GPO policyPrinter
Input Devices
• Restricted for WDAGDesktop Integration
• Shared memoryDisplay
Host User Mode
Hyper-V Container
System
Processes
Microsoft
Edge
System Processes
HVSIMgr
Process
Microsoft
Edge
VM Worker
Process
RDP Server
User Session
Host User Mode
Hyper-V Container
System
Processes
Microsoft
Edge
System Processes
HVSIMgr
Process
Microsoft
Edge
VM Worker
Process
RDP Server
User Session
BlueHat v17 || Securing Windows Defender Application Guard
Host User Mode
Hyper-V Container
System
Processes
Microsoft
Edge
System Processes
HVSIMgr
Process
Microsoft
Edge
VM Worker
Process
RDP Server
User Session
HVSIRDP
Client
Process
HVSIRPCD
Process
Mitigations
• Win32K Filter
• CFG Strict
• Image load
Restrictions
• Microsoft-only
• No Remote
• ACG
• No Child Process
creation
Storage Networking Interaction
Host User Mode
Hyper-V Container
System
Processes
Microsoft
Edge
System Processes
HVSIMgr
Process
Microsoft
Edge
VM Worker
Process
User Session
HVSIRDP
Client
Process
HVSIRPCD
Process
HVSI
Container
Service
dll
Host User Mode
Hyper-V Container
System
Processes
Microsoft
Edge
System Processes
HVSIMgr
Process
Microsoft
Edge
VM Worker
Process
User Session
HVSIRDP
Client
Process
HVSIRPCD
Process
HVSI
Container
Service
dll
Report vulnerabilities &
mitigation bypasses via our
bounty programs!
https://aka.ms/bugbounty
Or come work with us. We’re hiring
https://aka.ms/cesecurityopenjobs
https://aka.ms/wdgsecurityjobs
Windows is investing and performance and OS
integration to improve container density and scale
Conclusion
Extend WDAG technology to contain arbitrary apps
Follow us on the MSRC Blogs to get information on new bounties
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/msrc/
Windows Bounty Program includes all critical and important bugs in:
Windows Insider Preview
Hyper-V
Microsoft Edge
Windows Defender Application Guard
New Microsoft Bounty Programs | Additions
Windows Bounty Program Targets
 Submit:
 Critical and important vulnerabilities in Windows Insider Preview slow
 Hyper-V escapes, Information disclosure and DOS bugs in Hyper-V
 This continues our effort in finding bugs in various stages of development
Category Targets Windows Version Payout range (USD)
Base
NEW
Windows Insider Preview
WIP slow $500 to $15,000
Focus area
NEW
Microsoft Hyper-V
Windows 10
Windows Server 2012 Windows Server 2012 R2
Windows Server Insider Preview
$5,000 to $250,000
Focus area
NEW
Windows Defender
Application Guard
WIP slow $500 to $50,000
Focus area Microsoft Edge WIP slow $500 to $15,000
Focus area
Mitigation bypass and
Bounty for defense
Windows 10 $500 to $200,000
Vulnerability Type in Windows
Insider Preview Slow
Whitepaper / Report Quality/
Proof of Concept
Pay-out Range(USD)
Remote Code Execution
High Up to $15,000
Low Up to $1,500
Elevation of Privilege
High Up to $10,000
Low Up to $5,000
Information Disclosure
High Up to $5,000
Low Up to $2,500
Remote Denial of Service
High Up to $5,000
Low Up to $2,500
Tampering / Spoofing
High Up to $5,000
Low Up to $2,500
Submit high quality critical and important vulnerabilities in Windows
Insider Preview slow
Windows Bounty Program Targets
Vulnerability Type
Proof of
concept
Functioning
Exploit
Report Quality Payout range (USD)
Vulnerability resulting
in escape from the
WDAG container to
the host
Required
Yes High $30,000
No High $20,000
No Low $10,000
Vulnerability within the
Application Guard
container, no container
escape
Required
No High $10,000
No Low $2,000
Windows Defender Application Guard

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BlueHat v17 || Securing Windows Defender Application Guard

  • 1. David “dwizzzle” Weston Securing Windows Defender Application Guard Microsoft, Windows and Devices Device Security Group Manager Saruhan “manbun” Karademir Information Security Microsoft, Windows and Devices
  • 2. Eliminate entire classes of vulnerabilities Break exploitation techniques Contain damage & prevent persistence Limit the window of opportunity to exploit
  • 3.
  • 4. Edge Manager AppContainer Content AppContainer Store App AppContainer Adobe Flash AppContainer Win32 Process User Mode Font Driver Host AppContainer • UWP apps all run within an AC • Edge uses a multi-AC design for isolation • Office Protected view in n AC • Flash Runs in a separate AC • Win32k system call filtering is enabled for Edge Windows 10 Fall Creators Update • New AppContainer profile (LPAC) reduces broker surface by 90%! • Edge refactored to remove most of GDI System Call Filter AppContainer Properties Security boundary Microsoft will address vulnerabilities that can violate AC security boundary Capability-based resource access Network, file, registry, and device access are restricted (both read and write) Locked down process No symbolic links, reduced attack surface, and various mitigations on by default
  • 5. 2 2 1 6 5 5 6 5 14 15 Kernel exploitation trends Ubiquitous user-mode sandboxing has driven attackers to kernel attack surface Windows kernel is a “target rich” environment User-mode sandbox isolation leaves a large kernel attack surface (~2000 system calls) Windows not well suited to software kernel filtering (e.g. seccomp-bpf) Most applications have legacy dependency on kernel limiting effectiveness of filtering Kernel attacks are the top path for sandbox escape
  • 6. Privileged Access Workstation Strong kernel isolation for applications running in the guest Separate identity and resource infrastructure Can be extended to arbitrary application scenarios Qubes OS Desktop PAW Locked down host V-Switch V-Switch Strengths Weaknesses High resource requirements Difficult experience for non-technical users Expensive configuration
  • 7. • Lightest weight container. • Application isolated using file system and registry virtualization. • Used for centennial as a bridge • No Security guarantees • Container providing an isolated the user session • Shares kernel • Used to achieve higher density in cloud and server deployments. • No a security boundary • Container that uses a lightweight VM • Hypervisor boundary. • Used in hostile multi-tenant hosting. • Commercially known as a “Hyper-V container” • Container that uses a lightweight VM • Resistant to kernel attacks Runs a separate kernel from the host.
  • 8. Resource sharing between guest and host VM accesses a file, data is transferred into physical pages of the guest Pages are backed by private virtual memory on the host. Direct Map Physically-backed VMs statically mapped VA backed VMs have “hot hint” indicate set of physical pages should be mapped into the guest Reduces number of memory intercepts generated by the guest. Memory Enlightenment No scheduler in the hypervisor Remove extra scheduling layer Take advantage of the existing NT scheduler features Improved CPU resource tracking/management Root schedules all VP-backing threads Integrated Scheduler
  • 14. Host User Mode VM Worker Process Hyper-V Container System Processes Microsoft Edge StorVSP Host Storage Guest Storage C: HVSIMgr Process
  • 20. Host User Mode VMSwitch Hyper-V Container System Processes WinNAT Network Adapter(s) HVSIMgr Process Microsoft Edge
  • 21. Host User Mode VMSwitch Hyper-V Container System Processes WinNAT Network Adapter(s) HVSIMgr Process Microsoft Edge
  • 22. Host User Mode VMSwitch Hyper-V Container System Processes WinNAT LSASS Network Adapter(s) LSASS HVSIMgr Process DNS Client Microsoft Edge DNS Client
  • 23. Host User Mode VMSwitch Hyper-V Container System Processes WinNAT LSASS Network Adapter(s) LSASS HVSIMgr Process DNS Client Microsoft Edge DNS Client QueryContextAttributesEx( PCtxtHandle ContextHandle, ULONG Attribute, ULONG BufferLength,
  • 24. Host User Mode VMSwitch Hyper-V Container System Processes WinNAT LSASS Network Adapter(s) LSASS HVSIMgr Process DNS Client Microsoft Edge DNS Client QueryContextAttributesEx( PCtxtHandle ContextHandle, ULONG Attribute, ULONG BufferLength, typedef struct PCtxtHandle { ULONG_PTR dwLower ; ULONG_PTR dwUpper ; }
  • 26. Host User Mode WinNAT Network Adapter(s) HVSIMgr Process HVSIRPCD Process Hyper-V Container System Processes LSASS Microsoft Edge DNS Client VMSwitch LSASS DNS Client Mitigations • Win32K Blocked • CFG Strict • Image load Restrictions • Microsoft-only • No Remote • ACG • No Child Process creation
  • 28. Host User Mode Hyper-V Container System Processes Microsoft Edge System Processes HVSIMgr Process Microsoft Edge VM Worker Process RDP Server User Session
  • 29. • Limited Codec SupportAudio • Only Text and ImagesClipboard • Limited by GPO policyPrinter Input Devices • Restricted for WDAGDesktop Integration • Shared memoryDisplay
  • 30. Host User Mode Hyper-V Container System Processes Microsoft Edge System Processes HVSIMgr Process Microsoft Edge VM Worker Process RDP Server User Session
  • 31. Host User Mode Hyper-V Container System Processes Microsoft Edge System Processes HVSIMgr Process Microsoft Edge VM Worker Process RDP Server User Session
  • 33. Host User Mode Hyper-V Container System Processes Microsoft Edge System Processes HVSIMgr Process Microsoft Edge VM Worker Process RDP Server User Session HVSIRDP Client Process HVSIRPCD Process Mitigations • Win32K Filter • CFG Strict • Image load Restrictions • Microsoft-only • No Remote • ACG • No Child Process creation
  • 35. Host User Mode Hyper-V Container System Processes Microsoft Edge System Processes HVSIMgr Process Microsoft Edge VM Worker Process User Session HVSIRDP Client Process HVSIRPCD Process HVSI Container Service dll
  • 36. Host User Mode Hyper-V Container System Processes Microsoft Edge System Processes HVSIMgr Process Microsoft Edge VM Worker Process User Session HVSIRDP Client Process HVSIRPCD Process HVSI Container Service dll
  • 37. Report vulnerabilities & mitigation bypasses via our bounty programs! https://aka.ms/bugbounty Or come work with us. We’re hiring https://aka.ms/cesecurityopenjobs https://aka.ms/wdgsecurityjobs Windows is investing and performance and OS integration to improve container density and scale Conclusion Extend WDAG technology to contain arbitrary apps
  • 38. Follow us on the MSRC Blogs to get information on new bounties https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/msrc/ Windows Bounty Program includes all critical and important bugs in: Windows Insider Preview Hyper-V Microsoft Edge Windows Defender Application Guard New Microsoft Bounty Programs | Additions
  • 39. Windows Bounty Program Targets  Submit:  Critical and important vulnerabilities in Windows Insider Preview slow  Hyper-V escapes, Information disclosure and DOS bugs in Hyper-V  This continues our effort in finding bugs in various stages of development Category Targets Windows Version Payout range (USD) Base NEW Windows Insider Preview WIP slow $500 to $15,000 Focus area NEW Microsoft Hyper-V Windows 10 Windows Server 2012 Windows Server 2012 R2 Windows Server Insider Preview $5,000 to $250,000 Focus area NEW Windows Defender Application Guard WIP slow $500 to $50,000 Focus area Microsoft Edge WIP slow $500 to $15,000 Focus area Mitigation bypass and Bounty for defense Windows 10 $500 to $200,000
  • 40. Vulnerability Type in Windows Insider Preview Slow Whitepaper / Report Quality/ Proof of Concept Pay-out Range(USD) Remote Code Execution High Up to $15,000 Low Up to $1,500 Elevation of Privilege High Up to $10,000 Low Up to $5,000 Information Disclosure High Up to $5,000 Low Up to $2,500 Remote Denial of Service High Up to $5,000 Low Up to $2,500 Tampering / Spoofing High Up to $5,000 Low Up to $2,500 Submit high quality critical and important vulnerabilities in Windows Insider Preview slow Windows Bounty Program Targets
  • 41. Vulnerability Type Proof of concept Functioning Exploit Report Quality Payout range (USD) Vulnerability resulting in escape from the WDAG container to the host Required Yes High $30,000 No High $20,000 No Low $10,000 Vulnerability within the Application Guard container, no container escape Required No High $10,000 No Low $2,000 Windows Defender Application Guard

Editor's Notes

  • #3: matt
  • #4: matt
  • #10: dave
  • #13: We aren’t there yet. We have a bunch of work to do. We all need to help. Drive customer passion and engagement. WDG-IS is a customer… Find efficiencies, keep the bottom line down. Be willing to take risks, break how we have done things in the past.
  • #14: We aren’t there yet. We have a bunch of work to do. We all need to help. Drive customer passion and engagement. WDG-IS is a customer… Find efficiencies, keep the bottom line down. Be willing to take risks, break how we have done things in the past.
  • #20: We aren’t there yet. We have a bunch of work to do. We all need to help. Drive customer passion and engagement. WDG-IS is a customer… Find efficiencies, keep the bottom line down. Be willing to take risks, break how we have done things in the past.
  • #28: We aren’t there yet. We have a bunch of work to do. We all need to help. Drive customer passion and engagement. WDG-IS is a customer… Find efficiencies, keep the bottom line down. Be willing to take risks, break how we have done things in the past.
  • #35: We aren’t there yet. We have a bunch of work to do. We all need to help. Drive customer passion and engagement. WDG-IS is a customer… Find efficiencies, keep the bottom line down. Be willing to take risks, break how we have done things in the past.
  • #38: matt
  • #39: I wanted to have a special call out to these programs to ensure it’s gotten your attention. The Edge web plat beta and .net core and asp.net core programs were announced in the months of August and September this year.
  • #40: Let’s get to the heart of the matter – starting with a new Edge beta bounty I like to call it part 2 of the Edge beta bounty series as the first one was in 2015 Please submit RCE and W3c standard We want you to use our latest bits and partner with us to help us understand the issue better. Additional money will be awarded for those who submit bugs on WIP slow All bugs must reproduce on the Windows Insider Preview slow branch. A lot of you have had questions in the past on why we focus primarily on beta – one of the reasons is that we want to find all these bugs in our latest and greatest software in earlier development stages. It ensures the end user receives the most secure software possible (it’s been through internal and crowdsourced pen testing) Another change with this bounty aligns with the general trend by other software vendors and bounty agents We will pay $1500 for internally known bugs You’ve got about 7 more months to give us your bugs