Security and privacy issues of fog

Security and Privacy Issues of Fog
Computing: A Survey
Shanhe Yi(B)
, Zhengrui Qin, and Qun Li
College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, USA
{syi,zhengrui,liqun}@cs.wm.edu
Abstract. Fog computing is a promising computing paradigm that
extends cloud computing to the edge of networks. Similar to cloud com-
puting but with distinct characteristics, fog computing faces new security
and privacy challenges besides those inherited from cloud computing. In
this paper, we have surveyed these challenges and corresponding solu-
tions in a brief manner.
Keywords: Fog computing · Cloud/mobile computing · Security ·
Privacy
1 Introduction
The prevalence of ubiquitously connected smart devices are shaping the main
factor of computing. Rapid development of wearable computing, smart meter-
ing, smart home/city, connected vehicles and large-scale wireless sensor network
are making everything connected and smarter, termed the Internet of Things
(IoT). IDC (International Data Corporation) has predicted that in the year of
2015, “the IoT will continue to rapidly expand the traditional IT industry” up
14 % from 2014 [14]. As we know, smart devices usually face challenges rooted
from computation power, battery, storage and bandwidth, which in return hinder
quality of services (QoS) and user experience. To alleviate the burden of limited
resources on smart devices, cloud computing is considered as a promising com-
puting paradigm, which can deliver services to end users in terms of infrastruc-
ture, platform and software, and supply applications with elastic resources at
low cost.
Cloud computing, however, is not a “one-size-ﬁt-all” solution. There are
still problems unsolved since IoT applications usually require mobility support,
geo-distribution, location-awareness and low latency. Fog computing, a.k.a edge
computing, is proposed to enable computing directly at the edge of the net-
work, which can deliver new applications and services for billions of connected
devices [2]. Fog devices are usually set-top-boxes, access points, road side units,
cellular base stations, etc. End devices, fog and cloud are forming a three layer
hierarchical service delivery model, supporting a range of applications such as
web content delivery [48], augmented reality [15], and big data analysis [46].
A typical conceptual architecture of fog/cloud infrastructure is shown in Fig. 1.
c Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
K. Xu and J. Zhu (Eds.): WASA 2015, LNCS 9204, pp. 685–695, 2015.
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-21837-3 67

686 S. Yi et al.
Fig. 1. An example of fog/cloud architecture
Since fog is deemed as a non-trivial extension of cloud, some security and
privacy issues in the context of cloud computing [35], can be foreseen to unavoid-
ably impact fog computing. Security and privacy issues will lag the promotion
of fog computing if not well addressed, according to the fact that 74 % of IT
Executives and Chief Information Officers reject cloud in term of the risks in
security and privacy [49]. As fog computing is still in its infant stage, there is
little work on security and privacy issues. Since fog computing is proposed in
the context of Internet of Things (IoT), and originated from cloud computing,
security and privacy issues of cloud are inherited in fog computing. While some
issues can be addressed using existing schemes, there are other issues facing new
challenges, due to the distinct characteristics of fog computing, such as hetero-
geneity in fog node and fog network, requirement of mobility support, massive
scale geo-distributed nodes, location-awareness and low latency.
In this paper, we will discuss secur ity and privacy issues in fog computing
by reviewing existing work of fog computing and related work in underlying
domains, and identify new security and privacy problems.
2 Fog Computing Overview
In this section, we briefly give an overview of fog computing. We prefer not to
discuss the cloud computing or mobile cloud computing, and readers can refer
to extensive existing surveys if interested [8,47].
Definition. As a new paradigm of computing, fog computing is still not a full-
fledged concept in the community. In the position paper [2], fog computing is
considered as an extension of the cloud computing to the edge of the network,
which is a highly virtualized platform of resource pool that provides computa-
tion, storage, and networking services to nearby end users. In the perspective of
work [38], they have defined fog computing as “a scenario where a huge number
of heterogeneous (wireless and sometimes autonomous) ubiquitous and decen-
tralised devices communicate and potentially cooperate among them and with the
network to perform storage and processing tasks without the intervention of third
parties. These tasks can be for supporting basic network functions or new ser-
vices and applications that run in a sandboxed environment. Users leasing part of

Security and Privacy Issues of Fog Computing 687
their devices to host these services get incentives for doing so.” Although those
definitions are still debatable before, fog computing is no longer a buzzword.
Characterization. Fog computing has its advantages due to its edge location,
and therefore is able to support applications (e.g. gaming, augmented reality,
real time video stream processing) with low latency requirements. This edge
location can also provide rich network context information, such as local net-
work condition, traffic statistics and client status information, which can be
used by fog applications to offer context-aware optimization. Another interest-
ing characteristic is the location-awareness; not only can the geo-distributed fog
node infer its own location but also the fog node can track end user devices
to support mobility, which may be a game changing factor for location-based
services and applications. Furthermore, the interplays between fog and fog, fog
and cloud become important since fog can easily gets local overview while the
global coverage can only be achieved at a higher layer.
Fog Node. The ubiquity of smart devices and rapid development of standard
virtualization and cloud technology make several fog node implementation avail-
able. Resource-poor fog node This kind of fog nodes is usually built on existing
network devices. ParaDrop [42] is a new fog computing architecture on gateway
(WiFi access point or home set-top box), which is an ideal fog node choice due
to its capabilities to provide service and its proximity at network edge. Given the
fact that typical home environment gateways are resource-limited, the authors
implement the ParaDrop using Linux Container (LXC) abstraction which is more
lightweight than traditional virtual machines. Resource-rich fog node Resource-
rich fog nodes are usually specific high-end servers with powerful CPU, larger
memory and storage. Cloudlet [29,30], like a “second-class data center”, is able
to provide elastic resources to nearby mobile devices, with low latency and large
bandwidth. With cloud techniques, Cloudlet is easy to upgrade and replace.
Service Delivery and Deployment Models. Similar to cloud computing,
we can anticipate that the service delivery models in fog computing can be
grouped into three categories: software as a service (SaaS), platform as a service
(PaaS), and infrastructure as a service (IaaS). We may also expect the following
deployment models: private fog, community fog, public fog and hybrid fog.
Similar Concept. Mobile cloud computing (MCC) and mobile-edge computing
(MEC) are similar to fog computing. MCC refers to an infrastructure in which
both the data storage and the data processing happen outside of the mobile
devices [8]. MEC focus on resource-rich fog servers like cloudlets running at
the edge of mobile networks [11]. Fog computing distinguishes itself as a more
generalized computing paradigm especially in the context of Internet of Things.
3 Security and Privacy Issues
We admit that security and privacy should be addressed in every layer in
designing fog computing system. Here we ask ourselves “what is new about fog

688 S. Yi et al.
computing security and privacy?”. Due to the characteristics of fog computing,
we may need future work to tackle those problems.
3.1 Trust and Authentication
In cloud computing deployment, data centers are usually owned by cloud service
providers. However, fog service providers can be different parties due to different
deployment choices: (1) Internet service providers or wireless carriers, who have
control of home gateways or cellular base stations, may build fog with their exist-
ing infrastructures; (2) Cloud service providers, who want to expand their cloud
services to the edge of the network, may also build fog infrastructures; (3) End
users, who own a local private cloud and want to reduce the cost of ownership,
would like to turn the local private cloud into fog and lease spare resources on
the local private cloud. This flexibility complicates the trust situation of fog.
Trust Model. Reputation based trust model [18] has been successful in eCom-
merce, peer-to-peer (P2P), user reviews and online social networks. Damiani
et al. [7] proposed a robust reputation system for resource selection in P2P net-
works using a distributed polling algorithm to assess the reliability of a resource
before downloading. In designing a fog computing reputation-based reputation
system, we may need to tackle issues such as (1) how to achieve persistent,
unique, and distinct identity, (2) how to treat intentional and accidental misbe-
havior, (3) how to conduct punishment and redemption of reputation. There are
also trusting models based on special hardware such as Secure Element (SE),
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), or Trusted Platform Module (TPM),
which can provide trust utility in fog computing applications.
Rogue Fog Node. A rogue fog node would be a fog device or fog instance that
pretends to be legitimate and coaxes end users to connect to it. For example, in
an insider attack, a fog administrator may be authorized to manage fog instances,
but may instantiate a rogue fog instance rather than a legitimate one. Work [34]
has demonstrated the feasibility of man-in-the-middle attack in fog computing,
before which the gateway should be either compromised or replaced by a fake
one. Once connected, the adversary can manipulate the incoming and outgoing
requests from end users or cloud, collect or tamper user data stealthily, and easily
launch further attacks. The existing of fake fog node will be a big threat to user
data security and privacy. This problem is hard to address in fog computing due
to several reasons (1) complex trust situation calls for different trust management
schemes, (2) dynamic creating, deleting of virtual machine instance make it
hard to maintain a blacklist of rogue nodes. Han et al. [16,17] have proposed
a measurement-based method which enables a client to avoid connecting rogue
access point (AP). Their approach leverages the round-trip time between end
users and the DNS server to detect rogue AP at the client side.
Authentication. Authentication is an important issue for the security of fog
computing since services are offered to massive-scale end users by front fog nodes.
Stojmenovic et al. [34] have considered the main security issue of fog comput-
ing as the authentication at different levels of fog nodes. Traditional PKI-based

authentication is not efficient and has poor scalability. Balfanz et al. [1] have pro-
posed a cheap, secure and user-friendly solution to the authentication problem in
local ad-hoc wireless network, relying on a physical contact for pre-authentication
in a location-limited channel. Similarly, NFC can also be used to simplify the
authentication procedure in the case of cloudlet [3]. As the emergence of biomet-
ric authentication in mobile computing and cloud computing, such as fingerprint
authentication, face authentication, touch-based or keystroke-based authentica-
tion, etc., it will be beneficial to apply biometric-based authentication in fog com-
puting.
3.2 Network Security
Due to the predominance of wireless in fog networking, wireless network security
is big concern to fog networking. Example attacks are jamming attacks, sniffer
attacks, etc. Those attacks can be addressed in the research domain of wireless
network, which is not in the scope of this survey. Normally, in network, we
have to trust the configurations manually generated by a network administrator
and isolate network management traffic from regular data traffic [36]. However,
fog nodes are deployed at the edge of Internet, which definitely bring heavy
burden to the network management, imagining the cost of maintaining massive
scale cloud servers which are distributed all over the network edge without easy
access for maintenance. The employment of SDN can ease the implementation
and management, and increase network scalability and reduce costs, in many
aspects of fog computing. We also argue that applying SDN technique in fog
computing will bring fog networking security new challenges and opportunities.
How can SDN help the fog network security? (1) Network Monitoring and
Intrusion Detection System (IDS): CloudWatch [32] can leverage OpenFLow [21]
to route traffic for security monitoring applications or IDS. (2) Traffic Isolation
and Prioritization: Traffic isolation and prioritization can be used to prevent
an attack from congesting the network or dominating shared resources such as
CPU or disk I/O. SDN can easily use VLAN ID/tag to isolate traffic in VLAN
group and segregate malicious traffic. (3) Network Resource Access Control:
Klaedtke et al. [19] have proposed an access control scheme on a SDN controller
based on OpenFlow, (4) Network Sharing: Fog-enhanced router in home network
can be opened to guests, if the network sharing to guests is carefully designed
with security concerns. Work [44] has proposed OpenWiFi, in which the guest
WiFi authentication is shifted to the cloud to establish guest identity; access
is independently provided for guests; and accounting is enforced to delegate
responsibility of guests.
3.3 Secure Data Storage
In fog computing, user data is outsourced and user’s control over data is handed
over to fog node, which introduces same security threats as it is in cloud com-
puting. First, it is hard to ensure data integrity, since the outsourced data could
be lost or incorrectly modified. Second, the uploaded data could be abused by
unauthorized parties for other interests.

690 S. Yi et al.
To address these threats, auditable data storage service has been proposed
in the context of cloud computing to protect the data. Techniques such as homo-
morphic encryption and searchable encryption are combined to provide integrity,
confidentiality and verifiability for cloud storage system to allow a client to check
its data stored on untrusted servers. Want et al. [40] have proposed privacy-
preserving public auditing for data stored in cloud, which relies on a third-party
auditor (TPA), using homomorphic authenticator and random mask technique
to protect privacy against TPA. To ensure data storage reliability, prior stor-
age systems use erasure codes or network coding to deal with data corruption
detection and data repair, while Cao et al. [5] have proposed a scheme using
LT code, which provides less storage cost, much faster data retrieval, and com-
parable communication cost. Yang et al. [43] have provided a good overview of
existing work towards data storage auditing service in cloud computing.
In fog computing, there are new challenges in designing secure storage sys-
tem to achieve low-latency, support dynamic operation and deal with interplay
between fog and cloud.
3.4 Secure and Private Data Computation
Another important issue in fog computing is to achieve secure and privacy-
preserving computation outsourced to fog nodes.
Verifiable Computing. Verifiable computing enables a computing device to
offload the computation of a function to other perhaps untrusted servers, while
maintaining verifiable results. The other servers evaluate the function and return
the result with a proof that the computation of the function was carried out
correctly. The term verifiable computing was formalized in [13]. In fog computing,
to instill confidence in the computation offloaded to the fog node, the fog user
should be able to verify the correctness of the computation.
Below are some existing methods to fulfill verifiable computing. Gennaro
et al. [13] have proposed a verifiable computing protocol that allows the server to
return a computationally-sound, non-interactive proof that can be verified by the
client. The protocol can provide (at no additional cost) input and output privacy
for the client such that the server does not learn any information about the input
and output. Parno and Gentry have built a system, called Pinocchio, such that
the client can verify general computations done by a server while relying only
on cryptographic assumptions [25]. With Pinocchio, the client creates a public
evaluation key to describe her computation, and the server then evaluates the
computation and uses the evaluation key to produce a proof of correctness.
Data Search. To protect data privacy, sensitive data from end users have to be
encrypted before outsourced to the fog node, making effective data utilization
services challenging. One of the most important services is keyword search, i.e.,
keyword search among encrypted data files. Researchers have developed several
searchable encryption schemes that allow a user to securely search over encrypted
data through keywords without decryption. In [33], the authors proposed the first
ever scheme for searches on encrypted data, which provides provable secrecy for

encryption, query isolation, controlled searching, and support of hidden query.
Later, many other schemes have been developed, such as [6,39].
3.5 Privacy
The leakage of private information, such as data, location or usage, are gaining
attentions when end users are using services like cloud computing, wireless net-
work, IoT. There are also challenges for preserving such privacy in fog comput-
ing, because fog nodes are in vicinity of end users and can collect more sensitive
information than the remote cloud lying in the core network. Privacy-preserving
techniques have been proposed in many scenarios including cloud [4], smart grid
[28], wireless network [27], and online social network [24].
Data Privacy. In the fog network, privacy-preserving algorithms can be run-
ning in between the fog and cloud while those algorithms are usually resource-
prohibited at the end devices. Fog node at the edge usually collects sensitive
data generated by sensors and end devices. Techniques such as homomorphic
encryption can be utilized to allow privacy-preserving aggregation at the local
gateways without decryption [20]. Differential privacy [10] can be utilized to
ensure non-disclosure of privacy of an arbitrary single entry in the data set in
case of statistical queries,.
Usage Privacy. Another privacy issue is the usage pattern with which a fog
client utilizes the fog services. For example in smart grid, the reading of the
smart meter will disclose lots of information of a household, such as at what
time there is no person at home, and at what time the TV is turned on,
which absolutely breaches user’s privacy. Although privacy-preserving mecha-
nisms have been proposed in smart metering [22,28], they cannot be applied in
fog computing directly, due to the lack of a trusted third party (i.e., a smart
meter in smart grid) or no counterpart device like a battery. The fog node which
can easily collect statistics of end user usage. One possible naive solution is that
the fog client creates dummy tasks and offloads them to multiple fog nodes, hid-
ing its real tasks among the dummy ones. However, this solution will increase the
fog client’s payment and waste resources and energy. Another solution would be
designing a smart way of partitioning the application to make sure the offloaded
resource usages do not disclose privacy information.
Location Privacy. In fog computing, the location privacy mainly refers to the
location privacy of the fog clients. As a fog client usually offloads its tasks to
the nearest fog node, the fog node, to whom the tasks are offloaded, can infer
that the fog client is nearby and farther from other nodes. Furthermore, if a fog
client utilizes multiple fog services at multiple locations, it may disclose its path
trajectory to the fog nodes, assuming the fog nodes collude. As long as such a
fog client is attached on a person or an important object, the location privacy
of the person or the object is at risk.
If a fog client always strictly chooses its nearest fog server, the fog node
can definitely knows that the fog client that is utilizing its computing resources

692 S. Yi et al.
is nearby. The only way to preserve the location privacy is through identity
obfuscation such that even though the fog node knows a fog client is nearby it
cannot identify the fog client. There are many methods for identity obfuscation;
for example, in [41], the authors use a trusted third party to generate fake ID for
each end user. In reality, a fog client does not necessarily choose the nearest fog
node but chooses at will one of the fog nodes it can reach according some criteria,
such as latency, reputation, load balance, etc. In this case, the fog node can only
know the rough location of the fog client but cannot do so precisely. However,
once the fog client utilizes computing resources from multiple fog nodes in an
area, its location can boil down to a small region, since its location must be in
the intersection of the multiple fog nodes’ coverages. To preserve the location
privacy in such scenario, one can utilize the method used in [12].
3.6 Access Control
Access control has been a reliable tool to ensure the security of the system and
preserving of privacy of user. Traditional access control is usually addressed in
a same trust domain. While due to the outsource nature of cloud computing,
the access control in cloud computing is usually cryptographically implemented
for outsourced data. Symmetric key based solution is not scalable in key man-
agement. Several public key based solutions are proposed trying to achieve fine-
grained access control. Yu et al. [45] have proposed a fine-grained data access
control scheme constructed on attribute-based encryption (ABE). Work [9] pro-
poses a policy-based resource access control in fog computing, to support secure
collaboration and interoperability between heterogeneous resources. In fog com-
puting, how to design access control spanning client-fog-cloud, at the same time
meet the designing goals and resource constraints will be challenging.
3.7 Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection techniques are widely deployed in cloud system to mitigate
attacks such as insider attack, flooding attack, port scanning, attacks on VM
and hypervisor [23], or in smart grid system to monitor power meter measure-
ments and detects abnormal measurements that could have been compromised
by attackers [26,37]. In fog computing, IDS can be deployed on fog node system
side to detect intrusive behavior by monitoring and analyzing log file, access
control policies and user login information. They can also be deployed at the fog
network side to detect malicious attacks such as denial-of-service (DoS), port
scanning, etc. In fog computing, it provides new opportunities to investigate
how fog computing can help with intrusion detection on both client side and the
centralized cloud side. Work [31] has presented a cloudlet mesh based security
framework which can detection intrusion to distance cloud, securing communica-
tion among mobile devices, cloudlet and cloud. There are also challenges such as
implementing intrusion detection in geo-distributed, large-scale, high-mobility
fog computing environ men to meet the low-latency requirement.

4 Conclusion
This paper discusses several security and privacy issues in the context of fog
computing, which is a new computing paradigm to provide elastic resources at
the edge of network to nearby end users. In the paper, we discuss security issues
such as secure data storage, secure computation and network security. We also
highlight privacy issues in data privacy, usage privacy, and location privacy,
which may need new think to adapt new challenges and changes.
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