Labor Markets Core Course 2013: Severance Payments and Labor Market Performance

Labor Markets Core Course 2013: Severance Payments and Labor Market Performance

• 1.
  Labor Market CoreCourse World Bank Washington DC; May 15, 2013 David S. Kaplan (Labor Markets and Social Security Unit) Severance Payments and Labor Market Performance
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  Main Messages • Severancecan affect behavior by: ―providing stability in the employment relationship ―reducing incentives for formal hiring ―affecting the timing of job separations ―inhibiting productivity-enhancing reallocations • Enforcement as important as regulation itself • Possible improvements/alternatives to severance ―Many countries have unemployment insurance 2
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  What is thepurpose of severance? • Provide dismissed workers with $ to finance job search ―Would unemployment insurance be better? • Maintain consumption after job loss ―Only works if severance is really paid ―And really paid quickly • Reduce firm incentives for dismissal ―Is there a social cost of dismissing a worker? ―Perhaps workers collect unemployment insurance or other public subsidies [ Blanchard & Tirole (2008) ] 3
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  Severance: Firm Costvs. Worker Valuation • Poorly designed severance an example of wedge between firm cost and worker valuation ―In line with Anton, Hernandez, & Levy (2012); Levy (2008); & Ribe, Robalino, & Walker (2011) ―Labor taxes or contributions that are valued by workers do not incentivize informality ―But when worker valuation of legally-mandated benefits much less than firm costs of providing them, incentives for evasion (informality) are high ―If severance offers insurance to workers who may be fired, why would worker valuation be low? 4
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  Why Don’t WorkersValue Severance? • Because firms may go bankrupt ―Kugler (2005): introduction of severance payment accounts in Colombia led to wage decreases of 60- 80% of severance contributions ―Once possibility that firm can default is removed, workers value the benefit more • Because it is very costly for workers to force firms to pay ―Dávila (1997): 30% of workers in Mexico who are unjustly dismissed don’t go to court because of high uncertainty and the long duration of processes ―More than 2/3 of those who sue settle do so for a low fraction of what the law dictates 5
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  Why Don’t WorkersValue Severance? (continued) • Because severance looks more like a lottery than insurance ―Legally-mandated severance can be generous ―Some receive those payments (win the lottery) ―But many get zero or a tiny fraction • Because money doesn’t arrive when needed ―Liquidity constrained unemployed workers need money now, not after a long fight ―Data from one labor court in State of Mexico: time to go through entire legal process and collect (cases that don’t settle) median=742 days 6
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  Why is SeveranceSo Costly for Firms? • Because labor lawyers are expensive • Because evasion requires costly actions • Severance may be more costly for large (more productive firms) ―The fact that small firms may be able to more easily evade many obligations acts as subsidy for smaller (less-productive) firms. See Hsieh & Klenow (2009) ―Calderon (2010) calculates that for manufacturing firms in Mexico, severance as a share of wage bill is: 1.5% for small firms 2.6% for medium firms 2.7% for large firms 3.6% for very large firms 7
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  -8- Lost wages 12 daysper year 20 days per year 3 months of severance from the constitution Legally-mandated costs Firm costs In practice Worker benefits In practice Source: Own calculations based on assumptions regarding severance and reasons for worker separation. Percentages represent what the firm would have to pay monthly as a percentage of the wage to pre-finance severance. Estimates of severance costs in Mexico 9.9% in total 6.1% in total 2.5% 0.9% 0.6% 6.0% 3.9% + 8.7% 2.1% 1.3% 12.2% in total 1.8% 0.7% 0.4% 3.2% 2.9% + Difference between firm Cost and worker benefit Is pure waste!
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  Evidence from LaborCourts in Mexico • Kaplan, Sadka, & Silva-Mendez (2007) ―Study 2 labor courts in Mexico ―workers receive less than 30% of their claim ―A lot of variance, many receive nothing • Kaplan & Sadka (2011) ―Study different (local) labor court in State of Mexico ―Most workers who “win” in court don’t collect ―Firms almost never pay unless worker engages in costly attempt to seize firm assets ―Often multiple attempts necessary to force payment ―After multiple attempts, worker may give up. Court may say there are no tangible assets to seize 9
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  More Results fromKaplan & Sadka (2011) • Estimations of parameters of model imply: ―Worker valuation less than 30% of judge’s award ―40% of firms can successfully thwart seizure attempts ―If worker forces firm to pay judge’s award after seizure attempt, worker cost is 47% of award and cost to firm is 88% of award (plus award itself) ―Average cost to firm is 45% of award ―For firms who are not immune to seizure attempts, average cost is 75% of award ―These costs are in addition to costs incurred prior to judge’s ruling 10
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  Is Severance aGood Form of Insurance? • The answer seems to depend in part on design • Colombian severance accounts improve worker valuation of benefits, resolve uncertainty • Interesting example from Barbados. Workers can ask government to pay severance if ―Worker has taken reasonable steps (other than legal actions) to collect, or if employer is insolvent ―Worker doesn’t have to fight for right to severance ―Government takes legal action (with additional penalties) • Alternative: unemployment insurance 11
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  Effects of Enforcement •Almeida and Carneiro (2009 a & b, 2011) study differential enforcement of labor law in Brazil ―National labor law, only differences in enforcement • Greater enforcement … ―Improves compliance with severance health, & safety conditions ―Higher unemployment, lower wage inequality ―Reduce informality ―Constrains firm size ―reduces wages at top of formal wage distribution ―reduces self employment 12
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  Timing of Layoffs •Many benefits require minimum level of tenure ―Mexico: workers who are dismissed without cause only have right to reinstatement if they have one year or more of tenure ―Many countries require minimum level of tenure for workers to receive severance • Do these rules regarding tenure and worker rights affect dismissal decisions? • Case Study: Brazil ―After 3 months, advance notice is needed for layoff ―After 6 months, worker qualifies for UI ―After 12 months, written authorization required from union or labor ministry 13
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  14 Labor Regs andTiming of Dismissals Source: Gerard (2012) using Brazilian administrative data
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  15 Labor Regs andTiming of Dismissals Source: Gerard (2012) using Brazilian administrative data Advance notice of layoffs after 3 months
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  16 Labor Regs andTiming of Dismissals Source: Gerard (2012) using Brazilian administrative data UI eligibility after 6 months
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  17 Labor Regs andTiming of Dismissals Source: Gerard (2012) using Brazilian administrative data Layoffs need signature from union or labor ministry
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  Some Lessons fromBrazilian Study • Incentives matter! • Job protection measures do protect jobs ―Separation rates decline when job protection increases ―But these measures may prevent hiring ―Or prevent workers from reaching tenure that affords this protection • Firms fire workers partly to minimize severance • When money from government is available (case of UI), firms and workers may collude to take advantage 18
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  A Trial Periodmay Promote Turnover incentiva mayor rotación -19- 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 ley vigente con comportamiento observado antigüedad en meses Expected Severance Payment as a percentage of the flow of Wages (by worker tenure) Incentives for turnover Fuente: Elaboración propia basada en le Ley Federal del Trabajo y en varios supuestos sobre los despidos. Se supone un periodo de prueba de 6 meses.
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  Labor Regs, JobFlows, & Productivity • Misallocation of resources across firms hurts aggregate productivity ―Restuccia & Rogerson (2008) ―Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, & Scarpetta (2012) • Dismissal procedures impede labor reallocations ―Caballero, et al (2006); Haltiwanger, et al (2006); & Micco and Pages (2007) • Evidence that impeding reallocations (capital & labor) negatively affects aggregate productivity ―Eslava et al (2011) • Protect jobs or protect workers? 20
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  Frictions and Firm-SponsoredTraining • How can general training be financed? ―Becker (1962): Firm shouldn’t be willing to pay ―Acemoglu (1997) and Acemoglu & Pishke (various) point out that frictions may keep worker at firm ―If worker can’t leave, firm pays for general training ―Almeida & Aterido (2008); Picchio & van Ours (2010): empirical evidence that less flexible labor laws associated with more training • So is there a productivity justification for legislation that restricts mobility? ―Or would privately bargained severance a la Fella (2004) be sufficient when training is important? 21
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  Summary • Poorly designedregulations create unnecessary wedge between firm cost and worker valuation ―And therefore generate informality/unemployment • Enforcement is crucial • Dismissal procedures may affect timing of separations and impede labor reallocations ―And therefore affect aggregate productivity • May be some role for stabilizing employment relationship to promote training 22
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  Policy recommendations (myown) • Avoid mandated benefits that are costly to firms but not valued by workers • Avoid high costs to labor reallocation • Take measures to ensure that severance is paid ―Severance accounts ―State pays severance when firm can’t/won’t pay ―Unemployment insurance as alternative mechanism • Reduce transaction costs associated with regs ―More efficient labor courts 23
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  Thank you! [email protected] Inter-American DevelopmentBank / www.iadb.org 24