Introduction to the dual-self model of choiceDr. Russell James IIITexas Tech University
An alternative modelPrevious discussion shows that the rational, utility-maximizing assumption for consumers is not always true.So, now what?Throw it out the door?But, it often makes accurate predictionsA modification from behavioral economics
“Our theory proposes that many sorts of decision problems should be viewed as a game between a sequence of short-run impulsive selves and a long-run patient self.”Drew Fudenburg (Harvard U.) and David K. Levine (Washington U.), 2006, A dual-self model of impulse control. American Economic Review, 96(5), 1449-1476.
Fudenberg & Levine (2006)Long-run (patient) selfThis side tries to maximize utility across timeShort-run (impulsive) selvesSequential selves that exist only for a brief time
Each cares only about immediate experienceExperiment Time!This is real.  One of you will be picked to receive one of the choices you selected.
Choice OnePick oneYou can receive $1.00 (cash) on the second to last day of this class.You can receive $1.05 (cash) on the last day of this class.
Choice TwoPick one.  One week prior to the last day of class, you can have during class eitherTangerineChocolate BarThe dollar value of both is identical.  (Of course, the tangerine is a healthier choice.)
It’s now time!Get ready, someone is about to get a nice giveaway!
Choice ThreePick one.  Right now, you can have eitherTangerineChocolate BarThe dollar value of both is identical.  (Of course, the tangerine is a healthier choice.)
Choice FourPick oneYou can receive $1.00 (cash) right now.You can receive $1.05 (cash) during the next meeting of this class.
Research ResultsRead & van Leeuwen (1998). 200 participants. People who were not hungry, chose the unhealthy snack for delivery in one week			26% of the timeThey chose the unhealthy snack for immediate consumption			70% of the time←Next WeekRight Now -> 26%70%
Dual-selfLong-run (patient) selfThis side tries to maximize utility across timeShort-run (impulsive) selvesSequential selves that exist only for a brief time
Each cares only about immediate experienceDiscussionShort-run (impulsive) selvesDoes the short-run self care aboutFuture consumption next week?
Future health consequences?
Immediate consumption choice?←Next WeekRight Now -> 26%70%
DiscussionDiscuss with a neighbor and vote in a moment.Does this result fit better with simple rational decision-making or a two-system approach?  Simple rational decision makingTwo system “dual-self” decision making 	(long-run/patient self and short-run/impulsive selves)←Next WeekRight Now -> 26%70%
Class vote comparisonHow many voted for chocolate at the end of the semester?Fall 2009 – 62.7% (n=86)How many voted for chocolate right now?Fall 2009 – 64.8% (n=74)
Hyperbolic discountingWould you rather receive $100 right now or $101 in a week?  Most people choose $100 right now. But when the choice is between $100 a year from now and $101 in a year and a week from now, most people choose $101 in a year and a week. This is time inconsistent, as both choices involve delaying by one week for $1.Note also that choosing $100 right now implies an interest rate charge of 1% per week or APR of 52%
DiscussionShort-run (impulsive) selvesDoes the short-run self care aboutImmediate money?
Two different future money options? Now v. laterLater v. much later

The dual self model of consumer decision making

  • 1.
    Introduction to thedual-self model of choiceDr. Russell James IIITexas Tech University
  • 2.
    An alternative modelPreviousdiscussion shows that the rational, utility-maximizing assumption for consumers is not always true.So, now what?Throw it out the door?But, it often makes accurate predictionsA modification from behavioral economics
  • 3.
    “Our theory proposesthat many sorts of decision problems should be viewed as a game between a sequence of short-run impulsive selves and a long-run patient self.”Drew Fudenburg (Harvard U.) and David K. Levine (Washington U.), 2006, A dual-self model of impulse control. American Economic Review, 96(5), 1449-1476.
  • 4.
    Fudenberg & Levine(2006)Long-run (patient) selfThis side tries to maximize utility across timeShort-run (impulsive) selvesSequential selves that exist only for a brief time
  • 5.
    Each cares onlyabout immediate experienceExperiment Time!This is real. One of you will be picked to receive one of the choices you selected.
  • 6.
    Choice OnePick oneYoucan receive $1.00 (cash) on the second to last day of this class.You can receive $1.05 (cash) on the last day of this class.
  • 7.
    Choice TwoPick one. One week prior to the last day of class, you can have during class eitherTangerineChocolate BarThe dollar value of both is identical. (Of course, the tangerine is a healthier choice.)
  • 8.
    It’s now time!Getready, someone is about to get a nice giveaway!
  • 9.
    Choice ThreePick one. Right now, you can have eitherTangerineChocolate BarThe dollar value of both is identical. (Of course, the tangerine is a healthier choice.)
  • 10.
    Choice FourPick oneYoucan receive $1.00 (cash) right now.You can receive $1.05 (cash) during the next meeting of this class.
  • 11.
    Research ResultsRead &van Leeuwen (1998). 200 participants. People who were not hungry, chose the unhealthy snack for delivery in one week 26% of the timeThey chose the unhealthy snack for immediate consumption 70% of the time←Next WeekRight Now -> 26%70%
  • 12.
    Dual-selfLong-run (patient) selfThisside tries to maximize utility across timeShort-run (impulsive) selvesSequential selves that exist only for a brief time
  • 13.
    Each cares onlyabout immediate experienceDiscussionShort-run (impulsive) selvesDoes the short-run self care aboutFuture consumption next week?
  • 14.
  • 15.
  • 16.
    DiscussionDiscuss with aneighbor and vote in a moment.Does this result fit better with simple rational decision-making or a two-system approach? Simple rational decision makingTwo system “dual-self” decision making (long-run/patient self and short-run/impulsive selves)←Next WeekRight Now -> 26%70%
  • 17.
    Class vote comparisonHowmany voted for chocolate at the end of the semester?Fall 2009 – 62.7% (n=86)How many voted for chocolate right now?Fall 2009 – 64.8% (n=74)
  • 18.
    Hyperbolic discountingWould yourather receive $100 right now or $101 in a week? Most people choose $100 right now. But when the choice is between $100 a year from now and $101 in a year and a week from now, most people choose $101 in a year and a week. This is time inconsistent, as both choices involve delaying by one week for $1.Note also that choosing $100 right now implies an interest rate charge of 1% per week or APR of 52%
  • 19.
    DiscussionShort-run (impulsive) selvesDoesthe short-run self care aboutImmediate money?
  • 20.
    Two different futuremoney options? Now v. laterLater v. much later
  • 21.
    Class vote comparisonHowmany voted to take the $1 on the second to last day of the class (instead of $1.05 on the last day)?Fall ‘09: 32.2% (n=87)How many voted to take the $1 right now (instead of $1.05 in the next class meeting)?Fall ‘09: 66.3% (n=86)What is the implied interest rate being charged to those who chose the immediate $1?Next class in 2 days. 5% difference. APR = (365/2) X 5% ≈912%
  • 22.
    Thoughts to ponderCouldthe willingness of some to ignore a 920% interest rate for immediate reward have implications for consumer use of credit?Could the variations in the healthiness of food choices have implications for consumer food choices?More later…
  • 23.
    Slides by: RussellJames III, J.D., Ph.D., CFP®Associate Professor Division of Personal Financial Planning Texas Tech [email protected] use these slides! If you think you might use anything here in a classroom, please CLICK HEREto let me know. Thanks!The outline for this behavioral economics series is at http://www.slideshare.net/rnja8c/outline-for-behavioral-economics-course-component

Editor's Notes

  • #7 Use clickers. Write down percentages for discussion.
  • #8 Use clickers. Write down percentages for discussion.
  • #10 Use clickers. Write down percentages for discussion.
  • #11 Use clickers. Write down percentages for discussion.
  • #12 D. Read (Leeds U.) & B. van Leeuwen (Leeds U.), 1998, Predicting hunger: The effects of appetite and delay on choice. Organizational behavior and human decision processes, 76, 189-205.
  • #17 See Laibson, David, “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, 112 (1997), 443–477.Robson, A. J. (2002). Evolution and human nature. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(2), 89-106.