The Fight against ISIS and the US Policy in the Middle East

The Fight against ISIS and the US Policy in the Middle East

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  The Fight AgainstISIS and US Middle East Policy Daniel Serwer Scholar, Middle East Institute Professor, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University www.peacefare.net @DanielSerwer March 19, 2015 IAI
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  Middle East andNorth Africa (MENA)
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  Context is important •The fight against ISIS is occurring at the center of gravity of the Middle East • Its impacts are felt not only in Iraq and Syria and echo in Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and Iran • The war also occurs along the Sunni/Shia fault line • Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf states and Iran all have vital interests not only in the defeat of ISIS but also how it occurs as well as the aftermath
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  ISIS is notjust a terrorist group • President Obama calls it a terrorist group and is trying to use CT methods to kill it • But it is more than a terror group, even if less than a state • It controls and administers territory and significant populations • It acts like an insurgency and has declared itself a caliphate
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  This is whatthe problem looks like
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  Brief history ofthe Islamic State • Roots in Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, (Group of Monotheism and Jihad) founded by Jordanian Abu Musab al Zarqawi in 1999 • Became known as Al Qaeda in Iraq, joined insurgency against US occupation • AQI supplied and supported from Syria • Zarqawi targeted and killed by US 2006 • Group became Islamic State in Iraq • By 2008, largely defeated • 80% of leadership killed or captured (Odierno, 2010)
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  Back from defeat •May 2010 Abu Bakr al Baghdadi takes over ISI • Ba’athists replenish leadership • US withdrawal from Iraq December 2010, negotiated and signed by Bush administration • Revolution begins in Syria spring 2011 • Breaking the Walls (2012/13) frees thousands of prisoners in Iraq • ISI establishes and tries to merge with Jabhat al Nusra, as the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) • Al Qaeda rejects and disavows ISIS (2014) • June 2014 Islamic State takes Mosul and declares caliphate
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  What is acaliphate? • Caliph means “successor”: to Mohammed • Shia/Sunni split based on quarrel about who proper successor was • Sunnis regard Abu Bakr, Mohammed’s close friend, as first Caliph, • Shia think Ali, Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law, was rightful heir • Difference is method (election vs family) • Comparable to quarrels over legitimacy in Christianity: schisms in the Catholic Church, the Great Schism between Eastern and Western churches or Protestant/Catholic • A caliphate (or more than one) existed more or less from the 7th to the 20th century; ISIS imagines it is imitating early ones • Damascus and Baghdad were capitals of the Umayyad (661-750) and Abbasid (750-1258) caliphates, respectively • Last was the Ottoman Caliphate abolished by Ataturk 1924 • Restoration of a “true” caliphate is supposed to occur in the leadup to the return of the Mahdi (messiah) and the end times
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  What is lifelike under in the ISIS caliphate? • Strict practices: women cover (niqab), no smoking, Sharia, purifying violence against evil • Ideology is intolerant, anti-Western, anti-Shia • Authoritarian governance through two deputies and local governors in Iraq and Syria • Services delivered (water, electricity), taxes collected, law enforced, schools open
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  Most Sunnis don’tlike ISIS • In recent polling, Munqith Dagher finds in ISIS- controlled areas of Syria ISIS support is at 13% • In Iraq, 97% view ISIS as a terrorist organization • But they don’t necessarily like the anti-ISIS coalition either: yes in Iraq and Libya, no in Syria and Yemen • In Syria, support is stronger for the Coalition in ISIS- controlled areas than in opposition or regime- controlled areas • Also stronger among Sunnis than Shia • BUT: if given a choice between ISIS and Shia militias, Sunnis prefer ISIS
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  How did thishappen? • Bashar al Assad focused his attacks on moderates, allowed the Islamic State to thrive • Nouri al Maliki ran an exclusionary show, accused Sunni leaders, ignored protests • Security forces in both countries became increasingly sectarian, driving Sunni population towards extremists • The Islamic State was smart, patient and ferocious
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  The new Republicof Fear • West marvels at the use of social media, level and types of violence • But it is both necessary and productive for ISIS • It intimidates large numbers of people to comply and helps recruitment • Nothing succeeds like success, but nothing fails like failure • If we are able to begin to push ISIS back, it will lose a lot of its appeal
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  US reacted slowly •US Administration slow to recognize risk • Thought Iraqi army could/would fight/contain • ISIS advanced against Kurds, Yezidis June/July 2014 prompted unilateral bombing in August • Only August/September 2014 beheading of 2 American journalists stirred coalition effort • So we are less than six months into a counter- insurgency campaign • CI typically last 10-15 years!
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  The anti-ISIS wareffort now • Inherent Resolve Coalition: 60 countries participating, 20 with milops in Iraq, Syria or both • Mainly air attacks: 60% US • 4500 US troops in Iraq, plus civilian support • AUMF debate in Washington: legally irrelevant, politically important • Ds want less, Rs want more (especially forward targeters) but all resist enduring ops
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  Key operations • Kobane:not a strategically important place, but Coalition fought because ISIS exposed itself, Kurds succeeded but town is destroyed • Tikrit: retaken by mostly Shia forces with support from Iran, city depopulated, no apparent plan for governance afterwards • Iraq/Syria border: some progress in cutting ISIS supply lines • Mosul: US advertising offensive for this spring, a much bigger and more difficult effort
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  The fight ismore than kinetic • Obama insisted on replacing Iraqi PM Maliki to rally Kurdish and Sunni support • Diplomacy is still key to sustaining Coalition • Focused now on foreign fighters and financing • Massive humanitarian relief effort • Little attention yet to how cities (Mosul, Raqqa) will be liberated or governed, planning just beginning in Iraq for security, governance, essential services/$2 billion • No visible non-military support to Syrian opposition • No real idea of what to do about Assad • Failure post-war would leave a vacuum that extremists would quickly fill
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  Consequences • Enormous numbersof people displaced • In Syria, at least 1/3 of the population out of its homes, in Iraq millions • Many in Syria desperate, less so in Iraq because of oil, production mostly unperturbed • Four million refugees • Neighboring countries destabilized: especially Lebanon, but risks also to Jordan and Turkey • Sectarian and ethnic tensions heightened, especially in Syria • Little apparent prospect of return to the status quo ante
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  Syria regional refugeesnow total about 4 million, IDPs 7-8 million
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  In Iraq, problemis internal displacement
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  US policy options •Continue current CT war, efforts on foreign fighters and finance • Retrain ISF, support National Guard in Iraq • Start military rollback: is Mosul real, or a feint? • Train a new Syrian opposition force: in progress for up to 5000, insufficient to turn the tide • Unify and support existing Syrian opposition: not visible • “Safe area” along the Turkish border protected by no- bombardment zone, or in south • Boots? Loafers?
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  Question marks inSyria • Cooperation with Iran? • Russian-backed intra-Syrian dialogue: road to nowhere? • Other intra-Syrian efforts: Cairo? Paris? • UN freeze proposal: itself frozen • Governance once ISIS is rolled back • Syria reconstruction: Day After, Syria Transition Roadmap, UN ECSWA
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  The Levant willnever be the same • Sectarian and ethnic divisions accentuated • Minorities obliterated • Partition? Independent Kurdistan? Sunni regions in Iraq? Alawite enclave in Syria? • Safe haven for international terrorists? Khorasan group • Iran wins with Assad, loses big with partition • Russia still has its chips on Assad but loses big if he falls • Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan at risk