The New Cold War, Leo Rassieur

The New Cold War, Leo Rassieur

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  THE UKRAINE CRISISRMP 2017 The New Cold War: The United States’ Political, Economic, and Strategic Options for Containing Russian Military Aggression in Eastern Europe Leo Rassieur,1 Gokh Alshaif,2 1 Cupertino High School, 10100 Finch Avenue, Cupertino, CA 95014, USA e-mail address: [email protected] 2 Department of Global and International Studies, UC Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA In 2014, Russia illegally annexed the Ukrainian territory of Crimea, causing Ukraine to seek greater military aid from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members. This event, along with others preceding it, has led regional experts to believe that tensions between the two Cold War-era adversaries—NATO and Russia—may reach a breaking point within the next decade. Additionally, experts have argued that Russia’s instigation of conflict in eastern Ukraine further demonstrates a desire to fragment the liberal democratic world order. Multiple issues factor into the roles of NATO and Russia in the conflict—hegemonic competition, national security, and domestic political support. Through reviewing academic literature, policymakers’ statements, and news media, I attempt to understand the behavior of the actors involved in the ongoing geopolitical confrontation between Russia and NATO. To resolve the conflict, this paper outlines several options the United States has to contain Russian aggression and prevent global warfare. Keywords: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Russia, United States, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Cold War I. INTRODUCTION After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, many Western nations hoped that the influence of its successor state, Russia, would fade, allowing for a new world order dominated by a single superpower—the United States. Although most scholars would agree that we live in a unipolar world, several critical assumptions in post-Cold War triumphalism have now been disproven. Rather than aligning with the European Union (EU) and NATO, many Soviet-era satellite states and republics, such as Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, continue to look to Russia as an economic and military partner.1 Ukraine, the epicenter of the ongoing geopolitical competition between NATO and Russia, best demonstrates the profound divide between the two powers’ interests in the region. Post-communist politics in Ukraine primarily center around its conflicting reliance on Russian investment and desire for Western economic and political assistance. This schism has led to tremendous political instability in the country, culminating in a pro-Europe coup d’état February 2014 in Kiev, the nation’s capital.2 Russia responded by launching operations to annex the southern territory of Crimea from Ukraine in March 2014 and instigate violent pro-Russia protests in the southeast in April,3 the beginning of the current civil war. Moreover, conventional strategies used by the West— military encroachment and economic isolation—have produced unforeseen ramifications. Due in part to EU and U.S. sanctions beginning in March of 2014,4 Russia turned to China for economic partnership, inadvertently bolstering another of the U.S.’s strategic adversaries.5 NATO’s troop movements into the Baltic states have been met by reciprocation from Russia, heightening the need for peace negotiations before conflict inevitably erupts. Through my research, I aim to uncover the historical foundations of the conflict between NATO and Russia. I begin by examining relevant literature to see what factors motivate Russian foreign policy. I then track the development of the conflict over time. In the following section, I analyze the perspectives of each actor involved and use their motivations to understand how to create a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Thereafter, I outline the previously proposed peace agreements, particularly the Minsk Protocol and Minsk II. Then, I focus on the United States’s role as Europe’s strongest ally in limiting Russian influence and preventing conflict. Finally, I identify several strategies the United States can implement to achieve its goals in the region—conflict resolution, deterrence of Russian aggression, and geopolitical dominance. By examining the conflict through multiple lenses and perspectives, I hope to challenge the unsuccessful components of Russia-United States relations and adopt a worldview that is consistent with the rapidly shifting global political landscape. By adopting Russia’s viewpoint as a rational actor, I will limit the potential for adverse consequences from the policy options I outline. This will ensure that my solutions are more effective than those previously attempted in establishing peace and accomplishing American foreign policy objectives. II. LITERATURE REVIEW Most authors on the subject of West-Russia relations agree that the dominant motivating factor for Russia’s military intervention in eastern Ukraine in 2014 and beyond is the desire to rebuild the historic Russian empire of the Romanov (pre-1917) and Soviet eras. Ukrainian and Russian historian Serhy Yekelchyk argues that a negative view of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and thus of the loss of ‘great
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  THE UKRAINE CRISISRMP 2017 power’ status is at the core of post-Cold War Russian foreign policy.6 Historian Richard Sakwa agrees with this assessment, although he adds that the ‘anti-Russianism’ of NATO and EU after 1991 also contributed to Russian leadership’s antagonism toward the West.7 Sten Rynning, a Research Fellow with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, alleges that Russia’s moves against the West were never improvised—rather, they were deeply rooted in the nation’s imperial legacy as the dominant Eurasian power.8 Examining this idea, Dr. Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova concludes that, in ignoring Russia’s tendency toward empire, NATO and the EU inadvertently instigated Russian aggression by ‘squeezing’ Russia out of its ties with key Soviet-era allies. She additionally asserts that any U.S. military action in Ukraine would escalate the conflict, as Ukraine’s status as a buffer against NATO is a linchpin in the Russian national security mission.9 Other sources highlight Russian security needs as a driving rather than secondary factor in its reaction to the Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine. Political scientist Dr. Agnia Grigas identifies the importance of reclaiming the Russian diaspora to Russian President Putin, as the territory and population of Crimea and east Ukraine are crucial to countering NATO’s absorption of the Baltics, which are now no longer ‘buffer zones’ for Moscow. Another important facet Dr. Grigas analyzes is President Putin’s domestic support, his military ambitions a successful attempt to revive Russian nationalism and bolster his declining public approval out of fear that the trend of movements demanding regime change in the post-Soviet space could reach Moscow.10 Contributing to this perspective, Professor Elizabeth A. Wood suggests that the narrative of defending ‘Russian compatriots’ on Russia’s doorstep serves as Putin’s backdrop for political crackdowns and shifts attention away from domestic concerns. 11 However, Wood believes that, despite the numerous political and strategic incentives for Putin, the conflict was largely precipitated by economic rivalry. From a practical standpoint, duty-free EU trade with Ukraine would circumvent Russian tariffs on European goods meant to strengthen its Eurasian economic hub. Perhaps more importantly, however, is Putin’s unwillingness to relinquish Ukraine as a Russian economic satellite despite the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution replaced a non-aligned president with one who was overtly pro-West.12 Another economic influence emphasized by authors J.L. Black and Michael Johns is the West’s 2014 decision to sanction Russia, which ‘hardened’ Moscow’s position by eliminating economic ties.13 Dr. Grigas agrees that the Russia-EU economic battle rewarded Putin’s military actions, but ultimately disagrees with Black, Johns, and Wood, contending that the failure of the sanctions to halt Russian aggression disproves the idea that economic pressures affected Putin’s decision-making in 2014.14 In recognizing the four central aspects of Russia’s motivations in Eastern Europe—its imperial legacy, strategic considerations, Putin’s popular support, and economic relations—this paper seeks to clarify Russia’s foreign policy objectives and thus propose options for resolution that ensure the conflict’s key actor is compliant. III. TIMELINE OF CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT 2013 After decades of transition out of the Soviet system into neoliberalism, Ukraine experiences its first violent anti- government protests this year. Rather than immediate transformation into a wealthy Western nation, the introduction of capitalism to Ukraine led to massive state corruption and lower quality of life—between 1991 and 2013, the national population decreases from 52 to 44 million,15 a decline greater than 15%. During the same time period, the globe as a whole sees a population increase of over 33%.16 Russophones and ethnic Russians looked to Ukraine’s Westernization as the source of its economic woes while pro-Europeans saw them as a sign of Russia constraining Ukraine’s EU economic opportunities. On November 21, President Viktor Yanukovych suspends seven-year talks on the landmark EU Association Agreement over backlash from Russia,17 whose 30% discount on natural gas and investment are crucial for Ukraine’s struggling economy.18 Yanukovych’s government had tried courting both the EU and Russia, but the EU forces a decision between the Association Agreement and the Russian Commonwealth Free Trade Area. As a result, mass pro-Europe protests take place in the historic Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square), an event dubbed the Euromaidan, which triggers the current Ukraine crisis. Amid calls for the government to resign, both the West and Russia mobilize to secure the future of Ukrainian politics. In December, representatives from Germany, the EU, and the U.S. travel to Kiev, communicating an overall pro- Euromaidan message. President Yanukovych speaks with opposition leaders, while on December 17 President Putin announces another 30% natural gas discount and the purchasing of Ukrainian government bonds, signaling solidarity with Yanukovych.19 2014 In January, the Parliament of Ukraine, or Rada, begins cracking down on freedom of speech and assembly while hundreds of thousands of protestors engage in street violence against the government, leading to the first few fatalities.20 After tens of deaths in February, France, Germany, Poland, and Russia oversee a truce agreement between the government and the opposition; this is quickly rejected by Maidan protesters despite being signed by opposition leaders.21 One day later on February 22, President Yanukovych flees Kiev to the pro-Russia southeast for his personal safety.22 This coup triggers an immediate response from Russia, which sees the possibility of a West-aligned
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  THE UKRAINE CRISISRMP 2017 Ukraine on its border as unthinkable for its national security. On February 27, Russia begins covertly moving soldiers to seize government and transit buildings in Crimea. Russian operatives prompt the Crimean legislature to implement a referendum to declare independence from Ukraine and join Russia, which on March 16 allegedly passes with 97% in favor with 83% turnout23 —although European observers are skeptical of these values, the success of the referendum was all but guaranteed by the locals largely being ethnic Russians and Russophones. The United Nations (UN) General Assembly votes in March to condemn the Russian annexation of Crimea, and the West begins implementing economic and diplomatic sanctions on Russia, which are met by counter-sanctions. Despite this, President Putin’s approval jumps to a record 83% due to national pride after the victory in Crimea and China’s $400 billion energy deal with Russia helping ease the effects of low oil prices on its economy.24 In the same month, pro-Russian rebels organize independence referenda in Luhansk and Donetsk, two Russia-aligned oblasts (provinces) in eastern Ukraine collectively called the Donbass. May sees the referenda pass and the election of pro-West President Petro Poroshenko in Kiev, concluding the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution.25 Ceasefires are attempted in June and September, the latter of which being the Minsk Protocol (see below), but both fail before one month’s time. Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 crashes in the Donetsk Oblast in July, killing the 298 on board. Both sides of the conflict blame each other for the crash.26 The fighting in the Donbass between Kiev and the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) and Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is ongoing at the end of the year. 2015 The West and Russia continue to deliver humanitarian aid to their allies in Ukraine. On February 12, France, Germany, Russia, and Kiev sign Minsk II (see below), aiming to withdraw troops and plan local elections in the Donbass.27 By March, Putin openly admits to plotting the annexation of Crimea as Kiev begins to waver in its withdrawal agreement, citing continued separatist activity.28 The EU and Russia extend their prior sanctions in June, justifying this move as conditioning for the success of Minsk II and reciprocity respectively.29 By August, over 6,500 casualties have been reported30 in the now-sporadic conflict and President Poroshenko’s constitutional amendments to give the Donbass special status pass the first round of approval in the Rada, leading to three deaths in the ensuing violent protests. In September, NATO establishes military command posts in Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, and Russia develops a base near its border.31 At this point Minsk II looks to be effective at mitigating the scale of the conflict, although withdrawal of military presence has not fully occurred. Kiev continues to request weaponry from NATO, but only technical assistance with military organization and countering Russian propaganda is provided. In October, the Dutch Safety Board publishes a report attributing the crash of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 to a Buk missile fired from the pro-Russian east.32 Kiev withdraws the first small weapons, but by December the conflict sees minor escalation and economic ties between Russia and Kiev deteriorate.33 2016 In February President Poroshenko announces a troop buildup on the border with Crimea, signaling his intent to retake the territory from Russia. Talks in Paris during March fail to see either side commit to Minsk II, with a key area of contention being local elections in the separatist regions; a NATO-Russia Council meeting in April again fails to reach any agreement.34 However, a meeting on April 29 between Russia, Ukraine, and representatives from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) succeeds in having both parties agree to a ceasefire starting on Easter.35 Despite this, the fighting in the Donbass continues almost immediately following the announcement of the peace agreement.36 An announcement from the speaker of the Rada in June states that Ukraine is fully committed to joining NATO.37 The EU unanimously agrees extends its sanctions on Russia in June until January 2017, although Italy, Greece, and Hungary question their effectiveness in changing Russian policy in Ukraine.38 An August UN report concludes that both sides continue to use heavy artillery, in violation of the ceasefire agreements.39 Peace seems more attainable in September, as President Poroshenko takes steps to pass constitutional amendments through the Rada to grant autonomy to eastern Ukraine and the head of state of the DPR, announces a unilateral ceasefire in support of the Minsk agreements. France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine meet again in October, making minimal progress.40 The election of President Donald Trump in the U.S. on November 8 produces concern in Kiev, which had previously relied on the Obama administration’s hardline stance on Russia; Trump, meanwhile, had made several pro- Russia statements during his presidential campaign. The EU again extends sanctions on Russia for six months in December.41 2017 President Poroshenko in February plans a referendum for Ukraine joining NATO, which looks to succeed as violence in the east sees an uptick.42 Later in the month, President Putin issues a decree recognizing passports from the LPR and DPR.43 In March, Poroshenko halts all freight transit between the government-controlled Ukraine and the separatists, aiming to punish their seizure of Ukrainian businesses in the region.44 As the conflict currently stands in mid-2017, the West and Russia are still at an impasse. Economic ties between the two continue to fragment,
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  THE UKRAINE CRISISRMP 2017 harming each nation involved, while covert military buildup continues. IV. ACTORS’ PERSPECTIVES 1. NATO—Central and Western Europe NATO member states in Central and Western Europe, most notably France and Germany, are most interested in supporting Ukraine’s transition into a Western economic power, establishing peace in Ukraine, and upholding international law on state sovereignty. For NATO’s most powerful leaders, Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel and France’s President Emmanuel Macron, reconciliation with Russia is unlikely to be possible in the near future. Putin’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty in Crimea and the Donbass, as outlined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act signed by the U.S., most of Europe, and the Soviet Union,45 indicates a blatant disrespect for Western liberal norms. Moreover, Putin’s repeated deceptions regarding the extent of Russian interference in Western elections and in Ukraine makes it unlikely Merkel will have the goodwill to concede any Ukrainian territory.46 Strategically, Russia does not pose a credible threat to nations in Central and Western Europe due to its moderately weak military and the buffer zone of Eastern Europe between the two.47 Indeed, a purpose of NATO expansion westward was making the threat of a Russian attack both less likely and less effective. By limiting Russian influence in Eastern Europe, European leadership hopes to expand international trade and strengthen the global economy, and ultimately spread the Western democratic system of government. This grand vision begins with Ukraine integrating with the EU and cutting off economic ties with Russia, a goal made more likely to succeed by the European funding of Kiev. Continued missions to train the Ukrainian military makes it clear that Merkel and Macron are unwilling to surrender eastern Ukraine to Putin.48 A contributing factor in this is the considerable time spent by Germany and France in fostering the Minsk agreements; their failure would reflect poorly in the eyes of the European public. For these nations, a diplomatic victory with Russia to resume EU expansion and uphold international law on sovereignty would be the ideal resolution to the conflict, codifying the role of Europe as the center of the international community. 2. NATO—Eastern Europe NATO member states in Eastern Europe, most notably the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Poland, are most interested in avoiding conflict with Russia and maintaining NATO’s defense credibility. Unlike the other NATO member states, Eastern Europe perceives Russia as a credible and dangerous security threat. In the case of conflict escalation, the Baltics, where the U.S. and Germany have positioned a substantial number of troops, would see the most conflict. Another scenario, in which Ukraine were to become a pawn of Russia over the course of years of EU withdrawal, would allow Russia to place troops on Poland’s border. Both circumstances represent an unacceptable existential threat to Eastern Europe. As such, these nations are reliant on assistance from the U.S., Germany, France, and others in maintaining NATO’s defense spending and resisting Russia. Worse yet is the possibility that Putin will circumvent Western authorities by using covert tools against Eastern Europe, as it did in Ukraine. Cyberattacks, targeting of the sizeable Russian ethnic minorities49 in these post-Soviet states through the media and sending paramilitary operatives to seize government buildings or initiate referenda are all grave concerns for the leaders of the Baltics—Estonia’s and Latvia’s populations are 30% and 34% Russian-speaking, respectively.50 The likelihood of these dangers was amplified by the Russian abduction of an Estonian counterintelligence officer in September 2014, who Moscow claimed was planning espionage. Through strengthening NATO’s troop presence in these countries and punishing Russia for illegal intervention in Ukraine, Eastern Europe hopes that the Ukraine crisis will not become the first in a series of Russian destabilization operations in NATO member states.51 3. NATO—United States The U.S., as a member of NATO, is most interested in keeping open opportunities for future collaboration with Russia in Syria and beyond and establishing peace in Ukraine. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 made Russo-American relations significantly more complex. During the détente between the West and post-Soviet states in the 1990s, the U.S. perceived Russia as no longer being a strategic threat to its status as a global superpower, and nuclear warfare remained unlikely due to mutually assured destruction. However, Russia’s apparent unwillingness to cede its imperial past has again made the country a focal point in American politics. Under the Obama Administration between 2009 and 2017, a policy of containment was implemented which saw little potential for cooperation with President Putin; by moving troops into NATO’s eastern border in the Baltics and levying sanctions, Obama’s Russia policy demonstrated agreement with Europe. Critics point to the failed negotiations with Russia over the Syrian Civil War as evidence that the Obama Administration was nonetheless distracted by the potential for cooperation, precluding a credible hardline stance in Ukraine.52 The Trump Administration has opened new dialogues for collaboration with President Putin in both Syria and Ukraine. Although Trump’s campaign promise of ‘friendliness’ with Russia was largely shattered by the reinstatement of Obama-era sanctions and missile launches against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a longtime ally of Putin, current Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has stated that the Minsk agreements should not be a burden to Ukraine
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  THE UKRAINE CRISISRMP 2017 negotiations. This sudden departure from NATO’s insistence on the implementation of Minsk reveals Trump’s greater foreign policy vision—to reset relations with Russia and become independent from the current European unity against Russia.53 Unfortunately for Trump, this vision has been weakened by legislation passed by Congress on July 25, 2017 containing new sanctions on Russia and preventing Trump from lifting them.54 The U.S.’ European allies are doubly concerned by Trump’s threat to disengage from NATO, another keystone promise in his 2016 presidential campaign. This split from decades of American coalition-building is based on the failure of weaker NATO states to contribute to defense spending, and Trump’s desire to disengage from international organizations and efforts. In May 2017, however, American foreign policy representatives have asserted their commitment to the common defense principle of NATO.55 Undoubtedly, European leaders such as Germany’s Merkel are troubled by the U.S.’ simultaneous courting of Russia and of NATO. This seeming contradiction exposes Trump’s belief that trilateral cooperation between the U.S., Europe, and Russia is both possible and crucial for accomplishing America’s mission in Ukraine. In line with international withdrawal, ceding the Donbass and Crimea to Russia is a possibility for the Trump Administration, particularly if it would allow a victorious collaborative effort in Syria. These two accomplishments would bolster Trump’s ideal image as a political outsider who will erase years of failed, archaic foreign policy by bureaucrats in Washington and forge a new international order with the U.S. and Russia as allies. The two critical assumptions underpinning this worldview are that eastern Ukraine is unimportant strategically for the U.S.56 and that NATO is not critical to the future of Russo- American relations.57 4. Ukraine—Government (Kiev) The Kiev-based government of Ukraine is most interested in retaining political influence in Crimea and the Donbass, avoiding military escalation with Russia, and integrating with the EU and NATO. President Poroshenko faces substantial pressure from constituents to accelerate integration with the EU and assist the nation’s troubled economy. The faults in the Ukrainian economy go beyond endemic corruption; the severance of freight transit and financial cooperation between the west and the separatist east has severely disrupted domestic production. The economic damage is expected to cost tens of thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in 2017.58 This would hamper the country’s chances of acceding to the EU, which is still in the stage of assisting with economic reforms in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the civil war still prevents outright joining the EU, as the organization will not admit a nation with a territorial dispute. In order to achieve long-term economic growth, Kiev needs to make peace with the separatists and Russia, and move towards the reforms that the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have proposed. Resumed economic interaction between the east and west will help to ease economic stability as well. To accomplish this, Kiev seeks to grant the Donbass and Crimea greater autonomy, recognizing that a return to 2013 is unrealistic. Kiev perceives Russian control of these territories as violations that should not go unpunished; otherwise, this would set an unfortunate precedent for the sovereignty of the country and its Eastern European neighbors in the future. By courting the U.S.’ President Trump, Poroshenko hopes that he does not consider a direct deal with Putin to exchange east Ukraine for cooperation on Syria, for instance.59 5. Ukraine—Separatists (Donbass) The Donbass separatists in Ukraine are most interested in integrating with Russia, political independence from Kiev, and avoiding military escalation with NATO. The motives for the insurgents in the Donbass and the voters in Crimea to seek reunion with Russia are both cultural and historical. In 1954, the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union approved a motion to transfer control of Crimea from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. At the time, Soviet leaders assumed that the Soviet Union would never fall, making the transfer of Crimea, with a 75% ethnic Russian majority, simply a matter of proximity and goodwill to the Ukrainian leadership. This territory transfer, however, laid the ground for the pro- Russian separatists’ feelings of cultural divide.60 The Donbass is home to Ukraine’s most influential oligarchs—artifacts of the post-Soviet republic’s graceless fall into capitalism—and sorely lacks a modernized economy.61 The conflict has led to the displacement of over one million citizens, with many others lacking access to food, water, and educational and vocational opportunities.62 The hope for the leaders of the DPR and LPR is to end the conflict as soon as possible to allow humanitarian aid access while also retaining autonomy from Kiev. Reunion with Ukraine would, moreover, allow Donbass citizens to have a meaningful voice in the Rada and help restore Ukrainian economic ties with Russia to their 2013 state. However, the ideal resolution is to join Russia, as the separatists most identify with Russian culture and their history as a part of the greater Russian empire, both Romanov and Soviet. 6. Russia Russia is most interested in retaining jurisdiction over Crimea, establishing the Donbass as a buffer zone with NATO, preventing Ukrainian integration with the EU and NATO, and avoiding military escalation with NATO. Russia’s foreign policy is dictated by President Vladimir Putin, who faces an election in 2018.63 The upcoming election has seemingly pushed Putin to revive Russian nationalism with a state media-run narrative of defending Russian compatriots in Ukraine, who are allegedly under
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  THE UKRAINE CRISISRMP 2017 attack by Ukrainian nationalists at the state level. This campaign bolsters Putin’s approval among Russians, encouraging him to either prolong the conflict or seek a resolution where Russia retains control of some or all of the separatist Ukrainian territories.64 Past 2018, Putin has a much larger objective for his Ukrainian policy. Taking back the territories of the previous Russian sphere of influence and intimidating Russia’s western neighbors into economic cooperation accomplish several goals in Putin’s eyes. The Russian nation-state has historically desired regional hegemon status, which is being denied by NATO and the EU’s anti-Russia expansion mission. Secondly, strengthening Russia’s now-weak economy through trade and investment and Putin’s Eurasian Customs Union will dramatically improve the lives of Russians and fund its government. This is critical for the sustainable growth of Russian defense spending, a tool Putin needs to maintain a credible strategic threat against NATO member states. In addition, stronger domestic support for Putin’s foreign policy would further guarantee his reelection bid passing without protest. Currently, however, an invasion and occupation of western Ukraine would expend too much of Moscow’s economic and human capital to be tenable.65 With a new opportunity in President Trump, Putin will likely attempt to negotiate surrender of part of Ukraine back to Kiev in return for lifting of sanctions and U.S. collaboration elsewhere, such as in Syria. Alternatively, Putin can reduce support for Syria’s President Assad in order to procure Trump’s recognition of Russia’s jurisdiction over Crimea and the Donbass. Such a scenario is tantalizing for Putin, as a splinter between Europe and the U.S. would destroy the Western monopoly on control of international conflicts. An emerging multipolar world, Putin hopes, involves Russia just as much as it does Germany or China. The autonomy of Crimea and the Donbass also serves key strategic interests. Positioning the Russian Navy in the waters near Crimea and having a porous border between the Donbass and Russia will serve to coerce Ukraine into preferring Russia and the EU equally economically, if not Russia first.66 V. PREVIOUSLY ATTEMPTED .PEACE FRAMEWORKS 1. Minsk Protocol The first robust ceasefire agreement, the Minsk Protocol, is signed by Kiev, the DPR, the LPR, Russia, and a Swiss observer from the OSCE on September 5, 2014. The critical points of the agreement are as follows:67 1. A full and immediate ceasefire to be reviewed by the OSCE; 2. Implement legislation for decentralization of power 3. OSCE monitoring and securing of the Ukraine-Russia border; 4. Progress toward normalizing relations between Kiev and the separatists (exchange of detainees, amnesty for combatants, humanitarian aid, and recovery of economic activity in the Donbass); 5. Early local elections in particular districts of the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts; 6. Facilitation of an ‘inclusive national dialogue;’ 7. Dismantling of illegal military groups. The implementation of Minsk I failed within a matter of days as violence simply continued after September 5. Combat resumed full-scale by early October. Moscow’s delivery of humanitarian aid was believed by Kiev to actually be a shipment of heavy weaponry, a violation of the agreement, highlighting the lack of accountability and severe distrust between the negotiating parties.68 2. Minsk II Following the almost immediate collapse of Minsk I in September 2014, Minsk II is signed on February 12, 2015 by Kiev, the DPR, the LPR, Russia, France, and Germany. The critical points of the agreement are as follows:69 1. A full and immediate ceasefire in particular districts of the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts; 2. Withdrawal of heavy weaponry (i.e. artillery) from the line of conflict; 3. A dialogue on local elections in particular districts in the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts based on Ukrainian law; 4. Demarcation by the Ukrainian Rada of which territories in the Donbass attain special self-governance status; 5. Progress toward normalizing relations between Kiev and the separatists (exchange of detainees, access to humanitarian aid, amnesty for combatants, and cooperation on financial systems); 6. Granting full control of the national border to Kiev following the local elections and by the end of 2015; 7. Pullout of all foreign troops and arms; 8. Dismantling of illegal military groups; 9. Constitutional and legislative reform to grant special status to particular districts of the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts. Minsk II was substantially more effective than its predecessor, leading to a moderate reduction in fighting for several months. This was largely due to it being brokered by Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel and France’s President François Hollande. However, tensions have been exacerbated by the question of local elections, which Kiev perceive as a threat to its territorial integrity. However, the greater concern for peace prospects is that the end of the conflict remains opposed to Russian political and security interests. Territorial disputes in Ukraine prevent accession to the EU and NATO’s desire to partner with it, both victories for Moscow.70 Russia’s responsibilities in upholding Minsk II have been made conditions by the West for lifting sanctions. However, the unilateral nature of the sanctions all but guaranteed their failure. Intended to isolate Russia from international business, they only encouraged non-Western
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  THE UKRAINE CRISISRMP 2017 nations and organizations, such as China, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and BRICS, to take advantage of new trade and investment opportunities with Russia.71 Furthermore, the effect of the sanctions was minimal enough to be ignored in the face of Putin’s broader geopolitical goals in Ukraine, as low oil prices likely played a bigger role in the Russian economic crisis than a reduction in trade swiftly offset by Putin’s allies in Asia.72 VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES Potential objectives for U.S. foreign policy regarding the conflict in Ukraine are as follows: 1. A permanent end to the violence in the Donbass; 2. The strengthening of economic and political alliances with European nations; 3. Russian cooperation on international conflicts; 4. Intervention on behalf of international law; 5. Prevention of future security crises in Eastern Europe. Policy options for U.S. intervention in the conflict in Ukraine are as follows: 1. Negotiate with President Putin, President Poroshenko, and European leaders to fully implement Minsk II. President Trump’s involvement in negotiations will increase accountability on both sides, just as Merkel and Hollande’s involvement in the original February 2015 process improved on Minsk I. Poroshenko will be pressured by the U.S. to uphold the agreement or face a decrease in Western support. Likewise, Putin will likely see Trump’s commitment as a display of goodwill, and take the opportunity to deescalate the conflict once additional concessions are made to the separatist territories, such as greater autonomy or surrender of Crimea. This is the lowest-risk course to maintain strong diplomatic ties to both Europe and Russia. The probability for future conflict would be low as the reintegration of the pro-Russians into Ukraine would give Putin the political and strategic buffer he needs in Ukraine. This is the recommended course of action, as it is the only one which lacks the potential for immediate negative consequences if it fails. The other two courses of action described below should be attempted if this strategy consistently fails. 2. Negotiate with President Putin to cede the Donbass in return for his cooperation in Syria and/or elsewhere. Once Poroshenko stops receiving aid from the U.S., he and his Western backers would inevitably be forced to retreat from the separatist-held regions. Putin would likely accept this bargain, as the cost of funding the separatists is taking a toll on the Russia government. The ideal exchange would involve Russia no longer supporting the Assad regime in Syria; sharing military intelligence in the fight against the Islamic State is still unlikely to occur. EU leaders will no longer view the U.S. as a reliable ally against Putin, although American contributions to NATO are likely too significant to ignore when Trump next asks for assistance. This negotiation has the potential to backfire if Putin backtracks on his promise to align with American interests in Syria. This course of action is currently unlikely to be taken by Trump due to his involvement in the ongoing Russian election meddling scandal. 3. Deploy U.S. Marines to reclaim the Donbass from the pro-Russia separatists. The humanitarian crisis in the Donbass will likely motivate the rebels to surrender once troops arrive. Regardless of whether the separatists surrender, this will result in a decisive victory for the U.S., reassuring its allies in Europe. President Putin will reject cooperation in Syria and continue to turn to China as an economic ally. Furthermore, Kiev will exhaust its economic resources rebuilding the Donbass following its reclamation, particularly if the war is prolonged. Granting the Donbass autonomy will be necessary to prevent a resurgence of protests, but their new representation in the Rada will limit Ukraine’s integration with the West. Russia will perceive the U.S. troops presence on its border as a grave security threat; Putin will not retaliate due to U.S. possession of nuclear warheads, but may instead move troops to the border, committing to a new Cold War, potentially recreating the conditions for another proxy conflict to occur. For these reasons, this conflict resolution option is not highly recommended except as a last resort. VII. CONCLUSION The U.S. is now at a crossroads; President Trump must choose between upholding the status quo of Western solidarity against Russian aggression, or a multipolar world in which the U.S. may withdraw from its role as a superpower, allowing Russia and China to fortify their spheres of influences in Eurasia. It is clear that the current situation will result in thousands of more lives lost and continuing damage to the economies of Ukraine and Russia. Moving beyond Ukraine to prioritize defeating the Islamic State is yet another reason to swiftly take action to end the civil war. The burden on the Trump Administration is unenviable: the way in which the U.S. answers the questions at the heart of the Ukraine crisis will define the international order for decades to come. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my mentor, Gokh Alshaif, for giving me direction in my research and encouraging my progress. I additionally thank Dr. Lina Kim for giving me the opportunity to conduct this research and pursue my academic goals. I thank Zach Rentz for his helpful feedback on my work. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for supporting my interest in international relations and political science and being positive influences in my life.
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And Putin is even weaker.” Brookings. August 16, 2016. Accessed July 21, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from- chaos/2015/06/08/russia-is-not-strong-and-putin-is- even-weaker/. 48. Gressel, Gustav. “Keeping up appearances: How Europe is supporting Ukraine’s transformation.” European Council on Foreign Relations. October 05, 1970. Accessed July 21, 2017. http://www.ecfr.eu/ publications/summary/keeping_up_appearances_how_ europe_is_supporting_ukraines_transformation. 49. Williams, Carol J. “Latvia, with a Large Minority of Russians, Worries About Putin's Goals.” Los Angeles Times. May 2, 2015. Accessed July 21, 2017. http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-latvia- russia-next-20150502-story.html. 50. “Population by Language, Sex and Urban/Rural Residence.” United Nations. 2017. 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