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![Narrow Evil
The narrow concept of evil picks out only the
most morally despicable sorts of actions, characters,
events, etc. As Marcus Singer puts it “‘evil’ [in this
sense] … is the worst possible term of opprobrium
imaginable” (Singer 2004, 185). Since the narrow
concept of evil involves moral condemnation, it is
appropriately ascribed only to moral agents and their
actions. For example, if only human beings are moral
agents, then only human beings can perform evil
actions.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/theproblemofevil-160809134419/75/The-problem-of-evil-26-2048.jpg)
![Arendt's Analyses of Evil
(In the Origins of Totalitarianism.1951)
Arendt's thoughts on the nature of evil stem from
her attempt to understand and evaluate the horrors of the
Nazi death camps. she argues that “desk murderers”
such as Eichmann were not motivated by demonic or
monstrous motives. Instead, “It was sheer
thoughtlessness—something by no means identical with
stupidity—that predisposed [Eichmann] to become one
of the greatest criminals of that period” (Arendt 1963,
287–288). According to Arendt, Eichmann's motives
and character were banal rather than monstrous. She
described him as a “terrifyingly normal” human being
who simply did not think very deeply about what he
was doing.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/theproblemofevil-160809134419/75/The-problem-of-evil-40-2048.jpg)
Uploaded byJn Reloj
The problem of evil
This document discusses different philosophical perspectives on the concept of evil. It begins by outlining the deductive argument from evil, which argues that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God. It then examines various theories that have attempted to resolve this incompatibility, such as the idea that some evils may be logically necessary for greater goods. The document also analyzes different formulations of the problem of evil, like axiological and deontological approaches. Finally, it explores specific theories of evil proposed by philosophers and thinkers like Kant, Arendt, and various dualist and privation theories.
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The problem of evil
- 1. The Problem ofEvil Philosophical Quest for God
- 2. DID GOD CREATEEVIL?
- 3.
- 4. Arguments about Godon evil • If God exists, then God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. • If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil. • If God is omniscient, then God knows when evil exists. • If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil. • Evil exists. • If evil exists and God exists, then either God doesn’t have the power to eliminate all evil, or doesn’t know when evil exists, or doesn’t have the desire to eliminate all evil. • Therefore, God doesn’t exist.
- 5. where it isclaimed that if God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil. Libertarian conception. According to this view of free will. Free will is incompatible with determinism, and so it is impossible even for an omnipotent being to make it the case that someone freely chooses to do what is right.
- 6. Incompatibility Formulations The argumentfrom evil focuses upon the fact that the world appears to contain states of affairs that are bad, or undesirable, or that should have been prevented by any being that could have done so, and it asks how the existence of such states of affairs is to be squared with the existence of God. But the argument can be formulated in this:
- 7. Deductive Argument Deductive argumentfor the very strong claim that it is logically impossible for both God and evil to exist,
- 8. Abstract Formulations Thus somewould argue, for example, that the frustration that one experiences in trying to solve a difficult problem is outweighed by the satisfaction of arriving at a solution, and therefore that the world is a better place because it contains such evils. Alternatively, it has been argued that the world is a better place if people develop desirable traits of character— such as patience, and courage—by struggling against obstacles, including suffering.
- 9. It seems possible,then, that there might be evils that are logically necessary for goods that outweigh them, and this possibility provides a reason, accordingly, for questioning one of the premises in the argument set out earlier—namely, premise (4), where it is claimed that if God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.
- 10. How does thisbear upon evidential formulations of the argument from evil? The answer would seem to be that if there can be evils that are logically necessary for goods that outweigh them, then it is hard to see how the mere existence of evil—in the absence of further information—can provide much in the way of evidence against the existence of God.
- 11. Alvin Plantinga’s discussionsof the problem of evil. In God and Other Minds, in The Nature of Necessity, and in God, Freedom, and Evil, for example, Plantinga, starting out from an examination of John L. Mackie’s essay “Evil and Omnipotence” (1955), He focuses mainly on the question of whether the existence of God is compatible with the existence of evil, although there are also short discussions of whether the existence of God is compatible with the existence of a given quantity of evil, and of whether the existence of a certain amount of evil renders the existence of God unlikely.
- 12. Axiological : There existstates of affairs in which animals die agonizing deaths in forest fires, or where children undergo lingering suffering and eventual death due to cancer, and that (a) are intrinsically bad or undesirable, and (b) are such that any omnipotent person has the power to prevent them without thereby either allowing an equal or greater evil, or preventing an equal or greater good. : For any state of affairs (that is actual), the existence of that state of affairs is not prevented by anyone.
- 13. : For anystate of affairs, and any person, if the state of affairs is intrinsically bad, and the person has the power to prevent that state of affairs without thereby either allowing an equal or greater evil, or preventing an equal or greater good, but does not do so, then that person is not both omniscient and morally perfect.
- 14. : Therefore, from(1), (2), and (3): : There is no omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect person. : If God exists, then he is an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect person. : Therefore: God does not exist.
- 15. Axiological concepts, thatis, in terms of the goodness or badness, the desirability or undesirability, of states of affairs. The criticism that arises from this feature centers on statement which asserts that an omniscient and morally perfect being would prevent the existence of any states of affairs that are intrinsically bad or undesirable. In other words, in question, “God would be morally blameworthy if he failed to create the best world that he could.”
- 16. Deontological formulation Here theidea is that rather than employing concepts that focus upon the value or disvalue of states of affairs, one instead uses concepts that focus upon the rightness and wrongness of actions, and upon the properties—rightmaking properties and wrongmaking properties—that determine whether an action is one that ought to be performed, or ought not to be performed, other things being equal. When the argument is thus formulated, there is no problematic bridge that needs to be introduced connecting the goodness and badness of states of affairs with the rightness and wrongness of actions.
- 17. THE CONCEPT OFEVIL
- 18. During the pastthirty years, moral, political, and legal philosophers have become increasingly interested in the concept of evil. This interest has been partly motivated by ascriptions of ‘evil’ by laymen, social scientists, journalists, and politicians as they try to understand and respond to various atrocities and horrors of the past eighty years, e.g., the Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and killing sprees by serial killers such as Jeffery Dahmer. It seems that we cannot capture the moral significance of these actions and their perpetrators by calling them ‘wrong’ or ‘bad’ or even ‘very very wrong’ or ‘very very bad.’ We need the concept of evil.
- 21. Two Concepts ofEvil BROAD CONCEPT NARROW CONCEPT
- 22. A Broad Concept Thebroad concept picks out any bad state of affairs, wrongful action, or character flaw. The suffering of a toothache is evil in the broad sense as is a white lie.
- 23. Two Categories ofBroad Concept Natural Evil Moral Evil.
- 24. Natural Evil Natural evilsare bad states of affairs which do not result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents. Hurricanes and toothaches are examples of natural evils.
- 25. Moral Evils Moral evilsdo result from the intentions or negligence of moral agents. Murder and lying are examples of moral evils.
- 26. Narrow Evil The narrowconcept of evil picks out only the most morally despicable sorts of actions, characters, events, etc. As Marcus Singer puts it “‘evil’ [in this sense] … is the worst possible term of opprobrium imaginable” (Singer 2004, 185). Since the narrow concept of evil involves moral condemnation, it is appropriately ascribed only to moral agents and their actions. For example, if only human beings are moral agents, then only human beings can perform evil actions.
- 27. Friedrich Nietzsche's Attackon Evil The concept of evil should be abandoned because it is dangerous, since it has a negative effect on human potential and vitality by promoting the weak in spirit and suppressing the strong. In On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic, Nietzsche argues that the concept of evil arose from the negative emotions of envy, hatred, and resentment. He contends that the powerless and weak created the concept of evil to take revenge against their oppressors. (Nietzsche 1886 and 1887). Nietzsche's skeptical attack on the concept of evil has encouraged philosophers to ignore the nature and moral significance of evil and instead focus on the motives people might have for using the term ‘evil’
- 28. Dualist and PrivationTheories of Evil Manichaean Neoplatonist
- 29. The material worldconstitutes a stage of this cosmic battle where the forces of evil have trapped the forces of goodness in matter. For example, the human body is evil while the human soul is good and must be freed from the body through strict adherence to Manichaean teaching. The Manichaean solution to the problem of evil is that God is neither all- powerful nor the sole creator of the world. God is supremely good and creates only good things, but he or she is powerless to prevent the Prince of Darkness from creating evil. MANICHAEAN
- 30. BODY (IN MASCULINE FORM) BODY (INFEMININE FORM) SOUL
- 32. Neoplatonist According to theNeoplatonists, evil does not exist as a substance or property but instead as a privation of substance, form, and goodness (Plotinus, Enneads, I, 8; See also O'Brien 1996). For instance, the evil of disease consists in a privation of health, and the evil of sin consist in a privation of virtue. The Neoplatonist theory of evil provides a solution to the problem of evil because if evil is a privation of substance, form, and goodness, then God creates no evil. All of God's creation is good, evil is a lack of being and goodness.
- 33. One problem withthe privation theory's solution to the problem of evil is that it provides only a partial solution to the problem of evil since even if God creates no evil we must still explain why God allows privation evils to exist (See Calder 2007a; Kane 1980). An even more significant problem is that the privation theory seems to fail as a theory of evil since it doesn't seem to be able to account for certain paradigmatic evils. For instance, it seems that we cannot equate the evil of pain with the privation of pleasure or some other feeling.
- 34. Pain is adistinct phenomenological experience which is positively bad and not merely not good. Similarly, a sadistic torturer is not just not as good as she could be. She is not simply lacking in kindness or compassion. She desires her victims' suffering for pleasure. These are qualities she has, not qualities she lacks, and they are positively bad and not merely lacking in goodness (Calder 2007a; Kane 1980. See Anglin and Goetz 1982 for a reply to these objections).
- 35. Kant's Theory ofEvil Immanuel Kant, in his Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, was the first to offer a purely secular theory of evil, i.e., a theory of three apparently conflicting truths about human nature: (1) we are radically free, (2) we are by nature inclined toward goodness, (3) we are by nature inclined toward evil.
- 36. According to Kant,we have a morally good will only if we choose to perform morally right actions because they are morally right (Kant 1785, 4: 393–4:397; Kant 1793, Bk I). On Kant's view, anyone who does not have a morally good will has an evil will. There are three grades of evil which can be seen as increasingly more evil stages of corruption in the will.
- 37. First there isfrailty. A person with a frail will attempts to perform morally right actions because these actions are morally right, but she is too weak to follow through with her plans. Instead, she ends up doing wrong due to a weakness of will (Kant 1793, Bk I, 24–25).
- 38. The next stageof corruption is impurity. A person with an impure will does not attempt to perform morally right actions just because these actions are morally right. Instead, she performs morally right actions partly because these actions are morally right and partly because of some other incentive, e.g., self-interest. Impurity is worse than frailty because an impure person has allowed an incentive other than the moral law to guide her actions while the frail person tries, but fails, to do the right thing for the right reason (Kant 1793, Bk I, 25–26).
- 39. The final stageof corruption is perversity, or wickedness. Someone with a perverse prioritizes self-love over the moral law. Thus, her actions conform to the moral law only if they are in her self-interest. But since the reason she performs morally right actions is self-love and not because these actions are morally right, her actions have no moral worth and, according to Kant, her will manifests the worst form of evil possible for a human being. Kant considers someone with a perverse will an evil person (Kant 1793, Bk I, 25).
- 40. Arendt's Analyses ofEvil (In the Origins of Totalitarianism.1951) Arendt's thoughts on the nature of evil stem from her attempt to understand and evaluate the horrors of the Nazi death camps. she argues that “desk murderers” such as Eichmann were not motivated by demonic or monstrous motives. Instead, “It was sheer thoughtlessness—something by no means identical with stupidity—that predisposed [Eichmann] to become one of the greatest criminals of that period” (Arendt 1963, 287–288). According to Arendt, Eichmann's motives and character were banal rather than monstrous. She described him as a “terrifyingly normal” human being who simply did not think very deeply about what he was doing.
- 41.