UKRAINE – CHINA: from Project-to-Project Cooperation to Strategic Partnership

2st:Layout 1 23.11.2009 0:45 Page 1

Valentyn Badrak (edt.)
Sergei Zhurets (edt.)
Dmitriy Bogdanov
Vladimir Kopchak
Olga Nabochenko
Alexei Yarovoj

Ukraine — China:
from Project-to-Project
Cooperation to
Strategic Partnership

Published by the Center for Army, Conversion
and Disarmament Studies

Kyiv - 2009

avtori:Layout 1 23.11.2009 4:38 Page 3

Ukraine-China:
2 from Project-to-Project Cooperation to Strategic Partnership

Valentyn Sergei
BADRAK ZHURETS

Introduction.
Why China?
In the current situation — whereby $4.402 trillion (according to IMF data for
geopolitical scenery around Ukraine is get- 2008), China is wealthy enough to meet its
ting worse, fundamentally new challenges huge defense requirement.
and threats are brought into being, In nominal GDP terms, the PRC is
NATO’s key European players Germany now the third biggest economy in the
and France are refusing to further support world, lagging only the United State and
Ukraine, and the United States is keeping Japan. Amidst the ongoing global eco-
silence over all this — China’s potential nomic recession, the World Bank revised
role has risen significantly in the eyes of its 2009 economic growth forecast for
Ukrainian military-political establishment. China to 8.4%, up from the projection of
The PRC has silently evolved into a pow- 7.2% made in June. China’s economy grew
erful, almost independent center of influ- 6.1% in the first quarter of 2009, but recov-
ence on the planet; it has entered the elite ered to 7.9% in the second quarter and 8.9%
club of permanent members of the UN Se- in the third, according to the PRC National
curity Council, and boasts of having the Bureau of Statistics.
world’s biggest military force of 2.25 mil- At the present stage of civilization’s
lion. China’s defense expenditure in- development, amidst complex globaliza-
creased 14.9% in 2009 to reach well past $84 tion processes, the PRC is set to take upon
billion – the world’s second largest defense itself an alternative mission of global pro-
budget behind that of the United States. portions. China — who achieved a GDP
Having the world’s biggest foreign trade growth at a time of severe global economic
turnover of $2.5 trillion and a GDP of slowdown, and increased its foreign trade


Ukraine-China:
from Project-to-Project Cooperation to Strategic Partnership 3

turnover by 21% from last year — has of influence on the Western front. Of
much to be proud of (the PRC is reported course, this is simply a matter of specula-
to have already outpaced Japan by the rate tion. Even if it is assumed that Beijing
of economy growth). If this upward trend chooses to adopt this scenario, it would not
continues, China surpassing the United be implemented straightforwardly. Still,
States as the world’s biggest economy is such a scenario, in a certain specific situa-
simply a matter of time. It is projected by tion, might well become a reality.
the PRC leadership that the amount of Chi- Assumption that China’s ambitions
nese exports would have increased to $5 will certainly grow further could be vali-
trillion by 2020, with the proportion of dated by one evident aspect of U.S. foreign
high-tech products rising to about 50% of policies. A broad consensus appears hav-
the projected sum. In addition to this, the ing been reached among the expert com-
PRC has huge strategic ambitions for tech- munity to the effect that a policy of
nology and geopolitics, its technological containment of China is one of the funda-
ambitions having grown to the extent that mentals of the United States’ foreign pol-
they became the subject of concern by the icy, not simply part of it. Success or
United States and Russia. If, a few years unsuccess of this American policy will de-
ago, Moscow did not hesitate to sell Beijing termine the entire future architecture of the
an amount of naval versions of the S-300 international relations system. RAND Cor-
SAM system, today it faces uncertainty poration, an influential non-profit research
about the feasibility of supplying the PRC organization in the United States, contends
with Su-33 carrier-based fighters. Chinese that the PRC is the only country in the
weapons designers have developed a no- world to be potentially capable to rival the
torious reputation for successfully repro- U.S. in the amount and quality of available
ducing even most sophisticated designs military resources and to present a virtually
without gaining copyright permission. across-the-board high-tech challenge.
China’s approach to dealing with RAND experts believe that within a decade
problematic geopolitical issues appears to China would be able to supplant America as
be interesting enough. Suffice it to have a the dominant military power in East Asia.
look at PRC’s policies towards Pakistan. In In the meanwhile, a few recent years
relations with Islamabad, Beijing appar- have seen pretty perceptible changes in
ently took the ‘enemy of my enemy is my attitudes by some European countries to
friend’ approach. By persistently reinforc- cooperation with the PRC, which might
ing Pakistan, China weakens India and reserve as an extra argument in favor of
duces freedom of maneuver for New proposed Ukrainian-Chinese rapproche-
Delhi. These ambitions by Beijing are what ment. Some European countries (even
Kiev is looking at with much interest. On though the limitations on defense sup-
the one hand, Ukraine still retains much to plies to China from the EU continue to be
offer China with respect to technology. The effective) began systematic effort to ex-
other side of that coin is that the possibility pand their respective arms export quotas
is not fully ruled out that China’s territo- for the PRC, this being practiced not only
rial ambitions and general geopolitical ex- by Paris but London and Berlin as well.
pectations with regard to the Far East These quotas are fully legal since selected
might spur Beijing to begin actively rein- weapons types are not covered by the
forcing Ukraine as an anti-Russian center Chinese arms embargo.


Ukraine-China:

Such a situation developing around Given that the signatory states to the
China with its consistent and independent 1994 Budapest Memorandum (who as-
policies, and, also, the rising challenges to sumed commitments as to Ukraine’s sov-
Ukraine in whom China has a long-term ereignty and security assurances) tend to
interest, all speak of the feasibility and ra- take less and less account of Ukraine’s in-
tionale of proposed effort to ensure terests, this fact can and must become a
Ukraine’s rapprochement with China in major reference point in Kiev’s talks with
politics, technology and economy. Ukraine the United States. Moreover, Ukraine,
currently needs assurances of a different under the umbrella of the Chinese might,
type and a different format. If neither Rus- could try and alter it location on the
sia nor the USA intend to assume that role, geostrategic map of the region (particularly
it is essential that Kiev identify "a third through defense and dual-use technology
party" who would be interested in a sus- transfers) and, simultaneously, build up an
tainably developing Ukraine. Paradoxical indigenous missile shield powerful enough
as it may seem, it is China who might po- to deter potential aggressor of any kind. As
tentially act as a guarantor of this kind. For for China, who has in recent years begun
China itself, in the presence of potential massive export of weapons and defense
tensions in relations with the EU in case it equipment, not only does it visualize
is pressurized by the United States, a Ukraine as a technology donor, but, also,
strong Ukraine integrated into Europe as a potential large market for its defense
might be of interest, indeed. There is an industry products, given that the PRC has
opinion that China’s interest in Ukraine is already surpassed Ukraine in the develop-
exclusively technological, but this is only ment and production of a whole range of
true to a limited extent. Of course, Ukraine defense technologies.
as a technology donor still retains much to It goes without saying that a concept
offer China, most specifically in rocket and of a Ukrainian-Chinese rapprochement
aerospace technology. Despite China’s needs to be thoroughly elaborated and ne-
multi-year history of cooperation with the gotiated in detail with the Chinese party.
Russian Federation, a significant aspect in Still, for Kiev, this idea looks far more
potential cooperation between Ukraine preferable than apprehending an escala-
and China in critical technology sectors tion of tensions in relations with the states
might be that Ukraine and Russia would poised to ignore national interests of
offer China technologies that are not com- Ukraine or disrespect their own security
peting but, rather, complementing each assurances once provided to Ukraine in ex-
other. It might be said with a high degree change for its nuclear-free status.
of certainty that China’s interest in Ukraine In Chinese, the word ‘crisis’ is written
is partly explained by the fact that Kiev in two characters meaning ‘danger/haz-
never attaches any political strings or re- ards’ and ‘opportunity/chance/’. This
quirements to joint projects in sensitive sec- combination could well and fully convey
tors. Intuitively, Kiev’s forging close the content of military-political and mili-
partnership relations wit Beijing in the mis- tary-technological friendship between Kiev
sile technology area, i.e. missile warhead and Beijing for the sake of forging a new
technology improvement, might cause prob- relevant strategy.
lems in its relationships with Washington.

chepter2:Layout 1 23.11.2009 0:57 Page 7

Ukraine-China:

First chapter
In search of comprehensive
assurances

T
he period of 2008-09 proved to years from now. It could be predicted with
be a difficult trial for Ukraine’s a very high degree of certainty that
statehood. A systemic eco- Ukraine will not join NATO in the next 10
nomic crisis, coupled with a years. If key NATO players in Western Eu-
crisis of security system, has rope, most notably Germany and France,
become a stimulus for changing a geopo- continue with their current policies to-
litical situation on the European continent. wards Ukraine (i.e. refuse to support
A research conducted by the Center for Ukraine’s NATO membership bid), it risks
Army, Conversion and Disarmament Stud- being left outside the Western Club and the
ies (CACDS) revealed a number of adverse European Values System.
tendencies that might threaten Ukraine. Second, the level of threats has
For one thing, Ukraine has lost its changed to the extent that experts began
value in the eyes of the NATO members talking about emerging risks to the Ukrain-
who see in it a buffer strip between the Al- ian statehood itself. Ukraine, weakened
liance and Russia. Key European NATO from within, has long seemed to be a ‘sit-
players Germany and France have effec- ting duck’ for some countries. Tough-
tively refused to back Ukraine's Euro-At- worded statements by the leaders of
lantic bids, and there are grounds to claim Romania, Russia’s voiced territorial claims
yet no such support for Ukraine on the part to some Ukrainian regions and open inter-
of the United States. It’s not a stretch to say vention with Ukraine’s domestic affairs
that European players of the North At- and, finally, surprise and unprecedented
lantic Alliance have openly retreated in refusal by Moscow to acknowledge the ex-
their fight for Ukraine, opting instead for istence of the Ukrainian nation are all di-
maintaining smooth and even relation- rect consequences of a comprehensive
ships with Russia. All-knowing media weakening and undermining of the
sources have been talking everywhere Ukrainian State. The first losses of the
about ‘Munich conspiracy-2’ plot. Rhetoric weakened state were quick to come -- the
by the new American administration and de facto loss of Zmeiny Island and the
the character of the current dialogue be- shaping of the image of the Ukrainian as an
tween the United States and the Russian enemy to the Russian. Neighbors of
Federation are all warning that Ukraine Ukraine have an interest in weakening its
might be ousted to the periphery of Euro- political influence and defense capability.
pean developments. In this new situation, Furthermore, the security assurances pro-
Ukraine’s effort aimed at gaining for itself vided by Russia and the United States in
a place among the European ‘club’ of na- 1994 in connection with Ukraine's acces-
tions is not expected to pay off until many sion to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation


Ukraine-China:

of Nuclear Weapons are ineffective now approach 2017 when the Russian Black Sea
and will continue so in the future if the sce- Fleet is to be withdrawn from Ukraine.
nario is unfavorable to Ukraine. This as- Third, the Ukrainian Armed Forces’
sumption might be clearly validated by the development level has fallen to the lowest
"Tuzla" conflict [Russian attempt to join the point ever since independence. The
Tuzla spit in the Sea of Azov to the Russian Ukrainian military is in the state of rapid
mainland], the so called ‘gas wars’ with deterioration, with military morale declin-
Russia and the threatening Russian rheto- ing and carrier officers, not excepting those
ric itself, as well as the Russian-Georgian in the General’s rank, voluntarily retiring
war conflict over South Ossetia. The 1994 by the legions. The military employs
Budapest Memorandum on Security As- weapons arsenals and defense equipment
surances in connection with Ukraine's ac- inventories that are almost one generation
cession to the Treaty on the lagging behind those of the leading armed
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons forces of the world in terms of state-of-the-
provided security assurances for Ukraine art. Commentators are warning that
in exchange for it laying down its nuclear Ukraine’s warfighting capacity is clearly
arsenal and committing not to use or pos- not adequate to the current level of military
sess strategic weapons carriers. Ukraine threats facing it. The CACS is placing on
eventually handed over its arsenal of 1,734 record that defense capacity of the State
nuclear warheads to Russia as demanded has been brought to total collapse. In all the
by signatory states to the Budapest Memo- 18 years since independence, Ukraine has
randum. Obviously enough, the never end- failed to build an effective battle worthy
ing feud between political forces in army. Issues of the military and those of
Ukraine has effectively brought the coun- homeland defense have not been ad-
try to the brink of disaster where it may dressed as they should be; rather, they
cease to exist as an independent statehood. have been fully and systematically ig-
It’s not a stretch to say that, as we approach nored. Such an indifference to own armed
the end of 2009, Ukraine has reached a bi- forces and their capacity to defend the
furcation point where its further develop- country could be explained by the fact that
ment may, with an equal degree of the military in Ukraine has always been left
certainty, go down various tracks -- unidi- outside the scope of the system of issues
rectional or opposing one another alike. over which political opponents can pres-
Many experts are unanimous in their opin- surize each other. This system is unique to
ion that all the prerequisites for a military Ukraine and comprises the Interior Min-
intervention into internal affairs of Ukraine istry, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the
are in place now. Beginning in 2003, there court system, the Security Service (SBU)
has been a rapid growth in the level of and more organizations. The powers that
purely military and military-political be in Ukraine cannot see why they should
threats whereby the Ukrainian soil may be concerned about the military if it does
turn into a theater of military action. This not bring them any dividends. A manifes-
threat is becoming particularly imminent tation of such an attitude is that the Inte-
as loud voices are being heard demanding rior Ministry’s budget for 2009, for the first
that the issue of Ukraine’s nonaligned sta- time in a few recent years, has surpassed
tus be brought back on the agenda. The de- that of the Ministry of Defense
gree of this threat will steadily grow as we (UAH8.365bn as against UAH7.4bn).


Ukraine-China:

Worse still, Ukraine’s Military Establish- this trend being observed during the fifth
ment has lost much of its development in- consecutive year now. Some experts point
ertia; even three to four years of massive to an increasing tendency of some coun-
investment would not bring it up to the tries to be inclined to use military force for
best developed armed forces in the region resolving tasks such as changing world
in terms of combat effectiveness. In other order or redrawing the geostrategic map of
words, it is highly unlikely that Ukraine the world.
will be able to rely solely on its armed With this background in hand 18
forces any time soon when it comes to de- years past independence, Ukraine would
fending its sovereignty and inviolability of be urgently advised to begin an active
borders. search of alternative ways to ensure na-
Fourth, vigorous activities by neigh- tional growth and secure vital interests of
boring Russia at the diplomatic, economic, the State, not excepting those of homeland
information and social levels, coupled with defense and national security. In this par-
the absence of any coherent information ticular case, orientation to China’s military
policies by Kiev towards Crimea have power seems to be well justified.
brought high on the agenda the self-identi- China’s military accomplishments are
fication issue of a substantial portion of the really impressive. During a military parade
Ukrainian population in south and south- celebrating China’s 60th Anniversary na-
east regions. Against the backdrop of the tional day on October 1, 2009, Beijing
absence of a National Purpose, it could be demonstrated dozens of newest weapons
placed on record that a substantial part of and military hardware types that have fun-
the population are indifferent to whether damentally changed both the external look
Ukraine is independent or not. Ukraine’s and the image of the People’s Liberation
political establishment has been either in Army (PLA). Interesting enough, the Chi-
the grip of an infantile misunderstanding nese military-political leadership claim that
of the degree of the threats facing Ukraine the PLA now rivals armed forces of the
or remains to be heavily intoxicated by Western World in terms of state-of-the-art.
Russian propaganda. One way or another, This is a very serious claim that could be
Ukrainian policy makers are clearly seen as an evidence of China’s global am-
demonstrating incompetence. bitions. The PLA is the world’s biggest
The above well explains why Ukraine armed force with 2.25mn active military
has found itself in a ‘high-risk area’. The personnel plus a reserve force of 800,000,
situation is aggravated further by global followed by the United States with its
economic recession and deterioration of 1.4mn-member army. But what makes the
ecological, demographic, energy-related PLA’s key accomplishment is the level of
and ethical/moral problems of contempo- technology intensiveness that has risen
rary humankind which all brought our civ- dramatically in the past decade. The PRC
ilization into a ‘discussion stalemate’ and has consistently increased its defense
are stimulating aggressive behavior. Ex- spending during many years now; in 2004,
perts and analysts place on record that for example, China’s officially declared de-
about 70 percent of all the countries across fense spending jumped to about $25 billion
the globe have been increasing their de- from $22.37 billion in the previous years.
fense budgets and spending on associated Some analysts, however, think that the in-
re-equipment/re-weaponing programs, crease rate was 11.6 percent. Roughly the


Ukraine-China:

same growth rate has been observed in all its military, especially in the context of its
the following years up to 2010. Some ex- space warfare capability enhancement.
perts, though, believe that total spending Media reports had it that control of the
might be as high as $40-45 billion annually satellite was initially carried out by PLA
because the official budget doesn't include Navy’s satellite communication ships and
funding for weapons programs that are one of its nuclear-powered submarines.
normally set on a single line in the budget The results of the test had never been pub-
plan. The amount of China’s military ex- licly announced, but, if it was a success, the
penditure has always been a subject of se- Pentagon analysts say this could mean that
rious concern for the Pentagon. In a 2007 the Chinese military will not have a long
report, the Pentagon suggested that way to go to achieve a substantial progress
China’s actual defense spending might in improving its ASAT capability.
amount up to $139 billion, a significant in- Another area of priority attention for
crease over the publicly announced figure. the PLA leaders is the development of its
In March 2009, Beijing was planning to in- disruptive warfare capability. Disruptive
crease its defense spending by 14.9%, up to warfare is a form of non-traditional, asym-
$480.686 billion. In this context, a 2009 metric warfare that aims to undermine an
statement by China’s leadership that its opponent’s strengths by exploiting weak-
military arsenal is technologically roughly nesses. The Pentagon believes that China’s
on a level with the world’s most advanced logical strategy is to favor asymmetric ca-
armed forces looks highly symbolic. In an pabilities that target and exploit the weak-
interview whose text is available on the nesses of China’s militarily superior
Chinese Ministry of Defense website, De- opponents, especially the United States, in-
fense Minister Liang Guanglie said that the creasing the potential that China can defeat
PRC has achieved a great milestone in its them. Information warfare operations, es-
military modernization endeavor. pecially cyber attack operations are attrac-
Ukrainian experts must not lose sight tive to the Chinese military as an
of an issue such as the Pentagon’s concerns asymmetric weapon in that it is much more
over China’s anti-satellite and space war- effective than traditional weapons. PLA
fare capabilities. U.S. analysts believe that, analysts believe that the Pentagon has an
over the next few years, the PLA would excessive dependence on civilian computer
have enough technological capabilities in networks and its NIPRNET unsecured net-
hand to temporarily incapacitate or destroy work. It is believed that by attacking these
American satellites in any potential Sino- networks the PLA would be able to disrupt
U.S. military conflict. This concern, based US force deployments in Asia in a poten-
on a thorough examination of the results of tial U.S.-Sino conflict over Taiwan. PLA
China’s January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) commentators point out that by temporar-
test, was voiced, especially, by Chairman ily incapacitating or destroying these com-
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael puter networks the PLA would disrupt
Mullen. The Pentagon’s concerns are re- Taiwan’s capability to respond to a possi-
lated to the launch of China's first lunar or- ble act of aggression by China and, also,
biting satellite, Chang'e 1 in October 2007. would reduce the U.S. potentialities for a
Analysts believe that this launch was of rapid intervention into a conflict should it
paramount significance not only for the arise. Media reports on that subject had it
Chinese scientific community but also for that a disruption of computer networks


Ukraine-China:

supporting communications, financial sought to collect information (most partic-
transactions and energy supply in Taiwan ularly relevant to economy and defense do-
would cause a comprehensive panic, mains), secure own information networks
thereby forcing Taiwanese authorities to and the decision-making community, and
enter into talks with Mainland China. to uphold national unity.
PLA’s printed publications consider infor- Of particular importance to Ukraine is
mation warfare operations as a pre-emp- an aspect such as the Chinese experience
tive weapon to prevent a conflict from with the development of medium- and
escalating further. Here, one of priority ob- short-range missiles. Research and devel-
jectives in information warfare capability opment on missiles in this category has
development is protecting own computer been underway in China since the early
networks from hacker attacks. The PLA 1980s. Three groups of missiles have been
has in recent years begun setting up dedi- created to date, known by their export des-
cated research organizations to experiment ignations M9, M11 and M18. Most widely
with various information warfare scenar- fielded variant is the M9/DF-15 – a single-
ios. Expert research programs in this do- stage solid-fuel missile that was exported
main are well financed and an information to Libya (140 units), Syria (80), Pakistan,
warfare research and development net- Iran and Egypt. The PLA Air Force and
work is being expanded. Interestingly, the Navy additionally possess a combined ar-
PLA does not have an official information senal of 1,500-2,500 cruise missiles. One
warfare doctrine, neither does it have the more reason why this experience is of im-
capability to implement such a doctrine portance to Ukraine is that the Ukrainian
should it be there. Air Force has an inventory of Soviet-vin-
American military experts believe tage tactical missiles. These missiles, whose
that the information warfare concept cur- designers left in Russia after the demise of
rently existing in China does not imply a the USSR, all need in-service support and
war in its traditional, Western sense. It is maintenance by Russian engineers, and
more targeted at non-military applications, Ukraine, on numerous occasions, could not
in contrast to the West where military ap- reach understanding with the Russian side
plication of information warfare technolo- on that issue. Moreover, these arsenals are
gies is more traditional. This approach to antiquated by modern standards, and
warfare offers China a possible solution to therefore need to be rejuvenated. Here, it
the disparity between the capabilities of the must be pointed out that orientation to a
PLA and U.S. forces, while not requiring single military-technological cooperation
China to build a military fully equal to that partner has already had a detrimental ef-
of the United States. The objectives of the fect on military modernization. Ukraine, in
Chinese information warfare concept are 2005, set for itself a task of developing a
projected into a far future, decades away multi-target missile system combining
from now, unlike an equivalent concept in medium-range and short-range capabili-
the United States which is aimed at accom- ties. Ukrainian designers, while having a
plishing results ‘right there, right now’. history in the field of strategic missile sys-
Many evidences have emerged now rein- tems, do not have any experience in the de-
forcing the perception that China is cur- velopment of tactical/operational missile
rently conducting a non-Western-type weapons. For this reason, relevant skills
information warfare; China has recently and technology transfers with the PRC


Ukraine-China:

would be quite justifiable and feasible. In- technologies; cooperative research pro-
tuitively enough, that issue must be ap- grams; licensed production/co-produc-
proached with great caution, as some tion; own scientific-technical initiatives;
problems may arise here, both in the con- expansion of indigenous production ca-
text of limitations stemming from the in- pacities and modernization of the existing
ternational Missile Technology Control defense-industrial base.
Regime (MTCR) and at the level of rela- A characteristic of the current PLA
tionships with the United States. By the transformation/modernization stage is the
very fact of seeking such an opportunity in realization by the country’s military-polit-
relations with the PRC, Kiev sends a mes- ical leadership of the fact that the prime
sage to international community that role in ensuring national security is as-
Ukraine deserves better attitude on behalf signed to the PLA. A number of military
of the key players of global politics who operations at the start of the XXI century
tend to take little if any account of brought to the fore the issue of a widening
Ukraine’s vital interests. In recent years, a technological gap between the armed
clear shift has become visible in the United forces of the Western World and those of
States’ foreign policy, with more priority the rest of the world. This increasingly
given to the development of anti-terrorist widening technological gap spurred the
warfare capabilities. This has lead to alle- Chinese leadership to urge the PLA to seek
viation of the U.S. foreign policy pressure achieving ‘technological leaps’ in order to
on the PRC, and, simultaneously, opened expedite the development of new capabil-
new vistas for China’s enhancing its global ities for increased maneuverability, fire-
profile. This situation could be actively ex- power and precision of fire by way of
ploited by the Ukrainian diplomacy in se- comprehensive informatization of the Chi-
lecting ways to set up a platform for more nese armed forces. Chinese analysts also
intensive, expanded Ukrainian-Sino coop- believe that the first two decades of the XXI
eration. century would be a critical period in the
It must be emphasized here in this transformation and building of new rela-
context that by modernizing its military the tionships between the defense science/re-
PRC is keen to max out scientific and tech- search community and arms industry in
nological advances, creating a backlog of China. This experience should not escape
knowledge for many years to come. Fur- the close examination of Ukraine’s mili-
thermore, the PLA leadership is seeking to tary-political establishment, most particu-
max out the effectiveness of new arms de- larly in the context of enhancement and
velopments by integrating into them reinforcement of the Ukrainian Armed
breakthrough upstream research achieve- Forces and orientation to capabilities of
ments. In such a case, achieving full inde- own Military Establishment.
pendence from foreign defense suppliers The PRC has for many years now
remains a top-priority objective of the Chi- been developing cooperation in military
nese defense industry development. The technology with the Russian Federation.
current stage in the Chinese defense in- This seems to be no impediment to Ukrain-
dustrial complex development is notable ian-Sino cooperation, which is evident by
for an integrated employment of a whole a high enough level of this cooperation
set of various measures, including acquisi- seen today. An important characteristic of
tion of advanced foreign equipment and Ukrainian-Sino cooperation in critical tech-


Ukraine-China:

nology areas is that technologies offered development of bilateral cooperation be-
China by Ukraine and Russia have differ- tween special services.
ent applications and are, therefore, com- In forging cooperation with the PRC,
plementing rather than competing with one must be mindful that China strongly
each other. This perception is reinforced by opposes changing established rules of the
a pretty high level of cooperation the PRC game or previous agreements. This atti-
has maintained with Belarus, this being tude by China could be well observed from
boosted further by highest-level contacts problems emerged in relations with
between leaders of the two states. Ukrainian aircraft engine market ‘Motor-
At the same time, Ukrainian foreign Sich’, over, as claimed by some observers,
policy with respect to China has been no- pricing policy changes. A few years prior
table for a lack of consistency. Even though to this, China cancelled its previously de-
[Ukraine’s defense import/export author- clared intention to acquire a large amount
ity] UkrSpetsExport and some major de- of Il-76 military-transport aircraft from
fense suppliers, among them Motor-Sich Russian suppliers, again, because of
[aeroengine maker] do have their respec- changes of previously agreed price tags.
tive representative offices in China, no in- Also worthy of note is China’s tough atti-
tensification of contacts has been observed tude to quality issues of imported defense
at the top national level. Ex-president products. If we regard a few recent years
Leonid Kuchma, for example, paid two of- of military-technical cooperation, here
ficial visits to the PRC (one of them in a Ukraine has at least one negative example,
two-leg tour that included a trip to Ulan which is evidence, among other things, of
Bator). The sitting president, Viktor the loss of Soviet-era production quality
Yushchenko has never included Beijing on standards. In China’s eyes, Ukraine, sad to
his foreign tour schedules, and visits by say, still remains to be, to a certain degree,
Foreign Minister Petro Poroshenko and a nonresponsive inconsistent partner. One
Defense Minister Yuri Yekhanurov would example is that a well thought-out, once
never have filled in the void in relation- proven noncash-payment scheme option
ships with the key state dominating the did not work out again because the Ukrain-
Southeast Asian region. Even so, we must ian government failed to set up a frame-
not fail to take note that contacts have de- work allowing a defense exporter to barter
veloped pretty well at the industry-to- its products for civilian goods. Not enough
industry level. Also, expert appraisal of the clarity is provided with respect to privati-
existing legal and regulatory framework zation issues, either. Here, Ukraine cannot
for Ukrainian-Sino cooperation is favorable conduct a dialogue at an adequate level,
enough. There has been active work by the while concrete questions about business-
Ukrainian-Sino intergovernmental Mili- plans or international audit checks have,
tary-Technical Cooperation Commission more times than not, been left unanswered.
co-chaired by first deputy Minister of In- Furthermore, Ukraine does not seem to
dustrial Policy of Ukraine. Earlier in 2009, have felt much urgency to push ahead with
for the first time in many years, the Chief of a transparent privatization program for its
the Ukrainian MoD’s Intelligence Direc- defense industry companies. On the other
torate paid an official visit to Beijing, which hand, China will readily support projects
was appreciated by the Chinese side as a targeted at third-country markets. Already
constructive and useful step forward in the available positive experience here gives


Ukraine-China:

reason to hope for an expansion and fur- inclined to take fast decision but, rather,
ther advancement of this area of coopera- tend to thoroughly examine and weigh in
tion. the balance all the options available before
China has always been distinguished determining an acceptable response. Many
for a well though-out, balanced foreign experts believe that China has already
policy, and it therefore cannot be imagined launched a cautious advance on Russian
that the PRC would sign any agreements interests, but Beijing is very unlikely to go
providing security assurances to anybody. for direct confrontation with Moscow. The
A thoroughly calculated, consistent foreign important positive side to Ukraine’s rap-
policy course will stimulate China to be prochement with China is that it does not
highly cautious in taking decisions. There affect or run counter to its rapprochement
is certain to be no precipitation here. Still, with Russia. If Ukraine is to have a rap-
interesting enough, China has a separate prochement with China, it has to evolve
program facilitating cooperation with ex- into a consistent partner, unswervingly ad-
Soviet states. This program provides for a hering to previously assumed obligations.
range of mutually beneficial projects that Also, further advancement of Ukrainian in-
could allow participating countries to en- terests in China calls for a high-level lob-
hance their defense and technological po- bying and an intensification of bilateral
tentialities. An important characteristic of contacts between the leaders of the two
the Chinese leadership is that they are dis- states.


Ukraine-China:

Second chapter
Place of Ukraine in the
China-Ukraine-Russia triangle

A
s the defense market has de- The PRC, who has vigorously worked to
veloped highly dynamically, bring defense production processes to a
it gets pretty difficult some- commercial level and establish, in the
times to draw a line between shortest possible timeframes, indigenous
where mutually beneficial mass series production of previously im-
cooperation ends and open competition ported weapons types and items of de-
begins. fense equipment, has now been
When analyzing in quantitative progressively transferring from the sta-
terms the level of military-technological tus of defense importer to status of pow-
cooperation between countries, it is nec- erful defense supplier. Here, a tendency
essary to understand that volumes of de- could be observed where the Chinese
fense contracts typically make no outpace original design developers in
allowance for close international indus- putting reverse engineered designs into
trial cooperation ties where subcon- production. Simultaneously, original de-
tracted companies supply subsystems sign developers who transfer their most
and assemblies, machinery, or assem- advanced technology to China would
bly/repair kits, or replacement parts. have had little time left to produce new
The topic of upgrading and repairs designs and offer them to the market.
of numerous already operational The result is that the circle of technolo-
weapons systems and items of military gies that China would be interested to
equipment deserves a bit of its own at- obtain has been increasingly narrowing.
tention. The establishment of large serv- As the situation is today, most se-
ice centers in the Customer country is vere competition has been developing
emerging as a new tendency observed along two most visible lines. First, this is
among proven first line defense suppli- competition between Ukraine and Rus-
ers. sia over the Chinese market, and second
In addition to industrial offset pro- is competition within the Ukraine-Rus-
grams, one of factors of no little signifi- sia-China triangle over third markets in
cance is that defense customers are the Asian-Pacific Region, the Middle
increasingly keen to get an access to cur- East and Africa as well as part of the
rent-generation technology and, under- Iranian market. In the latter case,
standably enough, to establish and Ukraine has not been engaged in compe-
further develop their capacities for re- tition for political reasons.
verse engineering and licensed produc- Due to the arms embargo imposed
tion. The latter trend is most apparently on the PRC by the USA and major de-
observed in cooperation with China. fense suppliers in Europe following the


Ukraine-China:

1989 Tainanmen Square massacre, Rus- their developments through from con-
sia and Ukraine still have had the ability ception to construction is conducive to
to sell out to China what has remained of growing competition on the engineering
their scientific research potentials, re- service market. One more explanation
dundant weapons arsenals and surplus might be that most of basic design-fo-
military equipment inventories. In the cused upstream research was carried out
eventuality that the arms embargo back in the 1970-80s, and as such the de-
against the PRC is lifted, as has been velopments are almost finished intellec-
openly pushed for by the EU countries, tual products that cannot be put to use
Western designers could propose China under the conditions where there are a
more advanced technologies than Russia lack of operating assets, limited amount
or Ukraine can. On the other hand, how- and value of Government defense con-
ever, it is the desire by the West to put a tracts, and inability to solicit invest-
brake on the growth of China’s techno- ments, most particularly at the time of
logical potential and military might that economic recession.
has brought about the situation as it is On the other side of that coin, there
now, as Western nations clearly visual- is a major slump in the quality of defense
ize China as a potent competitor threat- production. In addition to a lack of ex-
ening their defense industrial perience with independently doing de-
dominance. sign and development, and a critical
Almost complete dependence of degree of obsolescence and wear-and-
Ukrainian and Russian defense indus- tear of manufacturing assets due to
tries upon the export market has evolved staffing shortfalls, there has been a sharp
into a common threatening tendency for drop in the culture of engineering, as
both countries, this stemming from very well. A board of inquiry set up by the
limited capacity of their respective do- Russian Government to investigate the
mestic defense markets which cannot ab- cause of a series of test launch failures of
sorb enough orders to provide domestic the submarine-launched intercontinental
manufacturers with sustained business ballistic missile ‘Bulava’ could not iden-
or large enough Government contracts. tify the cause of the failures for a long
One of the reasons why Ukraine or time. At the initial stage of investigation,
Russia cannot offer the defense market the finger was pointed to a subcontrac-
any of their fundamentally new designs tor who allegedly supplied faulty ejec-
is very tight budgets of their military tion cartridges used in the separation of
R&D and defense procurement pro- the missile's stages. Eventually, it was
grams. Further aggravating the situa- concluded that the most recent test
tion, the break-up of sound defense launch failed because of a design and
industry cooperation ties that existed be- construction fault of the first stage steer-
tween Ukraine and Russia prior to the ing system. A fatal accident with the
demise of the USSR has brought about a Russian nuclear attack submarine
situation where it takes decades to de- “Nerpa’ which left 20 people dead in No-
velop new designs and turn develop- vember last year could also be consid-
ments into products. The lack of ability ered a consequence of an overall decline
(stemming from a range of objective eco- in technical culture and a shortfall of
nomic reasons) for the designers to see highly skilled workforce.


Ukraine-China:

In addition to this, there has been a ucated and trained at military universi-
considerable upset in the quality control ties in Ukraine and Russia. In this con-
system that previously was based on the text, it may be noted that the latter two
institution of Military Acceptance. As have openly competed on the educa-
was pointed out in a final statement of a tional service market over Chinese stu-
conference on defense industry develop- dents. The 6,500 Chinese students (plus
ment issues hosted by Russian NPO PLA trainees) constitute the single
“Mashinostroyenie” (Scientific/Produc- largest foreign student contingent in
tion Association “Mechanical Engineer- Ukraine (29.25pct of a 45,000-strong for-
ing”), only one in ten defense companies eign student contingent). By comparison,
in Russia have international ISO quality the Russian Federation has a population
management certificates thus far, while of more than 25,000 Chinese students, in-
in Ukraine, a volunteer qualification sys- cluding about 6,000 in Moscow and over
tem for defense products has yet to take 4,000 in St-Petersburg. A considerable
shape. proportion of the Chinese student popu-
Low-level procurements of quality lation have been specializing in technical
weapons systems and military equip- disciplines related to defense technology
ment types result in fewer current-gen- among other things. A slant towards
eration systems being made available for technical education is most apparently
armed forces, thereby limiting their abil- visible among the Chinese student pop-
ity to build up operational experiences ulation, which has not been observed
with such systems. According to expert among student communities of other
figures for 2009, latest generation sys- countries. The foreign student popula-
tems account for a meager six percent of tion structure in terms of specialization
the Russian Federation Armed Forces in- is usually divided among three roughly
ventory. equal domains, with one third of stu-
It is worth of note that the PRC has dents specializing in medicine, one third
ascribed great importance to military in technology and engineering, and a
specialist training, seeking to enhance combined one third in oil and gas, rural
the overall educational level of the PLA economy, culture and other disciplines.
military personnel, which still remains As Western medicine is not practiced in
pretty low. A few teams of senior-rank- the PRC where the Traditional Chinese
ing PLA officers have taken training Medicine dominates, medical students
courses at reputed universities in from China are not to be found in
Ukraine and Russia. Curiously enough, Ukraine or Russia, which explains why
the Chinese trainees were less interested the proportion of students specializing
in the training course content but more in technical disciplines is much higher
in the training process in and of itself -- among the Chinese student population
its philosophy, organization, approaches as compared to student communities
and technique – apparently revealing from other countries.
their intent to put into use the lessons Ongoing armed forces downsizing
learnt in setting up massive military per- in Ukraine and Russia is conducive to
sonnel education and training grid in closures and mergers of military univer-
China. They made no secret of PLA’s in- sities, which has a highly adverse impact
tent to have legions of its specialists ed- on the quality of military specialist edu-


Ukraine-China:

cation and training there. Simultane- In pursuing their military-technical co-
ously, there are occurrences where se- operation policies, countries have to comply
lected Ukrainian scientists and scholars with current limitations relevant to so-called
are invited to visit China to provide high ‘rogue’ states under a variety of international
paying lecture courses on a variety of sanctions. While those limitations are duly
critical subjects relating, among others, respected by most of defense suppliers,
to theory and practice of aircraft carrier China has openly acted in defiance of sanc-
building, which reveals China’s desire to tions of any kind. As traditional markets for
obtain valuable knowledge by this way. defense supplies from Ukraine and Russia
It could well be assumed that Russian had taken shape back in Soviet-era days, the
scholars as well have been engaged to two countries took to competing over the
teach courses in China, both in private once shared market space.
capacity or under lecturer exchange pro- Holding huge financial resources in
grams. hand, China confines itself to purchasing
Financial support being provided small quantities, placing an emphasis on
by China to selected renowned foreign acquiring production licenses, engineer-
defense designers, and China’s engaging ing documentation and manuals with an
them to assist in the design and devel- apparent goal of subsequently reproduc-
opment of indigenous arms and military ing the defense designs obtained. By en-
equipment designs has in its basis the as- gaging foreign developers to assist in
piration to get access to new-generation R&D projects for indigenous defense de-
technology and build up own experience signs, China pursues the objectives to get
with independently doing R&D. This ob- comprehensive knowledge of current-
viously suggests that the PRC has been generation technologies, obtain relevant
deviating from reverse engineering as experiences and acquire intellectual
key defense technology development property products without purchasing
tool and, instead, progressively redirect- end products. Yet through it all, it must
ing its effort towards the establishment be noted that it was cooperation with
of scientific schools of its own. China that enabled survival of most of
A factor of no little significance is that the defense companies that remained in
China is geographically close to the Third place in Ukraine and Russia following
World countries who previously were tra- the Soviet collapse.
ditional customers for Soviet-supplied Either way, after acquiring sufficient
weapons systems. Here, China has ex- scientific-technological potentialities to
panded its political influence on those support its further technological develop-
countries and supplied them with licensed ment, China is going to give up coopera-
produced weapons types. Western Euro- tion with defense partners in Ukraine and
pean countries and their traditional markets Russia once it becomes economically un-
on the Euro-Asian continent have been ef- feasible. Future cooperation will only take
fectively closed to defense suppliers from place with dynamically developing de-
Russia or Ukraine. Interests of defense sup- signer companies capable of independ-
pliers are usually focused on countries with ently producing innovative designs. It
high GDP or excessive financial resources, must be noted for that matter that China
whereas markets in underdeveloped coun- once proposed Ukraine establishing a
tries usually remain to be neglected. range of industrial partnerships and setting


Ukraine-China:

up a research-and-technology park in accessible to it in Ukraine or Russia. This
Ukraine, but those proposals have never would enable it to emerge as a most power-
been materialized. Even though technol- ful competitor on third markets – powerful
ogy parks, according to statistics data, ac- to the extent as to oust Ukrainian and Russ-
count for no more than 13 percent of ian defense companies from their old tradi-
innovative product output, they attract tional markets, with only few critical
pinpoint investments in promising projects technologies remaining the exclusive
due to access to low-soft lending programs province of Ukraine and Russia.
and tax exemptions. Marked manifestation Basically, cooperation and growing
of inertia being observed there arises from competition between the three countries
considerable juridical difficulties involved could be observed on markets for the fol-
in official registration of technology parks lowing:
which require legislative amendments to •Satellite launch services and
be established. Regarding defense compa- co-development of satellite navigation
nies in Ukraine and Russia, cooperation systems;
with China almost always takes place in •Aeronautical technologies;
cases involving most easily producible de- •Land warfare equipment;
fense designs created 20 to 25 years ago. In •Naval ships and related
such a case, the shortest possible time limit weapons and systems;
required for China to reproduce a selected •Air defense systems.
design has been reduced to two years. In In addition, separate consideration
the opinion of a number of Ukrainian de- should be given to:
fense industry sources (general designers •Rocket and missile technolo-
at premier defense companies), the end of gies;
the active phase of cooperation with China •Control and communication
might be expected in five to seven years systems, electronic intercept radio intel-
from now, enough for the PRC to launch ligence systems, electronic warfare
indigenous production of reverse engi- equipment;
neered designs and oust Ukrainian and •Joint R&D activities;
Russian defense companies from their tra- •Educational services (military
ditional markets. Truth be told, this does specialist training)
not apply (at least at this point in time) to
the AFV and aircraft engine domains.
On the other hand, the PRC, by most
Problems involved in
conservative estimate, procured from $1.8 safeguarding intellectual
to 2.0 billion worth of weapons and de- property rights
fense equipment in each of the recent 15 Some interesting relationships, both
years when it achieved a considerable mil- in legal and moral terms, have arisen be-
itary-technological quality leap. After- tween individual companies in Ukraine,
wards, the amount of foreign defense Russia and China as well as at the trina-
procurements was willfully reduced to the tional level over intellectual-property
minimum. rights to technologies involved in some or
By expert estimates, China will, in the other military design.
foreseeable future, be able to establish pro- At the panel session on “Problems in-
duction of most of the defense technologies volved in safeguarding intellectual prop-


Ukraine-China:

erty rights relating to defense-industrial co- Ukrainian Minister of Industrial Policy,
operation between the Russian Federation V.Novicki. Even though Ukraine and Rus-
and foreign states” that took place in Janu- sia had previously jointly carried out a sim-
ary 2008 as part of the Infoforum-10 on ilar contract to supply four same-class
“Safeguarding intellectual property rights ‘Zubr’ air cushion landing vehicles to the
and the exploitation of the results of intel- Hellenic Navy, neither of the two has the
lectual property”, hosted by Moscow’s Sci- capability to build vehicles of this type sin-
entific Research Institute of Intellectual gle-handedly. Ukraine’s workshare in
Property, it was pointed out in a report building vehicles of this type is estimated
presented by E.A.Livadny that the China by analysts at no less than 40 percent, plus
North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) a major part of warranty and post-war-
was manufacturing without proper license ranty servicing provided by Research and
some individual small arms weapons types Manufacturing Gas Turbine Corporation
derived from the Kalashnikov AK-47 as- Zoria-Mashproekt. Competition over the
sault rifle: Type 97, Type CQ, Type 56 Hellenic Navy’s contract was fierce; it even
(copy of the AK-47), Type 68, Type 81, continued when work on the contract was
Type WQ 314 and Type WQ 314A. The already in progress, which resulted in a re-
same report said that China has established vision of the terms of the deal. The result
production of reverse engineered copies of was that the value of the $200mn contract
some of Russian-designed weapons sys- previously equally shared between the
tems, among them the AO-80K air defense Ukrainian and Russian contractors was re-
gun, the laser-guided 155mm projectile distributed in the latter’s favor by a factor
‘Krasnopol’ and the ‘Fregat M2EM’ naval of 1 to 3. The situation was eventually re-
radar, as well as the naval radar ‘Mineral- solved to satisfaction of Ukraine who was
ME’ designed by what is now the State En- awarded a compensating contract to sup-
terprise ‘Scientific-Research Institute of ply a TP-400-type ship transporter plat-
Radar Equipment ‘Kvant-Radiolocation’ form built at Sevmorzavod Shipbuilding
based in Kiev. Yard in Sevastopol. The value of the ‘Zubr’
Ukrainian designers are speaking of contract with China may amount to
numerous facts where equipment once $315mn, provided that the supply package
supplied to China had, while under war- includes the complete set of engineering
ranty, been subject to unauthorized open- documentation and manuals as demanded
ing with the aim of studying the structure by the Customer. It was reported by vari-
and construction of, and subsequently re- ous media sources that Russia was negoti-
producing its constituent subsystems. ating the transfer of production license for
However, no official complaints have ever the Zubr to China in 2007, in a package in-
been made out of fear of losing well-pay- cluding the supply of 10 to 15 such vehicles
ing customers. to be built at Russian shipyards. At various
Most illustrative in terms of copyright stages of the negotiating process, the
protection might be the two examples as amount of the supply varied from four ve-
described below. hicles (for $215mn) to six and ten vehicles,
First is about the contract from China but the negotiating parties had never ar-
to supply four Type 1232.2 ‘Zubr’ small rived to any compromised agreement. The
landing craft air cushion vehicles, whose Russian company Central Maritime Design
signing was announced in May 2009 by the and Development Bureau ‘Almaz’ based in


Ukraine-China:

St.-Petersburg has stated that the Ukrain- Exactly the converse situation in
ian party violates its intellectual property terms of safeguarding intellectual property
rights by transferring (or selling) engineer- rights is being observed with Ukraine’s top
ing documentation and manuals for the designer of naval radar systems, the Kiev-
‘Zubr’ small landing craft air cushion vehi- based Scientific Research Institute of Radar
cle to a third party without the Designer’s Equipment ‘Kvant-Radiolocation’. Its port-
authorization. UkrSpetsExport, Ukraine’s folio of highly successful Soviet-era de-
defense import/export authority, does rec- signs includes a range of 2D and 3D naval
ognize that copyright to the ‘Zubr’ design radar systems, among them the ‘Pozitiv’,
belongs to Almaz. Simultaneously, it the passive radar system ‘Mineral’, the tar-
points out that air cushion vehicles of this get designating radar system ‘Uspekh’ and
design have been built by Ukrainian ship- the ‘Mars-Passat’ (the Soviet alternative to
building yard FSK ‘Morye’ on the strength the US-designed integrated naval weapons
of bilateral agreement on intellectual prop- system AEGIS). Not only Kvant-Radiolo-
erty rights to ex-Soviet military designs, cation is designer of naval radar equip-
which allows the signatory parties to em- ment, but it also employs a manufacturing
ploy design concepts, engineering docu- plant in Kiev to series-produce own de-
mentation and manuals available to them. signs.
It requires that any kind of activities in- Kvant-Radiolocation is currently as-
volving the use of copyrighted designs or sisting its Russian counterparts in pre-pro-
safeguarding intellectual property rights duction works at a newly-built factory
should be performed in agreement be- where it was planned to be relocated at the
tween the signatory parties, but says noth- time before the USSR fell apart. Russian
ing about the intellectual property rights manufacturers of Kvant-Radiolocation’s
emerged in between the collapse of the So- designs are telling potential customers that
viet Union and the day when the agree- what they offer them are all their own de-
ment took effect a couple of years ago. signs that they sell with a minimum modi-
Therefore, the companies — fully com- fication. They don’t even bother to
prehending that in absence of contracts for re-designate the ‘adopted’ designs, except
the building of vessels of this unique design for changing the last few symbols in the
they would lose the capability to build them original designation name. In this particu-
or would cease to exist altogether -- are keen lar case, Kvant-Radiolocation has a strong
to take advantage of the last opportunity to interest in already existing cooperation ties
improve their situation through the Chinese to be maintained and developed further; it
order. It is obvious to all that exports of has opted to forget ‘past endeavors’ and
Russian- or Ukrainian-built Zubr-type ACVs concentrate its effort on new developments
would reduce to near zero once China gets rather than to compromise relationships
hold of the documents required for produc- with Russian partners.
tion of the hovercraft of this design to be Kvant-Radiolocation is currently a
launched at its own yards. As the situation at successful supplier of radar equipment to
the Ukrainian shipbuilder FSK ‘Morye’ is far China. It is now completing design and de-
worse than that at Almaz, the former would velopment of a command and control com-
agree to cooperate with China on much less puter system (C2CS, an equivalent of
beneficial terms and conditions, which in- AEGIS-class integrated command/man-
deed is what would suit the book of China. agement information system) for PLA


Ukraine-China:

Navy’s new Type-956 destroyers and, pos- Soviet-supplied weapons types, among
sibly, future aircraft carriers. In addition to them the P-15 cruise missile. But test flights
this, Kvant-Radiolocation supplies a con- of P-15 clones have all failed, as Chinese
siderable portion of radar and optoelec- engineers did not know even the first word
tronic systems for naval ships being built about rocket building. Ironically, now an-
for the PLA Navy in Russia. In so doing, tiquated concept of closed architecture (as
the Ukrainian company does not raise opposed to newer open-architecture con-
claim either to Russia or China. To make an cept) is more effective in terms of copyright
estimate of Kvant-Radiolocation’s contri- protection in that it does not allow poten-
bution, suffice it to have a look at the com- tial users to see inside or reproduce all or
position of the electronic countermeasure parts of a specific weapons design archi-
equipment package on the PLA Navy’s tecture. Even though the Ukrainian com-
Type-965E and Type-956ME destroyers pany is involved in the design and
that were supplied as wholly Russian-de- development of almost the complete set of
signed without any mention made what- sonar system types (underkeel, towed,
soever of the Ukrainian contribution. In add-on, helicopter-deployed), its products
addition to electronic warfare equipment, still remain an unknown quantity on most
the propulsion-machinery plant on the de- of potential markets. Nonetheless, Ukrain-
stroyers was designed in Ukraine’s Zapor- ian companies enjoy pre-eminence in the
izhzhia, as well. It might be noted for that global market for airborne anti-submarine
matter that the PRC has already launched radio sonobuoys, with the Russian Federa-
the effort to design and develop indige- tion and some NATO countries being
nous copies of some Russian-supplied de- among major customers. Radio sonobuoys
stroyer types, whereas Russia has yet to of the RGB series (RGB-
launch the development phase of a new de- 15/16/17/25/55/75) had been series man-
stroyer design where a premium is being ufactured at a factory in Kiev and,
apparently placed on innovative naval previously, in Nova Kakhovka. Kiev’s
weapons designs developed with revenues Radio Equipment Factory supplies ‘Os-
from the Indian Navy’s contracts. Ukraine minog’ (Octopus)-series target search and
and Russia both want to tap into the prom- track radar systems for integration with the
ising market for stealth corvettes, and in- K-28 helicopters exported by Russia to
tend to begin design and development of China (to date, seven units of the ‘Os-
future frigates of indigenous designs. In minog’ radar system have been supplied).
the marketplaces for corvettes and frigates, In this particular case, not only do Ukrain-
China has successfully promoted its earlier ian companies provide support for Russian
designs on Asian-Pacific markets. defense export contracts with the PRC, but,
In the case of hydroacoustic equip- to a certain degree, maintain a stranglehold
ment, similar situation could be observed. on some niche markets.
Here, however, Ukrainian company Kiev’s At the time when Ukrainian and
Scientific Research Institute of Sonar Russian economies were in deep collapse
Equipment is in a worse standing, being in the first few years immediately follow-
overshadowed by its Russian counterpart ing the disintegration of the USSR, neither
and not having a large enough portfolio of of the two could afford further maintain-
torpedo systems products. China previ- ing naval vessels of that big displacement
ously was making attempts to reproduce and, simultaneously, both were in desper-


Ukraine-China:

ate need of cash. As a result, China had ob- panies believe that visits by Chinese dele-
tained a few large naval ships that once gations on some occasions are not aimed at
epitomized the heyday of the Soviet naval forging a deal but, in actual fact, are mani-
shipbuilding school of thought, at a price festations of industrial espionage aimed at
even cheaper than that of ferrous scrap of collecting information about new technol-
an equivalent weight. In such a case, Russ- ogy and directions of future developments.
ian military officials managed to transfer Of course, some manifestations of open es-
even some top-secret assembly units to pionage (which is punishable by law) do
China. The Type 11436 aircraft carrying take place, as well. On July 28, 2009, Russ-
cruiser ‘Variag’ was towed to Dalyan Ship- ian Customs officers at Zabaikalsk-
yard from the Black Sea Shipbuilding Yard Manchuria international automobile
in Mykolayiv when it was 67% ready in checkpoint detained an exiting Chinese cit-
2002. Here, the PRC, while trying to see in- izen attempting to smuggle fighter aircraft
side the obtained military equipment de- power supply equipment that was dis-
signs, has been simultaneously making guised as pressure devices hidden in the
attempts to establish indigenous military luggage boot of his vehicle. Intellectual
design schools of thought and engineer in- property protection issues are closely in-
novative construction materials without ar- terrelated with keeping commercial and
bitrarily copying the technology solutions Government secrets, most notably in cases
acquired. This point could be underscored where potentialities for future cooperation
by China’s development of indigenous tor- and the status of modern designs make the
pedo weapons system series derived from transfer of new (but not newest) technolo-
American, Italian and ex-Soviet counter- gies quite feasible. Intellectual property
parts. The Chinese have built an indige- protection issues involved with military-
nous current-generation torpedo system technological cooperation programs of the
and, on a parallel track, developed a few Russian Federation, Ukraine and the PRC
innovative construction materials, i.e. for do exist for the copyright holders who can-
the torpedo’s fore section, a design whose not develop themselves further or offer
engineers have been awarded a state prize manufacture-ready innovative design so-
by the PRC Government. lutions. No matter whether an appropriate
Ukrainian and Russian naval design- contractual basis is in place or not, any
ers have complemented each other on a kind of a weapons system or an item of
number of niche markets, which has impli- defense equipment obtained from a for-
cations for their respective intellectual eign supplier may, to some or other de-
property rights. Conflicts do arise in situa- gree, potentially provide a basic design
tions where copyright holders begin ‘tilt- around which to build an indigenous de-
ing at windmills’ when they realize that rivative. For this reason, weapons types
they have nothing new to offer the market. designed for the export market should
The nature of copyright abuses lies in not contain newest-generation designs
differences between free-market Western but, rather, those of the latest but one gen-
ideology and socialist ideology. Remaining eration. As is lamentably often the case,
fully socialist, the PRC, as did the USSR in some Ukrainian defense designers, left
its own time, has openly abused intellec- without Government support, would not
tual property laws in the hunt for new stop short of selling out their most latest,
technology. Officials at some defense com- if not last designs.


Ukraine-China:

Competition on the space Russian partners provided the software
component. Therefore, in this particular
services market case, Ukrainian and Russian companies are
Russia and the PRC both have the complementing one another.
possession of a great deal of modern-gen- CJSC ‘Cosmotras’, a joint partnership
eration ballistic missiles, while Ukraine between Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan,
boasts of having a very rich experience has been converting the RS-20 (NATO re-
with designing, developing and manufac- porting name SS-18 ‘Satan’) ICBM into the
turing them. However, cooperation in the ‘Dnepr’ SLV for Russia, and it employs the
ballistic missile area — because of national converted rocket for launching small satel-
security considerations and the limitations lites from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in
assumed by countries in connection with Kazakhstan and a launch site of the Russ-
their international obligations relating to ian Strategic Missile Forces’ Yasnensk Mis-
nonproliferation of missile technologies – sile Division in Orenburg Region.
is restricted to the development of new ma- On August 31, 2009, Chinese launch
terials. Simultaneously, there is a fierce vehicle CZ-3B partially failed during the
competition observed on the space launch launch due to a third stage malfunction
market where each and all members of the which resulted in Indonesian communica-
space-faring club have been engaged. A tions satellite Palapa-D1 reaching a lower
most distinguishable characteristic of the than planned orbit. This was the first inci-
space services market is reluctance by any dent involving Chinese space launch vehi-
of the market players to share critical tech- cles in 13 years since August 1996. To date,
nologies with competitors. the PRC has carried out 77 successful space
Even though the PRC has been build- launches, revealing its aspiration to seize
ing indigenous space launch vehicles and part of the space launch market.
has launched a human spaceflight itself, it In late June 2009, international consor-
is still lagging in this domain far behind tium Sea Launch that comprises Ukrainian
other countries, including Russia and participants ‘Yuzhnoye’ Design Bureau and
Ukraine. NPO ‘Yuzhmash’ (a leading provider of
Russia and Ukraine both have opted launch services to the commercial satellite
the way of converting intercontinental bal- industry) filed voluntary petitions to reor-
listic missiles into commercial space launch ganize under Chapter 11 of the United States
vehicles (SLVs). The SLV ‘Rokot’, for ex- Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bank-
ample, has been built by way of converting ruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.
the PS-18 (NATO reporting name SS-19 Usually well-informed sources believe that
‘Stiletto’) ICBM. Rokot employs the the main reason why Sea Launch has slowed
Stiletto’s boost cluster as the first and sec- down the rate of its operations recently is in-
ond stages, while the upper stage is the ability by Russian company NPO ‘Energo-
newly-developed ‘Briz-KM’. Ukrainian mash’ to supply Yuzhmash with sufficient
company OJSC ‘Khartron’ based in numbers of sustainer engines for Zenith-3SL
Kharkiv is the designer, maker and sup- rockets employed for Sea Launch opera-
plier of control systems both for the SS-19 tions. They are claiming that Energomash is
Stiletto ICBM and the Rokot SLV. Control now more focused on cooperation with
system hardware for the ‘Briz-KM’ upper Lockheed Martin, supplying it with sus-
stage was developed by Khartron, while tainer engines for its ‘Atlas’ SLVs.


Ukraine-China:

A project is now nearing completion The PRC is apparently experiencing
in Ukraine to build a prototype of a funda- difficulties in building its indigenous satel-
mentally new SLV design to be known as lite navigation and positioning system Bei-
Cyclone-4. Being designated as the dou (‘Northern Dipper’ or ‘Ursa Major’).
youngest member of the Cyclone family, Incidentally, the Russian-Chinese joint-
the Cyclone-4 will, in actual fact, have little venture partnership Ural & Hangsheng
if anything in common with its older sib- Autoelectronics Co. Ltd., anticipating al-
lings. The Cyclone-4 has been scheduled to most simultaneous arrival of China’s Bei-
be ready to carry out its maiden launch dou and Russia’s GLONASS satellite
from the Alcantara Space Center (Centro navigation systems to the market, has al-
de Lançamento de Alcântara) in Brazil in ready launched the design and develop-
late 2010 or early 2011. ment of a receiver combining Beidou and
It might be noted that, according to GLONASS reception. Ukraine enjoys ex-
expert estimates, space launch services ac- perience with developing satellite naviga-
count for only about 5% of the overall tion systems, along with the USA
value of the space services market. Here, (NAVSTAR) and Russia (GLONASS). Rus-
most of the market in value terms is ac- sia has maintained its GLONASS satellite
counted for by services for the design, de- constellation as an alternative to the United
velopment and construction of spacecraft States’ GPS satellite navigation and posi-
and relating systems. This market is domi- tioning system. However, development of
nated by the U.S., Great Britain, France and the GLONASS project’s commercial com-
the Russian Federation. As far as Ukraine is ponent has been hampered by the lack of a
concerned, it has successful experiences cost effective receiver solution. Here,
with building Earth monitoring satellites Ukrainian company Orizon-Navigation
but still does not have even a single com- based in Smila, Cherkasy Region, has
munication satellite of its own. Ukraine’s closely and actively cooperated with its
first ever communication satellite will be Russian counterparts, doing processor lay-
designed, developed and built in Canada. out generation works. But Orizon-Naviga-
Separately, it may be noted that tion, as is the case with its Russian
Ukrainian companies have provided de- partners, does not have the possession of
signer’s technical supervision and in-ser- current-generation production technology
vice support and maintenance for the for its microelectronic circuits, and there-
intercontinental ballistic missiles remain- fore cannot compete with more technolog-
ing on stand-by duty in Russia. In such a ically advanced suppliers. Cooperation by
case, Moscow is apparently reluctant to tap Ukrainian companies with European part-
Ukrainian rocket builders for own ICBM- ners in the planned ‘Galileo’ satellite navi-
focused programs, while being obviously gation and positioning system of the
incapable of developing and building mis- European Union should not be considered
sile systems on its own. Russian designers as a manifestation of direct competition
will certainly eventually succeed in creat- with Russian companies, even though Rus-
ing a current-generation ICBM design some sia does not have an interest in more navi-
time in the future, but by engaging Ukrain- gation systems to be deployed on orbit
ian partners to assist in that effort they along with its GLONASS constellation. In
would achieve this goal more sooner and in this sense, China has launched a challenge
a more efficient yet less expensive way. against space-faring nations by announc-


Ukraine-China:

ing plans to deploy an indigenous satellite only considered here as weapons plat-
navigation system, the ‘Beidou’. In its cur- forms. In the Russia-Ukraine-China trian-
rent configuration, however, the Beidou gle, the unrivaled leader in the field of
has limited application and a coverage lim- missile weapons is the Russian Federation.
ited to the territory of China itself. In re- Any of the world designers have never
sponse to this move by China, Japan has managed to develop anything comparable
declared intention to set up own satellite in operational efficiency to the missile sys-
navigation system, but there has been no tem types created in Russia back in Soviet-
reports to date of Tokyo making any prac- era days. The USSR, reciprocally, had
tical implementation measures to this end. successfully reproduced U.S.-designed
It may be noted in this context that anti-ship missiles Tomahawk and Har-
Russian spacecraft are far inferior to Amer- poon, under designator names ‘Granat’
ican counterparts in operational capabili- and Kh-35, respectively. In the anti-ship
ties and lifetime (in sum their quality), and missile domain, China only has two in-
next-generation Russian satellites are not digenous designs, the C-801 and C-802 (the
expected to equal currently operational latter featuring an air breathing engine),
U.S. satellites in performance capabilities both of which are much inferior to U.S. and
until 2014-2016. Russian equivalents in operational capa-
So, the above indicates that Ukraine bilities. At the same time, the PRC has long
and Russia are cooperating with and com- caught up with Russia in the fields such as
plementing each other on the missile and artillery and multiple-launch rocket sys-
space services markets, and, to a limited tems. Even though they may not be as ca-
degree, are competing with one another on pable as Russian or Western-designed
the space launch market where the PRC is alternatives, still their indisputable com-
emerging as a viable competitor to Ukraine petitive advantage is much lower cost than
and Russia that of rival equivalents. Given that con-
ventional artillery systems had reached the
limit of their technological development
Competition on the rocket and back at the WWII time (with only fire con-
artillery markets trol system being improved in postwar
A common competitive disadvantage years), China has, in actual fact, developed
of Ukrainian and Chinese defense indus- a last century’s generation technology. In
tries (specifically Ukraine’s naval ship- the development of future-generation ar-
building industry) is the lack of advanced tillery weapons such as electromagnetic
shipboard missile system designs. Naval guns or liquid projectile weapons, the level
ships are cheaper to build in China than in of competition is difficult to evaluate, as
Ukraine or Russia. Asian-Pacific countries the developments are kept in secret and an
would build supersize vessels within a operational prototype is not to be built in
shorter timeframe and, often, with a higher the U.S. until 2025. A quite similar situation
quality. Moreover, at the time of economic could be observed in the domain of laser
recession, they openly resort to price weapon systems where the Russian Feder-
dumping practices by reducing prices by ation is the only country to have demon-
18-20 percent to get an extra edge over strated successful developments.
their European rivals. Naval ships, combat The PRC has successfully marketed
aircraft and armored fighting vehicles are indigenously-designed highly capable


Ukraine-China:

multiple rocket launchers, while Ukraine vated by its desire to get access to unique
has recently demonstrated an indigenous supersonic ramjet anti-ship missile
equivalent whereby an emphasis is obvi- ‘Moskit’. Russian non-nuclear submarine
ously placed on operational comfort for the designs, as well, include integrated anti-
launcher crew. sub/ship cruise missile systems of the
A rare manifestation of competition on ‘Klub’ series. Previously, when the USA
the rocket and artillery market was Russia’s was showing interest in purchasing a ship-
transfer of production license for the ment of Russian anti-ship cruise missiles
‘Krasnopol-M’ weapon to the PRC, in a pack- ‘Moskit’ (NATO reporting name SS-N-22
age with 1,000 precision-guided rounds of ‘Sunburn’) in a package with a few attack
this type. This means to say that more capable craft as carrier platforms, the Russian de-
Ukrainian equivalent ‘Kvitnyk’ (designed by signer of the missile, in an article published
Nizhyn’s Central Design and Development in ‘Komsomolskaya Pravda’, protested the
Bureau ‘Tochnist’) will never be able to make planned deal, saying that the USA, with its
it to the Chinese market. Furthermore, ex- virtually unlimited financial resources and
pected mass production of precision weapons technological potentialities, would be able
in this category at Chinese factories might to use the design as a basis for building an
threaten Ukrainian and Russian suppliers on indigenous equivalent capable of mid-
third-country markets. course speeds of up to 4.5 km/s. The
The PRC has already advanced ahead planned deal was scrapped after the
of Ukraine in some weapons technology protest. The ‘Moskit’, simple as it may im-
areas where Ukraine was previously a tech- mediately seem, is, in actual fact, a highly
nology donor. Now Ukraine itself is inter- sophisticated design which China will not
ested in reverse transfer of some Chinese be able to replicate or begin to mass pro-
technology required for building an indige- duce in the foreseeable future. On the other
nous tactical/operational missile system de- hand, the PRC has already obtained pro-
sign based on advanced and cost effective duction licenses for the Kh-35/AS-20
materials and electronic assembly units. The ‘Kayak’ and Kh-31A/AS-17 ‘Krypton’ anti-
PRC has also advanced far ahead recently in ship missiles.
robotic engineering and UAV development. In the field of submarine design and
It will therefore be easily understood construction, Ukraine is no competitor to
that, in the rocket and artillery market, Russia, as it does not have indigenous de-
Ukraine is interested in Chinese and Russ- signs in this domain, neither does its Navy
ian technologies, which would undermine have a substantial enough requirement for
its own position as arms supplier on the one submarines (it is estimated at 3-9 sub-
hand, but would simultaneously open new marines at most). As for China, it has vig-
vistas for international collaboration on the orously worked to develop reverse
other hand. engineered copies of the Type 877 Var-
shavyanka-class non-nuclear submarine
and its more recently designed versions,
Competition on the and even has launched the building of
naval market atomic submarines. After taking delivery
China’s selection of Russia as the sup- of the Varshavyanka in 2002, the Chinese
plier of a few expensive destroyers for the built a replica of the submarine’s hull in
PLA Navy was, to a large degree, moti- 2004 and, probably, ‘stuffed’ it with


Ukraine-China:

weapons whose types could not be viewed and again express an interest in a ship of
on overhead images in sufficient resolu- that class. For China, however, acquiring
tion. It could be well assumed that it won’t that type of a ship would be highly prob-
be long before the PRC would be able to lematic, given that the cruiser’s weapons
copy and build the sub’s key systems, as complement includes 16 anti-ship cruise
well. Considering the progress made by missiles capable of ranges in excess of 500
the PRC in microelectronics, radiolocation kilometers – a prospect that would cer-
and hydroacoustics, Beijing may soon tainly raise protests from the U.S., Taiwan
begin supplying naval vessels in all cate- and Japan. Russia, despite its rapidly
gories (with efficient enough naval growing geopolitical ambitions, is afraid to
weapons packages) to third-country mar- assume extra financial burdens for the
kets where it is going to face a competition completion and subsequent operation and
from Russia. The PRC has recently deliv- maintenance of that large ship. With regret,
ered the first-of-class F-22P frigate to the we point out here that the suggestions
Pakistan Navy, under a four-vessel being voiced for the unfinished cruiser to
$750mn contract awarded in 2004. Naval be employed as a seaborne anti-ballistic
electronic equipment on the first F-22P missile launch platform are almost as real-
frigate is almost entirely made in China. istic as creating a human settlement on
Previously, the PRC was supplying naval Mars.
ships to Thailand and Algeria. In the field of ship repairs, Ukraine
In the field of naval weapons, Ukraine enjoys some advantages over Russia, in
could cooperate both with the PRC and the that Ukraine supplies propulsion systems
Russian Federation. However, cooperation for most of ex-Soviet naval ship designs,
here might not be of a large scale, as the and, furthermore, the cost of ship repair
PRC and Russia both have excessive ship- services is cheaper in Ukraine. The PRC
building capacities. Ukraine has huge po- has seriously considered having its Type
tentialities and experiences with naval ship 956 destroyers repaired at Ukrainian yards.
developments. Even so, cooperation with As well as ship repairs, Ukraine has an
Russia or the PRC here is hardly possible, edge over Russia in the naval ship upgrad-
given that the former can do well on its ing market, as well, most particularly with
own without anybody’s help, while the lat- respect to gas-turbine engines which Rus-
ter, even though it does have a requirement sia does not manufacture thus far (naval
for naval ship designs, would prefer ob- gas-turbine manufacturing facilities being
taining them ‘for free’. Furthermore, it is under construction in Russia will not be
most unlikely that any of the two super- able to offer competitive products during
powers would openly recognize the need the mid-term period).
to have Ukrainian design companies en- Research and Manufacturing Gas
gaged in their respective naval shipbuild- Turbine Corporation Zoria-Mashproekt,
ing programs. earlier in 2009, was awarded a Chinese
One more area of common interest for contract to supply four naval gas-turbine
the three countries could be the completion engines worth $55mn, in addition to three
of the Type 1164 Missile Cruiser ‘Ukrayina’ large-scale orders from the Russian Navy.
that is currently staying unfinished at the It is worth of note that Ukrainian ship
61 Kommunara Shipbuilding Yard in repair yards in Sevastopol (which have
Mykolayiv. Both Russia and the PRC ever currently been employed as leased prop-


Ukraine-China:

erty by the Russian Black Sea Fleet, under defense modernization and improvement
a lease agreement expiring in 2017) are op- programs are restricted to a limited up-
erating at 100pct of capacity and provided grade of technically obsolescent and worn-
with sustained business through the lease out short range mobile SAM systems
period. As a result of ongoing fight for OSA/SA-8 ‘Gecko’ and, more rcently de-
property rights in Ukraine, a number of signed, self-propelled medium-range SAM
ship repair plants have been in deep col- systems of the BUK series, as well as re-
lapse, all the blame for their problems pairs on long-range S-300-series SAM sys-
being fixed on ‘ineffective management’. tems. The sales (including replacement
Therefore, in the naval shipbuilding parts) and repairs of soon-to-be-phased-
area, Ukraine has the possession of power- out SAM systems S-75/SA-2 ‘Guideline’
ful design and development capacities. At and S-125/SA-3 ‘Goa’ could be safely neg-
the same time, Ukrainian naval shipbuild- lected. A project to launch overall repairs
ing yards cannot hope for export contracts, of S-300-series SAM systems on the prem-
at least pending successful completion of a ises of Kiev’s Repair Plant ‘Radian’ proved
program to build four corvettes to meet the to be a total failure, while the State Enter-
Ukrainian Navy requirement. The Russian prise ‘Generator Plant’ (who was to be
Federation and the PRC both have the pos- made responsible for upgrading transmit-
session of substantial shipbuilding capaci- ter-receiver subsystems for the S-300) has
ties, providing a direct competition to currently been undergoing bankruptcy
Ukraine on third-country markets. In ab- proceedings.
sence of indigenous naval weapons de- To date, the Russian Federation has
signs, Ukraine has to engage with foreign exported a total of 40 S-300-series SAM fire
countries. Here, Chinese weapons are units to the PRC. In addition, Russia has as-
cheaper, whereas Russian weapons are sisted China in developing a copy of its S-
more advanced and of higher quality, even 300PMU-1 SAM design under Chinese
against the backdrop of Western counter- code name HQ-9, along with its simplified
parts. On the naval market, Ukraine’ main version FT-2000. Previously, China
competitive advantages over Russia or launched full-rate series production of the
China are its gas turbine engine develop- HQ-2-type SAM system (indigenous
ment and production capacities (which are replica of the S-75). It is worth of note here
far more advanced than those in Russia or that the PRC was purchasing SAM weapon
the PRC) and the capability to provide systems from Western suppliers until it
modestly-priced high-quality repair and came under international arms embargo in
maintenance services. 1989.
Ukraine has since 1993 persistently
proposed that Russia should assist in up-
Competition on the air grading to modern standards and extend-
defense market ing operational life of the UAF’s SAM
Comparing with the naval market, sit- weapons inventory. To date, agreements
uation is pretty different for Ukraine on the have been reached with Russia on a very
air defense market. For one thing, Russia limited number а projects. In 2003, a joint
enjoys pre-eminence on that market. Sec- project was completed to extend opera-
ond, Ukraine cannot offer competitive tional life of the UAF’s 5V55R and S-300P
enough current-generation designs. Its air SAM system inventories from 10 to 15


Ukraine-China:

years. The core of Ukraine’s surface-to-air The PRC has developed and is offer-
missile shield is comprised by Soviet-era ing potential export customers a range of
S-300PT and S-300PS SAM systems manu- indigenous medium-range SAM systems
factured back in the mid-1990s and pro- derived from the Western designs obtained
viding effective engagement ranges limited prior to 1989 when it came under an inter-
to 75 km. Newer and more capable S-300- national arms embargo. Using some West-
series versions had never reached Ukraine, ern and ex-Soviet SAM designs as a basis,
unlike China whom Russia was supplying the PRC has developed indigenous short-
with the S-300PMU-1 and S-300PMU-2 range SAM systems HQ-7 and HQ-61A, in
configurations. The HQ-9 SAM system addition to other air defense weapons
(Chinese copy of the S-300), which can de- which it has aggressively promoted on ex-
feat targets at ranges in excess of 100 km, port markets. The HQ-7 design was sold to
employs a Chinese indigenous guided Iran where it was successfully reproduced
SAM missile derived from the afterwards.
Soviet/Russian-developed 5V55. The HQ- It could be said with a high degree of
9, which is operationally deployed with the certainty that it is China who is going to
PLA Air Defense Force, is currently com- provide the toughest competition to Rus-
peting in a Turkish long-range SAM tender sia on the long-range SAM markets where
along with Russia’s S-400 and the United the supply of U.S. ‘Patriot’ SAM systems is
State’s Patriot. impossible for political reasons. In the
Most of 36D6/’Tin Shield’ radar sys- medium and long term, China might be of
tems (that provide target identification interest to Ukraine as a potential coopera-
and battle management for S-300-series tion partner in bringing up to modern stan-
batteries) have been supplied by Ukrain- dards UAF’s SAM assets, most particularly
ian company, the Research and Produc- in the aspects where real alternatives to
tion Corporation ‘Iskra’ in Zaporizhzhia. Russian proposals might be required.
In such a case, Russia does not even try to The State Enterprise ‘Arsenal Fac-
develop a more or less comparable in- tory’ in Kiev was onetime designer of
digenous design in the same category. It seeker heads for the ‘Igla’-series man-
would therefore be safe to say that portable SAM systems, and it still offers
Ukrainian and Russian suppliers are com- its most advanced developments. At the
plementing each other on the S-300- same time, Russia has developed indige-
series SAM market. nous capabilities for the design, develop-
An upgrade package for the ‘BUK’ ment and mass manufacture of
SAM system was developed to improve technologies in this category. The PRC
substantially its operational capabilities has, since the 1970s, persistently worked
by enhancing the high-frequency compo- to develop and mass produce indigenous
nent of its transmitter-receiver unit. By copies of the ‘Strela-2’ and ‘Igla-1’
the time the upgrade was to be launched, portable SAM systems, and it even began
China had established production of an equipping them with more advanced
indigenous copy of the BUK, along with a guidance units of indigenously design
missile equivalent to the 9M317. There- and make. Today, China itself offers the
fore, there is no reason to expect China’s export market indigenous SAM systems
purchasing SAM systems BUK or its QW-1, QW-2 and NH-5 (the QW-2 has al-
naval variants ‘Uragan’ or ‘Shtil’. ready been exported to Bangladesh).


Ukraine-China:

In the field of air defense artillery, tition with each other on all markets, in-
Ukraine is not in a position to compete cluding the PRC and regional markets. It
with Russia or the PRC, as each of the three might be noted here that Ukraine had ob-
countries have arsenals of pretty advanced tained a fully self-sufficient tank/AFV in-
yet unsophisticated and cost effective air dustry after Russia refused to assist in
defense guns. From-scratch development executing a large-scale tank contract from
of an artillery system with a caliber below the Pakistan Army. As a result, Ukraine in-
76.2mm is widely considered to be eco- dependently developed deficient tank
nomically unfeasible. guns and a range of explosive reactive
Therefore, in the Ukraine-Russia- armor (ERA) designs (when asked to sup-
China triangle, technological leadership in ply ERA systems to support the Pakistani
SAM weapons niche markets belongs to contract, Russia charged a price almost
Russia who has until recently been actively equivalent to 10pct of the entire cost of the
supplying its most advanced SAM designs contract). Eventually it turned out that
to China. Simultaneously, China has estab- Ukrainian company ‘Microtech’ Base Cen-
lished acceptable quality indigenous pro- ter for Critical Technologies in Kiev, who
duction of almost the entire range of SAM undertook to develop ERA solutions to all
systems, from heavy long-range systems to types of anti-tank threats, has outpaced
man-portable SAM launchers. The PRC here its key competitor, the NII STALI (Sci-
has experienced some difficulties with es- entific Research Institute of Steel) in
tablishing indigenous production of S-300- Moscow. The PRC has successfully estab-
series systems, still it is unlikely to procure lished indigenous manufacture of ERA sys-
more such weapons from Russia. Instead, tems and integrated them with the PLA
further supplies of more current-genera- Army tank fleets. The ERA designs devel-
tion configuration, the S-400, are possible. oped in Russia, Ukraine and the PRC all
In such a case, Russia will try not to trans- have comparable specifications and price
fer its newest technologies to the PRC until tags, but their operational capabilities can-
subsequent-generation designs are in not be compared other than in a ‘combat test’.
place. Ukraine’s capabilities in this field are A similar situation could be ob-
limited to repairs of SAM systems for the served in the fields of active protection
Ukrainian Air Force and potential export systems and electronic warfare equip-
customers, and upgrades of technically ob- ment. It’s only reasonable that each of the
solescent SAM designs for third-country countries gives preference to indigenous
markets. designs when selecting active protection
and electronic warfare system designs to
meet requirements of their respective mil-
Competition on the tank and itary forces.
light armored fighting vehicle Therefore, in the domain of tank and
(AFV) market lighter AFV protection, the three coun-
In the tank and AFV area, pretty com- tries have comparable capacities and
plex relationships have been developing compete with each other, with Ukraine
between Russia, Ukraine and the PRC. having a slight edge over the other two.
Ukraine and the Russian Federation both In this niche market, Ukraine could have
have entire clusters of tank and lighter success on third-country markets, includ-
AFV makers who enter into direct compe- ing in cooperation with its competitors.


Ukraine-China:

The PRC launched indigenous manu- ects, whereas Russians have closely coop-
facture of main battle tanks back in the late erated with China in the development of
1960s when, in March 1969, during an control systems.
armed clash between the PRC and the So- Russia and Ukraine are both equipping
viet Union along the Ussuri River on their tanks with French-supplied infrared im-
Damansky Island, the Chinese troops cap- aging cameras, while having own develop-
tured a Soviet T-62 tank. The tank was ment and manufacturing capacities for
carefully examined by Chinese engineers technologies of this kind (Ural Optical Me-
and some of its components were copied chanical Plant (Yekaterinburg, Russia) and
and integrated into indigenous designs. NPK Photoprybor (Cherkasy, Ukraine),
This suggests that the PLA Army currently which are competing with one another on
has in service a great deal of technically ob- third-country markets). Unlike Russian and
solescent armored vehicles. In the mean- Ukrainian counterparts, tank and AFV mak-
while, China has been procuring ers in China do not have the ability so far to
new-generation tanks in limited amounts, employ advanced Western technologies for
probably for reverse engineering purposes. integration into own AFV designs, which re-
The Chinese tank Type 90/MBT-2000, de- duces their competitive capacity on the export
veloped from the Soviet-vintage T-72, had market. It would be worth of note, however,
won against Russian (T-90) and Ukrainian that the United States and NATO have im-
counterparts in a contract competition to posed limitations on exports of latest-genera-
provide a tank fleet for the Pakistan Army, tion night vision equipment, which are
and it has now been successfully exported applicable to all potential customers.
to Pakistan as Al Khalid. The Al Khalid Meanwhile, fierce competition has been
tank is equipped with the Ukrainian poly- observed between Russia, Ukraine and China
diesel 6TD, which Pakistan had preferred on the oversaturated export market for light
over a Russian gas-turbine motor. So, armored fighting vehicles. To date, this com-
Ukrainian tank/AFV engines may hold the petition is largely restricted to the design, de-
promise of significant orders, most partic- velopment and marketing of new-generation
ularly when the Morozov Design and De- weapons stations. Here, all the three countries
velopment Bureau built a new, more offer designs with roughly comparable spec-
powerful engine. ifications and operational capabilities. For this
In February 2009, Ukrainian tank reason, any contract award to Russia, Ukraine
makers announced that 62 engine/trans- or China involving the supply of AFVs, ar-
mission packs for Al Khalids would have mored personnel carriers (APCs) or armored
been delivered to Pakistan before the end vehicles should be considered as one-time-
of September, along with an initial ship- only contract. The Russian Federation, for in-
ment of engine and gear boxes for special- stance, has delivered a small shipment of one
application vehicles. In 2008 alone, hundred new armored GAZ-2330 TIGR ve-
Pakistan awarded Ukrainian companies hicles to the PRC, while Ukrainian manufac-
$2.5mn worth of contracts for supplies of turers have not yet found large enough
replacement parts for purpose-built vehi- markets for their light armored vehicle de-
cles. signs. Even so, Ukrainian products such as
Ukrainian tank designers have cur- the newly-designed BTR-4 or upgraded BTR-
rently been actively engaged with Chinese 3E hold much promise with respect to export
counterparts on a range of joint R&D proj- opportunities.


Ukraine-China:

Tough competition between the three Progress Design and Development Bureau)
countries has been observed on the market provide aero engines for the Russian-built
for antitank weapons, as well. Arms factories aircraft supplied to the PRC.
in Russian Tula have traditionally enjoyed Furthermore, a number of Ukrainian
pre-eminent position here, followed by companies complement Russian counter-
Ukrainian company Design and Develop- parts supplying end products; State Enter-
ment Bureau ‘Luch’ who offers potential cus- prise ‘Krasyliv Assembly Manufacturing
tomers its advanced designs such as the Plant’, JSC ‘Phasotron-Ukraine’, OJSC
‘Stugna’, ‘Kombat’, ‘Skif’ and ‘Baryer’ anti- ‘Corporation FED’ and more defense com-
tank guided weapon (ATGW) systems. As for panies in Ukraine provide some key com-
the PRC, it has long established indigenous ponents and subsystems for
production of most of antitank weapons Russian-supplied MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter
types. aircraft. These include coherent radar sys-
Therefore, in the field of tanks and ar- tems, communications facilities, navigation
mored fighting vehicles, Russia, Ukraine and aids, bomb release systems and other in-
the PRC each enjoy comparably robust posi- dispensable subsystems of the combat air-
tions on third-country markets. On the one craft.
hand, they are competitors to one another. On The Mi-8, Mi-17 and Kamov-series
the other hand, Ukrainian engine systems for helicopters supplied by Russia to export
MBT applications have a number of advan- customers are all equipped with Ukrain-
tages over rival designs, and may therefore ian-made engines, each accounting for
hold the promise of further significant orders. about 20pct of the aircraft’s value. In such
The PRC does not appear to be in a rush to a case, warranty and post-warranty servic-
procure large enough shipments of current- ing of the engines is provided by the en-
generation tanks to meet the PLA Army re- gine supplier.
quirement. All the three countries are directly A characteristic of aeronautical coop-
competing with each other on third-country eration within the Russia-Ukraine-PRC tri-
markets. Here, the PRC enjoys traditionally angle is that the three countries are actively
robust position on Asian-Pacific markets, and closely cooperating in the engineering
while Ukrainian and Russian tank and AFV field, with Russia and Ukraine typically
suppliers have roughly equal export oppor- transferring selected technologies to China
tunities. In the niche market for light armored and the latter providing financial support
vehicles, standing of each of the three coun- for selected R&D projects of interest to it-
tries is relatively weak comparing to that of self.
Western suppliers, and they therefore can ZMBK Ivchenko-Progress offers co-
only hope for occasional contracts. operation in developing an engine for a
projected Chinese indigenous civilian
transport aircraft. Furthermore, in May
Competition on the aircraft 2009, the Shenyang Aircraft Engine Plant
market proposed that ZMBK Ivchenko-Progress
Ukrainian designers enjoy a pretty should carry out expert evaluation of its
stable position on the aircraft market, 12+ ton thrust aeroengine project. In the ro-
which is the most capital-intensive market torcraft engine field, ZMBK Ivchenko-
segment. Here, Ukrainian companies Progress offers the Chinese party its
(OJSC Motor-Sich and ZMBK Ivchenko- AI136T1 engine, an enhanced, more pow-


Ukraine-China:

erful version of the D136 engine for the An example of multidirectional na-
Mi-26 helicopters that the PRC purchased ture of Ukrainian-Sino cooperation in mil-
from Russia recently. Also, China might itary technology might be a deal on the
have an interest in equipping its Russian- design, development and type certification
supplied Mi-46 helicopters with the of the AI-222K-25F engine for the Hongdu
AI8000V engine (a derivative of the AI- L-15 Falcon supersonic fighter trainer,
222K-25F engine for fixed-wing aircraft), which also calls for the transfer of produc-
and the same engine type might work tion license for the engine. ZMBK
well with the heavy payload transport Ivchenko-Progress would supply two pre-
aircraft being currently developed by production units of the AI-222K-25F engine
China. to Hongdu Aviation Industry Group
ANTK Antonov Aeronautical Scien- (HAIG). An appropriate contract was
tific/Technical Corporation has been signed during the 13th edition of Beijing
closely engaged with its Chinese counter- International Air Show in October 2009.
parts, assisting in the development of the According to the terms of the contract, the
Y-H7/Y-14-100 aircraft (Chinese copy of Ukrainian partner will have to design, de-
the An-26). velop, fly test and type certify the AI-222K-
In the late 1990s/early 2000s, the PRC 25F afterburning turbofan for HIAG.
took delivery of a large quantity of Russ- China is determined to aggressively
ian-supplied Su-27 and Su-30MK fighter promote the Chengdu Aircraft Industry
aircraft, and bought respective production Corporation FC-1/JF-17 and J-10 fighter
licenses. Many of repair technologies for aircraft on potential export markets. The
the aircraft and relating engines were JF-17 fighter, (otherwise known as FC-1),
bought by China from Ukraine, and it was which was developed in a joint program
Ukraine where Chinese engineers and with Pakistan, has already entered service
technicians had been taught how to do re- with the PLAAF and Pakistan Air Force.
pairs on the equipment. It is not impossi- According to a high-ranking Chinese de-
ble that Ukraine might get interested soon fense industry official, the JF-17 has been
in China as a partner in aircraft upgrade selected as a top-priority project for exten-
programs. sive demonstration on the export market.
The PRC has launched license pro- The Pakistan Air Force alone has the re-
duction of the Su-27, under own designa- quirement for up to 300 aircraft in this cat-
tion Shenyang J-11. Engines appeared to egory to replace its legacy fleets of Chinese
be not among the Chinese aircraft indus- and French-supplied fighters.
try’s strong points. But this is not the case Earlier in 2009, China revived its ef-
now; China has already demonstrated a fort to build a C-130J class transport. The
domestically designed alternative to the Chinese Y-9 is a 77 ton indigenously de-
Russian AL-31F jet engine it has been signed aircraft that is back in development.
buying to date as primary power plant for The Y-9 is basically a stretched version of
the Shenyang J-11. A technological break- the 61 ton Y-8F-200, which is, in turn, a Chi-
through achieved by China in the aircraft nese copy, and upgrade, of the Russian
engine area has allowed for the propor- transport aircraft An-12. China wants to re-
tion of Chinese-made components and duce its dependence on Russia for trans-
technologies to be increased from 70-75 port aircraft, and has noted the success of
percent to 90 percent or even higher. the latest version of the C-130, the C-130J.


Ukraine-China:

Ukraine has supplied 953 (1,500 ac- Ukraine and Russia are competing
cording to alternative sources) R-27/AA- over Chinese contracts for limited supplies
10 ‘Alamo’ medium-range airborne of relatively high-tech weapons and de-
missiles, and Russia supplied 1,200 R- fense equipment types. These usually in-
73/AA-11 ‘Archer’ short-range air-to-air volve transfers of technologies,
missiles to China. In such a case, Ukrainian engineering documentation, manuals and
missile producers were supplying their production licenses. China has already suc-
missiles directly to China to support Russ- ceeded in launching indigenous produc-
ian fighter aircraft supply contracts -- com- tion of most of previously deficient
plementing Russian missile suppliers and technologies, and it will therefore become
without entering into competition with increasingly independent of Russia or
them. Ukraine as technology donors.
As seen from the above, Russia will Continuing mutually beneficial coop-
not be able to maintain the current high eration with the PRC is possible in the field
level of aircraft exports to China in the fu- of engineering. China is keen to invest in
ture, as China itself is evolving into a viable innovative technology developments and
player of the global aeronautical market. setting up research-and-technology parks
Given the difficulties being experienced by in Ukraine.
Russia with its fifth-generation jet fighter On the space services market, Ukraine
project, China is set to oust Russia from has most robust position in relation to Rus-
third-country markets in the mid-term, and sia and the PRC in the niche market for
may eventually develop into the world- space launch services. The PRC is keen to
wide leader in the aeronautical industry. further expand its indigenous satellite nav-
Here, selection of aeronautical suppliers igation and positioning system, while Rus-
will, to a large degree, be determined by sia and Ukraine are both interested in
political considerations and preferences. reverse transfer of Chinese microelectronic
Therefore, Ukrainian companies will, for a technology.
certain limited period of time, be able to On the aeronautical market, aircraft
continue with direct supplies of missile design companies in Ukraine and Russia
weapons and subcontracted supplies sup- might expect joint projects and co-devel-
porting Russian contracts with third coun- opment contracts with, as well as a certain
tries. amount of investment from China. In such
a case, there is a certain degree of direct
Conclusions competition being observed between air-
In view of almost total absence of fully craft design and development companies
integrated system supplies under military- in Ukraine and Russia.
technical cooperation programs between On the markets for naval, aircraft,
Ukraine and Russia, the Ukraine-Russia- tank and AFV engines, Ukrainian suppli-
China triangle has been progressively re- ers are supporting export contracts for re-
configured into a pyramid, with China at the spective host platforms, and are therefore
top and Ukraine and Russia a the base of the interested in increasing supplies of naval
pyramid. In such a case, China is financial ships, aircraft, tanks and AFVs within the
donor of selected new developments, while Ukraine-Russia-China triangle.
the Russian Federation and Ukraine act as Russia and Ukraine are worldwide
donors of technology and designs. leaders in the tank building industry.


Ukraine-China:

China does not seem to have any intent of entirely built and furnished at a shipyard
procuring large amounts of current-gener- in an Asian-Pacific country and subse-
ation tanks, but instead is keen to sell its quently registered as a Cyprus ship.
earlier-generation fleets to third-country In the field of electronic warfare and
markets. In the field of tank engines, communications equipment, the PRC has
Ukrainian diesels have an edge over Russ- already achieved a certain degree of self-
ian gas-turbine counterparts. sufficiency, to the extent that it can now
In the field of naval shipbuilding, the offer indigenous products to export mar-
PRC has been progressively and persist- kets. Almost only exceptions here are most
ently developing its indigenous capacities latest radar designs and combat informa-
for building naval ships in all categories up tion and control systems, which both re-
to and including aircraft carriers, seeking a quire sophisticated mathematical tools
worldwide ocean presence. In such a case, techniques to be developed and built.
China apparently lacks adequate knowl- In the fields of air defense weapons,
edge and experience. At the same time, conventional artillery and multiple rocket
shipbuilding yards in Ukraine and Russia launchers, Russia has already saturated the
have been severely underutilized (not in a Chinese market with new technology, to the
small part because of legislation where a extent where Ukraine, under suitable con-
vessel registration/license costs up to 40pct ditions, might contract with China for re-
of the cost of the vessel itself). For this rea- verse transfer of technology required for
son, it is more beneficial for a customer to indigenous development of a multi-role
have a vessel design developed in Ukraine missile system and SAM system. Also,
(as does Turkey), then to build the vessel Ukraine might be interested in China as a
hull indigenously, and, afterwards, get the potential partner in repairs and upgrading
vessel finished and furnished at shipyards of earlier defense technologies.
in Europe. Alternatively, a vessel could be


Ukraine-China:

Third chapter
The specifics of China’s policies
towards regional markets

T
he Chinese economy targets well as transport vehicles and construction
the export market, its export machinery have all shown a strong up-
orientation showing a continu- ward trend in recent years, as well. Simul-
ous trend of growth. In 2008, taneously, China, who has vigorously
for example, China was the worked to re-equip and re-weapon its
world’s second largest exporter, with ex- armed forces with advanced current-gen-
ports amounting to 1.43 trillion US dollars. eration arms and military hardware types,
Even though China ranks second in is keen to expand its presence on defense
the world in GDP terms behind the USA export markets, most notably in emerging
(according to IMF data, China’s GDP ran countries in Africa and the Middle East.
into 7.916 trillion in the international dol- Meanwhile, China’s standing on the
lar equivalent in 2008), its export-driven global defense market is pretty unique, this
economy — with exports accounting for 80 being explained by a number of logically
percent of the State foreign-exchange rev- interrelating factors.
enue and the export-targeted industries 1. China has since 1989 been in a
employing a combined workforce of about quasi-blockade situation. Following
20 million — makes the PRC highly de- Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, Euro-
pendant on export markets. Some 20 per- pean countries, in June 1989, imposed an
cent of China’s gross industrial output and embargo on arms supplies to the PRC.
agricultural produce is geared to exports, After the end of the Cold War era, the USA,
the export Nomenclature comprising about as well, became the natural opponent of
50,000 products. advanced arms and military technology ex-
The PRC has maintained trade and ports to the PRC. The issue of the embargo
economic relationships with 182 countries lift was raised several times during 2004-
and regions of the world, of which 80 have 06, still it has remained in place to date.
government-to-go-vernment trade agree- This situation resulted in Russia having be-
ments or protocols signed with China. come the key and almost the sole source of
PRC’s key trade partners include advanced advanced weapons and military hardware
and developed capitalist countries, most designs for China, this circumstance se-
notably the USA, Japan and Western Eu- verely impeding the effort being made by
rope, which all provide a combined 55 per- the PRC to obtain most advanced systems
cent of China’s foreign trade turnover. and technology. As consequence, the influx
China’s best selling product portfolio is still of new current-generation technology into
made up of footwear, garments and toys, China has been limited, and as such it is
yet the exports of electronic equipment, bi- putting a break on the development of in-
cycles, motorcycles and motor vehicles, as digenous designs, thereby restricting


Ukraine-China:

China’s capabilities as exporter of ad- during 1992-2005, on which basis the PRC
vanced weapons types to developed na- has set up the capability for the domestic
tions, and narrowing its niche markets in production of reverse engineered designs
emerging countries as well as its traditional and the development of indigenous
partner nations. third/forth-generation designs, there
2. The PRC has directed its effort to- might be an expectation of the PRC return-
wards establishing and building up own ing to the status of major defense exporter
R&D and manufacturing potentialities, in the foreseeable future, thus adding to ri-
most notably through reverse engineering valry on that highly competition sensitive
of foreign-designed items of equipment market.
with the goal of their subsequent ‘domesti- 4. Products offered by China on the
cation’ into indigenous designs. Even at the global defense market, being reverse engi-
time of massive arms and military technol- neered copies of previously procured for-
ogy imports in 1950-62 and 1992-2005, the eign designs, are all relatively low-tech,
PRC was keen to establish and further de- hence unsophisticated and cheap products,
velop its capabilities for indigenous pro- due to which China was present, if not
duction and subsequent upgrading of the dominated on defense markets in Egypt,
weapons and military equipment types Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Sri Lanka
being procured from foreign suppliers. The and Tropical Africa.
result is that most of Chinese defense ex- Nonetheless, China, due to its rapidly
ports comprise products that are either re- growing industrial and scientific research
versed engineered copies or officially potentialities, political weight and military
licensed replicas of foreign designs, mak- might, has been expanding its influence as
ing China a viable competitor on the de- a defense exporter with its own stable cus-
fense export market, and particularly so tomer base and niche markets. When ana-
with respect to countries of origin of Par- lyzing China’s standing on regional
ent designs. markets, it is worth of note that the PRC,
3. The Chinese defense export has having been under an embargo and, si-
been notable for clearly observable cyclic- multaneously, being a permanent member
ity, this stemming from specific ap- of the UN Security Council at that and,
proaches being applied to the development also, a member of the elite club of ‘grand’
of indigenous arms and military technol- nations, feels itself free to supply arms and
ogy designs through reverse engineering. defense equipment to the markets causing
Periods of defense procurements, followed some degree of concern for other defense
by technological breakthroughs achieved suppliers. Specifically, major recipients of
due to the influx of new advanced technol- Chinese defense products were Iran and
ogy, take turns with periods of ‘domestica- Iraq at the time when the two were warring
tion’ where foreign designs are repackaged against one another in 1980-88, in addition
as Chinese and as such are subsequently to such countries of concern as Sudan and
mass exported to third countries. An ex- Venezuela.
ample of such cyclicity might be massive In the context of China’s standing and
defense imports during the 1950s (1950- performance on regional markets, we feel
1962) and the transition to massive defense it necessary to cite here some data from a
exports seen in the 1980s. Considering the report by Stockholm International Peace
second wave of defense imports observed Research Institute (SIPRI). It follows from


Ukraine-China:

the SIPRI report that, in the period from plies to the above markets was different. In
2000 to 2008, China was supplying Algeria’s case, for example, Ukrainian sup-
weapons and defense equipment to Alge- plies mostly consisted of fully-integrated
ria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Cambodia, weapons systems, whereas China was sup-
Chad, the Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, plying components and subsystems for in-
Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, tegration with Algerian-built corvettes
Mali, Mauritania, Myanmar, Namibia, Djebel Chenoua FAC. Similar situations
Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, can be seen on other markets (see the table
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Sri below).
Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Based on the data as presented in
Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia and Zim- Table 1, a number of general tendencies
babwe. In the very same period of time, might be singled out.
according to the same SIPRI report, 1 Ukraine acted as supplier of compo-
Ukraine, was supplying defense equip- nents and subsystems for China-built items
ment to some of the above listed countries of defense equipment. This is most notably
among other markets. This is about Alge- about AI-25/DV-2 turbofans for China-sup-
ria, Chad, the Congo, Egypt, Iran, Jordan plied K-8 Karakorum combat capable trainer
Kenya, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nige- aircraft. Each and all of the recipient countries
ria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, of the K-8 Karakorum trainer aircraft were re-
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. cipients of the turbofan engines as well.
As seen from the SPRI report, the con- 2 The PRC acted independently of
tent of Ukrainian and Chinese defense sup- Ukraine as component and subsystem sup-
Table 1
Recipient country Ukraine China
AI-25/DV-2 engines for Components and subsystems for in-
Czech-supplied L-39 tegration with Algerian-built Djebel
trainer aircraft; Chenoua FAC
Mi-24V/Mi-35/Hind-E
combat helicopters;
R-27/AA-10 Alamo
Algeria
BVRAAM
R-73/AA-11 Archer
BVRAAM
R-40/AA-6 Acrid
BVRAAM;
T-72 battle tanks
Mi-24V/Mi-35, Mi-8/Mi- ZFB-05 APC/ISV
17 helicopters;
Chad Su-25/Frogfoot-A ground
attack aircraft;
BTR-80 APC
Mi-24P/Mi-35P/Hind-F ZFB-05 APC/ISV
Congo combat helicopters


Ukraine-China:

An-74/Coaler-B transport K-8 Karakorum-8 trainer/combat air-
Egypt aircraft craft assembled from kits in Egypt
An-74/Coaler-B Transport Components and subsystems for
Iran aircraft (1998-2002 con- weapons systems assembled/pro-
tracts duced in Iran
An-32/Cline Transport air- W-86 120MM Mortar
Jordan
craft
BM-21 Grad 122mm MRL Y-12 transport aircraft
Kenya
T-72M1 MBT WZ-551 APC
R-27/AA-10 Alamo Components and subsystems for
BVRAAM naval ships built in Myanmar
Myanmar T-72 MBT
BTR-3U Guardian IFV
MT-LB APC
AI-25/DV-2 Turbofan en- K-8 Karakorum-8 trainer/combat air-
gines for China-supplied craft
Namibia
K-8 Karakorum F-7MG Fighter aircraft
trainer/combat aircraft
Mi-8/Mi-17/Hip-H heli- MA-60 transport aircraft
Nepal
copters WZ-551 APC
BTR-3U Guardian IFV F-7M Airguard Fighter aircraft
Nigeria Mi-24V/Mi-35/Hind-E PL-9 SRAAM for F-7N1 combat air-
Combat helicopters craft
Components and subsys- Type-59-1 130mm and В-33 120mm
tems, particularly diesel towed guns
engines for Al-Zarrar, F-7MG fighter aircraft
MBT-2000 and Al Khalid J-10/FC-20 FGA aircraft (contract may
tanks not yet signed)
Il-78M/Midas A-5C Fantan FGA aircraft
tanker/transport aircraft Naval weapons and subsystems (in-
cluding C-802/CSS-N-8 anti-ship mis-
siles, Type-347G fire control radars,
Pakistan C-803 anti-ship missiles and R-440 Cro-
tale SAMs) for Jalalat FAC and Jiang-
wei (F-22P) frigates built in Pakistan
YLC-2 air surveillance radars
PL-12/SD-10 BVRAAM for JF-17 and
possibly modernized Mirage-3/5 com-
bat aircraft (contract may not yet
signed)
KJ-200 AEW&C aircraft built around
the Y-8 (delivery from 2010)


Ukraine-China:

AI-25/DV-2 turbofan en- Type-062/Shanghai patrol craft
gines for China-supplied BT-6/CJ-6 trainer aircraft
K-8 Karakorum
Sri Lanka trainer/combat aircraft
Mi-24P/Mi-35P/Hind-F
combat helicopters
MiG-27K/Flogger-J FGA
aircraft
AI-25/DV-2 turbofan en- Type-85-IIM tanks
gines for China-supplied A-5C Fantan FGA aircraft
K-8 Karakorum WZ-551 APC
Sudan
trainer/combat aircraft K-8 Karakorum-8 trainer/combat air-
craft
FN-6 portable SAMs
BTR-3U Guardian IFV Pattani-class frigates
Thailand C-801/CSS-N-4/Sardine and C-
802/CSS-N-8 anti-ship missiles
BMP-2 IFVs Y-12 transport aircraft
Uganda MiG-21bis/Fishbed-N
fighter aircraft
AI-25/DV-2 turbofan en- K-8 Karakorum-8 trainer/combat air-
gines for China-supplied craft
Zambia K-8 Karakorum MA-60 and Y-12 transport aircraft
BTR-70 APC
AI-25/DV-2 turbofan en- K-8 Karakorum-8
gines for China-supplied trainer/combat aircraft
Zimbabwe K-8 Karakorum
An-12/Cub transport air-
craft
plier; it did not directly supply compo- China is going to supply Pakistan with KJ-
nents or weapons subsystems for any of 200 AEW&C aircraft ordered for delivery
Ukrainian-supplied items of defense beginning in 2010. The KJ-200 is designed
equipment (though, it is not fully clear around the Y-8 military transport aircraft,
whether Chinese-made components were itself a licensed copy of the Ukrainian-de-
present or not in Ukrainian-supplied items signed Antonov An-12. Furthermore,
of defense equipment). Nepal exported from China the M-60 tur-
3 Weapons and items of defense boprop 60-seat airliner that was built
equipment supplied by China to the above around the Y-7, again, a licensed replica of
markets were all reverse engineered copies the Ukrainian An-24. This tendency might
of Ukrainian designs. As one example, harbor the risk of China eventually seizing


Ukraine-China:

some niche markets that previously be- Separate mention should be made of
longed to Ukraine, by supplying Ukrain- the fact that, according o SIPRI, Ukraine
ian-designed products repackaged as was actively exporting defense products to
Chinese or license assembled in China. The China, while the latter was not exporting
same pattern might be expected with re- its defense products to Ukraine. There
spect to the ‘Zubr’-class landing craft air might be two explanations for this situa-
cushion vehicle, if production of the design tion:
was launched in China under a Ukrainian 1 Ukraine’s defense market is effec-
license. tively closed to imports, with examples of
4 On overlapping markets, the tough- rare exceptions being unmanned aerial ve-
est competition between Ukraine and hicles bought from Israel to meet the
China could be observed on niche markets Ukrainian Army requirement and helicop-
for military transport aircraft and armored ters bought from Eurocopter to meet the
fighting vehicles, while the least competi- Emergencies Ministry’s requirement.
tion could be seen on markets for helicop- Other known occurrences of defense im-
ters (with Ukraine supplying Mi-series ports to Ukraine (Ukraine reported four
retired helicopters and China supplying such occurrences to the UN Conventional
none), naval weapons and equipment Weapons Registry 2008) are more intended
(Ukraine supplied none whereas China for re-export purposes and include Soviet-
was aggressively promoting its products in built items of defense equipment.
this category), beyond visual range air-to- 2 At this stage, China has not yet
air missiles (specifically, R-27, R-73 and R- reached the level of technology allowing
40 missiles which are traditional for penetration into the defense market in
commodities of Ukraine’s export nomen- Ukraine who itself has in place tradition-
clature being supplied to China among ally strong schools of military design.
other markets) and fighter aircraft (unlike At the same time, as seen from the
China, who was acting far more aggres- SIPRI report for the 2000-2008 period,
sively on this niche market, Ukraine had Ukraine was actively exporting weapons,
the sole contract to supply MiG-series defense equipment and related parts and
fighters to Uganda). subsystems to China. A few examples are
It would be worth of note now in this 1,577 R-27/AA-10 Alamo BVR air-to-air
context that China was supplying transport missiles for the SU-27SK and Su-30MK fight-
aircraft and armored fighting vehicles to the ers (including 953 such missiles supplied
markets which did not see any of defense during 2005-2008, according to the UN Con-
supplies from Ukraine in that period. One ventional Weapons Registry), AI-25/DV-2
example might be Chinese supplies of Y-8 turbofan engines for Chinese indigenous K-
(licensed copy of the An-12) and MA-60 8 Karakorum combat capable trainer aircraft
(built around the Y-7, reciprocally a licensed (including 58 engines supplied from 1997 to
copy of the An-24) aircraft to Tanzania and 2004, and 35 supplied during 2005-2008), 2S9
Ghana, respectively — the markets that were 120mm self-propelled guns, R-73/AA-11
not among Ukraine’s defense export desti- Archer BVRAAMs, Kh-55/AS-15 Kent air-
nations in the period under review. This fact launched cruise missiles, passive electronic
might be indicative either of latent competi- monitoring radar systems ‘Kolchuga’ and
tion or some division of defense markets be- DT-59 gas-turbine engines for the Type
tween Ukraine and the PRC. 052B/C Luyang-class destroyers.


Ukraine-China:

Regarding the division of defense mar- ticularly so with respect to tendencies for
kets between Ukraine and China, it might be markets narrowing or expanding, or over-
noted that most of markets for Chinese de- lapping market niches shared by Ukraine
fense products are countries in Asia, the and China.
Middle East, Africa and South America. So, as seen from the above, Ukraine
Also, China once supplied defense equip- and China are pretty viable competitors on
ment to Sudan, Venezuela and Iran. markets for military transport aircraft and
Simultaneously, Ukrainian defense armored fighting vehicles, with future
products, even though their markets over- competition on those markets tending to
lapped in the above listed countries with grow further. However, as Ukraine and the
those of China’s, preserved previously PRC have been drawing closer together in
won marketplaces of their own. Ukraine areas such as the design, development,
was supplying weapons and defense production and upgrading of aeronautical
equipment to ex-Soviet and ex-Warsaw technologies, and given successful cooper-
Pact states as well as Balkan countries, in ation between the two countries in the tri-
addition to the USA and Russia (them- national Ukraine-China-Pakistan MBT-2000
selves the world’s top defense exporters project to produce the Al Khalid main bat-
and the markets not seen on the list of tle tank for the Pakistan Army, it might
China’s defense export destinations in the well be expected that relationships be-
period under review) and, furthermore, to tween Ukraine and China will progress in
Afghanistan and Iraq (in 2006-2008). The the direction where the two will comple-
latter is indicative that Ukraine has been se- ment one another, manufacturing defense
lected by the International Anti-Terror products both for their respective domes-
Coalition members, including most partic- tic markets and for third markets as well.
ularly the USA, as a supplier of cost-effec- Until this expectation becomes a real-
tive yet highly-efficient European-class ity, however, China has been manufactur-
defense products. ing indigenous copies of the Ukrainian
The SIPRI 2000—2008 report shows that Antonov family of aircraft, specifically the
Ukraine was supplying defense commodities Y-5 Shijiazhuang (reverse engineered Chi-
to 53 countries as compared to 34 for China. nese copy of the An-2), Y-7 Xian (An-24),
Separately, it might be noted that any Y-8 Shaanxi (An-12), Y-9 Shaanxi (multi-
coherent analysis of markets for Chinese purpose transport, a variant of the Y-8X
defense products is very difficult to do be- Shaanxi, reciprocally a copy of the An-12),
cause of the lack of information provided MA-60 Xian (a 60-seat turboprop airliner
by China on its defense export supplies. built around the Y-7, itself a copy of the
Unlike Ukraine who openly and accurately An-24).While manufacturing aircraft of
declares information on its defense sup- these types, China has vigorously worked
plies, China is reluctant to provide the UN to add new variants to its family of aircraft
Conventional Weapons Registry with full designed as indigenous copies of Ukrain-
information, except for disclosing identities ian equivalents; China is currently devel-
of recipient countries and providing oping the Y8F-600 version with Ukrainian
weapon descriptions, but not their precise assistance, and it has signaled an interest
designations. With open official informa- in the An-70 military transport, most no-
tion unavailable, the task of doing the tably with regard to building an indigenous
analysis is very complicated, and most par- same-design equivalent. Simultaneously, the


Ukraine-China:

PRC is keen to have foreign-designed aircraft cently, some variants being Chinese copies of
assembled at Chinese factories; in June 2009, foreign designs. If Ukrainian light armored
China delivered its fist Airbus A320 jet air- IFV supplies were small and not numerous in
liner assembled at the Airbus A320 Family 2000-2008 (Ukraine only supplied its BTR-3
Final Assembly Line (FAL) in Tianjing, the armored personnel carriers to Myanmar and
first Airbus final assembly line to have been Nigeria), China was far more successful with
launched outside Europe. The Tianjing FAL is its WZ551 and ZSL92 vehicles. Interestingly
expected to assemble five A320s in 2009 and enough, some reports have it that China sup-
further 12 in 2010. In addition to this, Harbin plied a significant shipment of WZ551
Aircraft Industry Group Company Limited, wheeled armored personnel carriers to Thai-
one of China’s proven first line suppliers of land. Other say that two hundred such vehi-
aircraft, signed a framework contract with cles had been ordered for delivery, and that
Airbus in February 2009 to jointly produce it was after completion of the Thailand con-
composite material parts and components for tract when the Type 85/YW-531H variant
the A320 family of aircraft. This and other began to be series manufactured in China to
moves by China are apparently intended to meet the requirements of the PLA and foreign
lend weight to its position on aircraft markets. customers (among then Myanmar). The fact
As regards armored fighting vehicles that such a considerable shipment of IFVs
(AFVs), situation looks pretty interesting was supplied to Thailand by China looks
there. If Ukraine already has a ‘closed loop’ very interesting, especially considering that
AFV-production cycle which it inherited after Ukraine with its BTR-3U1 APC won a 2007
the collapse of the Soviet Union, China’s AFV tender competition to meet the Thailand
industry has been in the early stages of de- Army requirement for 96 wheeled armored
velopment. Despite a great progress troop carriers. The contract award was even-
achieved, the Chinese AFV industry is still tually postponed until a future date pending
lagging far behind the international quality completion of investigation into a bribe-tak-
standards, its capabilities at this stage of de- ing scandal involving high-level Thailand of-
velopment being constrained, confined to re- ficials. This fact by itself well illustrates the
verse engineering of foreign-designed degree of competition between Ukraine and
vehicles. Excepting the Pakistan Army, the the PRC on that specific niche market, and
traditional customer for Chinese-built battle this already fierce rivalry is expected to grow
tanks, Chinese AFV exports have been lim- still further as time goes by.
ited to small shipments supplied to underde- Against that background, considering
veloped countries. Such a situation offers China’s capability to ‘domesticate’ previously
considerable advantages to Ukraine, not only imported technology and items of equipment
in terms of lesser competition, but, also, in into indigenous designs, and the fact that
terms of supplies of the AFV components (in- China has been closely engaged with Ukraine
cluding engine and gear boxes for the Pak- in some defense technology areas, most par-
istan Army), which China is not in a position ticularly so in aeronautics, a further sharpen-
to manufacture independently thus far. ing of competition between Ukraine and
Unlike heavyweight AFV types, the de- China might be expected. Therefore, Ukraine
velopment of Chinese light armored infantry must get itself actively engaged in projects
fighting vehicles (IFV) has enjoyed a tremen- with China as soon as practicable – on legal
dous growth. The Chinese portfolio of light clearly defined contractual terms and with
armored IFV designs has been expanded re- longest possible contract periods.

333:Layout 1 23.11.2009 4:56 Page 51

Ukraine-China:

Fourth chapter
Military-Technical Cooperation
between Ukraine and China:
Directions and Cooperation Patterns

U
kraine and the People’s Re- 2005-06 China bought from Ukraine more
public of China have a rich than 900 R-27-series air-launched missiles,
history with trading in arms in addition to sporadic purchases of other
and defense equipment as aerial weapons types, among them a ship-
well as dual-use items. Mili- ment of bomb release systems produced by
tary-technological cooperation between the Krasyliv’s Assembly Manufacturing Plant.
two countries had at different times em- Ukrainian land warfare equipment sup-
braced almost all areas of defense technol- plies to China, on most occurrences, in-
ogy — from armored fighting vehicles cluded fully-integrated conventional
(AFVs) to precision weapons systems and systems such as 2C9 large-caliber artillery
sophisticated radio-technical equipment. systems or BTR-70 armored personnel car-
Practices of joint work between Ukraine riers. Regarding defense electronics,
and China in the defense technology area Ukraine once delivered to China a few
have passed several milestones, and vari- ‘Kolchuga’ passive electronic monitoring
ous forms of cooperation have taken shape. radar systems.
Ukrainian-Sino military-technical coopera- – A shift has recently been noticeable
tion is notable for the following: towards increasing occurrences of Ukraine
– China, in almost all cases, is the re- transferring production licenses (as China
cipient of weapons systems, military hard- places premium precisely on know-how
ware and dual-use goods; bilateral and production technology) and providing
cooperative projects, as well, are held ex- repair and maintenance services, with
clusively for China, with isolated cases of China being most interested in acquiring
joint defense technology projects carried the knowledge of principal importance for
out for third countries; the development of own defense industrial
– By the start of 2009, Ukrainian ex- capabilities.
ports of ready-made items or systems to Existing cooperative projects do not
China had reduced to almost zero, this allow for Ukraine to participate as a full-
being explained by China’s policy aimed to fledged partner in the development or
ensure its requirement for weapons and manufacture of defense technologies
defense equipment is to the maximum pos- jointly with China, Ukraine’s workshare
sible degree fulfilled through domestic being mostly confined to ‘hot spot’ works
production. For example, Ukraine had for or ‘hot spot’ projects. But how could it be
some time been one of China’s biggest sup- otherwise if Ukraine has never invested
pliers of guided air to-air missiles; during money in the promotion of some or other

333:Layout 1 23.11.2009 4:56 Page 52

Ukraine-China:

initiatives to date, its role being effectively basis, the tasks which China thus far lacks
reduced to performing, on the outsourcing the expertise or capability to perform on its
Selected international collaboration and cooperation patterns relating to R&D/pro-
duction of weapons and defense technologies
Cooperation/collaboration
№ Brief description
pattern
1 Licensed production A form of transnational cooperation providing
for the selling/transfer of production informa-
tion which enables a foreign government/pro-
ducer to manufacture an item of defense
equipment
2 Co-production A form of international division of labor where
two or more participating countries share, based
on their core expertise and knowledge in respec-
tive areas, the manufacture of an item of defense
equipment designed and developed by one of
the participating countries
3 Joint venture An entity jointly owned and managed by de-
fense-industrial firms/corporations of two or
more countries to undertake the development
and manufacture of a specific item or type of
arms or defense equipment together
4 Collaborative design and de- A form of cooperation where entities from two or
velopment more countries are working together to design,
develop and (usually) commercialize an item of
arms or defense equipment
5 A family of weapons system A form of international division of labor where two
or more countries undertake to work together to
produce a family of weapons systems or defense
equipment (for example, air-to-air missiles). For this
purpose, each specific weapons system or an item of
defense equipment is designed and developed by
one participating country to be subsequently co-
manufactured by all the participating countries.
6 Multinational strategic al- A formal relationship between defense-industrial
liance firms/corporations of two or more countries. The
alliance is a cooperation aimed for a synergy where
the benefits from the alliance will be greater than
those from individual efforts. The strategic alliance
usually provides for information swapping between
partners or investigating into potentialities for fu-
ture cooperation in the design, development and
manufacture of new weapons types or items of de-
fense equipment.

333:Layout 1 23.11.2009 4:56 Page 53

Ukraine-China:

own. Meanwhile, the global collaboration sign, development and production of mili-
best practices provide a few examples of tary equipment types based on Soviet-era
cooperation patterns that could be applica- designs. Here, it has strongly reinforced its
ble to specific areas or projects. scientific research and industrial capabili-
Ukraine’s interest in cooperation with ties that enabled it to go away from de-
China in military-political and military- pendence upon Russia in meeting its
technological sectors can and must be look- defense-related requirements, and, fur-
ing at the medium and long term. In the thermore, to generate alternative solutions
military-political cooperation sector, in a number of military technology areas.
Ukraine should direct its efforts towards When the interests of both partners coin-
creating an environment for a strategic cide and optimum cooperation patterns are
partnership to be set up between the two identified, these potentialities, if properly
countries, as Ukraine and China do not employed, could help Ukraine resolve
have ‘zones of conflict’ or differences relat- some of the pressing problems existing
ing to their respective national security in- both on the domestic and global defense
terests. In the military-technological sector, markets.
cooperation between Ukraine and China There are two aspects in which China
should be built up with due regard for the is distinguished from Ukraine or Russia,
global market trends in the development whose defense companies often act in tan-
and production of weapons and defense dem when carrying out projects for the
equipment, specific nature of that ex- PRC. First, China has built and continues
tremely competition-sensitive market, as building own military technical schools of
well as the immediate top-priority goals thought in high-technology clusters. Sec-
the two countries are most interested to ond, it has persistently worked to enhance
achieve in the short term. and improve its industrial base on which
China is interested in Ukraine as a co- to produce some or other weapon of de-
operation partner in areas such as theory fense equipment types. These two compo-
and practice of building aircraft carriers nents of principal importance, specifically
and ‘Zubr’-class landing craft air cushion human resources and industrial base, are
vehicles; theory and practice of employing what will provide a strategic advantage for
simulators for naval force training; ac- China in re-designing and improving
tive/passive radar equipment; ballistic weapons and defense equipment types im-
missile system controls; and the develop- ported from Russia or Ukraine and, also, in
ment of AFV and aircraft engines as well developing indigenous defense designs.
as gas-turbine engines. The extent of wear-and-tear of defense-in-
Ukraine’s mid-term interest in mili- dustrial assets in Ukraine and Russia is
tary-technical cooperation with China such that, on many occurrences, it effec-
should comprise areas such as military tively prohibits them from creating defense
aeronautics (specifically fighter, military- technology designs capable of competing
transport and combat capable trainer air- on the export market with Chinese-devel-
craft), missile technology and defense oped alternatives, particularly in terms of
electronics. China as a military-technolog- cost effectiveness. This, among other areas,
ical cooperation partner is of interest to is about microelectronics, optoelectronics
Ukraine in that China has successfully re- and measuring elements which intrinsi-
solved many of the tasks relating to the de- cally comprise the ‘nervous system’ of any

333:Layout 1 23.11.2009 4:56 Page 54

Ukraine-China:

of weapons systems, upgraded or devel- carried out, and it also assisted in the build-
oped. China has acquired the strategic ad- ing, testing and subsequent qualification of
vantage of this kind through high-tech the aircraft.
equipment acquisitions from European As well as the ARJ-21 project,
suppliers among other things, and the ben- Antonov has been engaged with Shaanxi
efit from this advantage will only grow as Aircraft Industry Corporation (SAC) in re-
time goes by. designing the Y-8F600 aircraft – an up-
graded variant of the Y-8F400, itself a
Aeronautics Chinese copy of the Antonov’s An-12 air-
The aeronautics sector is the one that craft. Antonov’s workshare under the proj-
dominates in military-technical coopera- ect included R&D works, development of
tion between Ukraine and China. This is no wing production technology, building sev-
wonder, considering Ukraine’s expertise eral aircraft models and providing techni-
and capabilities in this particular sector. cal advice on aircraft testing. Remarkably
ANTK Antonov Aeronautical Scien- enough, it was Anonov who, at its time,
tific/Technical Corporation, for instance, advised China Aviation Industry Corpora-
enjoys a pretty rich history in working to- tion II (AVIC II) to invite Ukrainian aircraft
gether with Chinese partners. This, above engine makers ‘Motor-Sich’ and Ivchenko
all, is about cooperative R&D projects and ‘Progress’ Design Bureau to join in the Y-
upgrades on transport (military transport) 8F600 project.
aircraft for China. In 2002, ANTK Antonov In September 2007, ANTK Antonov
and China Aviation Industry Corporation I and SAC signed a memorandum of intent
(AVIC I) signed a contract under a Chinese to set up Beijing’s aeronautical engineering
program to design and develop China’s center – a joint venture operating in full
first ever regional turbojet airliner of the conformity with respective legislations of
XXI century, the ARJ-21. Ukraine and China. The joint venture has
The contract provided, in particular, been set up to perform contractually re-
for co-development of a supercritical wing quired works involving R&D on new air-
for the aircraft. Antonov’s responsibilities craft and upgrades to already existing
under the contract included intermediate designs; validation of new aircraft designs;
and final calculations, computing geome- aircraft layout design; preliminary re-
try of the wing, building its simulation search; project evaluation and scientific re-
models, and evaluating the wing’s main- search works of other kinds.
tainability and robustness performance. It has been projected that the joint venture
Furthermore, Antonov subjected supercrit- would perform development and engi-
ical wing models of various configurations neering work on a lightweight short take-
to wind-tunnel testing, along with models off and landing (STOL) transport aircraft
of the aircraft as a whole, including the and a medium STOL transport aircraft, as-
ones with power jet simulators. sist in a Chinese project to build a large
In addition to this, the Ukrainian transport airplane and support upgrade
party built a wind-tunnel model of the projects for legacy aircraft designs.
ARJ-21 and subjected it to high-speed tun- Meanwhile, potentialities of China’s
nel testing. Antonov provided Load Analy- combat and trainer aircraft industries are
sis on which basis the wing’s static load of interest to Ukraine, most notably in the
strength and fatigue evaluation had been context of the challenges facing the Ukrain-

333:Layout 1 23.11.2009 4:56 Page 55

Ukraine-China:

ian Air Force (UAF). Specifically, the the fleet to be solely performed by MoD’s
UAF’s fighter fleet of ‘lightweight’ MiG-29s and Ministry of Industrial Policy’s repair
and heavier Su-27s has almost reached the facilities. But with the heavier fighter fleet
limit of its service life, and as such the fleet (Su-27), the situation appears to be far less
needs to be upgraded to preserve its mili- clear, if not threatening, given that almost
tary usefulness. That means that the UAF all of the UAF’s Su-27s would have
has, first, to evaluate the fleet’s serviceabil- reached the end of their expected service
ity status, perform its projected reliability life as early as by the beginning of 2010.
analysis and, based on the results obtained, This being the case, upgrading and life ex-
to determine the amount and the list of the tension of the Su-27 fleet becomes an ex-
works to be done. Once this work is com- tremely urgent challenge for the Ukrainian
pleted, the fleet will need to be upgraded Armed Forces. Unlike with the MiG-29,
to modern standards, and this endeavor is any kind of full-scale upgrading of the Su-
going to be even more complex and chal- 27 would be outside the scope of the do-
lenging. Both life extension and upgrades mestic defense industry capabilities.
traditionally require designer’s and Notably enough, according to the UAF
maker’s authorization. For Ukraine, that Commander, Ivan Rusnak, “In the late
issue has become a political one, as the de- 1990s/early 2000s, China bought from Rus-
signers and makers of almost all core sys- sia a great quantity of Su-27 and Su-30MK-
tems in the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ type aircraft together with related
inventory had left in Russia following the production license. It is no secret that, as
demise of the USSR. By 2009, not a single strange as it may seem, it was Ukraine
joint project relating to UAF’s fleet mod- where repair know-how and relating en-
ernization had existed between Ukraine gines for the aircraft came from to China,
and the Russian Federation. Against this and it was Ukraine where Chinese special-
backdrop, Ukraine’s parliament, the Verk- ists were taught how to do repairs on the
hovna Rada, on April 15, 2009, adopted a aircraft of this type”.
bill “On amending some laws of Ukraine China, who had been buying Su-27
with regard to maintaining serviceability multi-role fighters for a long period of
and upgrading of the Ukrainian Armed time, has already license built the Su-27,
Forces’ weapons arsenal and equipment in- under own designation Shenyang J-11. En-
ventory”. Under the new legislation, the gines appeared to be not among the Chi-
Cabinet of Ministers and the Ministry of nese aircraft industry’s strong points. But
Defense are vested with the authority over this is not the case now; China has already
the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ weapons sys- demonstrated a domestically designed al-
tems and military hardware that are free ternative to the Russian AL-31F jet engine
from Designer Supervision. In actual fact, it has been buying to date as primary
this applies to the aircraft fleets, missile power plant for the Shenyang J-11. In Feb-
systems and other ‘disputed’ equipment ruary 2008, Russian defense export author-
inventories on which Ukraine and Russia ity Rosoboronexport’s representative to the
have never reached any sort of a mutually PRC, Andrei Plotnikov stated that “…a
acceptable agreement to date. technological breakthrough achieved by
Regarding the MiG-29 fighter fleet, China in the aircraft engine area has al-
the Ukrainian MoD has developed a pro- lowed for the proportion of Chinese-made
gram allowing for a limited upgrading of components and technologies to be in-

333:Layout 1 23.11.2009 4:56 Page 56

Ukraine-China:

creased from 70-75 percent to 90 percent or tween ANTK Antonov and the re-emerg-
even higher”. Given the progress made by ing Chinese aircraft corporation AVIC-I-
China’s fighter aircraft industry recently, AVIC-II. This option (which requires a
Ukraine might consider recruiting Chinese speedier pace of the process to transform
partners to help resolve some of the tech- the ANTK Antonov into a share-holder
nological tasks associated with its Su-27 company) would provide a platform en-
fleet upgrade. abling parity-based cooperation and mu-
In the military-transport aircraft sec- tual oversight of marketing practices being
tor, Ukrainian engagement with China employed or work being carried out on
might include identifying a cooperation some or other specific market. At the same
pattern enabling the Antonov An-70 mili- time, this direction of joint work on the An-
tary-transport aircraft to be licensed as- 70 project with China still allows Kiev to
sembled in China, following a pattern pursue its own effort aimed at advancing
already tested by Ukraine in joint work on the aircraft to the European market to fill
the An-140 and An-148 aircraft projects in the gap emerged as a result of delays
with Iran. Such an approach might be ac- with completion of the A400M program.
ceptable to China as well, considering that Furthermore, ANTK Antonov offers
it has already employed similar patterns to for employment on China’s airlift and com-
establish domestic production of a range of mercial passenger air transportation mar-
foreign-designed aircraft types. Remark- kets several of its current-generation
ably, China Aviation Industry Corporation aircraft such as the new regional airliner
I (AVIC I), back in 2007, announced its in- An-148, in addition to the An-74-series air-
terest in producing a new heavy transport craft that are currently being advanced to a
aircraft with a payload capacity of 60+ new, higher level of development. Chinese
tons. For this purpose, the Chinese party customers, as before, are welcome to use
was considering a few cooperation pat- the Antonov Airlines’ fleet of the An-124-
terns with Ukraine, specifically recruiting 100 ‘Ruslan’ transports. Moreover, there is
ANTK Antonov to assist in R&D works on an agreement on intent concerning a Chi-
the new aircraft, buying an equity in nese development project for a new re-
ANTK Antonov (provided that there is an gional 70-seat turboprop airliner.
appropriate authorization by the Ukrain- Regarding the trainer aircraft sector,
ian Government) and setting up a joint mention should be made of a proposal
venture to support the project both in made to a visiting Ukrainian MoD team in
China and Ukraine. January 2009 to consider potentialities for
This would be advantageous to co-production of the supersonic trainer air-
Ukraine in that it would allow for the An- craft L-15, a design by the AVIC II’s
70’s potential customer base to be ex- Hongdu Group. In that context, it is im-
panded to reach the large Chinese market. portant to know that Ukraine’s OJSC
On the other hand, this involves the risk ‘Motor-Sich’ – the flagship aircraft engine
that the An-70 may follow the same path as supplier on the post-Soviet expanse — has
the Russian-designed Su-27 which eventu- been engaged with Chinese aircraft
ally has become strongly ‘Chinized’ in all builders since 2006, when it signed a con-
of its key components and subsystems. tract with Hongdu/AVIC II for an initial
That risk could be alleviated, for example, supply of AI-222-25F engines to equip the
by way of an equity for equity swap be- L-15s. The overall volume of the supply is

333:Layout 1 23.11.2009 4:56 Page 57

Ukraine-China:

projected to eventually amount to 200+ ening program-focused foreign acquisitions,
gines, with 10 engines delivered in 2008 it still lacks the expertise required to build
and 22 more ordered for delivery by the a ship of this type and dimensions. Second,
end of 2009, at a price tag of about $1 mil- Beijing is keen to get the indigenous carrier
lion each. The 4000 kg thrust AI-222-25F, a built at the earliest time possible. This all
design by Ivchenko State Design Bureau gives a chance for Ukrainian companies to
‘Progress’, is series manufactured by OJSC get contract awards for skills and ship-
‘Motor-Sich’ in cooperation with MMPP building technology transfers and for sup-
‘Saliut’ of Russia. As well as the L-15, it plies of selected components and
equips the future Russian combat-capable subsystems for ships and naval aircraft.
trainer Yak-130. The L-15 is powered by Ukrainian shipbuilder ‘Black Sea Ship-
two reheated engines. At this stage, neither building Yard’ once built the Project 1143.5
Motor-Sich nor MMPP Saliut have an in- heavy aircraft carrier ‘Kuznetsov’ (which is
terest in transferring production license for currently operationally deployed with the
the AI-222-25F to China. Russian Naval Force) and the same-class
On January 19, 2009, the Ukrainian Project 1143.6 aircraft carrier ‘Variag’
MoD’s press office reported the then Min- which was sold to China when 70-percent
ister of Defense Yuri Yekhanurov as say- completed. One more such ship, the Proj-
ing: “Even though it is the L-39 attack and ect 1143.7 heavy aircraft carrier
training aircraft that is operationally de- ‘Ulyanovsk’, which was designed with a
ployed with the Ukrainian Armed Forces, nuclear propulsion system and an enlarged
the proposal voiced in Beijing looks highly 70-aircraft ship-borne component, was
interesting. Here at the Ministry of De- eventually dismantled in a building berth
fense, sufficient capabilities exist to do when half-completed. The shipbuilder em-
projects of this kind. Now we are going to ploys two dry docks large enough to ac-
investigate into technological potentialities commodate heavy carrier-class vessels,
of our aircraft repair companies and hold and it has the core expertise and technol-
focused negotiations with Chinese repre- ogy required for building them.
sentatives with respect to possible produc- In April 1998, Beijing bought from
tion of this type of combat-capable Ukraine the heavy aircraft carrier ‘Variag’
airplanes”. The L-15, which comes at a whose ownership came over to Ukraine as
price of about $15 million, shall not be con- a result of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet divi-
sidered as a rival to the Russian Yak-130, at sion between Kiev and Moscow. The build-
least before it becomes clear which of the ing of the ship was brought to a halt in 1992
two aircraft with Ukrainian engines would when it was 67-pct completed, and as such
be better selling on the export market. it was sold to the Chinese military for only
$28mn. By comparison, same-class current-
generation aircraft carrier costs billions to
Naval ships and related build. The remarkable ‘feature’ of the deal,
equipment and systems as was widely reported at the time, was
China’s top-priority program in the that the intent of the firm that initially pro-
naval shipbuilding area is an indigenously cured the ship was to renovate and refit it
designed aircraft carrier. This program is into a leisure and gambling center. Back
noticeable in two aspects. First, even then, many analysts did not preclude the
though Beijing has continued with pursu- possibility that the canard reports were

333:Layout 1 23.11.2009 4:56 Page 58

Ukraine-China:

willfully distributed to disguise true intent, of that coin is that the U.S. thinking toward
specifically to obtain a half-built aircraft China’s effort aimed to build its own air-
cruiser for next to nothing. In 2008, the ship craft carrier fleet would certainly be
was re-designated as ‘Shi Lang’ after the strongly negative, considering military-po-
renowned Chinese military commander, litical stand-off between the two countries
which would be out of tradition for a and their rivalries over geopolitical domi-
casino. According to numerous media re- nance in the Asian-Pacific region. The level
ports, the carrier was planned to be com- of influence the U.S. leaders have on
pleted by 2010 and subsequently Ukrainian ones would be sufficient to
commissioned with the Chinese Navy. An- make Ukraine give up altogether any hope
alysts are almost unanimous in the opinion of supplying propelling plants for Chinese
that China’s purchase of the ‘Variag’ car- carriers.
rier might be considered to be a latent form China intends to have four medium-
of scientific-technical assistance or know- size aircraft carriers in place by 2020, with
how transfer that saved Chinese scientists the first-of-class planned to be integrated
ten years’ worth of upstream materials into the Chinese Navy by 2016. That ship
technology research. is going to be of the same class as the So-
Basically, Ukraine’s defense industry viet-era heavy carrier ‘Variag’ with a dis-
has the capability to equip all Chinese air- placement in the order of about 65,000
craft carriers with propelling plants (if the tons. Four carrier warfare groups are ex-
gas turbine engine type is selected as a final pected to be deployed in the South China
option). Mykolayiv-based State-owned Sea and East China Sea to secure maritime
company ‘Zoria-Mashproekt’ Research energy corridors and safeguard China’s
and Production Complex of Gas Turbine territorial waters there.
Building supplied China with a shipment It is worthy of note that a Ukrainian
of DA/DN-80 gas turbine engines which trace might be found in China’s effort to
have already been installed on four of the build an indigenous carrier-based fighter,
Chinese Navy’s Luyang-1/2-class multi- under a program being carried out on a
role destroyers. China was reported to parallel track with the indigenous carrier.
have bought production license for the According to Western media reports, in
DN-80 gas-turbine engine. Here, however, 2006, China purchased from Ukraine a T-
some risks have to be considered. Specifi- 10K test aircraft – one of preproduction
cally, the building of aircraft carriers for prototypes of the Su-27 carrier-based
China should be carried out as a trinational fighter (ancestor of the Su-27/Su-33). No
China-Russia-Ukraine program. This prizes for guessing that the purchase might
would be impracticable to implement be intended to get into the construction of
without Russia as the supplier of some key the aircraft’s folding wing, ruggedized
subsystems and components as well as landing gear, arresting hook system and so
naval weapons systems. In such a case, if on. Later in 2006, China bought, presum-
China opted to tap Russia and Ukraine for ably from the Russian Federation, four sets
its aircraft carrier program, one more issue of the Su-33 naval fighter’s tailhook system
to be addressed is the character and level to be employed, as the buyer put it, ‘for ex-
of military-technical cooperation between perimentation purposes’. The Su-33’s tail-
the latter two, which has shown a strong hook system supply package also
downward trend recently. The other side comprised a set of deck take-off/landing

333:Layout 1 23.11.2009 4:56 Page 59

Ukraine-China:

equipment, including four sets of cross- Carrier’ Project. In that event, leasing
deck arresting gear, aircraft arresting net Ukraine’s NITKA is supposed to be a tran-
systems and other equipment. sitional tactic, waiting for the completion
This all is closely interrelated with of China’s own NITKA. Before this, China
China’s interest in co-operating with may lease NITKA for a short period of time
Ukraine on the lease of its naval ship-borne to have early phase computerized simula-
pilot training center NITKA located at the tion flight or land-based taking-off and
Crimea Peninsula. At present, the Russian landing training of its naval aviation pilots.
shipborne aviation force is leasing NITKA Such training usually takes six months.
until 2011. The Chinese party has an inter- Consequently, China’s lease of the training
est in the naval pilot training center to be center is probably short-term and its in-
leased to the People’s Liberation Army vestment in upgrading the training infra-
(PLA). The establishment of the Chinese structure at the facility would also be very
version of NITKA pilot training center will limited.
lag behind the construction of aircraft car- The second scenario is very likely
riers, and because of this, the training of pi- China’s leasing the training center pending
lots should be pushed ahead first. As a the respective stage of its aircraft carrier de-
result, there is the need to send pilots to velopment. When it requires training the
Ukraine for training and thus need to lease pilots at different stages, the lease agree-
the NITKA training base. This is for one ment could be limited to half a year. The
thing. Second, the construction of the Chi- third model is not ruled out, with China
nese version NITKA is a very costly and purchasing NITKA’s blueprint and soft-
technologically demanding project, and ware or even some of its engineers and
also takes a long time. Particularly, this is technicians so as to speed up the construc-
supposed to include the take-off and ar- tion of its own NITKA. The Chinese
resting systems on the aircraft carrier. NITKA may eventually be built at Hainan
Moreover, it also requires the construction Island.
of supporting airports, which must be in At this stage, the Russian Navy does
costal regions close to the shore. Other es- not want to share this training center with
sential facilities include computer-based the Chinese. Ukraine will have to work to-
support system. NITKA is in fact a ‘land- gether with Russia on the issue of leasing
based aircraft carrier project’ without radar NITKA to China, and Russia will also have
or weapons systems. a share of the leasing fee. Without Russia’s
For this reason, Russia took more than help, the Chinese naval aviation pilots
ten years to discuss the plan of building its would not be able to fully master the take-
own aircraft pilot training base and has not off/landing training regulations on Russ-
yet initiated the project. The prime concern ian-style aircraft carrier even if they arrive
is the actual number of shipborne pilots to at NITKA
be trained will be limited and the cost is
very huge.
Several scenarios might be predicted Air-cushion vehicle programs
for China’s lease of NITKA training facil- China has invested much effort into
ity. Due to the national character, China the development of its Naval Force’s land-
would not want to be restricted by any ing craft air-cushion vehicle component.
party in the course of its ‘Grand Aircraft Particularly, it has launched practical-im-

333:Layout 1 23.11.2009 4:56 Page 60

Ukraine-China:

plementation phase of its program to in- The building of Project 1232.2 small
troduce Type 071 large landing platform landing craft air-cushion vehicles ‘Zubr’ is
dock (LPD) into service with the PLA becoming a separate area of Ukrainian-
Navy. The first-of-class Type 071 was com- Sino military cooperation. In 2008, follow-
missioned with the PLA Navy in Novem- ing a series of unsuccessful negotiations
ber 2007. The vehicle is propelled by four with the Russian Federation on the pur-
gas-turbine engines supplied by Zoria- chase of 10-15 Project 1232.2 ‘Zubrs’, Bei-
Mashproekt. With the Type 071 platforms jing entered into negotiations with Kiev. In
in place, the PLA Navy will obtain funda- May 2009, Ukrainian Minister of Industrial
mentally new capabilities to be initially de- Policy announced that the PLA Navy is
ployed for possible offensive operations to going to award Ukraine a contract to sup-
seize Taiwan and, afterwards, for future ply four Project 1232.2 landing air-cushion
operations elsewhere in the World’s oceans vehicles to be built by Feodosia’s FSK
and seas. The Type 071 is designed to be- ‘Morye’. Jane’s Defence Weekly estimated
come PLA Navy’s core landing compo- the cost of the future deal at $315mn, and
nent. According to the Type 071 LPD’s additionally reported that the contract
official description, its sealift capability is award was signed in Kiev by visiting
enough to carry a battalion-size marine deputy Chairman of the National Commit-
corps unit, including 500-800 troops, 15-20 tee of the Chinese People's Political Con-
amphibious armored vehicles and four sultative Conference on July 2, 2009. Other
landing craft air-cushion (LCAC) vehicles. reports have it that the two parties are in
The Type 071 LPD Program sub- the final stage of signing the contract which
sumes the development of an indigenous is not advertised, simply by virtue of a va-
LCAC vehicle design based, according to riety of subjective and objective factors
various reports, on a same-class U.S. de- such as resistance on the part of some Russ-
sign or the renowned Soviet-developed ian businesses.
landing air-cushion vehicle ‘Zubr’ that is In Ukraine’s case, the contract is valu-
currently being manufactured in Ukraine able in terms of the number of companies
and Russia. The ‘Zubr’ class of LCAC ve- to be tapped for subcontracted works, in-
hicles is intended for autonomous opera- cluding seven potential subcontractors at
tion to project amphibious assault assets to the Crimea Peninsula alone. In addition,
the designated battlefield. Conceptually, it Beijing’s $3mn worth of initial investment
was designed for roles such as rapid beach- under the contract would allow FSK
head seizure in the Black Sea and Baltic Sea ‘Morye’ to settle its debts. Of the four vehi-
regions. The ‘Zubr’ might be of interest to cles contacted, two will supposedly be
China in that its capabilities allow it to be built in Ukraine and another two in China,
deployed as a frontline attack component under the supervision and with assistance
to support possible marine assault opera- of Ukrainian engineers and technicians.
tions in Taiwan. Zubr’s primary role there Lessons to be learnt from the experience
could be the seizure of forward beachheads with building air-cushion vehicles at its
and support of lodgement expansion as own yards would enable China to subse-
follow-on forces arrive on Type 071 LPD quently series produce this type of landing
platforms. This means a chance for Ukrain- assets in quantities that might be required
ian defense companies to receive lump-sum by the PLA Navy. Even if this is the case,
orders that they so drastically need today. China would not be able to replicate in full

333:Layout 1 23.11.2009 4:56 Page 61

Ukraine-China:

all the production technology involved, potential cooperation area relates to the
and therefore it will have to purchase some Karakorum-8 (K-8/JL-8) basic jet trainer
parts and components from foreign sup- aircraft developed as a bilateral project be-
pliers (in Ukraine and Russia). Given the tween China and Pakistan. The K-8/JL-8
PLA’s requirement for assets of this kind, design allows for three choices of engines:
there should be an expectation of substan- U.S., indigenous Chinese or Ukrainian.
tial Chinese orders for ‘Zubr’ ACV compo- China’s initial choice was the U.S.-deigned
nents and subsystems supplies. TFE731-2A turbofan engine. But the U.S.-
led sanction against China forced it to
Naval and aircraft engines switch to the Ukrainian Motor-Sich AI-
China’s cooperation with Zoria- 25TLK turbofan and, eventually, to the
Mashproekt holds promise for projects be- Chinese indigenous WS-11 (licensed copy
yond the ‘Grand Aircraft Carrier’ program. of the Ukrainian AI-25TLK).
Some media sources reported that in mid- As well as aircraft and gas-turbine en-
2009, Zoria was awarded a $55mn contract gines designed for integration with the mil-
to supply four gas turbine propulsion sys- itary equipment types being developed to
tems to the PLA Navy. Ukrainian gas-tur- meet the PLA’s requirement under joint
bine engine designs might replace projects with third countries, Ukraine is
technically obsolescent KVG-4 steam supplying China with AFV engines as well.
boiler/turbine propulsion systems, and, Pakistan’s military, after taking the deliv-
also, could comprise the core of the propul- ery of a shipment of T-80UD tanks from
sion-machinery plant on the non-nuclear Ukraine, continued with the development
cruiser being developed in China around effort for its indigenous Al-Khalid main
the Soviet-vintage Type 1143.5 cruiser de- battle tank. The Al-Khalid is a design de-
sign. Moreover, Beijing is examining the rived from the Chinese ‘Type T-85’ which
prospect of its Russian-supplied Sovre- had been series manufactured in Pakistan
menny-class destroyers to be repaired in until it ceased to meet modern standards.
Ukraine. PLA’s Navy operates two Type The Al-Khalid required an engine with an
956-E destroyers and as many Type 956- output of 1,200hp which China did not
EM destroyers. What attracts China most manufacture. Therefore, a foreign-de-
in the prospect of having its naval ships re- signed 1,200hp diesel was to be selected.
paired in Ukraine is a relatively low cost of The final choice was made in favor of a
high quality repair services. On the other Ukrainian engine and gear box, and
hand, there may as well be an interest in Ukraine, represented by trading firm
obtaining technical documentation re- ‘Progress’, was awarded a contract to sup-
quired to organize repairs of naval ships ply the tank’s most sophisticated subsys-
and shipboard weapons systems in China. tem to Pakistan. The Malyshev Plant, based
In the aircraft engine sector, there is in Kharkiv, delivered to Pakistan 15 engine
an intensive work going on with China fo- and gear boxes for integration with the Al-
cused on building up aero-engine repair Khalid during 2001. Work started in the
capabilities. This direction of joint work summer of 2002 on a follow-on three-year
with the PRC may hold a promise of sig- $100mn contract to supply 285 engine and
nificant orders, given potential capacity of gear boxes for upgrading other AFV types
the market for fixed-wing aircraft and ro- already operated by Pakistan’s Armed
torcraft with Ukrainian engines. One more Forces.

333:Layout 1 23.11.2009 4:56 Page 62

Ukraine-China:

Missile systems China has also demonstrated great
China was purchasing air-launched progress with developing and building in-
missiles from Ukraine and Russia during digenous surface-to-air missile (SAM) de-
several years. In 2005/2006 alone, Ukraine signs. The HQ-9 SAM system (Chinese
supplied 953 (363+590) R-27 medium- copy of the Soviet-designed S-300), which
range airborne missiles to China. In can defeat targets at ranges in excess of 100
2007/2008, China did not buy R-27 mis- km, employs a Chinese indigenous guided
siles, which might be indicative of two SAM missile derived from the
things. First, China has already acquired Soviet/Russian-developed 5V55. The HQ-
enough missiles of this type to meet the 9 is operationally deployed with the PLA
PLAAF requirement and, second, it has Air Defense Force and it is currently com-
technologically resolved the task of estab- peting in a Turkish long-range SAM tender
lishing indigenous production of the mis- along with Russia’s S-400 and U.S. Patriot.
sile design at its own factories. It’s worth It could be said with a high degree of cer-
mentioning now in this context that China tainty that it is China who is going to pro-
has already demonstrated an indigenous vide the toughest competition to Russia on
active radar beyond-visual-range (BVR) the long-range SAM markets where the
air-to-air missile design, the Ramjet SD-10. supply of U.S. ‘Patriot’ SAM systems is im-
This has certain engineering design and possible for political reasons. In the
construction features revealing a similarity medium and long term, China might be of
to same-class missile designs by Russian interest to Ukraine as a potential coopera-
designer company KB ‘Vympel’ which, tion partner in bringing up to modern stan-
along with Scientific Research Institute dards UAF’s SAM assets, notably in the
AGAT, assisted in Chinese air-to-air mis- aspects where real alternatives to Russian
sile developments. The SD-10 has extra proposals might be required.
four fore-mounted control fins on its ex- As is the case with upgrading and life-
tended nose body, making it outwardly extension of the UAF fighter fleet, Ukraine
very similar to the R-27/AA-10. The ramjet has experienced the same difficulties with
motor’s two rectangular inlets bear a upgrading its air defense weapons arsenal,
strong resemblance of inlets on the RVV- specifically S-300-series SAM systems.
AE-PD/R-77M-PD missile – a design that Ukraine has since 1993 persistently pro-
was left without Russian Government posed that Russia should assist in upgrad-
funding but was probably employed with ing to modern standards and extending
great effect by Chinese missile design en- operational life of the UAF’s SAM weapons
gineers. inventory. To date, agreements have been
The Ukrainian Air Force (UAF) has a reached with Russia on a very limited num-
requirement for long-range air-launched ber а projects. In 2003, a joint project was
missiles, in conformity with its ‘au- completed to extend operational life of the
tonomous defense’ concept. This require- UAF’s 5V55R and S-300P SAM system in-
ment might be fulfilled, among other ventories from 10 to 15 years. The core of
options, through speeding up the pace of Ukraine’s surface-to-air missile shield is
indigenous long-range AAM design effort, comprised by Soviet-era S-300PT and S-
or direct acquisitions from or development 300PS SAM systems manufactured back in
and production of BVR missile designs the mid-1990s and providing effective en-
jointly with China. gagement ranges limited to 75 km. Newer

333:Layout 1 23.11.2009 4:56 Page 63

Ukraine-China:

and mode capable S-300-series versions had program for its satellite navigation and po-
never reached Ukraine, unlike China whom sitioning system GLONASS, which was
Russia was supplying with the S-300PMU-1 originally planned to be restored to fully
and S-300PMU-2 configurations. deployed status (i.e. 24 satellites in orbit
In this context, mention should be and continuous global coverage) by 2010,
made of the development effort being car- may not be completed at the time as sched-
ried out in Ukraine for indigenous SAM uled due to some unforeseen difficulties,
designs enabling air targets to be defeated and the European Union’s Galileo satellite
from extended ranges of up to 300 kilome- navigation constellation may not be fully
ters. Ukrainian developers of the indige- deployed by 2013 as planned, as well. Both
nous ‘Sapsan’ SAM design already GLONASS and planned Galileo systems
announced that design and development have been developed as alternative and
work for the tactical-operational air de- complementary to the United States’
fense missile system would be pursued Global Positioning System (GPS).
without Russia’s assistance. This an-
nouncement was made even before it be- Defense electronics
came clear what kind of difficulties may In a pretty rich history of Ukrain-
potentially emerge in developing this new ian-Sino military cooperation, a separate
precision-guided SAM design. The issues place belongs to the ‘Kolchuga’ passive
identified could be resolved using China’s electronic monitoring radar system, a
expertise and practical work experiences in unique-of-its kind design by the Donetsk
this field. When Turkey failed to obtain TOPAZ State Joint-Stock Holding Com-
production license for the U.S. Multiple pany. China was the second export cus-
Launch Rocket System M-270 MPRS, tomer for the Ukrainian ‘Kolchuga’ radar
Ankara proposed partnership to Beijing. system after Ethiopia, and ‘Kolchuga’ is
As a result, Turkish Roketsan is series man- the first and almost the only fully-inte-
ufacturing for the Turkish Army tactical grated system to have been exported by
SAM weapons ‘Yildirim I’ with a range of Ukraine to China’s defense market to
150 km and ‘Yildirim II’ (300 km) designed date. In this respect, given China’s ambi-
around the China Aerospace Science and tion and the ability to get ‘domesticated’
Industry Corporation’s (CASIC) solid fuel everything up to sophisticated high-tech
missile B-611. weapons systems into indigenous de-
Of particular interest to Ukraine signs, we would be so bold as to describe
might be projects relating to access to the the 2002 export deal for four Kolchugas
navigation signal of China’s future Biedou as being a genuine ‘breakthrough’. For
Satellite Navigation and Positioning Sys- 2002, TOPAZ reported a net profit that
tem that is slated to become fully opera- was more than five times the respective
tional by 2015 with 35 satellites in orbit. At figure for the previous year, thanks in no
this stage, China has five-satellite Beidou small part to the Chinese contract. It
constellation deployed in orbit, which is could be predicted with a high degree of
experimental and has limited coverage and certainty that four Kolchugas will be far
application. The Biedou constellation of from enough to satisfy China’s require-
navigation and positioning satellites will ment for surveillance assets in this cate-
eventually comprise 35 satellites offering gory. What probably prevented
complete coverage of the globe. Russia’s relationships with China on passive elec-

333:Layout 1 23.11.2009 4:56 Page 64

Ukraine-China:

tronic monitoring radar designs (and ahead of all other rival designs existing
other po tentially promising projects) elsewhere in the world, including the
from achieving the desired level of de- U.S. Considerable headway in this field
velopment was the notorious ‘Kolchuga has now been made in Russia, still its de-
scandal’ and resulting consequences on signs are no competitors to the Kolchuga
the 2002 deal with China. in terms of performance and operational
In addition to Ukraine, China took effectiveness. For this reason, the
its beating as well, being accused, indi- ‘Kolchuga’ chapter in Ukrainian-Sino re-
rectly or sometimes directly, of having lationships should not be closed alto-
re-exported the systems to Iraq. The PRC gether.
Foreign Ministry even had to officially
deny China being involved with alleged Cooperation in space
Ukrainian supplies of advanced ESM technologies
(electronic support measures) systems Bilateral co-operation in this field is
‘Kolchuga’ to Iraq. The accusations focused on projects concerned with the
against China were catalyzed by U.S. following:
and UK’s allegations that the deal was – Information swapping on techni-
assisted by an undisclosed intermediary cal parameters of the Chinese ‘Environ-
country. American and British experts ment-1-B’ and Ukrainian ‘Sich-2’ projects
doubted the credibility of Kiev’s asser- with the goal of forging mutually bene-
tion that China was the intended recipi- ficial co-operation in the exchange of
ent of the four Kolchuga systems. data obtained from space-based assets;
Persistent demands that Ukraine dis- – The supply of a laboratory instal-
close the details of the Kolchuga deal lation (together with related production
with China did not, to say the least, fa- license) required to set up production of
cilitate further relationships growth with spacecraft ion plasma thrusters in China;
the U.S, as Ukraine was not in a position – Forging mutually beneficial coop-
to reveal data containing commercial eration on interrelating and complemen-
and government secrets of a foreign tary IONOSAT Project of Ukraine and
country. China’s Seismo-Electromagnetic Satellite
If the Chinese would successfully Project.
establish commercial level production of
technologies such as the ‘Kolchuga’,
there is no doubt they will develop (and Specialist training programs
sell to whatever market they choose) Whilst Ukrainian-Sino military co-
their indigenous equivalents, under Chi- operation is mostly focused on exports of
nese brand names. This task thus far ex- fully-integrated systems, components
ceeds China’s ability, because the and subsystems, services and technol-
greatest challenge here is not copying ogy, it also encompasses a variety of
the equipment as such but, rather, com- training programs for Chinese military
prehending its operational algorithm. technology specialists. A few dozen jun-
Ukrainian third-generation passive ior, middle and senior-ranking PLA offi-
radar designs, along with those devel- cers, together with several Chinese
oped in the Czech Republic, are streets college professors, took training course

333:Layout 1 23.11.2009 4:56 Page 65

Ukraine-China:

at Kharkiv’s I.Kozhedub Air Force Uni- trol of missile forces and artillery”. Fur-
versity’s Department of Command and thermore, Chinese engineers and techni-
Control Computer Systems (C2CS) and cians are undergoing training under
Aviation Ground Support Equipment. A specialist training programs offered by
team of PLA Missile Force officers took military aircraft and naval ship repair
a refresher training course in “utilization companies in Ukraine.
of C2CS systems in command and con-


Ukraine-China:

Fifth chapter
China’s military parade as a mirror
of its global ambitions

B
eijing, on October 1, 2009, saw deniable, there is some doubt as to whether
a military parade celebrating they are truly ‘latest-generation indige-
China’s 60th Anniversary na- nous’ Chinese designs. Let us look and see
tional day. To provide an in- what exactly these terms imply in this par-
sight into modern China’s ticular context. Ten aircraft types and two
global ambitions, below we offer a retro- helicopter types participated in the Octo-
spective look at the aerial vehicle types, ber 1 flypast show. Their specifications are
most particularly the PLA Air Force’s fixed presented in the table below.
wing aircraft and helicopters that flew over The availability of a fleet of airborne
Beijing in a show of force, complementing early warning and control (AEW&C) plat-
an Army vehicle parade. Twelve air eche- forms is a sine qua non of any modern air
lons comprising a total of 151 fixed wing force. It’s no coincidence that aircraft with
aircraft and helicopters participated in this precisely this application were the ones to
lavish show. These air echelons included: open the Beijing’s flypast show. These
1 — 1 KJ-2000 AWACS aircraft; 8 J-7G were one KJ-2000 and two KJ-200 AEW&C
fighters; aircraft.
2 — 2 KJ-200 AWACS aircraft; 6 J-11 KJ-2000. The KongJing-2000 (KJ-2000)
fighters; is the first airborne warning and control
3 — 9 H-6H bombers; system (AWACS) in service with the PLA
4 — 2 H-6U aerial refueling tankers; 2 J- Air Force (PLAAF), with four examples
10 fighters; 2 J-8F fighters; commissioned between 2006~07. The air-
5 — 15 JH-7A fighter bombers; craft is based on the airframe of the Russ-
6 — 16 J-8F fighters; ian-made A-50/IL-76MD, but outfitted
7 — 15 J-10 fighters; with a Chinese indigenous electronically
8 — 12 J-11 fighters; steered phased-array (ESA) radar that is
9 — 10 Z-8K search and rescue (SAR) less capable than the Russian alternative
helicopters; ‘Shmel’ seen on the A-50. The KJ-2000 has
10 — 18 WZ-9A attack helicopters with five flight crew and possibly 10~15 mission
anti-helicopter weapons; crew. The aircraft carries out patrol mis-
11 — 18 WZ-9A attack helicopters with sions at an altitude of 5,000~10,000m. The
ant-tank weapons; maximum flight range of the aircraft is
12 — 15 JL-8 trainer aircraft. 5,000km and the flight endurance is 7
Official comments during the parade hours 40 minutes. At a range of 2,000km
described the participating aerial vehicles and patrolling speed of 600 kmph, the air-
as latest-generation designs developed and craft can remain on patrol for up to 1 hour
built in China. If their Chinese make is un- 25 minutes. The primary radar system


Ukraine-China:

housed in a radome is a three-sided elec- vide a 360 degree coverage. The Chinese-
tronically steered phased-array (ESA) de- made radar system could be similar in de-
veloped by Nanjing-based 14 institute. sign to the IAI Phalcon, but may not be as
Unlike the Russian A-50 or U.S. E-3, which capable as the latter. The Phalcon system
rotate their rotodomes to give a 360 degree could track up to 60~100 targets at the
coverage, the KJ-2000's radar antenna does same time and guide a dozen fighters in
not rotate. Instead, three ESA antenna all-weather, day and night operations. The
modules are placed in a triangular config- KJ-2000 has an aerial refueling capability
uration inside the round radome to pro- with a nose-mounted refueling probe.
Fixed wing and helicopter types showed off during the 60th Anniversary Parade

Designa-
J-7G J-8F J-10 J-11 H-6H FH-7A
tion

year of
service 2004 2003 2004 1998 2002 2004
entry

crew 1 1 1 1 4 2

engine
(number/ty 1xWP-13F 2xWP 13BII 1xAL-31FN 2xAL-31FN 2xWP-8 2xWS-9
pe)
thrust/with
afterburn- 4,400/6,700 4,800/7,000 7,770/12,500 7,770/12,500 9 500 5,600/9,300
ing, kg
max flying
speed, 2 450 2 300 2 450 2 500 1 014 1 810
kmph

max flying
2 200 2 200 3 400 4 000 6 000 3 650
range, km

operational
850 800 1 310 1 500 1 800 1 650
radius, km

operational
18 800 20 000 18 000 20 000 13 000 16 000
ceiling, m

wingspan,
8 9 9 15 34 13
m


Ukraine-China:

Designa-
J-7G J-8F J-10 J-11 H-6H FH-7A
tion

length, m 15 22 15 22 35 22

max
9 19 19 33 76 29
weight, t

combat
2 4,50 4,50 6,00 9,00 6,50
payload, t

number of
weapon 5 7 11 10 2 11
hardpoints

guns 1x30mm 1x30mm 1x23mm 1x30mm none 1x23mm

24x250-kg/ 36x250-kg/
bombs 4x500-kg 12x250-kg 8x250-kg 20x250-kg
8x500-kg 18x500-kg

guided
- 2 LT-2/LS-6 2 LT-2/LS-6 - - 2-4 LT-2
bombs

unguided
55mm/90m 2-4 2-6 2-6 8 (80mm)
- -
m missile
units
guided air-
2 YJ-9/ 4 KD-88/
to-surface - 2 Kh-31A - 2 YJ-63
2 YJ-8K 4 YJ-81/91
missiles

2-6xPL- 2-6xPL-
guided air- 8/11; 2- 8/11; 2-
2-10xR-73;
to-air mis- 2-4xPL-8 6xPL-12; 6xPL-12; - 2xPL-8
2-6xR-27
siles 2-6xR- 2-6xR-
27/77 73/77

external
1x1,400L; 1-3
fuel tanks 1-3x720L none none 2xPL-8
2x800L


Ukraine-China:

Designa-
KJ-2000 KJ-200v H-6U JL-8 WZ-9A Z-8K
tion

year of
service 2007 2009 1996 1998 2005 2007
entry

crew
crew 5+10-15v 2+ 2 2 2 -
v

engine
(number/ 4xD30KP 4xPW-150B 2xWP-8 1xWS-11 2xWZ-8A 3xRT6A-67
type)

thrust/with
afterburn- 12 000 4,250hp 9 500 1 720 740hp 1,941hp
ing, kg

flying
range, km 5 000 5 620 6 000 2 140 1 000 700

max flying
speed, 850 662 1 014 800 315 255
kmph

operational
- - 1 800 - - -
radius,km

operational
10 200 10 400 13,00 13 600 6 000 4 700
ceiling, m

wingspan,
50,50 38.0 34,2 9.63 11.37 (rotor) 18.9 (rotor)
m

length, m 46,6 34,02 35 11,6 13,46 23

max
190 65 76 4,33 4,1 13
weight, t


Ukraine-China:

Designa-
KJ-2000 KJ-200v H-6U JL-8 WZ-9A Z-8K
tion

combat
- - 18.5 (fuel) 1 2 5
payload, t

number of
weapon - - - 5 2 -
hardpoints

2x12.7mm
guns - - - 1x23mm machine- -
guns

bombs - - - 4x250kg - -

guided
- - - - - -
bombs

unguided
55-90mm
- - - 4 2 -
missile
units
air-to-sur-
face guided - - - - 8xHJ-8E -
missiles
air-to-air
guided mis- - - - 2xPL-8 8xTY-90 -
siles

external
- - - 2 - -
fuel tanks

The KJ-200 is a short-range AEW&C Improvements on Y-8F600 include: a two-
aircraft based on a Y-8F600 airframe (vari- man cockpit fitted with modernized avion-
ant of the Y-8 transport, Chinese copy of ics including U.S. Honeywell navigation
the Soviet-designed An-12). The KJ-200 fea- system; four Pratt and Whitney Canada
tures a linear-shape active electronically PW150B turboprop engines with British
steered array mounted on top of the fuse- Dodi R-408 six-blade propellers; increased
lage. The aircraft is fitted with Western take-off weight and range. It is less capable
avionics for improved performance. and less expensive as compared to the


Ukraine-China:

KJ-2000, and could therefore be deployed ers. The J-8F multi-role fighter entered the
in less important locations. PLAAF service in 2003, with 20 examples
Four fighter types, the J-7G, J-8F, J-10 placed under a single PLAAF air regiment.
and J-11 were demonstrated during the fly- The PLAAF currently operates a combined
past show. fleet of 254 J-8-series jet fighters. The J-8F
The J-7G is a Chinese copy of the So- features a JL-10 radar and WP-13BII en-
viet-designed MiG-21F-13/Fishbed-C su- gines. The aircraft is capable of near-
personic jet fighter aircraft that has been ground speeds of up to 1,300 kmph and
license produced in China since 1967. The climbing speeds of up to 200-240 m/s, and
J-7G entered the PLAAF service in 2004, operating within an 800-km radius. The
with 24 examples having been delivered to fixed weapon on the J-8II includes a twin-
a single PLAAF air regiment. The J-7G is barrel Type 23-III (a copy of the GSh-23L)
equipped with an I/J-band KLJ-6E Lieying 23mm cannon with 200 rounds in a ventral
(“Falcon”) pulse-Doppler fire-control radar installation. The aircraft has seven hard-
and an improved counter-missile ECM points (one under fuselage and six under
suite. Propelled by the WP-13F-type en- wings). The center fuselage hardpoint has
gine, it has an excellent climbing perform- a GDJ-4 pylon integrated dispenser system,
ance capability (195 m/s), enables which can carry up to six 250kg low-drag
operation within an 850km radius, and free-fall bombs, or a 1,400 liter drop tank.
withstands loads of up to 8g. Weapons The under-wing hardpoints can carry up to
complement for the J-7G includes a 30-mm six air-to-air missiles in various configura-
Type 30-1 gun plus up to 4 guided PL-8 air- tions (Chinese PL-8/11/12 or Russian R-
to-air missiles on four outer pylons, or, al- 27/77) or six unguided 55/90mm rocket
ternatively, a 2t (4x500kg) bomb load, or up pods, or as many 250kg free-fall bombs.
to 4 unguided 55/90-mm rockets. For an The two outboard wing hardpoints are also
extended range capability, provisions are pumped to carry two 800 liter drop tanks.
made for up to 3 external 720L fuel tanks. Later variants of the fighter are also con-
The J-7 series fighters have been with- figured to fire the Russian-made Kh-31A
drawn from production, still they comprise anti-ship missile or precision guided
the majority of the PLAAF’s fighter fleet weapons such as the LT-2 laser guided
(756 of a 1,300-aircraft fleet) and supple- bomb (LGB) or the LS-6 satellite guided
ment more capable and expensive counter- bomb. The J-8F could also be fitted with a
parts Su-27, Su-30 and J-10. The J-7G is fixed in-flight refueling probe. Although it
roughly on a level with the oldest versions has yet approached the capabilities of ad-
of production-standard F-16 fighters in vanced fighter aircraft such as the Su-27 or
terms of some performance capabilities, es- Su-30, it provides a relatively inexpensive
pecially maneuverability. supplement to PLAAF’s existing third-gen-
The J-8F is the most recent version of eration fighter fleet.
the J-8B fighter jet aircraft developed in The Jian-10 (J-10) is a multirole, all-
China from the J-8A fighter interceptor, it- weather fighter aircraft designed for both
self an enlarged version of the J-7 fighter air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. The
propelled by two WP-7 engines. The JB-8, aircraft was originally intended to be a
which entered series production in 1988, is high-performance air-superiority fighter to
comparable in performance capabilities to counter the fourth-generation fighters such
earlier versions of the F-4 and Su-15 fight- as the Soviet MiG-29 and Su-27, and Tai-


Ukraine-China:

wan’s F-16 and Mirage-2000. The develop- drop tank + laser targeting pod. A further
ment of the J-10 was reportedly assisted by improved single-seat fighter variant J-10B
Israel who provided the technologies of its has been under development. It features a
IAI Lavi lightweight fighter, and, in the diffuser supersonic inlet (DSI), a Russian-
mid-1990s, by Russia who supplied its AL- style forward looking infrared and laser
31F turbofan jet engine to power the air- target designator pod and an improved
craft. In 2004, the fighter was counter-missile ECM capability.
commissioned with the PLAAF who cur- The Shenyang J-11 is the Chinese
rently operates a fleet of 140 J-10s in five air copy of the Su-27 (NATO reporting name:
regiments. The J-10 is equipped with an in- Flanker) air-superiority fighter built under
digenous fire-control radar featuring a me- Sukhoi’s license since 1998. The PLAAF op-
chanically slewed planar array antenna, erates a 116-aircraft fleet of J-11 in 9 air reg-
capable of tracking 10 targets and engag- iments. The J-11 is fitted with the
ing 2 (using semi-active radar-homing JL-10-type fire-control radar. Powered by
AAM) or 4 (using active radar-homing AL-31FN engines, it provides near-ground
AAM) of them simultaneously. Possibly speeds of up to 1,300 km/h and climbing
based on Russian or Israeli technologies, speeds of up to 300m/s. It operates within
the radar is believed to be comparable to a range of 1,500 km and withstands loads
the early 1990s-era Western fighter radar of 9g. Weapons complement includes one
designs. The J-10 provides near-ground 30-mm gun GSh-301 plus up to 6 tons of
speeds of up to 1,470 km/h and withstands consumable weapons. The aircraft has 10
loads of up to 9g. The fixed armament of external stores stations for weapon car-
the J-10 includes an internally-mounted riage, three under each wing and four
Type 23-3 twin-barrel 23mm cannon, plus under the fuselage. Consumable weapons
up to 4.5 tons of consumable weapons. The include R-73, R-27 and R-27ET/ER AAMs,
aircraft has 11 external stores stations for 250-kg and 500-kg bombs, unguided rock-
weapon carriage, three under each wing ets B-8V1 (20 80mm rockets in each rocket
and five under the fuselage. The J-10 could pod). In its air superiority role, it typically
carry a mix of medium-range air-to-air carries up to ten AAMs (up to four R-73s
missiles (MRAAM), short-range air-to-air plus up to six R-27s). Other air-to-air com-
missiles (SRAAM) and drop tanks. Typical bat configurations include ten R-73s, or
air-superiority and interception weapon two R-27ERs or six R-27ETs. For ground at-
configurations are: 4xPL-11/12 MRAAM + tack roles, it an carry 24x250kg bombs, or
2xPL-8 SRAAM + 1x800ltr drop tank, or 8x500kg bombs, or up to six unguided
2xPL-11/12 MRAAM + 2xPL-8 SRAAM + rocket pods. The J-11, however, is not con-
2x1600ltr drop tanks + 1x800ltr drop tank. figured to carry guided bombs or missiles,
In a typical surface attack mission, the or Chinese-made weapons.
fighter carries up to eight 250kg bombs, China has developed an improved
along with two drop tanks and two PL-8/9 version of the J-11 designated J-11B with
SRAAMs. Typical surface attack and inter- much greater Chinese-made content. Mod-
diction weapon configurations for the J-10 ifications on the J-11B include an indige-
are: 2xPL-8 SRAAMs + 6x250kg LDGP nous multifunctional pulse-Doppler
bombs + 2x1,600ltr drop tanks + 1x800ltr fire-control radar reportedly capable of
drop tank, or 2xPL-8 SRAAMs + 2x500kg tracking 6~8 targets and engaging 4 of
LGB + 2x1,600ltr drop tanks + 1x800ltr them simultaneously; an indigenous digi-


Ukraine-China:

tal flight-control system; Chinese copy of weapon suites for its 5th-generation fighter
the Russian OEPS-27 electro-optic search aircraft.
and tracking system; a strapdown H-6H and JH-7A aircraft represented
INS/GPS navigation system; a ‘glass’ cock- PLAAF’s fighter bomber component dur-
pit featuring four-color multifunctional ing the flypast show.
displays (MFD) and a wide-angle holo- The H-6H bomber is the latest pro-
graphic head-up display (HUD). The air- duction-standard version of the Soviet-de-
craft could carry the Chinese-made PL-8 signed strategic medium bomber Tu-16
IR-homing SRAAM and PL-12 active Badger that was series produced in China
radar-homing MRAAM for air-to-air com- under a Russian license since 1968. The
bat. It is expected to have enhanced air-to- basic version, H-6A, was designed as a nu-
surface attack capabilities with the clear bomb carrier. In 1985, the PLA Navy
indigenous precision strike ammunitions commissioned the H-6D missile bomber
such as LT-2 laser-guided bomb, the LS-6 armed with two YJ-61 anti-ship missiles,
satellite-guided glide bomb, the YJ-91 (Chi- and seven years later, in 2002, the H-6H
nese copy of the Russian Kh-31P) anti-ra- bomber entered service with the PLAAF
diation missile, and the TV-guided KD-88 which currently has an inventory of 70 H-
air-to-surface missile. The J-11B is config- 6-series bombers in seven air regiments.
ured for the Chinese indigenous 7.5t (11.2t The H-6H is powered by twoWP-8 turbo-
with afterburning) thrust engine FWS-10A jets (Chinese indigenous copy of a Russian
(less capable copy of the Russian AL- equivalent), enabling cruising speeds of
31FN). 850 km/h and a flying range of 6,000 kilo-
China is believed to have been con- meters with a 6t payload. It carries two
ducting preliminary research on its fifth- subsonic highly maneuverable YJ-63 cruise
generation fighter aircraft J-XX. The fighter missiles with a range of 200 km and a 500-
is described as an advanced F-22-class kg warhead, or, alternatively, a 9t bomb
twin-engine stealth fighter with extensive load (various mixes of 250, 500, 1,500, and
radar cross section (RCS) reduction fea- 3,000kg bombs). After China failed to ac-
tures such as internal weapon bay. The two quire the Tu-23M3 strategic bomber as a
primary fighter aircraft design institutes of successor to the now outdated H-6H, it
the China Aviation Industries Corporation launched the development of its upgraded
(AVIC) – Shenyang Aircraft Design Insti- versions H-6M and H-6K. The latter fea-
tute (601 Institute) and Chengdu Aircraft tures some radical modifications, including
Design Institute (611 Institute) – have both six under-wing pylons to carry as many
been working on their own designs to bid new land-attack CJ-10A extended-range
for the PLA’s contract. In such a case, 611 (up to 1,500km) cruise missiles; two Russ-
Institute has worked on own advanced ian-made D-30KP 12-t thrust turbofan en-
fighter aircraft design, possibly based on gines (these engines would provide the
the design and technology of its J-10 new H-6K with increased weapon payload
fighter. The Chinese fifth-generation and extended range); a current-generation
fighter will feature very low RCS, provide radar; and a completely refurnished ‘glass’
excellent maneuverability and a supersonic cockpit featuring six large multifunctional
cruising speed capability. China may also displays. The H-6M features four large py-
seek potential partners from Russia, Israel lons fitted under the wings to carry four YJ-
and Europe to co-develop avionics and 81 anti-ship missiles. If necessary, the


Ukraine-China:

bomber may also be able to carry the KD- could be extended to 2,600km with one re-
88 land-attack cruise missile for precision fueling, or 3,500km with another. The Su-
strike role. 33MKK carries latest-generation systems
The JH-7A is the latest version of the and a weapons load increased to 8 tons, in-
basic JH-7 fighter bomber design that has cluding active radar-homing medium-
been in PLAAF service since 1992. The JH- range air-to-air missiles R-77/AA-12
7A was first delivered to the PLA Naval Adder, Kh-59ME air-to-surface missiles,
Aviation in early 2004, followed by the de- Kh-31 anti-ship cruise missiles, Kh-31P
livery to the PLAAF in late 2004. There are anti-radiation missiles and TV-guided
currently three JH-7/A regiments in the KAB-500Kp glide bombs.
PLA Naval Aviation, and a JH-7A regi- The H-6U aerial refueling tanker air-
ment in the PLAAF, totaling some 70 ex- craft was developed from the H-6 twin-en-
amples. The JH-7 is an all-weather, gine jet bomber and was accepted into the
two-seat, twin-engine fighter-bomber in PLAAF service in 1996, when PLAAF was
the same class as the European Tornado required to expand its reach to China’s pe-
IDS and Russian Sukhoi Su-24 Fencer. It is ripheral regions, such as the South China
equipped with the JL-10A multi-functional Sea and Taiwan Strait. To achieve this tar-
pulse-Doppler radar and powered by two get, the PLAAF was desperate in need for
WS-9 Qingling turbofans (a Chinese li- an aerial refueling capability that could ex-
censed copy of the British Mk202). The air- tend the radius of its combat aircraft. The
craft enables near-ground maneuvering at navy version is designated H-6DU. It ap-
1,210 km/h, and operates within a range of pears to be converted from existing H-6D
1,650 km. The JH-7A is fitted with a twin- anti-ship missile bomber. A total of 12~20
barrel Type 23-III (a copy of the GSh-23L) examples of the H-6U are believed to have
23mm cannon. Up to 5,000kg weapon been built so far. China was reported to
loads and/or drop tanks can be carried on have obtained some Western-made aerial
eleven external hardpoints (six under refueling equipment which was later used
wings, two on wingtips and 3 under fuse- as a pattern for developing China’s own in-
lage). The variant would carry four YJ-81 digenous design. The H-6 tanker carries 37
subsonic sea-skimming anti-ship missiles tons of aviation fuel inside its tanks,
and two PL-8 IR-homing SRAAMs, plus a enough to refuel six J-8D-type fighters to
1,400L drop tank. For surface attack mis- extend their radius to 1,200 km from 800
sions, the JH-7A could carry up to twenty km. Its refueling system is compatible with
250kg low-drag general-purpose, or TV- the J-10 and JH-7 fighter aircraft but does
guided KD-88 air-to-surface missiles, or not match to the Su-30MKK for which
LT-2 laser guided bombs, or YJ-91 anti-ra- China has ordered eight Russian Il-78
diation missiles. tankers. The H-6U can transfer 18.5 tons of
The most capable combat aircraft in fuel to the fighter aircraft. Its refueling sys-
service with the PLA, the Russian-supplied tem consists if two RDC-1 refueling pods,
Su-30MKK multi-role fighter bomber air- allowing two fighter aircraft to be refueled
craft was not on view at the parade. The at the same time.
Su-30MKK approaches the U.S. F-15E The JL-8 basic jet trainer aircraft was
Strike Eagle in terms of performance and jointly developed by the PRC and Pakistan
capability. It has an impressive combat ra- in the 1990s as a successor to the Cessna T-
dius of 1,600km without refueling, which 37 jet trainers in the Pakistani Air Force


Ukraine-China:

service. The aircraft is powered by the electronic countermeasures (ECM) suite
Ukrainian 1.7t thrust AI-25TL turbofan (or consists of radar warning receiver (RWR),
its Chinese copy WS-11). In its ground at- laser warning receiver, infrared jammer
tack configuration, there are four under- and chaff/flare decoy dispenser. The heli-
wing pylons to carry up to 1,000kg copter is thought to be fitted with a ‘fly-by-
payload, each rated at 250kg. The stations wire‘ (FBW) control system, and a modern
can carry drop tanks, 23mm cannon pods, glass cockpit with multifunctional display
unguided rockets, 250kg bombs or two PL- (MFD) screens. The helicopter is fitted with
8-type short-range air-to-air missiles. Rus- a 30mm cannon mounted under the nose,
sia reportedly assisted the PLAAF to build this being controlled from the pilot’s hel-
the more capable JL-15 (a copy of its Yak- met-mounted sight. A new-generation
130 trainer jet) powered by Ukrainian AL- anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) HJ-10 is
222K-25F motors. currently in development. The missile is
The PLAAF’s helicopter component thought to be comparable to the U.S. AGM-
was represented by the WZ-9A and Z-8K 114 Hellfire. The helicopter can carry up to
rotorcraft, which both are variants of Chi- eight such missiles under the stub wings
nese copies of the French-designed for anti-armor role. Alternatively, the heli-
AS365N and SA321J choppers, respec- copter can carry unguided rocket pods for
tively. ground attack, or TY-90 short-range air-to-
The WZ-9A is the most recent and ca- air missiles for air combat. The Z-10 proto-
pable member of the WZ-9 family of attack type is powered by two Pratt & Whitney
helicopters, introduced into the PLAAF Canada PT6C-67C turboshaft engines of
service in 2005. It is powered by two WZ- which ten have been procured by China for
8A turboshafts (a copy of the French Arriel its Z-10 program. The WZ-9A with Chinese
IC1), and features a nose-mounted indigenous engine WZ-9 is rapidly ap-
day/night sighting pod. The helicopter has proaching full-scale series production ma-
two weapon pylons to carry 4 (or 8 on the turity.
Z-9WA) HJ-8 wire-guided anti-tank mis- The PLA Air Force introduced the Z-
siles. Alternatively, the helicopter can carry 8K as a dedicated search and rescue (SAR)
two 12.7mm machine gun pods, or two helicopter in 2007. It is powered by three
57mm or 90mm unguided rocket pods, or Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-67B tur-
four TY-90 IR-homing air-to-air missiles boshaft engines. The Z-8K has a hoist with
(6km range). winch and scoop fitted externally above
The dedicated attack helicopter WZ- the starboard side cabin door for rescue
10 is being developed as a successor to the missions. For transport missions, the heli-
WZ-9A, and it is thought to be in the same copter can carry 27 armed soldiers, or 15
class as the Agusta A-129 and Tiger. Eight patient litters and a medical staff, or
prototypes have been built and now un- 5,000kg cargo externally on sling.
dergoing test and evaluation. An observa- The most capable combat helicopters
tion unit consisting of a forward looking in service with the PLA Air Force, the
infrared (FLIR), a low-light television and a Russian-supplied Mi-171 and Mi-17V-5/7
laser rangefinder/designator mounted on were not to be seen during the parade.
a steerable platform at the nose of the heli- Intuitively enough, the fixed wing air-
copter. All the critical systems on the heli- craft and helicopter examples demon-
copter have armor protection. The strated during the 60th national day


Ukraine-China:

military parade in Beijing more reflect ac- transports (or their reverse engineered
complishments by the Chinese aeronauti- copies), the H-6H bomber and H-6U aerial
cal research and design community than refueling tanker are modified licensed
the current status of the PLAAF’s fleet. In copies of the Tupolev Tu-16, the J-7G
actual fact, however, the PLAAF’s fleet is fighter is a redesigned Chinese copy of the
to a large degree obsolete and worn-out. Soviet-era MiG-21F-13/Fishbed-C super-
Especially, its 1300-aircraft fighter fleet sonic jet fighter, the J-11 is a licensed copy
only comprises 300 examples of the rela- of the Cu-27SK, and, finally, the WZ-9A
tively current-generation fighter types seen and Z-8K helicopters are variants of Chi-
during the October 1 air show (24 J-7Gs, 20 nese copies of the French designs AS365N
J-8Fs, 140 J-10s and 116 J-11s). With the 32 and SA321J, respectively. As well as assis-
Su-27s, this figure would amount to 332 ex- tance from foreign engineers and licensed
amples or 26 percent of the PLAAF’s production in China, direct cloning of for-
fighter fleet, the remaining 74 percent eign designs and industrial spying were
being technologically obsolete examples of heavily involved in the development of
the J-7 and J-8 series. Of the existing fleet of these aerial vehicles. Depreciation of the
550 fighter bombers in the PLAAF service, PLAAF’s fleet and China’s ambition to
the JH-7A bombers shown off at the parade have a modern air force equipped with in-
only account for 70 examples or 13 percent. digenous current-generation aircraft and
With the 73 Su-30MKKs, the fleet of rela- aerial weapons systems, supported by its
tively advanced attack aircraft would make growing financial capabilities and the re-
143 examples, or, again 26 percent, the refusal by the United States and other devel-
maining 74 percent being antiquated by oped nations to provide Beijing with
modern standards Q-5C/D ground-attack advanced military technologies and know-
fighters. how – this all may well be the rationale be-
Of the all 12 fixed wing and rotary hind China’s ‘by all means or foul’ policy.
wing aircraft types seen during the na- Such a pragmatic approach would be fully
tional day parade, only 4 fixed wing air- justifiable from the perspective of China’s
craft, specifically the J-8F, JH-7A, J-10 and top-priority national interests. The USSR,
JL-8 could be considered indigenous (to a in its own good time, pursued a similar
limited extent, though) Chinese designs. policy of competitive intelligence and di-
The J-8F was developed by way of modify- rect copying of foreign aeronautical de-
ing and improving, under a Russian li- signs. Especially, the Tu-4 strategic bomber
cense, the Soviet-era MiG-21F-13 fighter jet, was developed as a reverse engineered
and it was based on the layout of the Soviet copy of the Boeing B-29 bomber. China em-
Sukhoi Su-15 Flagon-A fighter. The J-10 ploys a variety of patterns for copying for-
was developed around the Israeli IAI ‘Lavi’ eign designs. One demonstrative example
experimental fighter with assistance from might be the J-11B, the Chinese clone of the
foreign engineers. All the four ‘indigenous’ Russian Su-27SK. In 1995, the Russians
Chinese designs involve foreign-supplied agreed in principle to allow the PRC to
engines (or their reverse engineered build the Su-27SK single-seat fighter lo-
copies), subsystems and weapons. The cally under license. In 1996, Sukhoi Com-
other designs are ‘indigenous’ to an even pany (JSC) and SAC entered into a contract
lesser extent; the AEW&C aircraft designs for the co-production of 200 Su-27SK fight-
were derived from foreign-developed ers as the J-11. Under the terms of the


Ukraine-China:

agreement, Sukhoi/KnAAPO would sup- 8 SRAAM, PL-11/12 MRAAM, CJ-10
ply the aircraft in kit form to be assembled strategic cruise missile, YJ-63 and KD-88
by SAC. It was reported that Russia also air-to-surface missiles, YJ-81 anti-ship mis-
agreed to help the PRC gradually increase siles, laser and satellite-guided bombs LT-
the proportion of Chinese-made content on 2 and LS-6, and the helicopter-launched
the J-11, so that SAC could eventually pro- ATG missile HJ-10. Development effort has
duce the aircraft independently. In No- been in progress for the strategic UAV de-
vember 2004, however, Russian media sign WZ-2000 that would be similar to the
reported that the J-11 production had United States’ Global Hawk, as well as for
stopped after about 100 examples were the future fifth-generation J-XX fighter,
built. According to the report, the Chinese special-mission WZ-10 attack helicopter,
side had requested Sukhoi Company to and the Z-15 multirole helicopter. The de-
stop deliveries of the assembly kits. The velopment level of China’s engine building
contract had been terminated when half- industry is still lagging behind other sec-
completed, and the Chinese copy, the fully tors’, still, this gap has been gradually
indigenously built J-11B, eventually had bridged.
been brought to the picture. In response to Ukrainian-Sino cooperation in mili-
accusations of copyright abuse and breach tary aeronautics has been restricted to sup-
of terms of the contract, the Chinese side plies of individual examples, subsystems
threatened to refuse awarding further and components, and the transfer/selling
highly lucrative contracts. Another exam- of licenses and know-how. Especially this
ple is the Kh-55 strategic cruise missile, is about engines (and related production li-
which is now being manufactured in China censes) for the JL-8 and JL-15 trainers, mo-
under local designation CJ-10A, a few tors for Russian-supplied Mi-171 and
years after an amount of such missiles was Mi-17B-5/7 helicopters, maintenance tech-
bought by China from Ukraine. The third nology for the AL-31FN engine, R-27/AA-
example could be the Ukrainian-supplied 10 Alamo medium-to-long-range air-to-air
T-10K experimental aircraft around which missiles, a shipment of Kh-55 cruise mis-
a naval fighter is being developed for fu- siles and the experimental aircraft T-10K.
ture Chinese aircraft carriers. The Center for Army, Conversion and
The PRC has over the past decade Disarmament Studies recently expressed a
made major achievements in the develop- suggestion to boost this cooperation, par-
ment of its scientific and technological ticularly with regard to co-production of
bases, especially with respect of avionics. the JL-15 trainer aircraft (as has already
This allowed China to develop and launch been proposed by the PRC) and the possi-
domestic production of radar equipment bility of China assisting Ukraine in bring-
for AEW&C applications, J-10 and JH-7 ing up to modern standards the UAF’s
fighter aircraft, upgraded/modified ver- Su-27 fighter fleet.
sions of the J-7, J-8B and H-6 fixed wing air-
craft, and Z-8 and WZ-9 helicopters.
Additionally, 100-percent Chinese made Conclusions
aircraft J-10B and J-11B have been brought First, the October 1 military flypast
into being. Also, China has achieved a show in Beijing involved 151 Chinese-built
great success in the development of preci- aerial vehicles of 12 types: two AEW&C
sion-guided air-launched weapons: the PL- platforms (KJ-2000 and KJ-200), four fight-


Ukraine-China:

ers (J-7G, J-8F, J-10 and J-11), two attack air- ters, J-10B and J-11B fighters; precision-
craft (H-6H bomber and JH-7A fighter guided air-launched weapons: the PL-8
bomber), one aerial refueling tanker (H- SRAAM, PL-11/12 MRAAM, CJ-10 strate-
6U), one trainer aircraft (JL-8), one combat gic cruise missile, YJ-63 and KD-88 air-to-
helicopter (WZ-9A) and one SAR helicop- surface missiles, YJ-81 anti-ship missiles,
ter (Z-8K). Of these 12 types, only four laser and satellite-guided bombs LT-2 and
could be considered indigenous (to a lim- LS-6, and the helicopter-launched ATG
ited extent) Chinese designs. These are the missile HJ-10. Development effort has been
J-8F, J-10, JH-7A and JL-8, which, however, in progress for the strategic UAV design
include foreign-designed (or reverse engi- WZ-2000, the future fifth-generation J-XX
neered) key components such as engines, fighter, special-mission WZ-10 attack heli-
selected mission systems and weapons. copter, and the Z-15 multirole helicopter.
Other designs are indigenous to an even Third, military-technical cooperation
lesser extent; the AEW&C aircraft designs between Ukraine and the PRC in the field
are built around a foreign-designed trans- of military aeronautics has been restricted
port aircraft or its Chinese copy, the to supplies of individual examples, sub-
bomber, aerial tanker and fighters are systems and components, and the selling
modified versions of foreign supplied of licenses and know-how (engines for the
equivalents, and the helicopters are reverse JL-8 and JL-15 trainers, motors for the
engineered copies of foreign-supplied Russian-supplied Mi-171 and Mi-17B-5/7
counterparts. helicopters, R-27/AA-10 Alamo medium-
Second, the PRC has over the past to-long-range air-to-air missiles and so on).
decade made major achievements in the The Center for Army, Conversion and Dis-
development of its scientific and techno- armament Studies recently expressed a
logical bases, which allowed it to develop suggestion to boost this cooperation, par-
and launch domestic production of the ticularly with regard to co-production of
KLJ-2000 and KJ-200 AEW&C aircraft, J-10 the JL-15 trainer aircraft and the possibility
and JH-7 fighter aircraft, upgraded/modi- of China assisting Ukraine in the UAF’s Su-
fied versions of the J-7, J-8B and H-6 fixed 27 fighter fleet upgrade.
wing aircraft, and Z-8 and WZ-9 helicop-

CIAKR:Layout 1 23.11.2009 5:11 Page 81

Ukraine-China:

CACDS expert conclusions

1.As geopolitical situation around 4.A characteristic of Chinese leader-
Ukraine has been going from bad to worse, ship is that they are disinclined to take fast
and given the emergence of fundamentally decision but, rather, tend to thoroughly ex-
new threats and challenges, the transition amine and weigh in the balance all the op-
from cooperation on a project-by-project tions available before determining an
basis to strategic partnership with the Peo- acceptable response. Key factors here, as
ple’s Republic of China holds the promise before, are a partner’s consistency and a
of huge benefits in terms of politics, econ- high enough level of contacts between
omy, military technology and defense se- upper reaches of political establishments,
curity, all the more so as there are no not excepting the supreme leaders of the
conflicts or points of disaccord in relation- two states. China’s policies towards Pak-
ships between Ukraine and the PRC. istan might provide for Ukraine an impor-
2.Being a powerful, independent cen- tant demonstrative example about how
ter of influence of global proportions, the problematic geopolitical issues should be
PRC, by virtue of its technological and dealt with. By reinforcing Pakistan, China
geopolitical ambitions, has an apparent in- thereby weakens India whom it considers
terest in Ukraine. Even though the differ- to be its rival in the region. The possibility
ence in mentalities between the Ukrainian is not fully ruled out that China’s territo-
and Chinese nations remains wide enough, rial ambitions and general geopolitical ex-
a sustainable tendency towards a Eu- pectations with regard to the Far East
ropeization of China is making this gap might spur Beijing to begin actively rein-
somewhat smaller. Furthermore, there is a forcing Ukraine as an anti-Russian center
large enough population of Soviet School of influence on the Western front. Many ex-
adherents remaining in China, which feeds perts believe that China has already
a considerable amount of interest in launched a cautious advance on Russian
Ukrainian culture in general and Ukrain- interests. The important positive side to
ian universities in particular. Ukraine’s rapprochement with China is
3.The PRC might potentially act as se- that it does not affect or run counter to its
curity guarantor for Ukraine. Although rapprochement with Russia.
China’s interest in Ukraine is primarily 5.The PRC has already outpaced
technological, another aspect of that inter- Ukraine in the development and produc-
est is that Kiev never attaches any political tion of some defense technologies, most
strings or requirements to joint projects in particularly fighter aircraft, SAM weapons
sensitive sectors and, furthermore, Ukraine and tactical/operational missile systems.
is a potent potential market for Chinese For Ukraine, building an indigenous multi-
goods. The PRC pursues a vigorous yet role short-range missile system is a top-pri-
well thought-out, thoroughly balanced and ority challenge in homeland defense
consistent foreign policy, and, for this rea- system. Ukrainian designers, while having
son, it is very unlikely to agree to provide a history in the field of strategic missile sys-
assurances of any kind. tems, do not have any experience in the de-

CIAKR:Layout 1 23.11.2009 5:11 Page 82

Ukraine-China:

velopment of tactical/operational missile supplier, exporting high-tech weapons sys-
weapons. For this reason, relevant skills tems and items of defense equipment, and
and technology transfers with the PRC continuously adding new products and
would be quite justifiable and feasible. In- services to its defense export portfolio. Pak-
tuitively enough, that issue must be ap- istan, a onetime traditional military-tech-
proached with great caution, as some nological cooperation partner of Ukraine,
problems may arise here, both in the con- has now preferred China as its closest part-
text of limitations stemming from the in- ner, most notably in the tank/AFV and
ternational Missile Technology Control ATGW areas of military technology. This
Regime (MTCR) and at the level of rela- reflects a more inclusive tendency of
tionships with the United States. By the Ukraine to be gradually ousted from its tra-
very fact of seeking such an opportunity in ditional markets in Asia and Africa by
relations with the PRC, Kiev sends a mes- China, unless a framework for cooperation
sage to international community that with China on third-country markets --
Ukraine deserves better attitude on behalf particularly through advancing joint proj-
of the key players of global politics who ects – can be established. It, however, must
tend to take little if any account of be appreciated that the PRC, in contrast to
Ukraine’s vital interests. India, has taken very cautious approach to-
6. Cooperation in military technology wards selecting joint projects with foreign
with China would allow Ukraine to build partners.
up its defense capacity and technological 8. Further advancement of Ukrain-
capabilities by carrying out a range of mu- ian interests in China calls for an intensifi-
tually beneficial projects. The PRC has re- cation of bilateral contacts at the top
inforced substantially its research and national level. In this particular context, not
manufacturing potentialities, thereby en- only is the issue of lobbying for coopera-
abling itself to go away from onetime de- tion with China of paramount importance,
pendence upon Russia as defense supplier, it also is a critical precondition for and part
and, furthermore, to generate alternative and parcel of Ukrainian-Chinese friend-
solutions in a number of military technol- ship, providing that there is an intention to
ogy areas. Ukraine must create an environ- develop the friendship into strategic part-
ment for some of these new Chinese nership. At this point in time, the level of
technologies to be employed, on a mutu- contacts between top leaders of the two
ally beneficial basis, for Ukrainian Armed countries is apparently insufficient, which
Forces re-equipment and re-weaponing in no way facilitates the task of bringing
programs as well as for joint projects on the relationships to a strategic level. Iner-
third-country markets. tia in relationships between top leaders of
7. The PRC has, year by year, been the two countries is the main impediment
evolving into a powerful global defense to progress in Ukrainian-Sino relations.

soder_eng:Layout 1 23.11.2009 10:57 Page 1

Contents
Introduction.
Why China?................................................................................2

First chapter
In search of comprehensive guarantees................................5

Second chapter.
Place of Ukraine in the
China-Ukraine-Russia triangle.............................................13

Third chapter
The specifics of China’s policies
towards regional markets.......................................................35

Forth chapter
Military-Technical Cooperation
between Ukraine and China: Directions
and Cooperation Patterns.......................................................43

Fifth chapter
China’s military parade as a mirror
of its global ambitions ...........................................................57

CACDS conclusions.................................................................71

UKRAINE – CHINA: from Project-to-Project Cooperation to Strategic Partnership

More Related Content

What's hot

Viewers also liked

Similar to UKRAINE – CHINA: from Project-to-Project Cooperation to Strategic Partnership

Recently uploaded

UKRAINE – CHINA: from Project-to-Project Cooperation to Strategic Partnership