The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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  THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES By: Darren Daley and Rizayel Mukashev INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IPOL8547, Dr. Laurance Fall 2009
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  Background: The RussianRevolution and the famine in 1921 produced a million Russian refugees; The League of Nations established High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR) in 1921;
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  Background (cont.) WWIIand the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA); The International Refugee Organization in 1946; The establishment of UNHCR in 1951.
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  States vs. UNHCR
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  States vs. UNHCR
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  Normalization of Repatriation1980s and 1990s: UNHCR begins involuntary repatriation Deems when conditions are “safe” for return without consulting refugees States pressure organization to relax this position UNHCR demonstrates its substantial autonomy Principles of refugee rights versus pressure from states and refugee circumstances UNHCR begins allowing for exceptions Emergence of exceptions cascade to become rule  repatriation culture
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  Discourse and ConceptualChange Prior to 1980s: Repatriation as permanent solution (asylum and resettlement) Post 1980s: Repatriation as preferred or durable solution The term “durable solution” does not exist in the UNHCR’s statute Term coined by High Commissioner Poul Hartling in late 1970s Signal to host countries concerned with the idea of permanent resettlement
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  Discourse and ConceptualChange (cont. 1) New categories introduced: conditions improved “substantially” or “appreciably” for safe return Subjective refugee consent is viewed as impractical, especially when working with large groups Subjective replaced by more pragmatic, objective criteria
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  Discourse and ConceptualChange (cont. 2) Modifying “voluntary repatriation” increases violation of refugee rights Decision to repatriate no longer dependent on refugee consent Efforts to avoid offending sovereignty-sensitive governments UNHCR requests “safety and dignity” for refugees, instead of respect for their human rights Introduction of new concepts: “safe return” and “voluntariness” Reinterpretation of old concepts: “protection” (no longer legal protection)
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  Bureaucratic Changes Inter-relationshipbetween protection and solutions and refugee law and action Emphasis on field operations and repatriation Downgrade legal protection 1980s: disband Protection Division – Creation of Refugee Law and Doctrine Result: protection officers loss of influence Reduced legal protection – Designed to alter UNHCR’s definition of “protection” Shift in willingness to intervene
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  Rules and DecisionCriteria Formal and informal rules 4 Preconditions for Repatriation: previous position Fundamental change in home country circumstances Voluntary decision to return Tripartite agreement: UNHCR + host country + home country Return marked by dignity and safety 3 Post-Reform Changes Acing under less than ideal condition Judge safe return in comparison to camp conditions Refugee rights should take into consideration state’s rights and broader political objectives
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  Rules and DecisionCriteria (cont.) Importance of repatriation as mechanism for rebuilding confidence and peacebuilding Repatriation as effect or potential cause of political stability Need for guidelines in the face of ambiguity Confrontation: subjective willingness to return vs objective situation awaiting refugee return home Handbook: repatriation is the ends with potential disregard for means Product of resource constraints, state pressures, staff succession
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  “ Voluntary” Repatriationof Rohingyas : A Case Study Repatriation Exercise of 1994-1995: Refugees from Burma to Bangladesh Bangladesh – UNHCR – NGOs – Burma – March, 1992: UNHCR joins assistance effort Involuntary repatriation vis-à-vis manipulation of data Conditions hadn’t changed / UNHCR better positioned to monitor Widespread lack of residency proof UNHCR limited ability to monitor return On going human rights abuses in Burma
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  Case Study (cont.)Dec., 1992: UNHCR withdrawal in protest – Jan., 1993: protests bring Bangladesh back to table with UNHCR The Desire to Return Refugees were not presented repatriation as an option UNHCR embellished on improved conditions UNHCR oversold their monitoring presence UNHCR gave each family $20 Burma Is Better Than It Was Capacity to Monitor Return
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  Power and PathologiesUse of various crises and global developments to increase mandate Exploit moral authority Coordinating body to humanitarian agency Expanded concept of “refugee” Solution preference: shift in 1970s from exile toward repatriation State pressure in response to regime’s demands