Ivo Pezzuto - Venezuela: Crisis in Caracas. The Global Analyst Magazine June 2016 Issue

Ivo Pezzuto - Venezuela: Crisis in Caracas. The Global Analyst Magazine June 2016 Issue

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  ¤ ̸» Ù´±¾¿´ßÒßÔÇÍÌ ¤ ïë¤ Ö«²» îðïê ¤ I N T E R N A T I O N A L Venezuela Ý®·­·­ ·² Ý¿®¿½¿­ Ê»²»¦«»´¿­ ®·½¸ ±·´ ®»­±«®½»­ô ±²½» ¿ ­±«®½» ±º ·¬­ ­¬®»²¹¬¸ô ¸¿ª» ²±© ¬¸» ͱ«¬¸ ß³»®·½¿­ ´»¿¼·²¹ ²¿¬·±² ±² ³¿¬ ¿­ ·¬ º¿½»­ ¿² »½±²±³·½ ½®·­·­ ¿¬ ¿² «²°®»½»¼»²¬»¼ ­½¿´» ¿²¼ ­·¦» ¿³·¼ ®±«¬ ·² ·²¬»®²¿¬·±²¿´ ½®«¼» ±·´ °®·½»­ò ת± 릦«¬± Ù´±¾¿´ Ó¿®µ»¬­ ß²¿´§­¬ô Ю±º»­­±® ¿²¼ б´·½§ ß¼ª·­±® ±º Û½±²±³·½­ ¿²¼ ײ¬»®²¿¬·±²¿´ Þ«­·²»­­ô ¿²¼ Ó»³¾»® ±º ß¼ª·­±®§ Þ±¿®¼­ I n Venezuela, these days it’s not un- usual to see huge gatherings of people jostling with each other in long queues to get inside supermarkets and department stores but only to be welcomed by empty shelves as supplies of even basic goods like food and water have got badly affected as the nation faces its worst economic crisis in sev- eral decades. The cash-strapped Ven- ezuelan government has been finding it hard to buy even essential items like medicines that have hit the healthcare services hard in the country, thus rais- ing fears that its current political and economic crisis may soon turn into a po- tential humanitarian crisis if immedi- ate steps are not taken. Meanwhile, the long lines at the supermarkets and the massive protests against the socialist government of President Nicolás Maduro represent the most dramatic illustration of Venezuela’s current po- litical and economic turmoil. Energy ex- perts predict a decline of oil production for Venezuela to 2.25 million barrels a day by the end of this year. Some polls estimate that more than 80% of basic consumer products are now in short supply in Venezuela. Much of the country’s recent troubles stem from the prolonged global collapse in oil prices over the last two- and-a-half years. Oil prices after hover- ing above $100 a barrel in January 2014 came crashing down to below $30 a barrel by January 2016. Although they have recovered some of lost ground to reach around $50 a barrel by June 2016, it’s still well below the comfort levels of many oil producing nations in- cluding Venezuela. “The latest figures from Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA show the average production cost for all its crudes is $18 a barrel, while Toronto-listed Pacific Explora- tion & Production, Colombia’s largest private operator, reported that—its production cost including diluents, transportation and taxes averaged $20 to $22 in the third quarter of 2015,” Reuters said in January. Venezuela’s Diluted Crude Oil (DCO) was selling at around $15 a barrel in the early this year. “A more acute crude price slump this month has put several South American countries in the difficult posi- tion of selling oil for less than what it costs to produce, according to traders and sources at three companies in Co- lombia and Venezuela,” commented Reuters, adding, “So far, the most af- fected crudes are blends formulated with naphtha and other imported diluents. But if the price rout that shows few signs of ending soon persists, other grades could be hit too, the sources added, potentially putting more pressure on public finances in the oil- dependent countries.” Venezuela’s President Maduro has requested emer- gency international help from the United Nations for public works fund- ing and construction to help the country recover from what he called an ‘extreme situation’. It narrowly avoided default on a $1.5 bn sovereign bond in February by draining its foreign reserves and squeezing imports for even daily neces- sities, like food and medicine, says Reuters. Venezuela derives nearly all of
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  ¤ ̸» Ù´±¾¿´ßÒßÔÇÍÌ ¤¤ Ö«²» îðïê ¤ïê Ê»²»¦«»´¿ its dollar revenues from oil exports, but the recent ‘oil shock’ has exposed it to the risk of growing budget deficit and ballooning foreign debt. Its oil exports revenues have fallen from about $80 bn in 2012 to less than $20 bn by 2016, according to Barclays’ data. Ó¿²§ ½¿«­»­ Multiple factors have contributed to the global oil glut and to the collapse in glo- bal commodity prices. Among these, the noticeable ones include geopolitical ten- sions and retaliations among countries in the Middle East; global competitive pressures among oil producers driven by their struggle to retain market shares and to outperform new aggres- sive entrants (Iran and USA shale crude producers); oil exporters’ overca- pacity and oversupply (global glut); im- balances between oil supply and de- mand due to the global economic slow- down; massive financial speculation in oil and commodities markets and vola- tile currency markets; markets' expec- tations on the Federal Reserve's mon- etary policy normalization process, the trajectory of the US dollar appreciation, and its impact on commodity prices; and higher production costs of oil per barrel vis-à-vis the market prices. Of all, it’s the last one that has had a more profound impact on oil exporters like Venezuela. Its falling oil export rev- enues have hit this crisis-ravaged na- tion hard. In fact, Venezuela’s income from oil in the last year has fallen by more than two-thirds. With less dollar inflows in the country the value of Venezuela’s foreign-exchange reserves has declined alarmingly and it is now teetering on the brink of a default in spite of the fact that the country has the largest reserves of oil in the world. In fact, the risk of a potential default by Venezuela persists if oil prices remain lower, or if they should fall again for a prolonged period of time to close at or below $30 per barrel. However, Venezu- ela and other oil exporting countries such as Nigeria, Brazil, Ecuador, Canada, Colombia, and others with higher break-even points in their profit- ability model will probably benefit in the coming months from the stabiliza- tion and/or slight increase in the price per barrel of crude-oil as it is forecasted to stay in the $40 to $60 band. Yet, this potential benefit might be seriously un- dermined by a decline in oil production in Venezuela in the coming months as it owes almost $2 bn to oil service compa- nies or by potential geopolitical risks and shocks in the oil market. In order to pay its debt, Venezuela will probably continue tapping into its gold and for- eign currency reserves. Some interna- tional experts suggest that the recent gold swap is another indication that the country is desperate for cash, while some predict that the country might face the risk of a default in the next 12 to 18 months. Some even suggest that what Venezuela is currently experienc- ing is not an economic crisis rather a depression. The International Mon- etary Fund (IMF) forecasts that Ven- ezuela will have an unemployment rate of 17% in 2016 and nearly 21% in 2017. The country however, could still prevent a potential default, in addition to the benefits of increasing oil prices, through financial assistance from one of its al- lies, such as China (China has recently accepted to lend Venezuela $5 bn to boost oil output), Russia or Iran, or through massive financial support from the international community (i.e., IMF and other multilateral lenders), or through an orderly foreign-debt restruc- turing. Venezuela’s government, how- ever, has not allowed the IMF to visit the country since 2004. Creditors are worried about the potential systemic risks of the dollar-denominated debt of corporate borrowers in Venezuela. They are also concerned about the potential spillover effects that an out of control political and economic crisis might have on other Latin American economies and emerging markets. There is a growing fear that a default by Venezuela might indeed trigger a blow-up across emerg- ing markets (as distressed debt rises) fueled by high volatility in the commod- ity markets, macroeconomic imbal- ances, unwise economic policies, low in- terest rates and credit-led bubbles. Venezuela currently owes about $123 bn to foreign creditors, according to estimates from Bank of America Merrill Lynch. The President, however, is fully aware of the fact that a default could be too costly for the country, since access to credit would be diminished and many of Venezuela’s assets located outside the country (including refineries and oil tankers) could be seized by creditors. Furthermore, some Venezuela’s sovereign-debt contracts have Collective-Action Clauses (CACs), which in case of debt restructuring can be imposed on all holders. On the con- trary, Venezuela’s main source of for- eign exchange, the state-owned oil com- pany PDVSA, has no CACs, thus it would have a harder time restructuring its debt in case of default. In addition to high levels of uncer- tainty, volatility, and macroeconomic imbalances, Venezuela has suffered a deep recession due to a number of con- troversial policies. Some of these in- clude the excessive reliance for eco- nomic growth on oil exports and state ownership (oil accounts for approxi- mately 95% of Venezuela’s export earn- ings and more than half of public sector revenues); unfettered government spending and massive budget deficits financed by printing money, which have allowed the country to finance expen- sive social programs; inefficient man- agement of public enterprises, unpro- ductive labor, and of direct and indirect subsidy schemes; crumbling infrastruc- ture; the inability of the government to fend off rampant corruption; the deci- sion of President Nicolás Maduro to raise fuel prices; the decision to sharply restricting imports (60% slump in im- ports over a four-year period) to con- serve central bank reserves; the deci- sion to enforce currency and price con- trols, and to introduce a complex ex- change rate system; the decision to shorten the working days of civil ser- vants to two days per week in a desper- ate effort to reduce electricity costs and to avoid an energy and hydropower gen- eration crisis. The government in April announced a 40-day blackout as water levels at the country’s hydroelectric dams touched its record lows, and is hurting its industry besides causing great inconvenience to its citizens. The government had also announced a 60-
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  ¤ ̸» Ù´±¾¿´ßÒßÔÇÍÌ ¤ ïé¤ Ö«²» îðïê ¤ day emergency plan to avoid a shut- down of its key hydropower facilities that could have plunged Caracas, the capital of Venezuela, into darkness. However, it has asked businesses like hotels and malls to generate their own power for 9 hours a day, while instruct- ing heavy industries to reduce power consumption by a fifth. Even the avail- ability of water in the country has been severely rationed. The country has used the oil boom of the past decade to quin- tuple its external public debt. Further- more, creditors are increasingly de- manding high yields on Venezuela’s dollar-denominated bonds due to the plunge in oil prices; the large amount of foreign-currency denominated bonds; the growing concerns about the country’s ability to service debt pay- ments; and the fear of a potential de- fault. A huge potential domestic default might lead also to high risk for external creditors. Yet, the current rebound in oil prices is making investors increasingly confident that the embattled Latin American nation might be able to make bond payments at least in the near fu- ture, unless systemic shocks or a much more profound economic crisis will hit it. Ó¿²¿¹·²¹ ³«´¬·ó»¨½¸¿²¹» ®¿¬»­ One of the major concerns regarding a potential default of Venezuela or its economic meltdown is the extent of im- pact that this crisis might have on the domestic market, international mar- kets and its trading partners. The IMF identifies Venezuela, as one of four key countries along with Brazil, Ecuador and Argentina that will cause GDP growth contraction Latin America and the Caribbean in 2016. Currently, its outlook remains bleak due to hyperinflation (inflation surged to 181% last year) and deep re- cession (IMF forecasts an 8% contrac- tion of Venezuela’s real GDP in 2016 and a 4.5% contraction in 2017, after a contraction of 5.7% in 2015). Further- more, there is some skepticism among analysts about the government’s com- mitment to the floating exchange rate which should eventually allow the ex- change rate to be set by market forces. Out of the recently introduced four offi- cial exchange rates, at least two deeply overvalue the bolivar. Currency arbi- trage has propelled in the country, while a rampant foreign exchange black-mar- ket has flourished (while official ex- change rate is about 10 bolívars to the dollar, the black-market rate is about 1,100 bolívars to the dollar). Venezuela seems to rely significantly for its eco- nomic survival on the recovery and sta- bilization of the oil prices. The govern- ment has artificially overvalued the currency (the bolívar). Yet, a further de- valuation would sharply increase prices of many basic products that many poor Venezuelans rely on to survive and would make debts denominated in dol- lars far more expensive to repay. Ac- cording to Bloomberg, “Venezuela’s gov- ernment sells dollars for 6.3, 12 and 172 bolivars per dollar. The first two rates are used for imports of govern- ment-authorized priority goods includ- ing food, medicine and car parts. The third rate, introduced on February 12, can be used by anyone who doesn’t re- ceive authorization to buy dollars at the first two preferential rates. On the black market, one dollar currently fetches about 190 bolivars.” The country is currently experienc- ing runaway inflation exceeding 200% a year (The IMF predicts that inflation will be approximately 480% this year and 1,642% in 2017). The government has contributed to the spike of runaway inflation by raising wages, printing more bolivars, and restricting imports (price controls and shortage of foreign exchange are leading to acute shortages of basic goods such as flour, sugar, eggs, medicines, etc.), thus creating too much money chasing too few goods. Venezuela, which has one of the world’s biggest gold reserves, has sold $1.7 bn gold reserves in the first quarter of 2016 in order to repay debts, thus adding up to an overall reduction of gold reserves of almost a third over the past year. Analysts also report that in 2016 so far the country has shipped almost 60 metric tons of gold to Switzerland. The country’s central bank is printing money to cover much of a fiscal deficit of around 20% of GDP. Real wages fell by 35% in 2015 and more than 70% of population is now poor. President Nicolás Maduro recently declared a60-day state of emergency for Venezuela and ordered military exer- cises, citing foreign threats. The opposi- tion wants President Maduro’s resigna- tion and a fresh election or his replace- ment with a moderate leader, but un- certainty remains on the future politi- cal scenario of the country where eco- nomic conditions have worsened over ײ¬»®²¿¬·±²¿´ ׳¿¹»æÉ·µ·°»¼·¿ Ø·­¬±®§ ±º Ê»²»¦«»´¿­ ײº´¿¬·±² ݱ³°¿®»¼ ¬± Ñ·´ 못²«»
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  ¤ ̸» Ù´±¾¿´ßÒßÔÇÍÌ ¤¤ Ö«²» îðïê ¤ïè Ê»²»¦«»´¿ the past few years. The former Presi- dent, Hugo Chávez, died in 2013. After he passed away, the new President Nicolás Maduro introduced a number of controversial policies which are at least partly responsible for the current crisis while some reports suggest that bil- lions of petrodollars have disappeared abroad during his time in office. Spiral- ing rates of violent crime in the country is causing large numbers of skilled workers to emigrate, which will eventu- ally affect the economy’s long-term per- formance. ̸» ·³°¿½¬ ±² ·²¼«­¬®§ As shortages of basic goods and com- modities increased and the country’s economic outlook became highly risky and uncertain, a number of foreign com- panies are increasingly moving their businesses out of Venezuela. For ex- ample, Coca-Cola has decided to halt its production of sugary soft drinks in Venezuela as it ran out of sugar. Kraft Heinz Co. and Clorox Co. have also had to halt operations in the country. Two of the leading oil service companies in the world, Schlumberger Ltd. and Halliburton Co., also announced re- cently of their intention to curtail work in Venezuela as they were not getting paid (Schlumberger in fact announced the inability to collect payments from the national oil company Petroleos de Venezuela SA). Even German airline Deutsche Lufthansa AG has told of its intention to temporarily suspend flights to Venezuela due to the ongoing economic turmoil in the country and dif- ficulties in repatriating billions of dol- lars in revenue held in the local bolivar currency due to exchange controls. LATAM Airlines, the biggest Latin American carrier, also decided to cut service to Venezuela. Recently, Avon Products Inc. shares fell to the lowest price in seven weeks after the cosmetics company reported among other causes, the impact of the restructuring costs and a write-down of its Venezuela busi- ness (inability to exchange the local cur- rency forced the company to split off that business and write down its as- sets). Some Indian pharmaceutical companies like Dr. Reddy’s Lab and Glenmark, with exposure to Venezuela, are yet to receive millions of dollars in payments that are pending with the Venezuelan government. Infact, a num- ber of firms which include AT&T, Gen- eral Motors, Colgate-Palmolive, Ameri- can Airlines, PepsiCo, AT&T and Ford Motor have all experienced write-offs in recent years due to their businesses in Venezuela. The Italian energy explorer, Eni S.p.A., recently warned it expects payment delays from Venezuela. Goodyear Tire & Rubber’s first quarter sales missed analysts’ estimates as foreign currency rates and the loss of revenue from its Venezuela operations overshadowed US demand for its tires. Telefonica SA, Spain’s largest phone company, posted its lowest quarterly revenue in more than a decade as high inflation and depreciating currencies in Latin America like in the case of Ven- ezuela and Argentina added pressures. The country’s largest privately-held company and biggest brewer, Empresas Polar SA, reported that it will be forced to stop producing beer because it cannot get the foreign currency it needs to pur- chase malted barley. Procter & Gamble’s sales fell 12% in its fiscal first quarter of 2016 due also to the deconsolidation of its Venezuela busi- ness. Finally, a number of firms that include General Mills and Clorox have also left the country. Given the current dramatic situa- tion in Venezuela of hyperinflation, deep recession, currency and price con- trols, political power struggle, social unrest, and financial strain, the inter- national community is highly concerned about possible policies and emergency measures that the country could poten- tially undertake in the attempt to rein in runaway inflation and to avoid a de- fault. However, there is no easy solution to avoid Venezuela’s looming collapse due to its complex political environ- ment. Further, a disorderly default in Venezuela, like in the case of Argen- tina, at this point is quite likely. Yet, in a worse-case scenario, the potential rise of systemic political and financial risks in the country, and in the Latin Ameri- can area, and their potential spillover effects on a global scale might lead the international community and the G7 or G20 leading nations to orchestrate res- cue plans to help mitigate the Venezu- elan crisis. Ñ°¬·±²­ ¾»º±®» Ê»²»¦«»´¿ In early June 2016, the crude oil price has almost doubled since January due to the wave of unplanned outages that have eroded production in Canada, Venezuela, Libya and Nigeria (i.e. at- tacks on oilfields and pipelines), and by a steady decline in higher-cost US shale output, yet if oil prices do not continue to increase and do not stabilize in the medium-term in order to allow the Ven- ezuelan economy to overcome the cur- rentemergency situationand to recover; and if the Country does not introduces sound growth-oriented economic poli- cies that aim to limit the current exces- sive dependency on the oil industry, the Country might probably face a cata- strophic scenario.Credit default swap markets estimate high risks for Ven- ezuela as the country’s future of oil out- put remain highly uncertain. Venezuela’s current reduced capacity will temporarily contribute to a higher crude oil price until conditions will change and unconventional production might rise again. Yet, against the odds, the country so far has been incredibly resilient in meeting all its debt pay- ments. In the worst-case scenario, how- ever, the options left to the Venezuelan leader might be few and very painful to implement if crude oil prices do not con- tinue to rise. Zimbabwe adopted the dollar fol- lowing its bout with hyperinflation in 2008-09. This solution is quite unlikely in Venezuela since the political leaders have warned for years of the dangerous reach of American imperialism. An al- ternative option could be adopting the Chinese yuan or some sort of currency’s peg to the yuan, especially now that the Chinese currency has entered the SRD basket of currencies of the IMF, and it is gradually becoming an internationally traded currency. Still, Venezuela could seek support of the IMF’s SDR basket or some other strong currency. Like in the case of Zimbabwe’s Hyperinflation
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  ¤ ̸» Ù´±¾¿´ßÒßÔÇÍÌ ¤ ïç¤ Ö«²» îðïê ¤ crisis, Venezuela could probably adopt a ‘cash budgeting’ rule, thus allowing it- self to spend only the money it brings in through taxes. But, first and foremost, the country should be allowed to pursue political stability and an open market economy ideology. The country should introduce economic reforms in order to liberalize independence of the central bank) and should foster an environment that en- courages true entrepreneurship, foreign direct investments (it could sell pub- licly owned oil and telecommunication companies or help develop interna- tional partnerships, joint ventures, alli- ances, clusters, and global value net- works), savvy infrastructural invest- ments, global competitiveness, and an improved Mercosur trade agreement. Venezuela should lift the restrictions and controls on the imports, prices, and exchange rates. The country should also strengthen its legal system with strong protection of property rights and human rights. Overall, the situation in Venezuela appears to be worrisome and collaps- ing. Time is running out for an orderly solution of the crisis. Yet, the interna- tional community might still take im- mediate action and help prevent, or at least, mitigate the devastating impact of this tragic humanitarian and eco- nomic crisis. and privatize the economy. It should also fight corruption, crime, tax evasion, and reduce the inefficient management of public enterprises and unfit subsidy schemes. Venezuela should also en- courage the development of a business- friendly environment and ecosystem (with a more efficient political, legal, tax collection, judiciary system, and full Ê»²»¦«»´¿­ ÙÜÐ Ù®±©¬¸ øû÷ Ú±®»½¿­¬ ͱ«®½»æ̸»É±®´¼Þ¿²µ Ê»²»¦«»´¿ô ±ºº·½·¿´´§ ¬¸» Þ±´·ª¿®·¿² λ°«¾´·½ ±º Ê»²»¦«»´¿ øÍ°¿²·­¸æ λ°&¾´·½¿ Þ±´·ª¿®·¿²¿ ¼» Ê»²»¦«»´¿÷ô ·­ ¿ º»¼»®¿´ ®»°«¾´·½ ´±½¿¬»¼ ±² ¬¸» ²±®¬¸»®² ½±¿­¬ ±º ͱ«¬¸ ß³»®·½¿ò ̸» ²¿³» Ê»²»¦«»´¿ ½±³»­ º®±³ ¬¸» ׬¿´·¿² ©±®¼ ‘Ê»²»¦·±´¿©¸·½¸ ³»¿²­ ‘°·½½±´¿ Ê»²»¦·¿±® ´·¬¬´» Ê»²·½»ò ׬ ©¿­ ²¿³»¼ ­± ¿­ ·¬­ ²¿¬·ª» ­¬·´¬ ¸±«­»­ ¾«·´¬ ·² Ô¿µ» Ó¿®¿½¿·¾± ®»³·²¼»¼ ¬¸» »¨°´±®»® ß³»®·¹± Ê»­°«½½· ±º Ê»²·½»ò Ê»²»¦«»´¿ ·­ µ²±©² ©·¼»´§ º±® ·¬­ °»¬®±´»«³ ·²¼«­ó ¬®§ô ¬¸» »²ª·®±²³»²¬¿´ ¼·ª»®­·¬§ ±º ·¬­ ¬»®®·¬±®§ô ¿²¼ º±® ·¬­ ­¬«²²·²¹ ¬±«®·­¬ ¿¬¬®¿½¬·±²­ ·²½´«¼·²¹ ¬¸» º¿³±«­ ß²¹»´ Ú¿´´­ô©¸·½¸·­ ¿´­±¬¸» ©±®´¼­ ¬¿´´»­¬ ©¿¬»® º¿´´ò ̸» ¬»®®·¬±®§ ½«®®»²¬´§ µ²±©² ¿­ Ê»²»¦«»´¿ ©¿­ ½±´±²·¦»¼ ¾§ Í°¿·² ·² ïëîî ¿³·¼ ®»­·­¬¿²½» º®±³ ·²¼·¹»²±«­ °»±°´»­ò ײ ïèïïô ·¬ ¾»½¿³» ±²» ±º ¬¸» º·®­¬ Í°¿²·­¸óß³»®·½¿² ½±´±²·»­ ¬± ¼»ó ½´¿®» ·²¼»°»²¼»²½»ô ©¸·½¸ ©¿­ ²±¬ ­»½«®»´§ »­¬¿¾´·­¸»¼ «²¬·´ ïèîïô ©¸»² Ê»²»¦«»´¿©¿­¿ ¼»°¿®¬³»²¬ ±º ¬¸» º»¼»®¿´ ®»°«¾´·½ ±º Ù®¿² ݱ´±³¾·¿ò ׬ ¹¿·²»¼ º«´´ ·²¼»°»²¼»²½» ¿­ ¿ ­»°¿®¿¬» ½±«²¬®§ ·² ïèíðò Ê»²»¦«»´¿·­¿ º»¼»®¿´°®»­·¼»²¬·¿´®»°«¾´·½½±²­·­¬·²¹ ±º îí­¬¿¬»­ô¬¸»Ý¿°·¬¿´ Ü·­¬®·½¬ ø½±ª»®·²¹Ý¿®¿½¿­÷ô¿²¼ º»¼»®¿´ ¼»°»²¼»²½·»­ø½±ª»®·²¹ Ê»²»¦«»´¿­ ±ºº­¸±®» ·­´¿²¼­÷ò Ю»ª·±«­´§ ¿² «²¼»®¼»ª»´±°»¼ »¨°±®¬»® ±º ¿¹®·½«´¬«®¿´ ½±³³±¼·¬·»­ ­«½¸ ¿­ ½±ºº»» ¿²¼ ½±½±¿ô ±·´ ¯«·½µ´§ ½¿³» ¬± ¼±³·²¿¬» »¨°±®¬­ ¿²¼ ¹±ª»®²³»²¬ ®»ª»²«»­ò̸» ïçèð­ ±·´ ¹´«¬ ´»¼ ¬±¿² »¨¬»®²¿´ ¼»¾¬ ½®·­·­ ¿²¼ ¿ ´±²¹ó®«²²·²¹»½±²±³·½½®·­·­ô ·² ©¸·½¸·²º´¿¬·±² °»¿µ»¼ ¿¬ïððû ·²ïççêò Ê»²»¦«»´¿ «²¼»® Ø«¹± ݸ?ª»¦ ­«ºº»®»¼ “±²» ±º ¬¸» ©±®­¬ ½¿­»­ ±º Ü«¬½¸ Ü·­»¿­» ·² ¬¸» ©±®´¼’ ¼«» ¬± ¬¸» Þ±´·ª¿®·¿² ¹±ª»®²³»²¬­ ´¿®¹» ¼»°»²¼»²½» ±² ±·´ ­¿´»­ò Ê»²»¦«»´¿ ·­ ½±²­·¼»®»¼ ¿ ³¿¶±® ®»²±©²»¼ °´¿§»® ·² ¾»¿«¬§ °¿¹»¿²¬­ ¿²¼ ½±­³»¬·½­ ·²¼«­¬®§ô ¿ °±°«´¿® °¿­¬·³» ±º ³¿²§ Ê»²»¦«»´¿²­ô ®¿µ·²¹ ·²©·¬¸ îî ª·½¬±®·±«­ °¿¹»¿²¬ ¬·¬´»­ ¬± ¼¿¬»ò ̱¼¿§ô Ê»²»¦«»´¿­ ±²» ±º¬¸»©±®´¼­ ´¿®¹»­¬ ±·´ »¨°±®¬»®­ô »½±²±³§ ·­ ·² ¬¿¬¬»®­ º¿½»¼ ©·¬¸º¿´´·²¹ °»¬®± ¼±´´¿®­ ±©·²¹ ¬± ­«¾­¬¿²¬·¿´ º¿´´ ·² ±·´ °®·½»­ô ©¸·½¸ ¸¿ª» º¿´´»² º®±³ ±ª»® üïðð °»® ¾¿®®»´ ·² ³·¼óÖ«´§ îðïì ¬± ¾»´±© üëð °»® ¾¿®®»´ ²±©ò ß¾±«¬ Ê»²»¦«»´¿ ͱ«®½»æÉ·µ·°»¼·¿ôÙ´±¾¿´ß²¿´§­¬Î»­»¿®½¸ Reference # 20M-2016-06-04-01 ײ¬»®²¿¬·±²¿´