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Web 2.0 threats, vulnerability analysis,secure web 2.0 application development and risk management
The document discusses security considerations for Web 2.0 applications. It begins with an overview of the evolution of Web 2.0 and its key characteristics that impact security, such as user-generated content and integration of data from different sources. The document then analyzes common Web 2.0 vulnerabilities like XSS, injection flaws, and broken authentication. It provides examples of how these vulnerabilities can be exploited in Web 2.0 and their root causes. Finally, the document outlines steps for building secure Web 2.0 applications, including threat modeling, secure code reviews, testing, and risk management.
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Web 2.0 threats, vulnerability analysis,secure web 2.0 application development and risk management
- 1. Copyright © 2010- The OWASP Foundation Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License. The OWASP Foundation OWASP http://www.owasp.org Vulnerability Analysis, Secure Development and Risk Management of Web 2.0 Applications Marco Morana OWASP Cincinnati Chapter, November 2010 Meeting
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- 3. OWASP 3 Agenda ForToday’s Presentation 1. The Evolution of Web 2.0 2. Web 2.0 Vulnerability Analysis 3. Building Secure Web 2.0 Applications 4. Web 2.0 Risk Management
- 4. OWASP 4 The Evolutionof the Internet to Web 2.0
- 5. OWASP General Web 2.0Background 5 Can be defined as: “Web applications that facilitate interactive information sharing and collaboration, interoperability, and user-centered design on the World Wide Web” … the main characteristics of web 2.0 are: 1. Encourage user’s participation and collaboration through a virtual community of social networks/sites. Users can and add and update their own content, examples include Twitter and social networks such as Facebook, Myspace, LinkedIn, YouTube 2. Transcend from the technology/frameworks used AJAX, Adobe AIR, Flash, Flex, Dojo, Google Gears and others 3. Combine and aggregate data and functionality from different applications and systems, example include “mashups” as aggregators of client functionality provided by different in-house developed and/or third party services (e.g. web services, SaaS)
- 6. OWASP Web 2.0 AsEvolution of Human Knowledge Source http://digigogy.blogspot.com/2009/02/digital-blooms-visual.html
- 7. OWASP Web 2.0 AsAdoption By Businesses 7
- 8. OWASP How Web 2.0Changes The Threat Landscape Web 1.0 threats are amplified by the intrinsic nature of Web 2.0 such as expanded interaction model and use of both old and new Web 2.0 technologies, examples: Social networks as target for attack users with malware, FaceBook is 350 Million users ! Web 2.0 prone to Web 1.0 vulnerabilities such as XSS, CSRF, Phishing, Injection Flaws Web 2.0 enable more effective attacks because of sharing and integration between disparate systems, examples are: Complexity of integration of different technologies and services, front-end/client and back-end/server Rich client interfaces increase the attack surface and the likelihood of business logic attacks Social networks facilitate information disclosure of confidential PII, examples are: Abuse of user’s trust first-verify model by attackers Sharing data model breaks boundaries of confidentiality, not clear boundaries between private vs. public, personal life vs. professional life
- 9. OWASP Web 2.O: OldVulnerabilities And New Exploit Scenarios
- 10. OWASP 10 Web 2.OVulnerabilities
- 11. OWASP Top 50 WASCThreats and Top 10 OWASP Risks Especially Impacting Web 2.0
- 12. OWASP WASC-23 XML INJECTION,WASC-29 XPATH INJECTION, OWASP A1: INJECTION FLAWS WEB 2.0 EXPLOIT SCENARIOS: XML INJECTION/POISONING User-supplied input is inserted into XML without sufficient validation affecting the structure of the XML record and the tags (and not just content) XPATH INJECTION XPath injection is an attack to alter an XML query to achieve the attacker’s goals JSON INJECTION An attacker can force execution of malicious code by injecting malicious JavaScript code into the JSON (JavaScript Object Notation structure) on the client. RSS FEED INJECTION RSS feeds can consume un-trusted sources injected with XSS WEB 2.0 KNOWN INCIDENT EXAMPLE: WHID 2008-47: The Federal Suppliers Guide validates login credential in JavaScript -
- 13. OWASP WASC-08/OWASP A2: CROSSSITE SCRIPTING (XSS) WEB 2.0 EXPLOIT SCENARIOS: INSUFFICIENT LIMITS ON USER INPUT Users are allowed to enter HTML data that can be potentially malicious (e.g. while creating contents such as networks, blogs or wikis) Users have extensive control over user content including unsafe HTML tags that can be abused for XSS INSUFFICIENT FILTERING FOR XSS DOM XSS exposure is increased for Web 2.0 especially for XSS DOM since is used in RIA written in FLASH or Silverlight, Mashups and Widgets using DOM AJAX increases the entry points for potential XSS injections WEB 2.0 KNOWN INCIDENT EXAMPLE: WHID 2008-32: Yahoo HotJobs XSS Hackers exploiting an XSS vulnerability on Yahoo HotJobs to steal session cookies of victims
- 14. OWASP WASC-01: INSUFFICIENT AUTHENTICATION OWASP-A3:BROKEN AUTHENTICATION AND SESSION MANAGEMENT WEB 2.0 EXPLOIT SCENARIOS: WEAK PASSWORDS User choice of simple-to-guess passwords and trivial password-reminder questions set by on-line site contributors CLEAR TEXT PASSWORDS Password stored in AJAX Widgets/Mashups sent and stored in clear outside the control of the host INSUFFICIENT PASSWORD MANAGEMENT CONTROLS Password recovery/reminders not protected from brute force attacks SINGLE-SIGN-ON DESIGN FLAWS Passwords stored in personalized homepage and in the desktop widget as “autologon feature” or in the cloud to SSO from the desktop WEB 2.0 KNOWN INCIDENT EXAMPLE: WHID 2009-2: Twitter Accounts of the Famous Hacked
- 15. OWASP WASC-09/OWASP A5: CROSSSITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) WEB 2.0 EXPLOIT SCENARIOS: CSRF USING AJAX REQUESTS XHR calls enable invisible queries of a web application by the client that user cannot visually validate for forgery INSUFFICIENT BROWSER ENFORCEMENT OF SINGLE ORIGIN POLICY Desktop widgets do not have the same SOA protection as browser applications and faciilitate CSRF WEAK SESSION MANAGEMENT Session expiration times are typically quite high, increasing the risk of session base attacks such as CSRF Persistent session cookies are shared by Widgets increase the opportunities for CSRF attacks WEB 2.0 KNOWN INCIDENT EXAMPLE: WHID 2009-4: Twitter Personal Info CSRF -By exploiting a CSRF bug in Twitter, site owners can get Twitter profiles of their visitors.
- 16. OWASP WASC-21: INSUFFICIENT ANTI-AUTOMATION WEB 2.0 EXPLOIT SCENARIOS: AUTOMATIC SPREAD OF SPAM AND PHISHING LINKS Spammers can automatically post links to increase the popularity ranking of site Fraudsters can use automation to embed malicious links such as malicious advertisements for drive by download malware attacks AUTOMATIC REGISTRATION OF USER ACCOUNTS Scripts to automatically register web e-mail accounts in order to authenticate to other services/applications AUTOMATIC EMBEDDING OF COMMANDS Embedding commands for controlling botnet using RSS feeds, social networking sites AUTOMATIC BUSINESS LOGIC EXPLOITS Automatically bid on items to increase prices, resource exhaustion of available seats, buy and resale tickets WEB 2.0 KNOWN INCIDENT EXAMPLE: WHID 2007-65: Botnet to manipulate Facebook
- 17. OWASP Vulnerability Root CauseAnalysis
- 18. OWASP WASC Classification ofRoot Causes Of Web 2.0 Vulnerabilities 1. USER GENERATED CONTENT Ability of consumers to add and update their own content 2. MASHUPS & WEB SERVICES Aggregation of data on the desktop through mashups and web services 3. DATA CONVERGENCE No boundary between private and public information 4. DIVERSITY OF CLIENT SOFTWARE Data and software functions available across many different technologies and environments 5. COMPLEXITY & ASYNCHRONOUS OPERATION Increased user interaction, integration APIs lead to complexity one of which is AJAX
- 19. OWASP Summary of TopWeb 2.0 Security Threats VULNERABILITY EXPLOIT SCENARIO WEB 2.0 ROOT CAUSES V1: INSUFFICIENT AUTHENTICATION CONTROLS V1.1 WEAK PASSWORDS V1.2 INSUFFICIENT ANTI-BRUTE FORCE CONTROLS V1.3 CLEAR TEXT PASSWORDS V1.4 SINGLE-SIGN-ON W1 – User contributed content W2 – Mashups, W4 – Diversity of client software, W5 - Complexity V2: CROSS SITE SCRIPTING (XSS) V2.1 INSUFFICIENT LIMITS ON USER INPUT W1 – User contributed content V3: CROSS SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF) V3.1 CREDENTIAL SHARING BETWEEN GADGETS V3.2 CSRF USING AJAX REQUESTS V3.3 LENGTHY SESSIONS W5 - Complexity & Asynchronous Operation W2 – Mashups, W4 – Diversity of client software V4: PHISHING V4.1 PHONY WIDGETS V4.2 PHONY CONTENT USED FOR PHISHING V4.3 XSS EXPLOITED FOR PHISHING W2 – Mashups, W4 – Diversity of client software W1 – User Contributed Content V5:INFORMATION LEAKAGE V5.1 SENSITIVE INFORMATION POSTED TO WEB 2.0 SITES V5.2 INFORMATION AGGREGATION IN SOCIAL NETWORKS V5.3 EASY RETRIEVAL OF INFORMATION THROUGH WEB SERVICES W1 – User contributed content W3 – Consumer and enterprise worlds convergence) W4 – Mashups & Web Services V6: INJECTION FLAWS V6.1 XML INJECTION V6.2 XPATH INJECTION V6.3 JSON INJECTION W4 – Mashups & Web Services, W5: Complexity & Asynchronous Operation V7:INFORMATION INTEGRITY V7.1 AUTHENTICATED USERS PUBLISH FRAUDULENT INFORMATION W1 – User contributed content V8:INSUFFICIENT ANTI- AUTOMATION V8.1 WEB SPAM V8.2 AUTOMATIC OPENING OF USER ACCOUNTS V8.3 UNFAIR ADVANTAGE ON SITE W1 – User contributed content W2 – Mashup & Web Services Source www.secure-enterprise2.0.org
- 20. OWASP 20 Building SecureWeb 2.0 Applications
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- 22. OWASP Web 2.0 SecurityEngineering Essential Steps 1. Document Security Standards For Web 2.0 Document Web 2.0 technology security requirements (e.g. AJAX, FLASH) and enforce them at the beginning of the SDLC 2. Conduct Application Threat Modeling during design Examine the architecture of Web 2.0 application and all tiers for secure design of authentication-session management, authorizations, input validation, error handling-logging 3. Perform Secure Code Reviews On Web 2.0 Components/Frameworks Assure source code adherence to security coding standards Identify security bugs in both client (e.g. Widgets, AJAX) as well as servers (e.g. Web services, SOA) 4. Security test Web 2.0 components Security test cases for AJAX and Web Services, use the OWASP test guide test cases 5. Assess the whole Web. 2.0 applications for vulnerabilities Conduct final vulnerability assessment on whole Web 2.0 application (e.g. test for OWASP T10, WASC, SANS-25 vulnerabilities)
- 23. OWASP Security Touch PointsFor Web 2.0 using AGILE SDLC STEP 5: Final Web 2.0 Vulnerability Assessment Security Sprint Reviews STEP 4: Security Tests For Web 2.0 Components 1. Iteration Planning Meeting 2. Begin Sprint # Requirements Iteration # 3. SPRINT Initiation, Design Discussion 4. Review Use Cases and Storyboard 5. Build & Deploy Prototype 6. Demo Prototype & Gather FeedBack 7. Incorporate F/B & Continue Development (iter #N) 8. Incremental Integrated System Tests 9. User Acceptance Testing (No Iteraction) 10. Release STEP 3: Secure Code Reviews @ End of Each Sprint STEP 1: Incorporate Web.20 Security Requirements STEP 2: Secure Architecture Reviews/Threat Modeling
- 24. OWASP Secure Architecting AJAXIn Web 2.0 Applications Client side business logic/state Backends Servces accessible from untrusted callers without server side security enforcements ESB can only be called by trusted internal systems AJAX endpoint call backend directly Secure Communications Authentication & session Management, Access Controls Input validations Error Handling/Logging AJAX call associated with active sessions/ server side
- 25. OWASP Secure Code ReviewsOf Web 2.0 Applications
- 26. OWASP “TOP 10” SecureCoding Requirements for AJAX 1. Validate data on the server side for all data entry points and URLs of AJAX calls for code injection vulnerabilities such as Javascript injection, JSON injection, DOM injection, XML injection. Use JSON.parse to parse objects before calling eval() if used 2. Make sure business logic is enforced on the server not by client side logic ! using server parameters 3. Validate a well formatted XML against allowed specification of values at server side 4. Enforce authentication before any XMLHTTPRequest (XHR) session. 5. Enforce authorization checks on data accessed through XHR 6. Add token to the URL and verify at server side for CSRF vulnerabilities via forging of dynamic script tags. 7. Do not store or cache sensitive data on the client such as passwords, sessionIDs, client javascript, Flash local shared object and Mozilla’s DOM storage 8. Avoid using dynamic <script> tags since there is no opportunity for data validation before execution 9. Always use POST method to send request as default 10. Do not use javascript alert() for error handling
- 27. OWASP Secure Testing Web2.0 Client and Server Components
- 28. OWASP 28 Web 2.ORisk Management
- 29. OWASP OWASP Risk Framework(used in OWASP T10)
- 30. OWASP Potential Web. 2.0Attack Vectors And Targets XML, JSON Injections JS Injection XSS, Malware Broken Auth and Session Mgmt DOM XSS CSRF Phishing, Drive by Download Information Disclosure & Integrity Information Disclosure, DDOS XPATH & SQL injection
- 31. OWASP Web 2.0 ApplicationRisk Framework Threat Agents Misuses and Attack Vectors Security Weaknesses Security Controls/ Countermeasures Technical Impacts Business Impacts Web 2.0 Users, Customers/ Employees User shares private/confidential information, agents post confidential information Inherent weaknesses in controlling user contributed content in social networks, blogs, IMs, private emails Web 2.0 Social Networking Security Policies, Compliance, Monitoring, filtering, archiving, approval workflow for social site posts Loss of sensitive/ confidential data Reputation loss. Unlawful compliance fines Malicious Users, Fraudsters Victim is targeted by phishing, download of phony widgets, clicking on malicious POSTS Social Engineering, Web 2.0 Vulnerabilities: XSS Consumer Education, Data Filtering, escape all un- trusted data based on HTML content Execute JS on client, install malware Fraud, financial losses, reputation loss/defacements Malicious Users, Fraudsters Attacker sends malicious data to the application’s interfaces Web 2.0 Input Validation Vulnerabilities: XPATH injection, XML injection, JSON injection Filtering, parameterized API, ESAPI filtering APIs, white-list validations Loss of data, data alteration, denial of service/access Public disclosure of XSS- Reputation damage Malicious Users, Fraudsters Attacker uses leaks or flaws in the authentication or session management functions Web 2.0 Broken Auth and Session Mgmt Vulnerabilities Follow Security Requirements For Secure Password Policies, Implement Locking, Disable “Auto-logons” Unauthorized access to data, functions Loss of CIA, legal and financial implications Fraudsters Attacker creates forged HTTP requests and tricks a victim into submitting them We 2.0 Cross Site Request Forgery Vulnerabilities Include the unique token in a hidden field. Can change data and functions on behalf of the user Loss of CIA, fraud, denial of access Automated Scripts/ Spam Bots Application post links, create accounts, game the application Insufficient Anti- Automation Include CAPTCHA, ESAPI intrusion detection APIs Can overflow process with spam, Enumerations Business Disruptions/losse s, reputational damage
- 32. OWASP Web 2.0 BusinessApp Example: Twitter Company’s Customer Support offers help through twitter’s help account, Bank Of America Example
- 33. OWASP Managing Risks ofCompany’s Twitter Twitter Application Security Vulnerabilities Landing page for selecting twitter might be vulnerable to web 2.0 vulnerabilities Countermeasure: Require a scan of web 2.0 vulnerabilities of the landing page hosting the link to twitter Use of AJAX might introduce new source code vulnerabilities Countermeasure: Validate existence of filtering for sanitization of malicious characters for XSS, XPATH, XML injection and mitigation of CSRF, sufficient anti-automation controls Countermeasure: Validate compliance of source code with AJAX secure coding standards
- 34. OWASP Managing Risks ofCompany’s Twitter Twitter Information Security And Compliance Risks Customers can disclose confidential information by micro blogging to twitter’s company account Countermeasure : Ask the user not to enter anything sensitive such as PII, SSN ACC# but his phone number Company is not liable for user’s content posted to third party twitter and for twitter vulnerabilities Countermeasure : Once the customer selects to go to twitter he will be presented a speed bump with notice of release of liability to user and to twitter Content shared between enterprise customer support representatives (twitter agents) can leak customer’s confidential information such as PII, ACC# Countermeasure : use a content enterprise social filtering and monitoring tool, agents moderate the content that is posted on twitter
- 35. OWASP 35 Q UE S T I O N S A N S W E R S
- 36. OWASP Thanks for listening,further references Ajax and Other "Rich" Interface Technologies http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Ajax_and_Other_%22Rich%22_Int erface_Technologies Vulnerability Scanners for Flash Components http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Flash_Security_ Project Web Application Vulnerability Scanners http://samate.nist.gov/index.php/Web_Application_Vulnerability_Sca nners.html Facebook Outs Hacker Krillos http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/facebook-outs-hacker-kirllos- 051310?utm_source=Recent+Articles&utm_medium=Left+Sidebar+ Topics&utm_campaign=Web+Application+Security 36
- 37. OWASP Further references con’t Facebook Now Trending As Phishing Target http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/facebook-now-trending- phishing-target- 051310?utm_source=Recent+Articles&utm_medium=Left+Sideba r+Topics&utm_campaign=Web+Application+Security Botnet Herders Can Command Via Twitter http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/botnet-herders-can-now- command-twitter- 051310?utm_source=Recent+Articles&utm_medium=Left+Sideba r+Topics&utm_campaign=Web+Application+Security OWASP TOP 10 Risks http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Pro ject Guide to Twitter Compliance http://insights.socialware.com/ 37
- 38. OWASP Further references con’t Web 2.0 Top 10 Web 2.0 Attack Vectors http://www.net-security.org/article.php?id=949&p=4 Defending against the worst web based application vulnerabilities of 2010 http://www.slideshare.net/shreeraj/web-attacks-top-threats-2010 Security Concerns Hinder Adoption of Web 2.0 and Social Networking in Business http://investor.mcafee.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=511103 Web 2.0 a Top Security Threat in 2010, Survey Finds http://pr.webroot.com/threat-research/ent/web-2- security-survey-170210.html 38