diff options
author | Tom Lane | 2020-05-14 17:06:38 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Tom Lane | 2020-05-14 17:06:50 +0000 |
commit | 5cbfce562f7cd2aab0cdc4694ce298ec3567930e (patch) | |
tree | 64e722d72fc5f1803cb6f6371d6cf12863e2812f /src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c | |
parent | 1255466f8358ecac29581aa5ecec76628dc2e33c (diff) |
Initial pgindent and pgperltidy run for v13.
Includes some manual cleanup of places that pgindent messed up,
most of which weren't per project style anyway.
Notably, it seems some people didn't absorb the style rules of
commit c9d297751, because there were a bunch of new occurrences
of function calls with a newline just after the left paren, all
with faulty expectations about how the rest of the call would get
indented.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c | 18 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c index 5e5119e8ea7..5214d328656 100644 --- a/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c +++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static char *build_server_final_message(scram_state *state); static bool verify_client_proof(scram_state *state); static bool verify_final_nonce(scram_state *state); static void mock_scram_secret(const char *username, int *iterations, - char **salt, uint8 *stored_key, uint8 *server_key); + char **salt, uint8 *stored_key, uint8 *server_key); static bool is_scram_printable(char *p); static char *sanitize_char(char c); static char *sanitize_str(const char *s); @@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ pg_be_scram_init(Port *port, if (password_type == PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256) { if (parse_scram_secret(shadow_pass, &state->iterations, &state->salt, - state->StoredKey, state->ServerKey)) + state->StoredKey, state->ServerKey)) got_secret = true; else { @@ -293,15 +293,15 @@ pg_be_scram_init(Port *port, } /* - * If the user did not have a valid SCRAM secret, we still go through - * the motions with a mock one, and fail as if the client supplied an + * If the user did not have a valid SCRAM secret, we still go through the + * motions with a mock one, and fail as if the client supplied an * incorrect password. This is to avoid revealing information to an * attacker. */ if (!got_secret) { mock_scram_secret(state->port->user_name, &state->iterations, - &state->salt, state->StoredKey, state->ServerKey); + &state->salt, state->StoredKey, state->ServerKey); state->doomed = true; } @@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ pg_be_scram_build_secret(const char *password) errmsg("could not generate random salt"))); result = scram_build_secret(saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, - SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, password); + SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, password); if (prep_password) pfree(prep_password); @@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ scram_verify_plain_password(const char *username, const char *password, pg_saslprep_rc rc; if (!parse_scram_secret(secret, &iterations, &encoded_salt, - stored_key, server_key)) + stored_key, server_key)) { /* * The password looked like a SCRAM secret, but could not be parsed. @@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ scram_verify_plain_password(const char *username, const char *password, */ bool parse_scram_secret(const char *secret, int *iterations, char **salt, - uint8 *stored_key, uint8 *server_key) + uint8 *stored_key, uint8 *server_key) { char *v; char *p; @@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ invalid_secret: */ static void mock_scram_secret(const char *username, int *iterations, char **salt, - uint8 *stored_key, uint8 *server_key) + uint8 *stored_key, uint8 *server_key) { char *raw_salt; char *encoded_salt; |