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TABLE OF CONTENTS(Click on Section)

PURPOSE

BACKGROUND

WITNESSES

The purpose of this hearing is to review what is being done and what needs to be done to meet the December 31, 2002 statutory deadline for deploying checked baggage screening systems.

Shortly after the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in 1988, FAA issued a rule requiring airlines to purchase advanced technology to detect bombs in checked baggage. The best technology at the time was the Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) machine. FAA purchased three TNA machines for testing from the only company that made them.

After testing the TNA machines at several airports, FAA realized the machine could only detect levels of explosives that were twice the amount that it believed destroyed Pan Am 103. The TNA machines were also expensive, very large, and extremely heavy making their deployment impractical. In 1990, a Presidential Commission recommended that the FAA not make further investments in TNA machines, but should instead aggressively research other detection systems.

As a result of the problems encountered with TNA and the recommendations of the 1990 Presidential Commission, Congress decided to proceed more deliberatively with explosive detection equipment. The resulting security law amended Title 49 by adding a section 44913(a)(1) governing the purchase and deployment of explosive detection equipment. This law read as follows:

A deployment or purchase of explosive detection equipment under section 108.7(b)(8) or 108.20 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, or similar regulation is required only if the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration certifies that the equipment alone, or as part of an integrated system, can detect under realistic air carrier operating conditions the amounts, configurations, and types of explosive material that would likely be used to cause catastrophic damage to commercial aircraft. The Administrator shall base the certification on the results of tests conducted under protocols developed in consultation with expert scientists outside of the Administration. Those tests shall be completed not later than April 16, 1992.

This law required that certification standards be established for bomb detection equipment and that equipment be purchased and deployed only if it met those standards.

FAA established the certification standards but they are classified. However, the standards are believed to be very rigorous since it has been shown that only a small amount of plastic explosives can be enough to bring down a large aircraft. The typical x-ray is designed to detect metal guns and is not well suited for detecting plastic explosives.

In December 1994, the FAA certified its first explosive detection system. The system is known as the CTX 5000. InVision, a company based in Foster City, California, makes this machine. Its workings are similar to that of a CAT Scan, as used in the health care industry. More recently, the FAA certified a similar machine made by L3 Communications. L3 has facilities in New York and Clearwater, Florida.

There are at least two other companies, Heimann and Perkin-Elmer, which are hoping to submit machines for certification in the new future.

In 1996, after the explosion of TWA 800, the Congressional approach shifted. This disaster, which is now thought to have been caused by a mechanical flaw in the fuel tank, was at first thought to have been caused by a bomb. Many people were aware that there were explosive detection systems being used in the rest of the world that, while not certified by the FAA, might still be useful in detecting bombs before they made it aboard an aircraft. As a result, section 305 of the 1996 Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act (codified at 49 USC section 44913(a)(3)) and the Gore Commission recommended the use of non-certified commercially available explosive detection equipment. The FAA responded by purchasing and deploying trace detection devices. These usually involve wiping a cloth or blowing air on a person or bag to detect the presence of explosive residue.

According to the FAA, it has spent $441 million for the purchase of explosive detection systems. This includes both the uncertified trace detection devices as well as the certified bulk detection machines, i.e. the CTX and the L3 products. At the end of the last fiscal year, 142 bulk detection systems had been installed at 47 airports for 20 airlines. At that time, there were 22 systems still in a warehouse but the FAA stated that they would be installed in the next 2 months.

Although this equipment is being deployed, it has often not been fully utilized. In a 1998 report on Deployment of Explosives Detection Equipment, the Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported that for the first quarter of that year, 10 of the 11 CTX machines that they reviewed were screening fewer than 200 bags per day. The IG continues to report that the equipment is underutilized and indeed, at many airports, one can see these machines sitting idle.

Even if the machines were fully utilized, there are not currently enough of them to screen all checked baggage at all airports.

After the September 11th attacks, people became more aware of the fact that not all checked baggage was being screened by explosive detection systems. Currently, airlines use a computer profiling system, known as the Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System (CAPPS), to select those passengers who pose the greatest threat and whose baggage should be subject to a more rigorous inspection.

However, since most passengers do not fit the computer profile, most checked baggage is not subject to examination by an explosive detection machine.

Section 6 of the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-528, 114 Stat. 2521, November 22, 2000) required the airlines to increase their utilization of explosive detection equipment. The Act required that in addition to the baggage of passengers who were selected by the CAPPS profile, explosive detection equipment should also be used to examine passenger baggage that is randomly chosen. According to the DOT Inspector General, however, the latest data show that utilization rates remain low.

Section 110 of the recently enacted Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Public Law 107-71) amends section 44901 of Title 49 to establish firm deadlines for the screening of checked baggage. It also transferred responsibility for aviation security from the FAA to a new Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within DOT.

Within 60 days, the law requires that all checked baggage be screened by any approved means. This could include, for example, the use of explosive detection machines where available, matching the bag to the passenger, profiling the passenger with additional searches of selectee's baggage, hand searches, or the use of bomb-sniffing dogs.

By December 31, 2002, the law requires that enough explosive detection systems be deployed to screen all checked baggage. The law does not actually require that all checked baggage be screened by that date (although Congress clearly hoped that it would be) only that the explosive detection machines be deployed by that date and when enough machines are deployed, all checked baggage must be screened by them. Until enough machines are in place, alternative means, such as those mentioned above, must be used to screen checked baggage.

There is concern that it will be difficult to deploy enough explosive detection systems by the December 31, 2002 deadline in the law. This hearing will focus on what is being done and what needs to be done to ensure that this deadline is met and that the equipment deployed will be effective in keeping bombs off commercial aircraft. Questions involve the number of machines that will be needed, how much money must be appropriated to buy them, whether the government can rely on the two certified manufacturers or should encourage more, whether the certification standards should be changed to accommodate more products, whether the existing machines can be upgraded as the technology improves, how these large heavy machines can be installed in sufficient numbers in airports and integrated into the airline baggage systems, and what the impact will be on passenger service.