AT THE INTERFACE: DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS OF EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT LANGUAGE

KNOWLEDGE
Author(s): Nick C. Ellis
Source: Studies in Second Language Acquisition , June 2005, Vol. 27, No. 2, SPECIAL
ISSUE: Theoretical and Empirical Issues in the Study of Implicit and Explicit Second-
Language Learning (June 2005), pp. 305-352
Published by: Cambridge University Press

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SSLA, 27, 305-352. Printed in the United States of America.
DOI: 10.101 7/S0272263 1 05050 1 4X

AT THE INTERFACE:
DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS
OF EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT
LANGUAGE KNOWLEDGE

Nick C. Ellis
University of Michigan

This paper considers how implicit and explicit knowledge are disso-
ciable but cooperative. It reviews various psychological and neuro-
biological processes by which explicit knowledge of form-meaning
associations impacts upon implicit language learning. The interface
is dynamic: It happens transiently during conscious processing, but
the influence upon implicit cognition endures thereafter. The primary
conscious involvement in SLA is the explicit learning involved in the
initial registration of pattern recognizers for constructions that are then
tuned and integrated into the system by implicit learning during sub-
sequent input processing. Neural systems in the prefrontal cortex
involved in working memory provide attentional selection, perceptual
integration, and the unification of consciousness. Neural systems in
the hippocampus then bind these disparate cortical representations
into unitary episodic representations. These are the mechanisms by
which Schmidt's (1990) noticing helps solve Quine's (1960) problem
of referential indeterminacy. Explicit memories can also guide the con-
scious building of novel linguistic utterances through processes of
analogy. Formulas, slot-and-frame patterns, drills, and declarative
pedagogical grammar rules all contribute to the conscious creation
of utterances whose subsequent usage promotes implicit learning
and proceduralization. Flawed output can prompt focused feedback
by way of recasts that present learners with psycholinguistic data

Thanks to Rod Ellis for first suggesting that I try to write this and to the staff and students at Depart-
ment of Applied Language Studies and Linguistics University of Auckland (2003), the TESOL Pro-
gram Temple University Japan (2003), the Chester Language Development Reading Group, and the
LOT winter school (2004) for helping me think it through. I am particularly grateful to Michel Para-
dis, Michael Swan, Karen Roehr, Anne Feryok, and Tamar Keren-Portnoy for pointing their giant bio-
logical cameras of consciousness at a prior draft, and for sharing their awareness with me in kindly
and constructive fashion. I have learned a lot from it.
Address correspondence to: Nick C. Ellis, English Language Institute, University of Michigan,
3134 TCF Building, 401 East Liberty Street, Ste 350, Ann Arbor, MI, 48104-2298; e-mail: ncellis®
[Link].

© 2005 Cambridge University Press 0272-2631/05 $12.00 305

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 306 Nick C. Ellis

ready for explicit

put include diffe
cesses of conscio
relationships bet
capacities and la

1. HOW DOES EXPLICIT KNOWLEDGE AFFECT IMPLICIT

LANGUAGE LEARNING?

The more novelty we encounter, the more conscious involvement is needed

for successful learning and problem-solving. (Baars, 1997b)

We learn language while using language. When things go right, when rou-
tine communication flows easily, this time on task tunes our skills without us
giving much thought to the learning process. When things go wrong, when
communication breaks down, we try hard to negotiate meaning, and we learn
a lot about linguistic construction in the process. Implicit learning of lan-
guage occurs during fluent comprehension and production. Explicit learning
of language occurs in our conscious efforts to negotiate meaning and con-
struct communication.
Cognitive linguistic and functional theories of language contend that the
basic units of language representation are constructions. These are form-
function mappings, conventionalized in the speech community and entrenched
as language knowledge in the learner's mind. Constructions are symbolic: They
specify the defining properties of morphological, syntactic, and lexical form
and the semantic, pragmatic, and discourse functions that are associated with
it. Usage-based theories of language acquisition hold that we learn construc-
tions while using language, of engaging in communication, and that an indi-
vidual's linguistic competence emerges from the memories of the utterances
in their history of language use and the abstraction of regularities within them.
The following reviews provide overviews of the foundation fields of cognitive
linguistics and usage-based models of acquisition: Barlow & Kemmer, 2000;
Bates & MacWhinney, 1981; Bod, Hay, & Jannedy, 2003; Bybee & Hopper, 2001;
Croft & Cruise, 2004; N. Ellis, 2003; Goldberg, 1995; Jurafsky, 2002; Jurafsky &
Martin, 2000; Langacker, 1987; Robinson & Ellis, in press; Taylor, 2002; Toma-
sello, 1998, 2003.
As 1 have argued before in these pages (N. Ellis, 2002a), the bulk of lan-
guage acquisition is implicit learning from usage. Most knowledge is tacit knowl-
edge; most learning is implicit; the vast majority of our cognitive processing
is unconscious. Implicit learning supplies a distributional analysis of the prob-
lem space: Frequency of usage determines availability of representation accord-
ing to the power law of learning, and this process tallies the likelihoods of
occurrence of constructions and the relative probabilities of their mappings
between aspects of form and interpretations, with generalizations arising from

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Explicit-Implicit Interface 307

conspiracies of memorized utterances c

linguistic constructions (Bybee & Hoppe
1996; Langacker, 1987; MacWhinney, 1987b
2003). Implicit learning also forges seri
tions, larger formulas, and composite con
tiguous components, thus creating hi
(N. Ellis, 1996; Reber, 1993; Stadler & Fre
ponents stimulate each other, via these c
tion of the cognitive unconscious. Relat
implicit memory, their likenesses harmo
is by these means that linguistic prototy
the aspects of language acquisition that
ist models (Christiansen & Chater, 2001).
out primary and secondary neocortical se
evidence of language, and the results of t
tion to the problem space of form-funct
use. The representational systems modula
In these ways, unconscious learning proce
ing language usage, are necessary in de
(N. Ellis, submitted; Jurafsky, 1996; Mac
Donald, 1999; Shanks, 1995). Neverthel
cient. Many aspects of a second langu
acquired very slowly - from implicit p
in press; submitted).
Krashen (1985) was correct to the exten
and learning are different things; in p
implicit knowledge are distinct and disso
of representation and are substantiated in
1994c, 1996; Schacter, 1987; Squire & K
rect in stating that explicit knowledge do
nor can it be converted to it. Nevertheless
they are, these two types of knowledg
the very foundations of SLA, applied li
tion, has motivated a wide range of empi
and the weight of the subsequent finding
sition can be speeded by explicit instruct
quasi-experimental investigations into
(L2) instruction (e.g., Doughty & Williams
&DeKeyser, 1997; Lightbown, Spada, & Wh
particularly the comprehensive meta-anal
onstrate that focused L2 instruction resul
that explicit types of instruction are mo
that the effectiveness of L2 instruction i
Learning is a dynamic process; it take
(1949), Craik and Lockhart (1972), Pienem

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308 Nick C. Ellis

all reminded us f
cessing and langu
implicit systems
to concentrate on
processes are high
implicit modules,
ing additional co
only think about
into the road, and
dictable condition
edge in new way
consciousness, so
(James, 1950). Th
face. They share t
happens in consc
Section 2 context
scientific studie
lates of consciou
which consciousn
the neurobiology
ing, the neural pr
scious cognition i
consciousness an
and language learn
Section 3 describ
ing is the initial r
then tuned and in
sequent input pr
in working memo
neuronal synchro
of coherent repr
cation of conscio
ral systems in th
unitary episodi
Schmidt's (1990) n
indeterminacy.
Section 4 conside
ories are also use
Formulas are used
and-frame patter
ical grammar lik
that then partake
output can also pr
ers with psycholi
acquisition from o

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Explicit-Implicit Interface 309

formulas, originally explicitly learned

dissected into their component structu
phonological loop can provide data tha
tions, discontinuous dependencies that - a
learning- can nevertheless be scrutiniz
sions can provide negative evidence, cons
overly general grammars. Section 5 co
tions take place in working memory and
ences in working memory capacities mig
aptitude.

2. THE NEUROBIOLOGICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSCIOUS

AND UNCONSCIOUS LEARNING

The interface question has driven research in applied linguistics and SLA for
the last 20 years (Białystok, 1982; Krashen, 1985; McLaughlin, 1987) while ps
chological research was independently investigating the dissociations between
implicit and explicit memory (Schacter, 1987) and between implicit and expli
learning (Reber, Kassin, Lewis, & Cantor, 1980). Ten years later, research
on the boundary of applied linguistics and psychology pulled together th
separate bodies of research (N. Ellis, 1994a; Paradis, 1994; Schmidt, 1990). The
clear evidence of the dissociability of implicit and explicit knowledge system
led these analyses to focus upon the separability of implicit and explicit lan-
guage learning and of implicit and explicit language knowledge, with som
reviews concentrating on the contributions of implicit learning to SLA (N. Ell
2002a, in press; Krashen, 1985, 1994) and others concentrating on those
explicit learning to SLA (N. Ellis, 1995a; Lightbown et al., 1993; Long, 19
Schmidt, 1993). However, applied linguistic analyses suggest some interf
between explicit and implicit learning, if only a weak one (Doughty & W
liams, 1998; R. Ellis, 1994, 2001; Long, 1991; Norris & Ortega, 2000; Spada, 19
What is the nature of this weak interface? How can we understand it in cog
tive and neurobiological terms? The goal of this paper is to outline a range o
possible mechanisms, building upon prior proposals in terms of cognitive analy
ses of attention in SLA (N. Ellis, 2002b; Robinson, 2003; Schmidt, 2001), focu
on form (Doughty, 2001), input processing (Gass, 1997; VanPatten, 1996, 2002
skill theory and output practice (DeKeyser, 2001; DeKeyser & Sokalski, 19
and combinations thereof (N. Ellis, 2002b; R. Ellis, 1994; MacWhinney, 19
Robinson, 2001; Terrell, 1991), and to begin to relate these to current neuro-
scientific analyses of consciousness and language.
The last 10 years have seen significant advances in our understanding
consciousness and its roles in learning and memory. There have been thr
main developments to the Scientific Study of Consciousness (Baars, Banks, &
Newman, 2003) 1 : (a) cognitive neuroscientific investigation of the neural co
relates of consciousness (NCC; see Koch, 2004, for review), (b) cognitive analy

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310 Nick C. Ellis

sis of consciousn
1997b), and (c) co
gence of self-amp
tions, the dynami
the unconscious
the fleeting stre
Dehaene, Sergent,
upon SLA. These d
implicit tallying,
sciousness in lear

The Neurobiolo

The wealth of cog

tallying, priming
recently been sup
involved in learni
A visual word th
readable. However
poral proximity w
a phenomenon ca
orthographic, and
meaning - can be
sciousness of tho
unconsciously ac
Dehaene et al. (20
event-related pot
masked words. T
extrastriate, fusif
ity caused signifi
in brain activity
failed to elicit the
of prefrontal an
sciously perceived
index of consciou
to report the mas
Thus, words tha
to be below the th
perceptual areas s
and therein prime
support conscious
prefrontal areas
Koch, 2002).

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 Explicit-Implicit Interface 311

This work also speaks to the relationsh

tion. Although noticing is not necessary
Naccache, Blandin, and Dehaene (2002)
ing occurred only if subjects attended to
priming took place. It seems, therefor
not that we are passive learners, with ev
being tallied. Nor are we restricted to be
which is focally attended and of which w
is learned. It is something in between
associative learning that results from st
cally processed following preestablished
this level of attention might not be suf
stimulus.

The NCC

More usually, without masking, with processing driven by longer presenta-

tions or more salient stimuli or volitional attention, there is an additional surge
of activity, widespread and multifocal, involving a plethora of prefrontal, cin-
gulate, and left parietal regions (Dehaene et al., 2001; Kanwisher, 2001; Koch,
2004; Rees, 2001a; Rees et al., 2002). The NCC involve a coalition of forebrain
neurons implicated in working memory and planning, interconnected via wide-
spread cortico-cortico and cortico-thalamic feedback loops with sets of neu-
rons in sensory and motor regions that code for particular features. Any one
percept - real or imagined - corresponds to a winning coalition of the essen-
tial features coded by these different but related regions. Thus, for example,
even though different areas of my brain code the heat, the liquidity, the aroma,
the sweetness, and the color of a mouthful of coffee, activation in these nodes
is simultaneously synchronized into a winning coalition that reinforces the
firing activity of its member neurons - probably by synchronizing their spik-
ing discharge - and suppresses competing ones in a winner-takes-all fashion.
Consciousness gives clout : When processes compete for ongoing control of
the body, the one with the greatest clout dominates the scene until a process
with even greater clout displaces it (Dennett, 2001). At any one moment, the
winning coalition, expressed in the content of consciousness, is briefly sus-
tained for a discrete epoch of somewhere between 20 and 200 ms before it is
replaced by another coalition in the ongoing stream of snapshots of conscious-
ness. Stabilization of the coalition seems to be achieved by massive feedback
known as reentrant signaling, perhaps involving thalamocortical loops, which
is synchronized in rhythmic action potential discharge in the 30- to 60-Hz
gamma band of electroencephalograph (EEG) frequency. There is consider-
able ongoing research into this gamma band activity, both as an index of atten-
tive awareness and as a mechanism for solving the binding problem (Crick &

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 312 Nick C. Ellis

Koch, 2003; Dehae

2000; Koch, 2004; S
The NCC is a huge
correspondingly m
been discovered in
marized here, is po
scious and implicit
within modality an
routines within a
menagerie of speci
ations in the abse
chapter 12). Howev
unifies otherwise
scious activity aff
and influence than
potential associati

Consciousness and Learning: The Collaborative Mind

Compared to the vast number of unconscious neural processes happening in

any given moment, conscious capacity evidences a very narrow bottleneck.
However, the narrow limits of consciousness have a compensating advantage:
Consciousness seems to act as a gateway, creating access to essentially any
part of the nervous system. Consciousness creates global access (Baars, 1997a).
Baars (1988, 1997a) introduced Global Workspace Theory by describing the
likenesses between our cognitive architecture and a working theater. The entire
stage of the theater corresponds to working memory, the immediate memory
system in which we talk to ourselves, visualize places and people, and plan
actions. In the working theater, focal consciousness acts as a bright spot on
the stage. Conscious events hang around, monopolizing time in the limelight.
The bright spot is further surrounded by a fringe (Mangan, 1993) or penumbra
(James, 1950; Koch, 2004, chapter 14) of associated, vaguely conscious events.
Information from the bright spot is globally distributed to the vast audience
of all of the unconscious modules we use to adapt to the world. A theater
combines very limited events taking place on stage with a vast audience, just
as consciousness involves limited information that creates access to a vast
number of unconscious sources of knowledge. Consciousness is the publicity
organ of the brain. It is a facility for accessing, disseminating, and exchang-
ing information and for exercising global coordination and control: Con-
sciousness is the interface. "Paying attention - becoming conscious of some
material- seems to be the sovereign remedy for learning anything, applicable
to many very different kinds of information. It is the universal solvent of the
mind" (Baars, 1997a, p. 304).

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Explicit-Implicit Interface 313

Note that in this view, consciousness i

author of the play. The contents of con
top-down processes. However, the str
of thoughts, not the thoughts themse
to the implicit workings of the prefron
in the evaluation of different courses
ning than it does to the implicit work
primary perceptual cortex. The theater
our unconscious modules; there is no
unconscious modules send their result
by the Audience, as in a Cartesian the
terms, the id and the super-ego are b
chapter 18), the homunculus is nonco
consciousness is an intermediate level
sory data, concepts, and more abstract p
is conscious about thoughts are image
ings associated with intermediate-leve
time, our state of mind reflects comple
explicit knowledge:

In the human brain information (as a mar

is created and destroyed in the metast
dynamics, where tendencies for apartnes
collective, segregation and integration, p
tering coexist. New information is create
a special regime where the slightest nud
nated state. In this way, the (essentially
creates new, informationally meaningfu
stabilized over time. The stability of inf
by the coupling between component par
a dynamic kind of (nonhereditary) memo

Global Workspace Theory and paralle

mechanisms by which the brain interfa
pendent implicit and explicit memory s
auditory, emotive, or visual processin
tual, or procedural memories, despite
which bear upon representations and en
logical adaptations tend to be accretive (
example, is overlaid on a set of organs th
ing, eating, and simple vocalization. La
visual representation of the world. Yet,
sentations of language and the analog
interact so that through language, we
that might normally be produced only
and integrated by the sensory and perc
1976). Likewise, it might be that the glo

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 314 Nick C. Ellis

sciousness system
motor. In his majo
neuropsychology,
three principal fun
waking; the unit f
unit for programm
that it would be a
activity independe

Each form of consc

takes place through
which makes its ow
units work concerte
each unit makes i
obtained into the n
(pp. 99-101, empha

Language represe
ules, largely impli
tions in dynamic
the phonological
motor groundings
sciousness be invo
explicit, metaling
implicit systems?

3. WHEN SOMEBODY SAYS SOMETHING

YOU DON'T UNDERSTAND

Second Language Quinean

Consciousness is experiencing: William James called the experiencing "self,"

the knower, the "I." It is about access, too: "That of which I am conscious is
that to which I have access, or (to put the emphasis where it belongs), that to
which I have access" (Dennett, 1978, emphasis in original). When trying to
engage your experiencing self in this paper, despite the usual third-person
conventions of scientific writing, I am therefore going to address you directly.
So, please imagine yourself there, a nonnative speaker (NNS), perhaps a child
in arms or an adult tourist, gathering hedgerow fruits with your Quinean-
speaking conversation partner. You're trying to reach that fat blackberry that
is just out of reach when your companion whispers, "I wonder if we'll see
some gavagai today." Your interpretation is constrained by what you already
know that is implicitly brought to bear. Your determining the meaning of a
new word is guided by the constructions your language processors apply in
the analysis and by your knowledge of grammatical categories and frames
(Brent, 1994; Gleitman, 1990; Maratsos, 1982; Tomasello, 2003). Gleitman showed

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 Explicit-Implicit Interface 315

how, for example, learners can clarify th

ing to its argument structure, a process of
case, the morphosyntactic contexts cu
work out. It is a start at least.
You look up to see the autumnal sunset casting long shadows across the
field- dappled orange, brown, and green. Leaves fall. The dew is forming, mist-
ing the shaded hollows. An animal hops closer to the ditch. Mushrooms, cow-
pats, acorns, long grass, thistles ... a rich and complex scene. And just what
might "gavagai" be? Either your host would have to add something more con-
structive, or else you would need to be present at quite a number of such
scenes before your implicit distributional analysis systems could abstract the
correct solution without further clues or guidance. You would need enough
scenes to show that dew, thistles, and acorns are just random noise in the
presence of this linguistic cue, that it occurs equally at any time of day, and
that it is the coney that is the most reliable corollary. Implicit learning is like
multivariate analysis - the correlated variables will become apparent against
the background noise no matter what the number of variables, as long as you
have a large enough number of observations: It is slow because it needs a
large sample, and the greater the number of potential variables of relevance,
the larger the sample size that is required for the computation of robust esti-
mates. However, even a whole warren of examples might not justify a definite
conclusion, as Quine (1960) demonstrated with his famous gavagai parable-
referential indeterminacy is a fundamental problem: Single words cannot sim-
ply be paired with experiences because they confront experience in clusters.
Other things being equal, a good bet might be to translate the word as "rab-
bit." But why not translate it as, say, "fluffy cotton tail," or "long ears," or
"softness," or "undetached rabbit-part," given that any experience that makes
the use of "rabbit" appropriate would also make that of "undetached rabbit-
part" appropriate?2 Once you figure out that a word is related to something
in the world, you need to figure out specifically how, an inductive problem
whose solution is not immediately apparent in the labeling situation.
Your search for the correct referent might be helpfully speeded by a host
of attention-focusing biases that you have already acquired as general word
learning heuristics: A tendency to believe that new words often apply to whole
objects (the whole object constraint), that they more likely will refer to things
for which a name is not already known (the mutual exclusivity constraint),
that they more often relate to things distinguished by shape or function rather
than by color or texture, and the like (Bloom, 2000; Golinkoff, 1992; Golinkoff,
Mervis, & Hirsh-Pasek, 1994; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Markman, 1989). Recent
computational models provide concrete accounts of how such word learning
principles emerge in development from more general aspects of cognition,
including associative learning, attention, and rational inference - that is, from
prior knowledge of the world and the ways language usually refers to it and
from the learner's existing repertoire of linguistic constructions (MacWhin-
ney, 1989; Merriman, 1999; Regier, 2003). Language is a social construction,

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 316 Nick C. Ellis

and the ways that

mined. General pr
ontogenetically f
salient aspects of t
inferences.
If the sample of e
sis to successfully
type of construct
make of "cookerg?
so, just what func
implicit learning m
will strengthen a
want to understa
been drawn to th
crucial point for ac
level L2 material w
ceived as deficits
Likewise, White (
provide learners w
L2 acquisition. At
are brought to bea
locutor. Analyses o
actions demonstr
novel vocabulary
tual referents or s
(Baldwin, 1996; Ch
1997; Gelman, Col
ver, 1995; Tomase
various means of
speech, (b) by prov
the communicatio
actional structure
voked to search f
spotlight the relev
and actions.

Explicit Learning in the Consolidation

of Linguistic Constructions

"Look, there's the gavagai," they say. "Look at it hopping through the field. Is
that a carrot it is eating?" Or, "Yes, Tom cooked the gavagai with some tur-
nips. The gavagai cookerg really well in a stew." They say whatever is required
to make that referent stand out in the bright spot of focal consciousness, or
at least to provide enough illumination to shade off many of the foils and irrel-

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 Explicit-Implicit Interface 317

evancies.3 In this way, the primary mec

initial registration of pattern recogni
scious awareness is important in the init
sentation. Attention is required in or
integrated objects. Attention carves out
subset of conjunctions amid the mass
tures present in the scene. Scaffolded at
lem. Conscious self- and other-cued at
are the mechanisms of Schmidt's (1984,
which holds that the subjective expe
sufficient condition for the conversion o
for SLA:

The idea that consciousness is a gateway- something that creates access

to a vast unconscious mind - has interesting implications for understand-
ing learning. It suggests that learning just requires us to "point" our con-
sciousness at some material we want to learn, like some giant biological
camera, and the detailed analysis and storage of the material will take place
unconsciously. Given a conscious target, it seems as if learning occurs mag-
ically, without effort or guidance, carried out by some skilled squad of
unconscious helpers. (Baars, 1997a)

By noticing, Schmidt (1994) meant the registration of the occurrence of a

stimulus event in conscious awareness and its subsequent storage in long-
term memory. Neural systems in the prefrontal cortex involved in working
memory contribute to the apperception of the stimulus- that is, its original
registration, providing the neuronal synchrony that is required for perceptual
integration, buildup of coherent representations, attentional selection, aware-
ness, and the unification of consciousness (Baddeley, 2000, 2002; Cleeremans,
2003; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Prabhakaran, Narayanan, Zhao, & Gabrieli, 2000;
Smith & Jonides, 1999; Treisman, 1998). But what about subsequent storage?

Explicit Memories of Linguistic Constructions

Working memory is required in both the initial encoding and the ultimate recall
of explicit knowledge (for reviews, see Frąckowiak et al., 2004; Kandel, Schwartz,
& Jessell, 2000, chapter 10). Explicit learning typically results in explicit mem-
ories, the establishment of new conjunctions of arbitrarily different elements
bound into a unitized memory representation. The encoding of episodic mem-
ories is mediated by two principal components: a frontal-lobe component
whose operations are strategic, organizational, and accessible to conscious-
ness and voluntary control, and a modular medial temporal or hippocampal
component whose operations are essentially automatic (Gabrieli, 1998; Mosco-
vitch, 1992). Evidence for the conscious contributions of working memory in
the formation of new long-term memories include (a) the fact that the encod-
ing of explicit memories is clearly hindered by divided attention during learn-

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 318 Nick C. Ellis

ing (Baddeley, L
Benjamin, & And
preparatory atten
and (c) the existen
(PET) that demon
ciated with activa
1994), that activat
nated by the perf
et al., 1994), and t
tive of subsequent
ral systems in t
consolidation of
cally binds toget
sentation that ca
Thus, the hippoc
rience (i.e., an ep
just a jumble of
Kandel, 1999). By
region performs
recognition units
bindings; these ar
they subsequently
O'Reilly & Norman
Recent brain ima
systems in the c
and 24). Hippocam
early in training,
ities and evolving
ing when other br
these representatio
ing studies have a
encoding of mem
elty, in that they
(Stern, Corkin, Go
covitch, & Houle
Lesion and imagi
ory, as indexed by
specific plasticity
tactual priming b
sensory neocortic
a given domain a
neural networks t
with these change
The two complem
the neocortical sensori-motor areas - allow the coexistence of instances and

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Explicit-Implicit Interface 319

abstractions, thus solving the two basic

that needs to be able to acquire both spe
today?" or "What is the L2 phrase for
tions ("What's the script for purchasing
does the L2 form a plural?"), and they
interference suffered by purely implici
land, 1995, 1998; O'Reilly & Norman, 200
rate to gradually integrate new informat
lapping distributed representations to ex
of the environment. In contrast, the hip
tinctive sparse representations to input
of specific events while minimizing inte
Additional support for the claim that th
tion ordinarily involves focused attentio
subsequent consolidation of an explici
deficit and from mnemonic success. Def
acquisition of novel linguistic constru
who have lost the ability to form novel
age to their hippocampal system, cannot
are severely deficient at developing n
these abilities alongside the rest of their
brain damage, they cannot consolidate a
daily lives, and these experiences are thu
from short-term memory. Amnesia is n
tion; it is a failure to consolidate an exp
Devoid of the memorial advantages of no
memory and tuning of their perceptual
existing memory representations but
ciations. Unlike normal individuals, th
concepts or word meanings from a few
preserved implicit memory ability affor
Amnesic patients with hippocampal dam
new associations through many, many r
a habit - or through methods that invol
gressively diminishing cues (Parkin, 198
of learning is grossly slow in compariso
edge so acquired is atypically inflexible
same cues are presented that were use
where (N. Ellis, 1994c), I made much of
abilities, discussing how these can tun
motor systems for language perception
clusion of present relevance is simple: B
ability equals no ability to consolidate
In counterpart to the evidence from de
accomplished vocabulary acquisition. A

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 320 Nick C. Ellis

memory is an "eff
the better you rem
and Lockhart (197
depth of analysis,
orate, longer lasti
memory for vocab
ating form-meanin
ing keyword techn
clues, inference fr
cises, optimally sp
& Raugh, 1975; N. E
2001; Nation, 2001;
deep, elaborative
representations al
constructions.

Formulas: The Concrete Seeds of Abstract Trees

Explicit memories seed what will later become more schematic linguistic con-
structions. The initial representation of a novel form-meaning conjunction usu-
ally involves consolidation of a specific, concrete explicit memory- a formula
(N. Ellis, 1996; Pawley & Syder, 1983; Schmitt, 2004; Wray, 2002). The first exem
plar is often a high-frequency expression, a salient one of prototypical mean-
ing and high functionality. Zipf's law applies within constructions, as it does
elsewhere throughout language and beyond (Schooler & Anderson, 1997; Zipf,
1935), observing that the most frequent exemplar of a construction accounts
for a disproportionately very large number of overall occurrences of that pat-
tern. This formula is usually prototypical in its function or meaning (Gold
berg, 2003a, 2003b; Goldberg & Sethuraman, 1999), and it often serves a really
useful social function too, a formulaic key to interaction and social involve
ment (Wong-Fillmore, 1976). So it is this formula that is acquired early and
thus serves as the concrete beginnings of what later will be a more genera
construction schema. Ninio (1999) showed how individual "pathbreaking"
semantically prototypie verbs form the seeds of verb-centered argument
structure patterns, with generalizations of the verb-centered instances emerg-
ing gradually as the verb-centered categories themselves are analyzed into
more abstract argument structure constructions. The second formula of related
meaning is explicitly learned. Then, the third, and perhaps another. Also, the
database begins to provide sufficient exemplars to allow analysis (Tomasello
1992): both the conscious explicit analysis of how the general construction
might work (attentive working memory processes of hypothesis formation and
analogy, which I will deal with in Section 4) and also implicit learning (the
neocortical processes of categorization, distributional analysis, and connec-
tionist frequency-tuned abstraction of patterns outlined in Section 1), hence

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Explicit-Implicit Interface 321

the usual route of naturalistic acquisitio

pattern to creative construction.

Explicit Focus on Implicit Tuning

Once a construction has been seeded in t

junction consolidated as explicit memorie
and prototypical exemplars, thereafter
on every subsequent occasion of use. E
in the elements of the construction bein
memory as a result: The pattern-recogn
form that are involved are incremented
ments that are represented in the for
bound more strongly together as a res
ing; the associated meaning or functio
by its usage; and so is the association be
In other words, implicit learning results
tion that are activated in processing bei
whole. Noticing is no longer necessary
for this implicit tallying, priming, and
guists performance data show us to be i
form-function mappings, the default pa
terns of regularity within the mapping
has been implicitly acquired (N. Ellis,
to simulation using connectionist mo
MacWhinney, 1999).
However, one criticism of connectionis
modelers who select what subset of the
to the model in the first place. Illustrat
ature are the responses of Carroll (1995,
of Gregg (2003) to N. Ellis (1998; Ellis &
tion is pragmatic in that it is impossible
environment to a computer model, and
for focus. The linguists' criticism is tha
the model with a priori solutions to t
tions It Crucially Supposes) in which m
posedly emerges as a result of experienc
model beforehand: For the beginnings o
(1988) criticism of the original Rumel
model. This is the modern virtual parall
nings of SLA that although learners are
goes in- Corder's (1967) distinction be
guage) and intake, that subset of input t
utilizes in some way. Although connecti
range of patterns of implicit acquisiti

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 322 Nick C. Ellis

thereby evidencing
rate and accuracy
1987b; Taraban & R
ence between the v
A connectionist m
"I type, I typed; I
with regular and ir
actual occurrence i
tests: I &&; I &&ed.
guage learner, mo
ence, as their NS p
I danced not at all;
in full heart. You a
now that I love yo
guage, 1 agree. Nev
input to connection
focus on form- th
ing from intake. H
ment as a complete
language (LI) mode
of whom are impe
exemplars of high-
What are these f
intake, the sorts o
presents major pr
that characterizes

There is no functio
to nouns, verbs an
ers, subordinating e
Note that there is n
no mood, no agreem
1998, p. 545)

And the reasons, I believe, are because L2 learners continue to process these
aspects of language implicitly, following the habits and tunings laid down for
the LI (N. Ellis, 2002b, submitted). The learners are encountering novelty,
wherein - in the words used to open this article - a more conscious involve-
ment is needed for successful learning and problem-solving, yet they do not
realize it because these aspects of language are neither salient nor are they of
significant communicative value (N. Ellis, in press).

Salience and Insignificance: Competition and

Multiple Cues to Meaning

The aspects of form that typically fail to become adopted and routinely used
in L2 processing are those that - however reliable as potential cues to

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Explicit-Implicit Interface 323

interpretation- are of low salience and a

standing of an utterance. One could un
the input to our far-flung learner discu
the circumstances of the rest of the m
cues to the temporal reference and more
generally, phonologically reduced ten
brighter cues of temporal adverbs, as ar
by the more obvious plurality of the cle
In such cases, the learner's constructions
include these insignificant cues, and if
there is no concomitant strengthening o
its association with the interpretation.
Experiments using miniature artificial
tial stages of acquisition, learners tend t
example, when cues for determining the
noun animacy, and agreement of noun a
tion on only one of these as the predicto
tracked the use of this first cue, they
begin to use the two in combination, a
tional cues are added if they significant
ing (Matessa & Anderson, 2000). This is e
probabilistic contrast model (Cheng & Ho
rational human associative learning in
able backgrounds. However, a language lea
ing low-salience cues, particularly when
by the other more obvious cues does w
tive survival. Indeed, these secondary re
ciative learning phenomenon of blocking
chapter 2). It is not that they are mer
actively attentionally blocked (N. Ellis
tive learning effect in situations where
In this way, low-salience cues might nev
idated construction, and, broadly, never
never tallied by implicit learning in usa
Low-salience cues might be overshadow
ers than in LI child language learners.
to look elsewhere for their cues to inter
all the animals in your backyard live in
spot the gavagai? English learners of Ch
Japanese learners of English have difficu
lems resulting from zero use in the LI. Si
agreement, and noun animacy, along wit
the subject of a sentence to lesser or g
learners carry their LI cue strength hie
ally resetting the ordering after cons

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324 Nick C. Ellis

1987a), if at all (M
optimally tunes th
of low salience of L
and we describe t
"stabilized."

Explicit Learnin
Input Processin

The remedy is to b
uations, some type
Smith, 1981) or fo
place, consolidating
tation. Explicit in
processing. Schmi
input are likely to
intentionally focu
necessity for succ
ized explicit gramm
the students' atten
instruction targete
monly ignored fea
ture and, second, b
of the same gramm
Instruction (VanPa
strategies, to chan
to maximize the am
into the construct
strengths are inc
does not have to
use in processing f
lary is that if exp
relevant input tha
cessing of the cu
relevant interpreta
cessing thereafter
Paradis (1994, 20
edge and implicit l
propriate to talk o
per se directly aff
that it is only fro
struction are encou
quency statistics t
the learner, eventu

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 Explicit-Implicit Interface 325

automatically. Although VanPatten (199

that it is via processing that implicit m
influence of metalinguistic information
profound that claims of interface and int
(1997a) illustrated, although you are cons
you definitely did not just now conscious
On reading it, you were surely unawar
although in a different sentence you wou
meaning to mind. What happens to the o
dence demonstrates that some of them ex
of a second before your brain decides on
in English) have multiple meanings, bu
time. This is a fundamental fact about consciousness and a demonstration of
the fundamental role of context on the contents of consciousness. Read the
following:

(1) [pay] bill [speed?] sprinted [when?] crawls

[duck] bill [when?] sprinted [speed?] crawls
[had to] bill [rhyme?] sprinted [person?] crawls

In each pair, your reading of the second element was radically different as
you met it on each line. The form was the same, but the processing was very
different in different contexts. The [when?] context focused you in on tense,
and it was the tense aspect of present -s or past -ed that was processed and
strengthened more from those processing episodes as a result. The [speed?]
context instead focused you in on the relevant aspects of meaning. These rep-
resent different contexts, different interpretations, different tallying, and dif-
ferent tuning (Baars, 1997b, chapter 5). Metalinguistic information can thus
provide the context that serves as a powerful constraint upon the processing
of subsequent forms, priming their conscious interpretations in these fash-
ions. Metalinguistic information provides Scott Kelso's (2002) slightest nudge
that is enough to put the system into a new coordinated state. Metalinguistic
information connects with implicit learning, and they meet and interact in pro-
cessing. It is a dynamic interface.
Several evaluation studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of process-
ing instruction in the development of L2 comprehension and production (Van-
Patten, 2002). More broadly, a meta-analysis of 25 explicit form-focused
treatments from a wide variety of studies with interventions, including con-
sciousness raising, input processing, compound focus on form, metalinguistic
task essentialness, and rule-oriented focus on form, demonstrated an average
effect size of these various treatments in excess of 1.2 (Norris & Ortega, 2000).
More generally still, the same meta-analysis demonstrated average effect sizes
in excess of 1.0 for 69 different explicit instructional treatments, whether they
involved focus on form or more traditional focus on forms. It is true that

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326 Nick C. Ellis

explicit instructi
themselves more
form-focused inst
production measu
R. Ellis (2002) con
implicit learning.
tion using outcom
implicit knowledg
dence to date is i
being focused on
scious processing

Perseveration:

Transfer and LI e
In general, a soun
in a language is m
ers of a language
boundary (Repp
effects are found
LI; these phenome
inger, 1994). The
ing is one of plas
optimal represen
exposed. Infants
contrasts of every
can only distingui
& Tees, 1984). In c
the neural stuff f
might be example
LI English langua
Japanese speaker.
perceive /r/ and
vated on each hea
various function
ings, their link to
or wrongly. The p
or attractors, dist
seem more similar
Under normal LI
to the input. A sa
fer is that more i
deeper into the h

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Explicit-Implicit Interface 327

Exaggerated Stimuli and Noticing,

and Adaptive Training

The pedagogical innovations that have be

ers to overcome such negative transfer
ural words, giving listeners words spoke
immediate feedback as to the correct wo
less learning techniques where discrimin
sively more difficult. The use of exag
(McClelland, Fiez, & McCandliss, 2002), li
generally, ensures that subsequent respo
contrast rather than leading the learner
confusion (Baddeley, 1992; Baddeley &
sciousness is needed to change behavior.
sus "lock" are made more exaggerated by
the normal range until L2 learners can co
start by noticing these discernible po
are correctly identified - the discrimina
such exaggerated stimuli and adaptive tr
the use of difficult stimuli with no adap
benefit (McCandliss, Fiez, Protopapas,
land, 2001). If the distinction is not bro
ness, our zombie agents are beyond our
processing the stimuli in the same old L
LI learning. At this point, the implicit
mally tuned that it quickly, autonomousl
priate interpretation of a stimulus w
elsewhere. However, if that same form o
then this automatization is the bane of S
ing mechanisms can cope with a new int
do differently.7 The only hope for chang
The instructional techniques mentioned
eral principle of explicit learning in SLA:
on in their language processing changes
tune. Krashen's (1985) noninterface inpu
ing to the exclusion of all else (Krashen,
input processing hypothesis focused exc
face (DeKeyser, Salaberry, Robinson, & H

4. WHEN YOU TRY TO SAY SOMETHING

BUT DON'T KNOW HOW

If you do not already know how to say something, then you bring to min
whatever explicit knowledge that you can that is relevant to the problem. Th
section considers various conscious processes of construction. Explicit mem

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 328 Nick C. Ellis

oríes are used as s

ing memory. Form
of construction in
ing memory. Dril
declarative statem
scious constructi
saying it to yours
rized utterance or
desired construc
tive knowledge c
processes and the
into implicit learn
steps can become
orized as a form
memory and inte
ways detailed in
Alternatively, if
focused feedback
of expression. "N
their actions, an
present learners w
because - in the contrast between their own erroneous utterance and the
recast- they highlight the relevant element of form at the same time as the
desired meaning-to-be-expressed is still active, and the language learner is again
engaged in the processes of focused input analysis described in Section 3. As
we will see in Section 5, the longer the delay between a cue and its outcome,
the less likely their association is to be learned and the more working mem-
ory is required for successful acquisition.
Another scope for explicit learning involves explicit memories as objects of
scrutiny for later analysis. Formulas, originally explicitly learned as whole con-
structions, can be differentiated at a later stage, when the learner has also
acquired some of the relevant component building blocks, only then realizing
that these wholes might indeed be dissected into their component parts. Con-
scious phonological rehearsal of an utterance can also provide a data source
that evidences noncontiguous associations, discontinuous dependencies that -
although out of the scope of implicit learning- can nevertheless be conjoined.
Equally, memorized expressions might serve as fodder for hypothesis forma-
tion - for example, by providing negative evidence that can constrain hypoth-
esis space and reign in overly general grammars. This range of mechanisms,
each briefly reviewed subsequently, supports an output hypothesis as well.

Creative Construction in Working Memory

The Conscious Use of Exemplars as Analogies. Let us assess your explicit

ability to construct a novel utterance in Welsh. Your task is to fill in the miss-
ing cell in Table 1.

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Explicit-Implicit Interface 329

Table 1. Some Welsh utterances and th

English phrase Welsh phrase English noun Welsh noun

I have a headache Mae gen i gur pen Headache Cur pen

I have a car Mae gen i gar Car Car
I have a cat ? Cat Cath

I will warrant that you

tern for possession, and
ries. And fu is the result
so, you managed it using
You took some known fo
noted the relational struc
and applied that change
ative construction. The m
have in common, the mo
connectionist mechani
learner must have an exp
ships between the struc
respondence in surface
reasoning are involved.8
scious involvement is n
(Baars, 1997a). The essen
solar system as a model o
of parallel roles in relati
ence is developing soph
Markman, 1997; Gentn
stadter & Mitchell, 1994)
analogy in linguistic co
Skousen, Lonsdale, & Pa
also realizing learners' e
tory viability of this pr
tion as well as form are
Tomasello, 2003; Verhage
Thus, explicit memori
building of novel linguis
soning and conceptual b
ing and the resources of
the more likely it is to
observe their own think
an account of why they c
for a particular analog
assessments of their und
solving problems (Chi, B
& Chi, 1992).

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330 Nick C. Ellis

The Conscious U
Declarative Know
ferred style of le
tion of drills, con
or other metalin
metalinguistic kn
the implicit fluen
or when (as descr
output. Then, the
tional support for
(Poulisse, 1990; P
classes provide th
spect upon my c
mensa mensae m
reaction time re
tions that deman
these labored cons
system? As we wi
ing, and the devel
my continued us
interface is by no
Even if the learn
ful utterance-buil
fact that they n
want to say. The
these forms in su
esis formation an
sources (Swain &

Monitoring

Learners can mon

can remind them
proposed a limited
that comes into
acquired system
the utterance if
when it's an ee so
This use of metali
what Baars (1997
control function
paigns to persuade
over the long term
ing, intending th

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 Explicit-Implicit Interface 331

automatic habit. By consciously relating s

can help to make it conscious more oft
of successful adaptation. Health psycholog
ioral change - the challenge of making ex
habits. They share similar difficulties, to
be very resistant to change.
It is worth emphasizing again that - of
tions do not impact implicit language know
and they are stored in different parts
1994). However, metalinguistic descriptio
come to consciousness at the appropriat
ing of a language form and its correspo
guage knowledge. The issues of transfe
2002; Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977;
memory (Baddeley, 1997), and the main
ior modifications (Kazdin, 2000) apply to
of prior explicit language instruction (Seg
Learners' own productions can also rem
correct productions from native speakers
norms to be identified, which is why *re
first place. The result can be an immediat
then entering into the implicit learning
his or her production of this form tends
ging for caution and attentive processing
1989) described his perceptual loop theory
tion and monitoring of prearticulatory o
neous LI production. Research on L2 sel
of LI and L2 monitoring and self-repair be
ogous patterns of distribution, detectio
isse, 1999). Nevertheless, a lack of automa
attention available for L2 error detection
that there are fewer relevant correct exe
these come less readily and less accurately
on the context and stage of learning, a L
quality and quantity of explicit declarativ
to bear compared to a native speaker. Kor
described these processes of monitoring a

Feedback, Recasts, and Negative Evidence

In the same way that communication partners help our receptive learning of
"gavagous" new constructions, so they can scaffold our productive enter-
prises as well. If the output is flawed, a helpful NS will provide focused feed-
back by way of recasts that illustrate more appropriate forms of expression.

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332 Nick C. Ellis

A recast presents
for acquisition b
ous utterance and
at the same tim
(Doughty, 2001; D
Interaction in wh
nication problem
nects input, inte
output in product
in their words an
initiated, with co
cussions (Gass, 19
In these ways, S
attention by some
and that recruits
in a conscious tens
guage productions
or metalinguistic)
recasts are effec
dynamic system.
recasts unless the
necessarily attend
2002). However, o
Kelso, 2002) that
Heraclitus charact
sition, and all are
lectic (N. Ellis, 20

Integration fro
Chunking, and

Thus, by various
construct an utte
here as it does w
theory of explicit
guage performan
explicit knowledg
ances results in fl
ances themselves
consciously constr
mation, the learn
quickly next time
cally. Thus, consc
matic, zombie sen

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 Explicit-Implicit Interface 333

Note that there are four different eff

The first effect is improved access: We
ative memories as a result of practice.
the second result of practice: We link
the same sequence. These two effects all
stages of explicit construction in the s
calling and executing the different proce
tice, in the same way that a novice cook
mel sauce from a recipe; the stages are t
more readily, and the progression throu
ing different conscious procedures a litt
an automatization of explicit knowled
Thus, fluency is not necessarily evidenc
ency might reflect speeded-up contro
50-53). The third effect is chunking:
sequences become more strongly bound
structed message itself will get chunked
the utterance into an entrenched formu
up from memory the next time it is r
N. Ellis (1996, 2002a) described the way
tion lead to the consolidation of memori
atization is a result of practice: With suf
production is executed swiftly and witho
chef can make a sauce without thinking a
at the same time. Production is automat
control, when it occurs ballistically, and
ing of something else. Segalowitz and
temporal criteria that differentiate spee
Anderson's (1983, 1992, 1996) ACT mode
ative to procedural knowledge as three b
a declarative description of the proce
where the learner works on productions
autonomous stage, where execution o
matic. McLaughlin (1987) described proce
novice's slow and halting production b
struction in working memory to fluent
programs and routines being executed sw
(1992) described Logan's (1988) instance
relates to SLA, and Towell and Hawkin
Segalowitz (1993), and DeKeyser (2001
automatization.

So how do you say "I have a cat?" in Welsh again? Every permutation of
proceduralization, automatization, and memorization is possible, as it is in
the math classroom (3 x 4X: 3.. + 3.. + 3.. + 3.. = 12. Next time 3 x 42: 3 + 3 +
3 + 3 = 12, with faster counting and realization of the stages. Next time 3 x

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334 Nick C. Ellis

43 = 12), so it is i
mensae mensae me
mensa mensae me
amat mensam . .
evidence of these d
your having a tabb

Differentiation

Another scope fo
scrutiny for later
tions. Only later, w
ponent building b
indeed be dissecte
not just rely on in
ation leading to a r
McLaughlin, 1990
tallying and distri
tions come first f

Explicit Analys
Short-Term Mem

Implicit learning i
ciations between c
in parsing. It is g
(N. Ellis, 2002a; He
ments, associations
cession require mo
they can be acqui
vided evidence tha
dencies in language
the surface eviden
rehearsal in the p
which allowed scr
and Keele (1990) a
sequences can be a
ous sequences req
(1997) demonstrat
lesser complexity
guages. However,
order dependencies
but new surface fe
resources and slave

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Explicit-Implicit Interface 335

Working Memory and Awareness

Beyond the Here-and-Now

This notion that implicit learning is l

involving spatially and temporally con
"here-and-nowness" of implicit learning
analysis of associations across longer
traction requires the resources of work
ate a tone with an immediate shock a
follows a while (18 seconds) afterward. H
at random in the gloomy cage during th
ing to the delayed shock is much weake
from attending to the relationship betw
tion does not, however, affect the stren
immediately follows the tone, suggestin
less working memory than do discontin
Humans show a similar involvement of
associative learning across time and d
here as well: Clark and Squire (1998) test
iments where one sound- say a pure
signaled a puff of air into their eye,
noise) was never followed by this aversi
air puff followed the conditioned stimu
eye blink conditioning (blinking befo
whether or not they were consciously
describe them. They showed this implic
tion in dual-task experiments, where th
bers or monitor a movie at the same
stimulus followed the conditioned stimu
distracting task interfered with learnin
ditioning could describe the relations
unconditioned stimulus (e.g., "The tone
hiss was not."), but those who did not c
discontinuous associations are to be l
resources of working memory to attend
be aware of the relation between them.
discrete events to be brought together
ness, and consolidated into an explicit m

Overly General Grammars and Pr

Implicit learning mechanisms and their

ularities from exemplars and are able
items and are thus able to successfully p
of language are only quasi-regular; th

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336 Nick C. Ellis

terns. Much of the

regular domain of
same system can m
exemplars of like
gence of defaults. O
petition (MacWhin
frequency pattern
frequency pattern
preemption (if the
communicative fu
struction preemp
Leinbach, Taraban
models, provided t
quency (Brooks, T
1991). In these circ
preemption can be
However, sometim
ization applies, wh
dox possible? Some
is an L1-L2 contras
to notice that the
rule. Consider adve
cannot intervene b
White (1991) demo
sibilities of adverb
(A) Verb (V) Object
the learners she te
coffee") to be a po
cal classroom instr
feedback came to r
whereas a control
If the natural in
cation of a regula
negative feedback
generalization. It
nisms of monitori
of correct product
system can be retu
viously with regar
can be very slow.

Output Processi

The comprehensib
posed that in add

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Explicit-Implicit Interface 337

contributes to L2 acquisition because le

prehensible if obliged to do so by the dem
Panova & Lyster, 2002). The present anal
as learners try to produce comprehensib
struction described in Section 4 poten
ment of accuracy and fluency (De Bot, 1
The balance of experimental findings s
encouraging learners to produce outp
rized the results of six studies from bef
ski, 1996, and Salaberry, 1997) that invo
by output practice and that demonstrate
1.39. Izumi, Bigelow, Fujiwara, and Fearn
for reconstruction in a pushed output ta
relevant aspects of linguistic form and t
learning in relation to those forms. DeK
results of more recent studies (Allen, 20
tine, 1998; Farley, 2001), all of which
ments promoted learners to significant
subjunctive, acquisition of Spanish copul
the Italian future tense, and acquisition
Shea, Tracy, and Wa-Mbaleka (in press) r
of studies of the effects of interaction o
ple studies in this meta-analysis involv
were required to attempt production o
played the role of information-holders in
tasks. The effects of these treatments
action studies that did not provide op
involving opportunities for pushed outp
sizes than tasks without pushed outpu
Much more research is needed to get at
together, these studies provide good rea
explicit knowledge affects implicit learn

5. WORKING MEMORY IN LANGUAGE ACQUISITION

Like any other biological adaptation, consciousness is functional. However,

the power of consciousness is exponential in that its major functions provide
flexible adaptations to novel situations (Baars, 1988, chapter 10). Baars out-
lined nine separate such functions of consciousness, all of which involve work-
ing memory as the theater of consciousness. Working memory is like 221b
Baker Street: It is the home of explicit deduction, hypothesis formation, ana-
logical reasoning, prioritization, control, and decision-making. It is where we
develop, apply, and hone our metalinguistic insights into an L2. Working mem-
ory is the system that concentrates across time, controlling attention in the
face of distraction, as illustrated in the experiments by Clark and Squire (1998)

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338 Nick C. Ellis

and Han et al. (20

schedules cognitive
tions that become
what 397 x 27 is, y
work it out. If I as
shop, you again m
the route. When I
a cat," you had to
porary memory r
representations of
ing processing rap
teams to be describ
ter, and colleague
contemporaries) -
nature of human w
prehensive compar
The Canadian wor
man Case, 1981; &
sizes the trade-of
operationalization,
where sentences h
a verbal storage l
magnitude. People
portantly, these i
People with bette
(Daneman & Carpen
Daneman & Merikl
L2 (Harrington & S
Fujii, and Tatsumi
that individual dif
individual differen
scious processing a
The British worki
Baddeley, Gatherc
Baddeley, 1993) co
slave memories (t
more recently - a t
sodic memories ret
2002). There are se
in LI acquisition (
acquisition (N. Ell
tered on the role
and formulaic utte
supports short-t
rehearsal in the p

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 Explicit-Implicit Interface 339

ing its attended scrutiny and analysis

sured by short-term memory span for
good predictor of L2 learning ability (El
To date, there has been too little wo
Atlantic models of working memory a
different aspects of SLA. To my knowle
penter, and Just (1994), which assessed t
span in L2 cue assignment in sentence co
compared nonword span and sentence
guage grammatical induction, Juffs (200
ing, and Mackey et al. (2002), which in
uptake from recasts. There is too little t
als in Sections 3 and 4, we might expect
memory to be differentially involved in
ing. Phonological short-term memory
form- both implicit and explicit- and to
back in the form of recasts. Explicit dec
explicit construction- and its ready acce
ability in conscious creative construction
supervisory attentional system, as tappe
sentence span tasks, should be more asso
analysis of the language that is tempo
loop or episodic buffer as well as in c
analysis already suggests that there are
ferent components in different tasks. Gi
cularity in interpretation and operation
(Canadian working memory tasks always
so ability on language processing tasks
and the interactions of explicit and impli
face as analyzed in this review, it is clea
of the Canadian and British working me
different aspects of language learning w
tems work together: Attention might w
able declarative metalinguistic summa
attention ready for noticing, and all thi
sentation of language form in the phono
ified. Equally, holding a recent uttera
phonological loop provides little explic
analysis.10

6. BALANCED LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES

The facts (a) that implicit and explicit language learning are different, (b) that
they promote different aspects of language proficiency, and (c) that atten

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 340 Nick C. Ellis

tional focus in inp

tunities for the
together, have si
instruction- nam
there must be a b
meaning focused
fluency developm

7. TWO DISSOCIATIONS AND A UNION: CONSCIOUS AND

UNCONSCIOUS LEARNING, WORKING MEMORY,
AND CONNECTIONISM

In this paper, I have distinguished between the mechanisms of conscious and

unconscious learning. I have emphasized the importance of attention an
consciousness in the former and of connectionist learning in the latter. In
synopsis - so oversimplified that I fear it will come back to haunt me - th
sequential motives of learning are novice + externally scaffolded attention ->
internally motivated attention -» explicit learning explicit memory implicit
learning -» implicit memory, automatization, and abstraction = expert. W
carve development into broad stages, and complex systems into rough an
ready departmental separations, just so that we can pin them down and talk
about them. However, the wonder of complex systems- none more wonderful
or more complex than the human mind - is their wholeness. The world in which
we live becomes represented in our minds. Old brain and new brain integrate
into one functional whole (Luria, 1973). Our significant others, peers, and guide
in this world become internalized in our motivations and attentions (Toma
sello, 1999; Vygotsky, 1980). The memes of our culture, transmitted through
language, infect our conscious and unconscious selves (Dawkins, 1976; Den
nett, 1992). Controlled processing tunes our zombie agents. The echoes of our
conscious experience live on in our unconscious. Emergence, dynamism, an
synergy abound (Elman et al., 1996; Holland, 1998; Larsen-Freeman, 199
MacWhinney, 2001b; Scott Kelso, 1997).
So what? Well, I have maintained the functional and anatomical separations
of systems of conscious attended processing and systems of implicit process-
ing. This is usual, as any cognitive psychology or neurobiology text will affirm
However, these implicit and explicit systems are like the yin and the yang. Con
scious and unconscious processes are dynamically involved together in ever
cognitive task and in every learning episode. The input to our connectionis
implicit learning systems comes via unitized explicit representations forged
from prior attended processing. The input to our slave systems in workin
memory comes via the echoes and abstractions of our long-term memorie
we perceive the world through schematic lenses that represent our prior expe
rience of the world. What we attend to is determined by our prior experience
Salience is as much a psychological as a physical property; many affordances

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 Explicit-Implicit Interface 341

are cultural, goal-driven, and emergent. W

tant to us- it is not the things of the wor
of those things. Long-term attentional bi
structions emerge from experience. Shor
the learning of constructions emerge fro
metalinguistic knowledge. There are long-
term memory representations. So, these a
from experience and they can be understo
tional biases emerging during learning an
connectionist systems (Kruschke, 2001; N
ing capacity emerging from network arc
ity of experience, both functionally (M
anatomically (Faw, 2003). On the whole, t
cessing of language is part of the same d

NOTES

1. The Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness was established in 1996 and held
its inaugural conference in 1997.
2. In statistical terms, this is the problem of multicollinearity, as it affects multiple regression.
3. If this does not do the job and you are still at a loss, a helpful interlocutor- if they judge that
your understanding is more important than a break in flow- will often next explain in detail, per-
haps providing an explicit definition.
4. There is no better reasoned a case for the advantages of attended over unattended process-
ing for L2 learning than that of Schmidt (2001). For the various reasons mentioned in Section 1 and
N. Ellis (2002a, 2002b), I believe he seriously underestimated the contributions of implicit learning
in SLA, but nevertheless, I remain convinced of most of his arguments in favor of attended process-
ing. Attention guides our SLA as it guides us through the world. Guthrie (1959) realized the moder-
ating power of attention, modifying his previous behaviorist learning theory to allow for selection,
in his words "What is noticed becomes the stimulus for what is done" (p. 186). Likewise, James
contrasted the traditional philosophical empiricist view of the person as "absolutely passive clay,
upon which 'experience' rains down," with that moderated by attention: "My experience is what I
agree to attend to" (1950, p. 402). For James, attention is the mental action associated with choice
and free will: "each of us literally chooses, by his ways of attending to things, what sort of universe
he shall appear to himself to inhabit" (p. 424, emphasis in original).
5. It is a common enough phenomenon: As 8-year-old Aspen observed, having fallen in love
with a litter of Jack Russell terriers a fortnight earlier, "Once you've noticed them, they seem to be
everywhere." To which 10-year-old Gabe added, "Like those lizards in Malaysia, once you'd seen
one, they were all over the place."
6. This does not mean that repeated noticing might not be beneficial for consolidation, partic-
ularly in cases where the cue is nonsalient, the form is complicated, the meaning is subtle, the
contingency between the two is unreliable, or there is strong competition from LI transfer.
7. Automaticity- the involuntary nature of automatic actions- is a common cause of slips of
action. Analysis of the errors leading to catastrophic accidents shows that many such fatal errors
involve a habitual intrusion, an inadvertent substitution of a highly automatic action for the correct
one (Reason, 1984).
8. This is not to say that connectionist models cannot learn abstract relations - quite the con-
trary (Dienes, Altmann, & Gao, 1999; Elman, 1998; French & Cleeremans, 2002). It is rather that anal-
ogies and broad abstractions, relational parallels that generalize to stimuli instantiated on quite
different stimulus dimensions from those of the training set, are more readily captured by the con-
scious mind. In the language of Jean Piaget (1975), the more we must accommodate to new informa-
tion, the more we need to be consciously involved with it.
9. Of course, "noticing the gap" is not of itself a solution. It is just the beginning orientation, a
recognition that the problem needs to be consciously addressed.

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 342 Nick C. Ellis

10. Williams and Lova

is a determinant of lea
determiners that acco
knowledge of other g
scrutiny in working m
to guide the analysis a

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