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https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-024-10120-0

Disability, Affordances, and the Dogma of Harmony: Socializing the

EE-Model of Disability
Sophie Kikkert1 · Miguel Segundo-Ortin2

Accepted: 18 October 2024

© The Author(s) 2024

Abstract
Recent years have seen increased interest among 4E cognition scholars in physical disability, leading to the development
of the EE-model of disability. This paper contributes to the literature on disability and 4E cognition in three key ways.
First, it examines the relationship between the EE-model and social constructivist views that address the bodily reality
of disablement, highlighting commonalities and distinctions. Second, it critiques the EE-model’s focus on individual
strategies for expanding disabled persons’ affordance landscapes, arguing that disability policy should integrate insights
from both the EE-model and social constructivist approaches. Finally, it assesses the EE-model against the “dogma of
harmony.” We argue that while the EE-model’s focus on active human-environment collaboration is valuable, it can inad-
vertently perpetuate this dogma. We contend that integrating certain social constructivist insights can help the EE-model
avoid the dogma of harmony.

Keywords Disability · Affordances · EE-model of disability · Dogma of harmony

1 Introduction populated by socially shaped affordances (see, e.g., Doku-

maci 2017; 2023; Toro et al. 2020; Silva and Schwab 2024).
In the last years, there has been a growing interest among This paper makes three main contributions to the lit-
4E cognition scholars in physical disability.1 This interest erature on disability and 4E cognition. First, while the
has crystallized in the creation of the EE-model of disability, EE-model of disability has been compared to traditional
a model that emphasizes the individual bodily experience Medical and Social Models of disability, there hasn’t been
of disabled persons as they interact with an environment any discussion of its (in our view more interesting) relation
to recent social constructivist views that aim to do justice to
1
Some authors (Toro et al. 2020; Silva and Schwab 2024) focus spe- the bodily reality of disablement (e.g., Barnes 2016; Jenkins
cifically on motor or ‘movement related’ disabilities, which includes and Webster, 2021). We identify several interesting com-
conditions such as Cerebral Palsy and Parkinson’s Disease. In order monalities and explain where the approaches come apart.
to compare these views to alternative models, we will treat them as
concerning physical disability more broadly. For the purposes of
Second, a key insight of the EE-model of disability is that
this paper, we will set aside the question of whether these accounts disabled individuals do not passively suffer the experienced
can be extended to capture instances of cognitive and psychological tension between their bodily features and their environment,
disability. but actively create or discover new affordances to remove
that tension. While this is an attractive idea, we argue, fol-
lowing our previous analysis, that focusing on individual-
Miguel Segundo-Ortin level strategies to expand disabled persons’ affordance
[email protected]
landscape has important drawbacks too. Instead, we pro-
Sophie Kikkert pose that disability policy ought to combine insights of the
[email protected]
EE-model and the above-mentioned social constructionist
1
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP), approaches.
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, To finish up, we evaluate the EE-model of disability
Germany vis-à-vis the “dogma of harmony” (Aagaard, 2021), which
2
Departamento de Filosofía, Facultad de Filosofía, has been argued to plague the 4E literature. This dogma
Universidad de Murcia, Murcia, Spain

13
 S. Kikkert, M. Segundo-Ortin

manifests as an overly optimistic portrayal of human-envi- to how we design physical spaces and artifacts, what we
ronment interaction, which shows up in a subtle manner in expect others to be able to do, and so on) stemming from
the EE-model of disability. Despite recognizing the model’s a constructed ideal of ‘normal functioning’. Oliver (1996)
focus on disabled individuals’ active search for human- represents this view when he introduces the distinction
environment collaboration as its most valuable contribu- between physical impairment and disability: “it is society
tion to the literature on disability, we argue that the sort of which disables physically impaired people. Disability is
individual-level activism championed by defenders of the something imposed on top of our impairments by the way
EE-model must be accompanied by political actions aimed we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full par-
at attaining long-lasting changes in the social norms that ticipation in society” (p. 22).
dictate what we consider normal bodily functionality. As shown by Barnes (2016; see also Tremain 2002;
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 intro- Jenkins & Webster, 2021), both models face important
duces the EE-model of disability. Section 3 compares the shortcomings, and deliver incorrect verdicts about some
EE-model with two recent social constructivist approaches: paradigmatic examples. A different sort of criticism comes
Barnes’ Solidarity Model (2016), and Jenkins and Web- from defenders of the Ecological-Enactive Model, also
ster’s (2021) Marginalised Functioning Model. Section 4, in referred to as the “EE-model” (Toro et al. 2020; Dokumaci
turn, combines what we consider most valuable of the EE- 2017, 2019, 2023; Vaz et al. 2023; Schwab et al. 2022; Silva
model with insights from Barnes’ and Jenkins and Webster’s and Schwab 2024). According to proponents of this view,
accounts to offer concrete suggestions to improve the lives the Social and Medical models equally overlook the ways
of disabled individuals. We argue that it is by incorporating disabled people experience their own body and the world
the insights of these recent social constructivist models of because of their physical impairments. Thus, the EE-model
disability that the EE-model can avoid falling victim to the is born with the pretension of “doing justice simultaneously
dogma of harmony. to the lived experience of being disabled, and the physiolog-
ical dimensions of disability” (Toro et al. 2020, p. 1). This
model, it is argued, takes into account the valuable insights
2 The Ecological-Enactive Model of offered by the other two models, but cannot be reduced to
Disability them, precisely because it foregrounds the distinctive first-
person perspectives of disabled people. Let us examine this
Traditionally, accounts of physical disability have been model in more detail.
divided into two camps: so-called Medical and Social Approaches united under the umbrella of the EE-model
models of disability (Cureton and Wasserman 2020; Jen- share a common root in the ecological approach to perception
kins & Webster, 2021). The Medical Model (Daniels 1985; and action, originally formulated and developed by James
Buchanan et al. 2000; Boorse 2010) conceptualizes disabil- and Eleanor Gibson (Gibson 1966, 1969, 1979; Gibson and
ity in terms of the dysfunctional limitations of the person’s Pick 2000). The ecological approach (also referred to, more
body. Consequently, this model considers disability to be a generally, as “ecological psychology”) can be described as
“pathological medical condition and something to be “fixed” the combination of four main ideas (see Segundo-Ortin and
or “normalized” by a rehabilitation professional” (Schwab Raja 2024). The first one is that perception is a direct pro-
et al. 2022, p. 1) and calls for “medical treatment aimed at cess, meaning that it is not mediated by unconscious per-
enabling disabled persons to adjust to society” (Toro et al. ceptual inferences and constructive processes happening in
2020, p. 3).2 the brain. According to this view, agents can be perceptually
On the other hand, defenders of the Social Model (Oli- aware of (at least some properties of) the environment by
ver 1996; 2013; Shakespeare and Watson 1997) reject the detecting or “picking up” the perceptual information that
individualistic conception of disability promoted by the non-ambiguously specifies it (Warren 2021; Segundo-Ortin
previous model and conceptualize disability as a socially et al. 2019).
produced phenomenon. According to advocates of this The second idea is that among the properties of the
view, disability is both a social category and the product of environment one can perceive are the affordances. The
a series of oppressive and discriminatory practices (related affordances are the opportunities for action an environ-
ment offers an individual. Importantly, the very notion of
affordance implies a relationship of co-dependence between
2
This description captures the Medical Model as it is most commonly the action-relevant properties of the environment, and the
portrayed. However, a more charitable reconstruction (Koon 2022)
suggests that proponents of this model can coherently hold that the bodily properties, motor abilities, and skills of individuals.
diversity associated with disability is valuable, and that some of the For instance, an inclined surface that is sufficiently extended
harms associated with disability result from a lack of accommodation and rigid (relative to the size and weight of the perceiver)
rather than from bodily dysfunction (p. 3768).

13
Disability, Affordances, and the Dogma of Harmony: Socializing the EE-Model of Disability

will only afford support and locomotion to an agent with the Defenders of the view that perceptual learning is a matter of
necessary strength to climb it. For ecological psychologists, enrichment begin with the assumption that all that perceiv-
then, part of our experience of the environment is given in ers have access to are ambiguous sensory stimuli. There-
terms of possibilities for action. Said differently, we rou- fore, they claim that individuals improve their capacity to
tinely experience the world in relation to what we can and perceive the environment as they acquire new knowledge
cannot do. about the world and become able to make more sophisti-
The empirical evidence collected so far supports both that cated inferences, ultimately resulting in the construction of
individuals perceive affordances over action-neutral proper- a more accurate representation of the external environment.
ties of the environment (e.g., size, height, and so on) and Alternatively, ecological psychologists argue that there is
that such perception is dependent on the action capabilities specific, non-ambiguous information about affordances,
of the perceivers. For example, observers’ perceptions of the and that perception improves as agents get better at finding
point at which a vertical aperture no longer affords passing it. Perceptual learning is thus conceived as the increasing
through (Warren and Whang 1987) vary accurately in situ- capacity of individuals to detect the information that speci-
ations where the body of the observer takes more space – fies the affordances they want to perceive and actualize.
e.g., during pregnancy (Franchak and Adolph 2014), when This process is far from simple. To begin with, it requires
using a wheelchair (Franchak et al. 2012), or while carrying that we educate our attention so that we become able to dif-
hand-held objects (Wagman and Taylor 2005). Likewise, ferentiate and detect the informational properties that spec-
the perception of affordances has been shown to change ify the affordances we are interested in. This education of
as a function of increasing fatigue (see Pijpers et al. 2007) attention is often accompanied by other processes, including
and in individuals with similar bodily features but different the education of intention (Segundo-Ortin 2024), and the
skills (Lee et al. 2012). As Schwab et al. (2022) explain, the re-calibration of perceptual-motor systems due to changes
notion of affordance is very useful for the debate about dis- in bodily dimensions and action capabilities (Fajen 2005).
ability because it “capture[s] the entanglement of the indi- As mentioned above, the ecological approach to per-
vidual-environment in defining the skill-based experiences ception and action is central to the EE-model of disability.
that underlie disability” (p. 3).3 According to Silva and Schwab (2024), when individuals
The third idea is that perception is an active process, with disabilities engage in goal-directed functional activi-
something that individuals do, instead of something that ties, they “often experience disruptions in their fit to the
happens when their sensory receptors get activated. Per- physical and social environments” (p. 298). This “misfit”
ception is active in a dual sense. First, to perceive the appears as an experience of “I cannot,” whereby an affor-
environment’s affordances, we must pay attention to the dance that is easily perceived and actualized by another per-
informational variables that specify them. This is, we must son is perceived as impossible or too difficult to actualize by
look, hear, smell, taste, etc. Second, it is often the case that the disabled person. These experiences, they argue, “have
the informational variables that specify an affordance are a common consequence: A disruption in the experience of
not directly available; rather, the individual must explore the goal-action continuity” (p. 299) which, in turn, is accompa-
environment, moving and grabbing objects, changing per- nied by a perception of the own body as an object and the
spectives, and so on, in order to find it.4 external world as an obstacle.
Finally, consistent with the idea that perception is some- Nonetheless, this “misfit” can often be resolved. These
thing we do, the fourth idea of the ecological approach is resolutions are the focus of attention of Arseli Dokumaci’s
that perception is a skill, meaning that perceivers must learn theory and ethnography (2017, 2019, 2023). According to
how to perceive the relevant affordances. This idea was Dokumaci, disabled people do not remain passive when
fundamentally developed by Eleanor Gibson (1969; E. J. facing obstacles to immediate goal-directed action; instead,
Gibson and Pick 2000). According to her theory, percep- they explore the environment and look for alternative means
tual learning is a matter of differentiation, not enrichment. to reach their goals. In doing so, people with a disability cre-
ate or “enact” their own functional environments, improvis-
3
As we will discuss later, this physical notion of affordance has been ing new uses for known objects or situations: “Rather than
extended to cover opportunities for action created or made salient fitting or misfitting, we retrofit the very same environment
by social norms. These latter affordances are termed “canonical to our emergent bodily states, needs, and singularities; we
affordances”. do not adapt to anything but actively carve out a niche for
4
This idea is captured by James Gibson when he says that the eco- ourselves” (2017, p. 404). Thus, argues Dokumaci, peo-
logical approach “begins with the flowing array of the observer who
walks from one vista to another, moves around an object of interest, ple with a disability often “make up” new affordances for
and can approach it for scrutiny, thus extracting the invariants that attaining their goals, creating new enabling conditions to
underlie the changing perspective structure and seeing the connec- their activities.
tions between hidden and unhidden surfaces” (1979[2015], p. 290).

13
 S. Kikkert, M. Segundo-Ortin

It is important to recognize that this capacity to explore Following this idea, Silva and Schwab (2024; see also
and create new affordances is not exclusive to disabled peo- Schwab et al. 2022) propose a “paradigm shift” in physical
ple. In fact, it is considered an essential component of the therapy practice, which consists of supporting disabled peo-
processes that lead to perceptual learning (see E. J. Gibson ple in the creative process of looking for new affordances:
and Pick 2000). The crucial difference, however, lies both
in the capacity for, and the necessity of, creating these new A physical therapy aligned with this principle would
affordances. To begin with, creating affordances is a press- be defined by interventions designed to assist indi-
ing necessity for the disabled person, for they live in a social viduals with disability (1) to enhance their attunement
environment designed for the able-bodied. Despite this and control over the ensemble of capacities that define
necessity, disabled people encounter serious limitations: their lived bodies and (2) to develop and maintain the
capacities required to achieve their functional goals.
[T]he plenitude of affordances that can be created by a (2024, p. 313)
disease-free, able-bodied person cannot be compared
to the precariousness of the affordances made by a This sort of therapy thus focuses on the first-person perspec-
person with disabilities […] the person is disabled tive of disabled individuals, providing them with opportuni-
because she can live the everyday only in certain ways, ties for exploration and creativity, and fostering agency as
not in a plenitude of possibilities […] the affordances opposed to normalization. In addition, this approach calls
that she makes are the only ones with which she can for including patients in the clinical reasoning processes,
live the everyday. The conceiving of an affordance, in allowing them to take the lead in their own development and
this case, is not a luxury; it is a necessity. Without its reminding therapists that universality in rehabilitation mea-
actualizations, living remains ruptured. This is how sures and outcomes among people should not be expected
affordances made in the experiencing of diseases and or assumed.
disabilities differ from those created in their absence.
(Dokumaci 2017, p. 407)
3 Comparing the EE-model and Social
To sum up, the EE-model proposes that part of what it is Constructionist Approaches
to be disabled is the pervasive experience that the affor-
dances usually perceived and actualized by non-disabled Many recent accounts of disability move away from some
people are insufficient to support goal-directed activities. In of the key principles of the traditional Social Model, while
other words, an essential component of being disabled is retaining the claim that disability is a socially constructed
finding yourself in need of re-negotiating your environment phenomenon. Among them are accounts developed to cor-
and creating new affordances very often, a condition that is rect for the Social Model’s tendency to “sideline the body”
usually accompanied by a feeling of anxiety and discomfort (Jenkins & Webster, 2021, p. 730). A shared concern of
with the external environment and your own body.5 proponents of these accounts is that while social factors
Echoing this view, Toro et al. (2020) go further and clearly contribute to the disadvantages and marginaliza-
define a mode of “pathological embodiment” which some tion that many disabled people face, living with a disability
disabled persons suffer. Pathological embodiment is char- is importantly also a “personal, embodied, and sometimes
acterized by the feeling of being unable to come up with even medical” (Barnes, 2018, p. 1158) experience (see also
different ways of achieving goals and the tendency to avoid Terzi 2004; Jenkins & Webster, 2021; Begon 2020; 2023).
situations of tension: “Instead of being open to exploring In short, although disabilities are not simply dysfunctional
for affordances that allow for the formation of a temporary features of bodies, navigating bodily difference is a central
stable equilibrium with the environment, the person acts to aspect of what it means to be disabled.
limit to the best of their ability, situations in which they are While the EE-model of disability has previously been
unable to respond adequately” (p. 9). Thus, whereas the non- compared to traditional versions of the Medical Model and
pathologically embodied disabled person has the capacity to the Social Model, it would in our view be more valuable to
explore their environment to identify new affordances, this assess it relative to these more recent social constructivist
capacity remains limited for pathologically embodied dis- accounts. In what follows, we consider two such accounts
abled individuals. in particular: Barnes’ Solidarity Model (2016), and Jenkins
and Webster’s Marginalised Functioning Model (2016).
This will allow us, first, to specify the differentiating fea-
5
Likewise, Toro et al. claim that “[a] key part of what disability tures of the EE-model more precisely; and second, to iden-
means for a normally embodied person is, we suggest, constantly tify potential avenues to enrich the EE-model.
correcting for this experience of I-cannot” (2020, p. 12).

13
Disability, Affordances, and the Dogma of Harmony: Socializing the EE-Model of Disability

3.1 Barnes’ Solidarity Model Similarly, Silva and Schwab (2024) argue that the Social
Model “lacks constructs to capture how an individual’s
In The Minority Body (2016), Barnes examines what uni- lived experiences are shaped in meaningful ways by bodily
fies individuals with a physical disability. Dissatisfied with impairments” (p.307; see also Crow 1992; Siebers 2001).
the Medical Model, which characterizes disability in terms The strategies employed to overcome this problem by
of biological or statistical bodily abnormality, and with the Barnes on the one hand and by proponents of the EE-model
Social Model, which takes disability to result from social on the other diverge significantly. Whereas Barnes proposes
prejudice towards individuals with ‘non-normal’ bodily there is a set of rules (informing the judgments of the DRM)
features, she advances an ameliorative view. The Solidarity that determines which bodily differences (which may pres-
Model says, roughly, that an individual is physically dis- ent an individual with unique difficulties regardless of social
abled just in case they have a physical condition that the context) are disabilities, proponents of the EE-model high-
Disability Rights Movement (DRM) is promoting justice light shared features of the embodied experience of disabil-
for. On this view, disability is a meaningful social kind, ity. Still, sidelining the body is a concern shared by both
but only because the DRM has made this so. There is noth- approaches.
ing that all and only disabled individuals have in common Likewise, both the Solidarity Model and the EE-model
besides the fact that they stand in the right relation (i.e., a are eager to move away from a view that portrays disability
relation of solidarity) to the DRM. as a passively suffered disadvantage. To do so, each model
Prima facie, Barnes’ project is very different from that of emphasizes an activist feature of disabled lives. The for-
proponents of the EE-model. Yet closer inspection reveals mer focusses on community building and group solidarity,7
some interesting and surprising commonalities. In particu- the latter on individual affordance creation (see especially
lar, Barnes’ concerns about the Social Model, which inform Dokumaci 2019, 2023). Thus, each model in their own way
her positive view, are echoed by proponents of the EE- highlights disabled persons’ active involvement in a “social
model. She leverages two important objections against the process of world-remaking” (Silva and Schwab 2024, p.
Social Model. First, she argues that this model makes dis- 292).
ability into something too far removed from bodily differ- Needless to say, there are many important differences
ence. There is more to being disabled than being treated or between the Solidarity Model and the EE-model. We will
perceived in a certain way. Being disabled is also a matter of highlight just one such difference here. The Solidarity Model
(objectively) having a certain kind of body. Having this kind can be understood as an attempt to explain what unifies all
of body may present someone with unique challenges, irre- and only people with a disability, i.e., what makes disabil-
spective of whether they are (in addition) treated unjustly. ity a genuine (social) kind. Barnes arrives at the (initially
Second, she claims that the Social Model is based on a prob- unintuitive) conclusion that being disabled just is whatever
lematic distinction between impairment and disability. By the DRM is promoting justice for only after rejecting many
defining disability as a particular type of disadvantage that other (initially perhaps more intuitive) criteria for disabil-
results from problematic attitudes towards impairment, the ity. To be precise, Barnes claim is that the rules informing
Social Model portrays it as entirely negative. Conceptual- group solidarity held by the DRM8 are based on a kind of
izing disability as a form of disadvantage is hard to square cluster-concept reasoning. If one’s body has enough of the
with disability pride, i.e., the idea that disability is some- features that the rules specify as relevant (e.g., being viewed
thing to be celebrated.6 as atypical, making ordinary tasks more difficult, and so on),
The first concern is clearly visible in work by propo- then one counts as disabled.
nents of the EE-model. As Toro et al. (2020) point out in In contrast, the EE-model is best understood as high-
their assessment of the Social Model, “the lived experience lighting a significant and overlooked aspect of disability:
disabled people have of the world through their embodi- the individual embodied experience of ‘I cannot’, and the
ment is at best sidelined and ignored” (p. 4, emphasis ours). creative and explorative work that goes into re-shaping
one’s experience of the environment. Its proponents do not
6
claim that this shared experience is what makes disability
Of course, as Begon (2021; 2023) points out, characterizing disabil-
ity as a special kind of disadvantage is compatible with celebrating 7
the diversity associated with impairment. Strictly speaking though, The DRM has not just shaped but created the category ‘disabled
this wouldn’t be a celebration of disability (which is defined as the people’. On Barnes’ view, the fact that people with certain bodies
suffering of some sort of disadvantage or injustice as an effect of count as disabled is itself the result of a creative process of activist
one’s impairment). Impairment is something that warrants pride; organization.
8
disability, on the Social Model, is an injustice to be combatted. As These rules need not be explicitly formulated, nor consciously held
Barnes (p. 26) puts it, on the Social Model, “an ableism-free society by members of the DRM. What matters is that there is a set of rules
is a society without disability”. Many thanks to an anonymous referee which, when everything goes right, informs the DRM’s disability
for inviting us to clarify this. judgments.

13
 S. Kikkert, M. Segundo-Ortin

a genuine kind, but rather aim to offer “a different perspec- with deviation from some biological or statistical norm10,
tive […] that is better placed to do justice to how the body but rather with a diversion from a socio-environmentally
of a disabled person situates them in the world” (Toro et al. created norm or expectation. As Silva and Schwab (2024)
2020, p. 5). It follows that it is in principle open to Barnes put it, being disabled is a matter of lacking certain ‘nor-
to suggest that the lived experience of disability is just one mative’ skills – skills that are scaffolded by a process of
of the features associated with the DRM’s cluster-concept. socialization, and that attune an individual to canonical
Following Barnes view, having this lived experience isn’t affordances (i.e., affordances that most people habitually
the only or most interesting feature that (many) physically realise). Canonical affordances, in turn, are incorporated
disabled persons share. Yet, if someone’s body has enough into our built environment and cultural practices, affecting
other features that the DRM’s rules specify as relevant, then “the shape of stairs, sidewalks with high curbs, and the tim-
they are disabled. We won’t explore this suggestion further, ing of stoplights” (p. 295).
but instead conclude that the two approaches, though very Crucially, both Jenkins and Webster and proponents of
different in their focus, are not necessarily incompatible. the EE-model stress that ‘non-normal’ ways of functioning
The main disagreement between Barnes and proponents of (or of completing tasks) are not inherently defective. Rather,
the EE-model can be construed as concerning the relative some ways of functioning and interacting with the environ-
importance of different aspects of the nature of disability: ment are normalized, others marginalized. However, where
should we focus, first and foremost, on the relations that the Marginalised Functioning Model accentuates an objec-
obtain among members of a community, or on individual tive (i.e., third-person perspective) misfit between disabled
people’s lived experience? bodies and environments moulded by expectations regard-
ing normal functioning, the EE-model is concerned with the
3.2 The Marginalised Functioning Model embodied experience of a misfit. According to proponents
of the latter model, the fact that there are no readily avail-
A second social constructionist model that aims to do justice able affordances doesn’t entail that body-environment col-
to the bodily reality of living with a disability is Jenkins laboration is ultimately impossible. As we argue in Sect. 4,
and Webster’s (2021) Marginalised Functioning Model. this optimistic picture has some important drawbacks.
This model emphasizes the relation between disabled indi- A second feature that is common to both the Marginalised
viduals’ bodily capacities and their social environment. As Functioning Model and the EE-model is that disability can-
opposed to Barnes, Jenkins and Webster believe there is a not be understood without reference to a socio-environmen-
criterion other than an individual’s relation to the DRM that tal context. For Jenkins and Webster, disability consists in
is met by all, and only by, disabled people. They propose an individual’s bodily relation to features of an environment
that what unifies disabled individuals is their failure to meet that is structured by our social organization. Correspond-
expectations regarding normal functioning in the society ingly, Nathan and Brown (2018), whose position can be
where they are situated. considered aligned to the EE-model, conceive of disabili-
The authors are concerned specifically with expectations ties as “relational features of organisms embedded in sets of
that serve as defaults for constructing material spaces and environments” (p.7).11 In a similar vein, Silva and Schwab
structuring social interactions. Take the expectation that (2024) claim that normative skills can only be described
human adults can climb stairs. This assumption clearly in reference to the socio-physical environment. Thus, on
informs the architecture of university campuses and office both views, disability is characterized in terms of a relation
buildings, meaning that, in effect, individuals who can- between the individual and their (social) environment.
not climb stairs have marginalised functioning: they lack
the bodily capacities required “to function in ways that are
treated as social defaults” (p. 731) within their society.9 10
Deviation from a ‘statistical norm’ is to be understood here as hav-
Again, this approach shares some interesting features ing a body that is, statistically speaking, abnormal. This approach dif-
with the EE-model. First, like Jenkins and Webster, EE- fers from the norm-based approaches discussed in what follows, which
focus on socially generated rather than merely statistical norms. Some
model advocates point out that disability doesn’t have to do persons whose body is statistically abnormal may nevertheless be able
to meet social expectations and to act on canonical affordances. Think,
for example, of people who are, statistically speaking, abnormally tall.
9
Here is a precise definition: “A subject S has marginalised func- Such individuals may, despite their statistical abnormality, neverthe-
tioning relative to a context C iff (i) there is a set of social norms N, less meet social expectations regarding normal functioning and get
comprising n1, n2,, …, nn, each of which serves as a default for the around as most other people do.
11
purposes of constructing common social environments and structur- They suggest this implies that disability is not a property of the
ing common social interactions in C; and (ii) there is some norm in individual, but since social properties are by definition relational, there
N such that S cannot physically function in a way that satisfies it.” seems to be no problem in saying that disability is a social property of
(p. 738). the individual.

13
Disability, Affordances, and the Dogma of Harmony: Socializing the EE-Model of Disability

Let us now turn to an important respect in which the Mar- the creation of new affordances to temporarily overcome the
ginalised Functioning Model and the EE-model differ. One experience of misfit. As mentioned earlier, this emphasis is
of the most central and interesting aspects of the EE-model sometimes accompanied by the recommendation that physi-
is the idea that there exists a “bi-directional, dynamic rela- cal therapists, physiotherapists and teachers make room for
tion between the disabled body and the environment that is the exploration of new, non-normative ways of performing
implicated” (Silva and Schwab 2024, p. 310). As pointed out relevant tasks.
above, the initial experience of tension due to body-environ- While the EE-model’s portrayal of disabled persons as
ment misfit can often be resolved, as the individual reshapes active participants in a creative process of world-remaking
her relation to the environment to create new enabling con- is decidedly attractive, it has some important limitations
ditions for herself. On the Marginalised Functioning Model, too, especially if the proposed picture is offered as a guide
the individual’s objective incapacity to function in the way to disability policy. Our aim in this section is to show how
their environment demands is much more definitive. There the EE-model of physical disability can be enriched by
is little (besides campaigning for social change) that the incorporating some insights offered by social construction-
individual can do to change this. ist approaches.
This point is closely related to a second difference To begin with, recall Toro et al.’s (2020) distinction
between the models. Whether someone has marginalized between “pathological” and “non-pathological” embodi-
functioning is determined not by their ability to perform ment (p. 6–7). It is important to highlight the distinction’s
tasks they set out to perform, but by whether they can do connection with the sort of activism the model emphasizes.
so in a way that is in line with expectations regarding nor- According to the EE-model, being disabled implies having
mal functioning. Thus, an agent who creatively establishes the experience of “I-cannot” more often than non-disabled
a new, non-normative way to complete a relevant task – per- people. However, most of the time, physically disabled peo-
haps with the help of some type of assistive technology – ple can overcome this feeling of misfit, finding alternative
has marginalized functioning despite finding a way to reach affordances to negotiate the environment and attain their
her goals. Jenkins and Webster stress that, so long as the goals. As explained earlier, a non-pathologically embodied
agent’s way of performing a task is conceptualized as non- disabled agent is “constantly correcting this experience of
normal, or the tools used as special aids, they are at a special I-cannot […] by finding their way to affordances that allow
risk of marginalization. The fact that the agent is “dependent them to temporally form a dynamic stability with the envi-
on accommodations to access and navigate certain social ronment” (Toro et al. 2020, p. 12, emphasis added). This
spaces […] renders them vulnerable” (p. 743). process is often described as a process of “creating” new
In relation to the EE-model, this suggests that ‘impro- affordances and intentionally “carving out” new environ-
vising more habitable worlds’ through the individual enact- ments, thus “transforming the world and its very material-
ment of newly discovered affordances doesn’t necessarily ity” (Dokumaci 2017, p. 393). These affordances are termed
make the disabled person less vulnerable to marginalization. “activist” affordances by Dokumaci (2023), a name that, in
In addition, there is important work to be done in the col- the view of Silva and Schwab, “celebrates the agency of
lective recognition of capacities different than those we are individuals with disability” while “highlight[ing] environ-
currently socialized to develop. This is an important step mental barriers and reveal[ing] more accessible futures for
on the route towards more genuinely inclusive (rather than themselves” (2024, p. 303).
assistive) environments. In sum, the Marginalised Function- One of the EE-model’s strengths is that it recognizes a
ing Model suggests that ultimately, a social-level change in defiant kind of agency in disabled individuals, which has
expectations regarding normal functioning (rather than indi- been neglected by previous medical and constructivist
vidual creative action) is required to rid disabled persons of approaches. However, the model’s primary focus on non-
their vulnerability. pathological forms of physically disabled embodiment may
be its Achilles’ heel at the same time.
To elaborate on this point, it is useful to introduce the
4 Socializing the EE-Model “dogma of harmony”, a notion recently coined by Aagaard
(2021). According to Aagaard, optimism about human-envi-
Having compared the EE-model of disability to contem- ronment collaboration is a common feature of 4E approaches
porary social constructionist approaches, two key charac- to cognition, the general framework from which the EE-
teristics that we explored in § 2 stand out. The first is the model stems: “4E scholars tend to paint an overly idealized
EE-model’s focus on the pervasive experience of a misfit picture of human-technology relations in which all entities
between the disabled body and the environment. The second are presumed to cooperate and collaborate” (p. 2). Notably,
is its emphasis on individual-level activism that consists in Aagaard does not see this dogma as an insurmountable issue

13
 S. Kikkert, M. Segundo-Ortin

for the 4E cognition paradigm but rightly points out that of marginalization.12 This point is further supported by a
defenders of this approach often treat (at least implicitly) the closer look at how social factors affect individual perceptual
empirical hypothesis of human-environment cooperation as learning.13
an a priori assumption. As explained above, the ecological approach conceives of
As things stand, we believe that the dogma rears its head perceptual learning as a process through which individuals
in the EE-model of disability as well. It does so, first, in progressively improve their ability to discriminate the affor-
the model’s pervasive focus on those cases where disabled dances of the environment, thus becoming better adapted to
individuals find ways to overcome the experience of misfit it (see Gibson 1969; E. J. Gibson and Pick 2000). One key
by looking for new ways to achieve their desired goal, and aspect of this learning is the education of attention, which
second, in the emphasis on individual-level activism that refers to the process by which individuals learn to detect the
follows from it. perceptual variables that are specific to the affordances they
It is important to recognize that collaboration is not attain- want to perceive and exploit. Some ecological psychologists
able in all cases, and that serious political work is required have noticed the influence that other members of society
to reduce the risk that instances of pathological embodiment (e.g., caregivers) may have on this process (see, e.g., Reed,
arise. Defenders of the EE-model of disability recognize 1974; Heft, 2017). Accordingly, more expert individuals
that pathological embodiment may be a product of soci- can scaffold the education of attention of novices, providing
ety’s expectations regarding normative embodiment, inso- the right conditions for the latter to learn how to perceive
far as these expectations manifest in the design of common those aspects of the world that are significant for particular
objects, public spaces, and technological aids. Living and tasks and practices.
acting within a social and material reality that wasn’t built The finding that social interactions influence which
to accommodate one’s bodily functioning can have demor- aspects of the environment we attend to is important, since
alizing results and place a significant burden on the disabled it helps explain why disabled individuals often lack read-
person attempting to find new affordances. Thus, we should ily available affordances: the aspects of the world that are
not overlook the possibility that finding new affordances is relevant for them to perform a given task may be differ-
not always possible, and expecting that physically disabled ent from those relevant for others, and, typically, less social
people will be able to do so can be seen as an instance of the guidance in learning to attend to these aspects is available. It
implicit optimism described by Aagaard (2021). also makes clear that the creation of a new affordance does
In addition, it is worth considering Jenkins and Webster’s not necessarily render the individual’s new, private way of
(2021) claim that whether an agent is disabled is indepen- engaging with the environment visible to others. Whether
dent from their capacity to attain their goals. The key factor, it does, depends at least in part on the individual’s social
instead, lies in the fact that they can only do so in ways that position and their ability to pass what they have learned on
are considered non-normative. Elaborating on this view, we to others.
argue that although encouraging physically disabled people Besides the education of attention, we follow Segundo-
to imagine new affordances may improve their day-to-day Ortin (2024; see also Jacobs and Michaels 2007) in empha-
functioning, the wider recognition of the agents’ new capa- sizing the complementary education of intention. The
bilities is perhaps equally important. If the agents’ new way importance of the education of intention becomes evident if
of performing a task is not recognized and valued by other we reflect on how we interact with everyday objects – e.g.,
members of the society, they remain subject to a significant chairs. Although a chair affords many different actions, we
type of disadvantage. The non-normatively skilled person do not perceive all of them simultaneously, as this would be
will continue to be marginalized from various domains of rather overwhelming and inefficient. Instead, we direct our
life (i.e., work, education, leisure) so long as their way of attention to detect the variables relevant to our intentions.
completing a given task is regarded as suboptimal. For example, the information variables specifying whether
Both observations suggest that it is undesirable for indi- we could jump over the chair would be irrelevant if we
vidual performances to be the main site of disability activ- intended to sit on it. Hence, what we intend to achieve deter-
ism. As we see it, lasting change requires a shift in social mines the information we seek and, thus, the affordances we
norms and expectations. It follows that encouraging dis-
12
abled patients to continue to creatively explore their envi- This concern is related to recent claims that architectural and design
ronment when experiencing tension must be accompanied movements aimed at improving the lives of the disabled may in turn
foster (techno-)ableism and exclusion (van Grunsven 2024).
by a broader strategy aimed at transforming what it is con- 13
It is important to note that none of the authors we discuss explicitly
sidered ‘normal’ and ‘expected’, thus reducing the risk claim that individual resistance is the only way to help disabled people
overcome daily challenges. Rather, our concern is that highlighting
and celebrating resistance in the form of individual affordance creation
distracts away from the need for a deeper, structural solution.

13
Disability, Affordances, and the Dogma of Harmony: Socializing the EE-Model of Disability

perceive. This idea is captured by Heft when he claims that expectations that guide a given practice. The second type of
“an affordance is perceived in relation to some intentional strategy aims at making practices more inclusive, to render
act, not only in relation to the body’s physical dimensions” engagement in them accessible for individuals with various
(1989, p. 13). ways of functioning.
Yet, if perception is “controlled by a search for the Advocates of the EE-model recognize the importance of
affordances of the environment” (Gibson 1974[1982], pp. the expectations held by rehabilitation specialists and thera-
387–388), it follows that novices must not only learn how to pists. This is precisely what underlies Silva and Schwab’s
find particular affordances, but also what affordances they (2024) proposed paradigm shift in physical therapy: thera-
should pursue: pists should move away from thinking in terms of optimal
and sub-optimal functioning, and instead accommodate and
[W]hereas the education of attention refers to the indi- encourage the development of alternative ways of function-
vidual’s training to detect the most useful variable for ing that suit the individual patient. But it is insufficiently
the sought affordance, intention is educated when the stressed that this change in social attitudes must ultimately
individual learns what affordances are appropriate to come to extend beyond the physical therapy room. More-
seek and actualize given the situation. (Segundo-Ortin over, getting others (therapists or not) to adjust their expec-
2024, p. 8) tations regarding appropriate ways of functioning calls not
(just) for individually improvised action, but for collectively
So conceived, the education of intention is inherently organized social and political interaction. To emphasize: the
social, since it rests on interacting with others and engaging goal should not merely be to encourage disabled individuals
in communal practices (see also Segundo-Ortin and Satne to create new affordances for themselves, which may not be
2022). Through these interactions, we learn not only which possible in all cases, but to promote the invention and nor-
aspects of the environment are relevant to perceive particu- malisation of new canonical affordances within the wider
lar affordances, but also what affordances we are permitted society.
to (and even expected to) actualize. This education of inten- The relevant political interactions can take various
tion manifests itself both at the reflective, in the form of forms. Disability activism groups (including the DRM,
explicit desires, and pre-reflective level, as “[h]abit-based which Barnes (2016) discusses) play an important role in
preferences for particular actions [and accompanying] atten- coordinating processes to bring about the required shift in
tion habits toward certain specific information” (p. 14; see attitudes. We will not attempt to give a comprehensive over-
also Segundo-Ortin and Heras-Escribano 2021). In sum, we view of all processes that are important to help reduce mar-
come to behave appropriately by learning what affordances ginalization here. In lieu, we list two aspects that we believe
we can exploit and how to find them simultaneously. an adequate response must incorporate.
If intention is educated in the ways described, this further First, it will be important to counter prejudice towards
confirms that serious creative imagination, combined with and stereotypes about people with various disabilities14, in
a willingness to challenge social expectations and a special particular when they serve to justify the individual’s exclu-
kind of confidence is required to engage with one’s envi- sion from a particular domain of life. Practices are unlikely
ronment in non-canonical ways. Especially if disabled indi- to change and become more inclusive if those whom they
viduals are sometimes taught that particular activities are don’t suit are excluded from participation at the outset.
not appropriate for someone like them, or excluded from As a concrete example, consider that disabled people still
participating in communal practices, then engaging in these don’t have the same employment opportunities as others
activities nevertheless is (in a new way) a significant task (Oliver 2004). If many places of employment are unwill-
to shoulder. ing to hire a disabled person to fulfill a particular role, the
Importantly for our purposes, looking at perceptual way in which the work associated with that role is carried
learning in more detail shows how deeply intertwined affor- out is unlikely to change. Relatedly, we must encourage
dance perception and social expectations really are. Which architects and designers to create spaces and artifacts that
affordances are readily available to an individual doesn’t include and are sensitive to various kinds of embodiment
just depend on their body-environment fit, but also on the (van Grunsven 2024). By normalizing the provision of
norms and expectations that guide the everyday activities appropriate spaces and objects for the inclusion of disabled
where they are situated (i.e., how ought these activities be people in all domains of life, we can begin to get rid of the
performed? When is it appropriate to perform them?). A implicit assumption that there is one norm which all bodies
strategy that aims to increase an individual’s range of read-
ily available affordances therefore needn’t just focus on 14
This may involve encouraging accurate portrayals and representa-
individual exploration: it may also focus on changing the tion of people with different kinds of disabilities in popular culture, as
well as educational campaigns.

13
 S. Kikkert, M. Segundo-Ortin

must accommodate, and stop distinguishing between ‘nor- misfitting. In other words, it is the already exploited
mal’ design and ‘adapted’ design. affordances of the environment (and the particular
Second, given that intention and attention are socially forms, shapes, designs, and meanings that have been
educated, inclusive education will be indispensable. Strate- given to them) that create fitting or misfitting. Other-
gies that improve the inclusivity of educational institutions wise, the environment itself if full of possibilities, no
may include promoting practices that help integrate physi- matter how limited and limiting its niches. (2017, p.
cally disabled pupils, where possible, in the mainstream 402-3)
classroom, as well as providing the necessary tools and
support for pupils with diverse (normative and non-norma- However, by focusing especially on non-pathologically
tive) skills. Accommodating disabled pupils further has the embodied disabled individuals, EE-model advocates run
potential to enhance the visibility of non-canonical ways of the risk of portraying human-environment relations in an
performing a task to non-disabled peers, which may help overly optimistic manner, thus falling victim to the dogma
reconfigure attentional and intentional habits more broadly. of harmony. Pathological embodiment may result from
Overall, then, strategies aimed at helping disabled persons socio-material practices that make it hard or impossible for
overcome the persistent experience of body-environment the disabled person to explore and establish her own skilled
misfit would do well to combine insights from the EE-model ways of engaging with the relevant affordances, includ-
and social constructionist approaches. With respect to the ing the canonical affordances that materialize in interac-
EE-model, we ought to take seriously the observation that tion with other people. This is where the insights of recent
disabled agents are constantly engaged in a kind of active social constructionist models of (physical) disability come
and micro-activist resistance, which is required to perform in useful for defenders of the EE-model: serious social and
day-to-day tasks in a society whose norms and practices political work is required to reduce the risk that instances of
are a poor fit. Importantly though, we propose that – as the pathological embodiment arise.
social constructionist teaches us – if the goal is to create Furthermore, it is important to recognize that overcom-
long-lasting change, these instances of micro-activism must ing the experience of a body-environment misfit does not
be accompanied by a deeper, societal shift. In particular, as equate to overcoming marginalization and exclusion. Inso-
the Marginalised Functioning Model implies, they must be far as physically disabled persons are forced to create new
supported by changes in social expectations and norms, and affordances and improvise original ways to navigate their
(in effect) by changes in the norms that ground perceptual environment, they remain at risk of being marginalized.
learning and environmental design. Foregrounding disabled Encouraging disabled individuals to creatively explore the
individuals’ lived experience need not come at the cost of environment’s opportunities must thus be accompanied
neglecting the most valuable insight of the Social Model: by broader social and political strategies to change social
ultimately, combatting the disadvantage that disabled peo- expectations about what it is consider normal and optimal.
ple face requires advances in social justice. In sum, we have argued that the EE-model’s optimism
is best received when tempered by a clear-headed image
of the socio-political reality in which the disabled person’s
5 Concluding Remarks creative search for new affordances takes place. Defenders
of the EE-model have created a new (and welcome) way to
In this paper, we have compared the EE-model of disability think about physical disability, but the approach calls for
with two recent social constructionist approaches: Barnes’ a social twist. To create long-lasting change, instances of
Solidarity Model (2016), which emphasizes the importance micro-activism must be accompanied by a broader societal
of collective activism, and Jenkins and Webster’s (2021) shift, which involves political action aimed at changing
Marginalised Functioning Model, which characterizes dis- social expectations and norms, including the norms that dic-
ability as failing to meet social expectations regarding ‘nor- tate what we consider optimal and sub-optimal in percep-
mal’ functioning. We have argued that the EE-model makes tion and motor skills, perceptual learning, architecture, and
a valuable contribution to the literature, as it emphasizes design.
the political and activist dimension of individuals’ search
for new action opportunities. The view is appealing, in part, Acknowledgements We would like to thank participants in the work-
shop ‘Social Interaction and Social Abilities: Norms, Scripts, and
because it is hopeful. As Dokumaci puts it: Injustices’, where we developed the initial idea for this paper. The
workshop was generously funded by the German Research Foundation
It is not when we encounter the fleshiness of the envi- (DFG), the German Society for Analytical Philosophy (GAP) and the
ronment per se, but when we come up against its cur- DFG-funded Centre for Advanced Studies: ‘Human Abilities’ (Grant
number 409272951). M.S.-O. was supported by a Ramón y Cajal Fel-
rently available niches that we experience fitting or lowship from Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación del Gobierno de

13
Disability, Affordances, and the Dogma of Harmony: Socializing the EE-Model of Disability

España (Award # RYC2021-031242-I) funded by ​M​C​IN ​ ​/A

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