DeFacto Philosophy

SECTIONAL PAPER 1

CIVIL SERVICES MAIN EXAMINATION – 2025

Philosophy

Time Allowed: 3 Hrs. Maximum Marks: 250

INSTRUCTIONS:
All questions are compulsory.
Marks allotted and word limits are indicated for each sub-question.

WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

Q1. All 5 sub-parts × 10 = 50 marks | 150 words each

(a) “I think, therefore I am” – Is Descartes' cogito an act of knowing or

being?

Answer:

Descartes’ dictum “Cogito, ergo sum” (“I think, therefore I am”) is

best understood as an epistemic act—a foundational act of knowing,
not a metaphysical declaration of being.

In Meditations (1641), Descartes subjects all beliefs to radical doubt.

Even the body, senses, and God may deceive—but the act of doubting
affirms a thinking self. This awareness is self-validating and forms the
first indubitable truth. The cogito reveals that one exists as a thinking
substance (res cogitans), not what one is.

It serves as an epistemological anchor: as Arnauld noted, it is clear,

distinct, and non-inferential. While Gilson held that being and thinking
are inseparable, it is thinking that discloses being, not vice versa.

Hence, the cogito is not a metaphysical thesis like Aristotle’s ousia or

Aquinas’ ens per se, but the first principle of Descartes’ rationalist
method—being affirmed through knowing.
(b) Can Leibniz’s pre-established harmony reconcile freedom with
determinism?

Answer:

In Monadology (1714), Leibniz proposes pre-established harmony to

reconcile freedom with determinism. Monads are causally
independent, indivisible substances that unfold by internal principles,
yet remain perfectly synchronized, like clocks set by God. Thus, mind
and body appear coordinated without direct interaction.

Leibniz distinguishes metaphysical necessity—the structure of the best

possible world—from moral necessity, where freedom means acting
from rational inclination, not external compulsion. For him, freedom
lies in rational self-determination, not randomness.

This forms a compatibilist model: the world is deterministic, yet agents

are free if they act autonomously.

Voltaire, in Candide, ridiculed this as naïve optimism, and Kant rejected

divine coordination as the basis of moral autonomy, grounding freedom
in the moral law within.

Yet, Leibniz’s theory offers a sophisticated reconciliation—freedom

as rational agency, embedded in a divinely ordered, harmonious
cosmos.

(c) “To be is to be perceived.” — Evaluate Berkeley’s epistemology in light

of this dictum.

Answer:

“To be is to be perceived” (esse est percipi) captures George

Berkeley’s subjective idealism, developed in A Treatise Concerning the
Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). Rejecting Locke’s
representational realism, Berkeley denies mind-independent matter.
Physical objects are bundles of ideas, existing only when perceived.

To ensure object continuity, Berkeley posits God as the eternal

perceiver, sustaining all perceptions. Thus, reality is mind-dependent,
but not solipsistic, being grounded in the divine mind.
However, his view collapses ontology into epistemology, resolving
metaphysical issues through theological premises. Thomas Reid and
G.E. Moore defend common-sense realism, while Kant posits a
transcendental structure based on a priori forms.

Scientifically, thinkers like Penrose and Hawking affirm a mind-

independent cosmos. Even in quantum theory, observation influences
measurement, not existence.

Thus, Berkeley’s dictum is philosophically provocative but largely

incompatible with scientific realism, and often critiqued for over-
theologizing epistemology.

(d) What does Kant mean by “concepts without intuitions are empty,
intuitions without concepts are blind”?

Answer:

In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Immanuel Kant states: “Concepts

without intuitions are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind,”
highlighting the co-dependence of sensibility and understanding in
knowledge formation.

Intuitions are immediate sense impressions, structured by a priori

forms like space and time. Concepts are categories of the
understanding that organize this data. Without intuitions, concepts lack
empirical content; without concepts, intuitions remain chaotic. Only
their synthetic unity yields valid cognition.

This insight grounds Kant’s transcendental idealism, bridging

rationalism and empiricism by showing that knowledge is actively
constructed, not passively received.

Hegel critiqued Kant’s dualism as rigid, while Husserl emphasized the

intentionality of consciousness. Yet cognitive science affirms Kant:
perception is shaped by mental schemas. Even quantum mechanics
reveals that observation presupposes conceptual frameworks.

Thus, Kant’s dictum remains a foundational insight into human

cognition, where neither experience nor reason alone suffices.
(e) Does Wittgenstein’s concept of language-games eliminate
philosophical problems or dissolve them?

Answer:

In Philosophical Investigations (1953), Wittgenstein’s concept of

language-games shows that meaning arises from use within social
contexts. He argues that philosophical problems emerge when
language is misapplied outside its ordinary contexts.

Rather than eliminate problems through theory, Wittgenstein seeks to

dissolve them by clarifying how language functions in practice. His
method is therapeutic, not system-building—as seen in the private
language argument, which denies purely internal meanings.

Ernest Gellner criticizes this as evasive, while Kripke raises the rule-
following paradox. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty fault him for
neglecting embodied meaning.

In linguistics, Chomsky favors innate grammar over use-based models,

though Lakoff and Pinker support context-sensitive semantics aligned
with Wittgenstein.

Thus, Wittgenstein dissolves pseudo-problems, shifting philosophy

from abstract theorizing to ordinary language clarity, offering not
solutions, but liberation from conceptual confusion.

Q2. (20 + 15 + 15 marks) (300, 225 and 225 words)

(a) Spinoza equates God with Nature. Does this make him an atheist,
pantheist, or something else?

Answer:

In Ethics (1677), Baruch Spinoza equates God with Nature (Deus sive
Natura), claiming that all reality is one infinite, eternal, self-caused
substance—God or Nature. Everything else, including minds and bodies,
are merely modes, or finite expressions, of this singular substance.
Spinoza thus rejects Cartesian dualism and the traditional personal,
transcendent God, proposing instead a God immanent in the rational
structure of the universe.
This radically non-anthropomorphic conception led critics like Pierre
Bayle to accuse him of atheism, since Spinoza denied divine will,
miracles, and moral judgment. Yet he does not deny God’s existence—
he redefines God as the necessary, intelligible order of reality.

Spinoza is often seen as a pantheist, since he holds that nothing exists

outside God, and all beings exist in God. However, his God does not
love, command, or intervene. As Bertrand Russell observed, this is “a
poetic phrase,” while Einstein saw in it a vision of impersonal cosmic
rationality.

Spinoza’s God acts only through necessity, not will, and is known
through natural laws and reason, not revelation. He anticipates rational
immanentism, where God is not a person but being itself—without
purpose, passion, or providence.

Thus, Spinoza is neither an atheist nor a traditional theist. He is best

understood as a rational pantheist, perhaps even a panentheist, who
identifies God with the logical, lawful, self-sustaining unity of Nature.
His God is not a supernatural ruler but a metaphysical principle—a
framework for understanding the world through reason, not devotion.

In doing so, Spinoza offers a revolutionary theological vision,

reconciling scientific necessity with spiritual awe, and remains a
philosophical bridge between metaphysics, ethics, and science.

(b) How does Spinoza’s determinism shape his ethical doctrine of

blessedness?

Answer:

In Ethics, Spinoza’s determinism forms the basis of his ethical system.

He asserts that all things—thoughts, emotions, and actions—follow
with logical necessity from the one infinite substance: God or Nature
(Deus sive Natura). Human freedom, therefore, does not mean uncaused
choice, but the rational understanding of necessity.

This leads to Spinoza’s concept of blessedness (beatitudo), defined not

as moral reward or divine grace, but as a state of enduring joy through
adequate knowledge. The path lies in the intellectual love of God
(amor Dei intellectualis), wherein one transcends passive emotions
(passiones) and cultivates active affects (actiones) guided by reason.
Blessedness, for Spinoza, is not the conquest of fate but its
comprehension. One becomes truly free by understanding—not
resisting—the eternal causal order. This clarity brings ethical liberation,
rooted in acceptance and self-mastery.

Kant critiques this as undermining moral autonomy, and Jacobi equates

it with fatalism. Yet, Spinoza offers an ethics of rational joy, not
resignation—a vision of freedom as intellectual and emotional
transformation.

Ultimately, blessedness is the joy of knowing one’s place within the

necessity of Nature—a form of spiritual freedom achieved through
understanding, not will.

(c) Compare Descartes’ and Spinoza’s views on substance and the self.

Answer:

René Descartes and Baruch Spinoza offer fundamentally opposed

views on substance and the self.

For Descartes, substance is that which exists independently. In

Meditations (1641), he defends substance dualism: reality comprises
two distinct substances—mind (res cogitans) and body (res extensa).
The self is an immaterial, thinking subject, known through the cogito: “I
think, therefore I am.” This self is autonomous and capable of existing
apart from the body. However, Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and
modern neuroscience (Damasio) have challenged the coherence of
mind-body interaction.

In contrast, Spinoza, in Ethics (1677), posits substance monism: only

one substance—God or Nature (Deus sive Natura)—exists. Mind and
body are not substances but attributes of this singular reality. The self is
a finite mode, entirely determined by Nature’s causal order. Freedom
lies not in choice but in the rational understanding of necessity.

Whereas Descartes grounds ethics in free will, Spinoza grounds it in

alignment with reason. Modern science increasingly supports
Spinoza’s integrated view, casting doubt on Cartesian dualism.

In sum, Descartes sees the self as an independent thinking substance;

Spinoza as a determined expression of a unified, rational cosmos—two
visions that continue to shape debates on consciousness, ethics, and
metaphysics.

Q3. (20 + 15 + 15 marks) (300, 225 and 225 words)

(a) Does Hume’s scepticism about causality undermine empirical

science?

Answer:

In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), David Hume

questions the basis of causality, arguing that we never perceive a
necessary connection between events—only a constant conjunction.
When a billiard ball strikes another, we observe succession, not necessity.
Our belief in causation, he claims, arises from habit, not reason or
empirical proof.

This leads to Hume’s problem of induction: the assumption that the

future will resemble the past is psychologically natural but logically
unjustified. Since empirical science generalizes causal laws from
experience, Hume’s scepticism seems to undermine its foundations.
Bertrand Russell noted that science presupposes regularity it cannot
strictly prove.

However, Hume’s critique is diagnostic, not destructive. Kant,

“awakened from his dogmatic slumber,” argued in the Critique of Pure
Reason (1781) that causality is an a priori category—a necessary
condition of experience, not derived from it.

In the 20th century, Karl Popper reframed science around falsifiability,

not inductive certainty. Bayesian inference, developed from Thomas
Bayes, embraces probabilistic reasoning under uncertainty. Judea
Pearl’s causal models and counterfactual logic further formalize
causal inference without relying on metaphysical necessity.

Thus, Hume compels science to shed metaphysical pretensions and

embrace epistemological humility. He shows that science rests not on
certainty, but on inference, pattern recognition, and rational trust in
coherence.
In conclusion, Hume’s scepticism does not undermine empirical
science—it deepens its philosophical maturity. It reveals that science
thrives not on guarantees, but on critical inquiry, provisional belief, and
the rigorous logic of testing—a legacy inseparable from Hume’s radical
empiricism.

(b) What are the implications of Hume’s bundle theory for personal
identity?

Answer:

In A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), David Hume denies the existence

of a unified, enduring self. According to his bundle theory, the self is
merely a collection of fleeting perceptions—thoughts, sensations,
emotions—linked by memory and association, but lacking any
underlying substance.

This has wide-ranging implications. It destabilizes moral and legal

responsibility, since continuity of identity is central to attributing
praise, blame, or punishment. It also undermines doctrines like
immortality or the soul, as there is no persistent subject to survive
death. Hume’s view challenges Locke’s memory theory, which
presupposes the very self it seeks to define. Instead, personal identity
becomes a psychological construct, aligning with cognitive science,
which sees the self as emergent and dynamic, not metaphysical.

Critics include Thomas Reid, who argues this erodes the basis for
accountability, and Immanuel Kant, who claims that unified experience
presupposes a transcendental unity of apperception. Hume also
leaves unresolved the bundle-subject problem—what binds these
discrete perceptions into a coherent stream?

Yet, Hume’s theory anticipates the Buddhist concept of anattā (non-

self) and aligns with neuroscientific models of the self as a brain-
based, fluid process.

Thus, while radical, Hume’s bundle theory forces a rethinking of

selfhood, with enduring impact on ethics, legal theory, and philosophy
of mind.

(c) Can custom, as per Hume, substitute for rational justification?

Answer:
In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), David Hume
argues that custom, not reason, underlies our belief in causality and
inductive inference. We never perceive a necessary connection—only
the constant conjunction of events. For example, we see the sun rise
daily, but our belief that it will rise tomorrow stems not from rational proof,
but from habitual association.

Thus, custom functions as a psychological substitute for rational

justification. Our expectations about the future, though lacking
deductive certainty, arise from repetition and experience. Hume
concedes that such beliefs are not rationally justified in a strict sense,
yet they are practically indispensable.

This introduces moderate scepticism. If custom replaces rationality,

does knowledge lose its normative grounding? Bertrand Russell raised
this concern, while Immanuel Kant, influenced by Hume, argued that
causality is an a priori category, necessary for experience itself.

Nevertheless, Hume’s insight remains profound. It anticipates pragmatic

epistemology (e.g., William James) and aligns with cognitive science,
which sees reasoning as heuristic and associative. David Hartley and
J.S. Mill expanded on his associationism.

In conclusion, while custom lacks rational necessity, Hume reinterprets

belief as a product of natural human psychology, not logic—offering a
naturalized epistemology that remains relevant today.

Q4. (20 + 15 + 15 marks) (300, 225 and 225 words)

(a) “Existence precedes essence.” – Explain Sartre’s redefinition of

human nature.

Answer:

“Existence precedes essence” is the central tenet of Jean-Paul

Sartre’s existentialism, asserting that humans are not born with a fixed
nature or purpose. In a universe without God or intrinsic meaning,
human beings first exist, and only later define themselves through freely
chosen actions. This overturns traditional essentialist views—from
Plato’s forms to Aristotle’s telos—where essence precedes existence.
Sartre claims that humans are radically free, condemned to freedom in a
world devoid of objective values. This freedom entails anguish, because
the individual bears the responsibility of self-definition. Every act
becomes a model for humanity, placing moral weight on our choices. He
contrasts authenticity—owning one’s freedom—with bad faith, where
individuals deny responsibility by appealing to social roles, religion, or
determinism.

However, Sartre’s voluntarism invites critique. Simone de Beauvoir

notes how structures of oppression—gender, class, race—can
constrain freedom. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes embodiment and pre-
reflective experience, challenging Sartre’s abstraction. MacIntyre and
Charles Taylor warn that lacking a shared moral framework may lead to
ethical relativism.

Modern science deepens the challenge. Steven Pinker, Antonio

Damasio, and Robert Sapolsky show that genetics, neural patterns,
and environmental conditioning shape behavior, undermining Sartre’s
notion of continuous, conscious authorship. Cognitive science suggests
much decision-making is non-conscious and automatic.

Yet, Sartre’s redefinition of human nature remains ethically

transformative. It affirms the power of the individual to create meaning
amid uncertainty, to resist conformism, and to pursue authentic
selfhood despite limitations.

In an age of systemic crises and identity flux, Sartre’s vision endures as a

call to moral responsibility, creative freedom, and the dignity of self-
creation.

(b) Compare authenticity in Heidegger’s Being-toward-death with Sartre’s

bad faith.

Answer:

In Being and Time (1927), Martin Heidegger defines authenticity

(Eigentlichkeit) as arising from the individual’s confrontation with Being-
toward-death. Death is the most personal and non-relational
possibility, revealing the finitude of Dasein. Most live inauthentically,
absorbed in das Man—the impersonal norms of society. Authenticity
involves anticipating death and choosing one’s finite possibilities with
existential resolve.
In Being and Nothingness (1943), Jean-Paul Sartre defines bad faith
(mauvaise foi) as self-deception—denying one’s radical freedom by
hiding behind fixed roles. The self is not a substance but a negating
project. Authenticity, for Sartre, means embracing freedom and acting
without appeal to determinism.

Both reject conformity and emphasize reclaiming individual existence.

Yet Heidegger grounds authenticity in mortality, while Sartre anchors
it in freedom and moral responsibility.

Critics offer refinements: Levinas faults Heidegger for ignoring ethical

intersubjectivity; Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty critique Sartre’s
abstract voluntarism, stressing how history, gender, and embodiment
shape agency.

In conclusion, Heidegger views authenticity as owning one’s death; Sartre

as owning one’s freedom. Both redefine subjectivity as self-realization
against social inertia, yet their frameworks benefit from ethical and political
supplementation to fully address the complexities of human existence.

(c) How does existentialism respond to nihilism without invoking God?

Answer;

Existentialism confronts nihilism—the belief that life is meaningless

without God or objective values—by asserting that meaning must be
created, not discovered. Thinkers like Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean-Paul
Sartre, and Albert Camus accept the collapse of traditional metaphysics,
yet refuse despair.

Nietzsche declares “God is dead,” foreseeing cultural nihilism. His

answer is the Übermensch—one who transcends herd morality and
affirms life through self-overcoming. Sartre, in Existentialism is a
Humanism (1946), proclaims that existence precedes essence: humans
are born without fixed nature and must define themselves through
authentic action and free choice. Camus, in The Myth of Sisyphus
(1942), embraces the absurd—the gap between human longing and a
silent universe—but calls for lucid rebellion, living with dignity despite
futility.

Critics like Alasdair MacIntyre warn of moral relativism; Charles Taylor

critiques its atomistic individualism; even Simone de Beauvoir notes
that freedom is shaped by social conditions.
Yet, existentialism offers a radical response: in the absence of divine
authority, it affirms human freedom, responsibility, and the courage to
live meaningfully. Value is not inherited—it is forged through lived
experience, ethical action, and existential resolve.

In confronting nihilism, existentialism transforms absence into

opportunity—making life a project of authentic self-creation.

Q5. All 5 sub-parts × 10 = 50 marks | 150 words each

(a) Can Spinoza’s system accommodate individual freedom?

Answer:

In Ethics, Baruch Spinoza presents a deterministic metaphysics in

which all things—including human actions—follow necessarily from the
nature of the one infinite substance: God or Nature (Deus sive Natura).
This seems to negate individual freedom.

However, Spinoza redefines freedom as acting from the necessity of

one’s own nature, not the capacity to choose otherwise. When guided
by adequate ideas and rational understanding, individuals achieve
intellectual self-determination—freedom through reason, not chance.

This aligns with the Stoic ideal of inner freedom through rational clarity.
In contrast, Leibniz questioned whether Spinoza’s determinism permits
moral responsibility, while Kant argued that freedom requires
autonomy—the power to act otherwise.

Still, Spinoza offers a compelling model of freedom as self-mastery,

where liberation lies in understanding necessity and aligning with it—
a vision of freedom grounded in rational determinism, not volitional
indeterminacy.

(b) How does Hume distinguish between impressions and ideas?

Answer:

In A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), David Hume distinguishes

between impressions and ideas as the two basic kinds of mental
content. Impressions are vivid and forceful experiences—such as
sensations, emotions, and passions—arising through sense perception
or internal feeling. Ideas are fainter copies of these impressions,
occurring in memory or imagination.

Hume’s copy principle states that all ideas, even complex ones, derive
from prior impressions. A “golden mountain”, for example, combines
separate impressions of “gold” and “mountain.” This principle grounds
Hume’s empiricist theory of mind, rejecting innate ideas posited by
Plato, Descartes, and Leibniz.

Thomas Reid criticizes Hume for reducing the mind to passive

reception, ignoring active faculties like judgment. Chomsky and
cognitive science further challenge this view by proposing innate
mental structures.

Nonetheless, Hume’s distinction remains foundational to empiricism,

shaping debates on perception, knowledge, and mental
representation.

(c) What is the significance of the categorical imperative in Kant’s

philosophy?

Answer:

The categorical imperative is central to Immanuel Kant’s moral

philosophy, outlined in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785).
It provides a universal, rational foundation for ethics, independent of
desires or consequences. Unlike hypothetical imperatives, which are
goal-dependent, the categorical imperative commands unconditionally:
“Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that
it should become a universal law.”

A second key formulation—the formula of humanity—requires treating

each person as an end in themselves, never merely as a means, thereby
grounding ethics in autonomy, dignity, and rational will.

Hegel criticized it as overly formalistic, and Schopenhauer for lacking

emotional depth. Yet thinkers like Rawls and Habermas invoke Kant to
defend moral universality and human rights.
The categorical imperative remains a profound articulation of
deontological ethics, asserting that moral law arises from reason, not
inclination or outcome.

(d) Explain Russell’s theory of descriptions and its metaphysical

consequences.

Answer:

In On Denoting (1905), Bertrand Russell proposed the theory of

descriptions to resolve puzzles involving non-referring expressions,
such as “The present King of France is bald.” Rather than treating
descriptions as names, he reformulates them into quantified logical
structures: “There exists one and only one present King of France, and
he is bald.” Since the existence clause is false, the entire statement is
false—without assuming the subject exists.

This avoids ontological commitment to non-existent entities,

countering Meinong’s claim that unreal objects possess subsistence.
Russell’s theory underscores the distinction between grammatical form
and logical form, promoting logical clarity and ontological parsimony.

P.F. Strawson criticized it for ignoring presupposition failure, while

Keith Donnellan challenged its uniform treatment of descriptions via the
referential–attributive distinction.

Still, Russell’s theory remains foundational in analytic philosophy,

showing how linguistic analysis can dissolve metaphysical confusion
and clarify what exists.

(e) What is the role of grammar in dissolving philosophical puzzles

according to later Wittgenstein?

Answer:

In Philosophical Investigations (1953), Ludwig Wittgenstein argues that

many philosophical puzzles arise from grammatical misuse—treating
words outside their language-games. Terms like “mind,” “pain,” or
“meaning” become confusing when abstracted from their ordinary use.
For Wittgenstein, grammar refers to the implicit rules governing
meaningful language. Meaning is use, and when this use is ignored, we
fall into linguistic illusions, mistaking them for metaphysical problems.

Philosophy’s task, then, is not to solve but to dissolve problems by

clarifying language. It shifts from theory-building to conceptual
therapy, exposing category mistakes and restoring linguistic order.

Ernest Gellner criticized this as linguistic minimalism, and Saul Kripke

questioned whether grammar alone explains normativity in rule-
following.

Yet, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy profoundly altered the discipline,

showing that many philosophical confusions arise from misunderstood
grammar, not from ontological mysteries.