PART 2 [85]

OF COMMONWEALTH

CHAPTER XVII
OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION OF
A COMMONWEALTH*

1. THE final cause, end, or design of men, (who naturally love The end of
liberty, and dominion over others,) in the introduction of that re- commonealh,
straint upon themselves, (in which we see them live in common- Parcularsecurily.:
wealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and ofa more
contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from
that miserable condition of war, which is necessarily consequent (as
hath been shown, chapter xIt) to the natural passions of men, when
there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear
of punishment to the performance of their covenants, and obser
vation of those laws of nature set down in the fourteenth and
fifteenth chapters.
2. For the laws of nature (as justice,equity, modesty, mercy, and (in Which is not
sum) doing to others, as Pe Dould be done to,) of themselves, without from
to be the
hadlap
the terror of some power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary of nature:
to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge,
and the like. And covenants, without the sword, are but words, and
of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the
laws of nature (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will
to keep them, when he can do it safely) if there be no power erected,
or not great enough for our security; every man will, and may
lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all
other men. And in all places, where men have lived by small fam
ilies, to rob and spoil one another, has been a trade, and so far from
being reputed against the law of nature, that the greater spoils they
gained, the greater was their honour;* and men observed no other
laws therein, but the laws of honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty,
leaving to men their lives, and instruments of husbandry. And as
small families did then; so now do cities and kingdoms which are but
greater faräiles (tor their wn security) enlarge their dominions,
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 PART 2 OF COMMONWEALTH

upon all pretences of danger, and fear of invasion, or assistance that

may be given to invaders, and endeavour as much as they can, to
subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open force, and secret arts,
for want of other caution, justly; and are remembered for it in after
ages with honour.
Nor from lhe 3. Nor is it the joining together of a small number of men, that
conjunction of gives them this security; because in small numbers, small additions
a fep men or
families: on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great,
[86] as is sufficient to carry the victory; and therefore gives encourage
ment to an invasion. The multitude sufficient to confide in for our
security, is not determined by any certain number, but by compari
son with the enemy we fear; and is then sufficient, when the odds of
the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to deter
mine the event of war, as to move him to attempt.
Nor from a 4. And be there never so great a multitude; yet if their actions be
great directed according to their particular judgments, and particular
multitude,
unless appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection,
directed by neither against a common enemy, nor against the injuries of one
one judgment. another. For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use
and application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one
another; and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to nothing:
whereby they are easily, not only subdued by a very few that agree
together; but also when there is no common enemy, they make war
upon cach other, for their particular interests. For if we could
suppose a great multitude of men to consent in the observation of
justice, and other laws of nature, without a common power to keep
them all in awe; we might as well suppose all mankind to do the
same; and then there neither would be, nor need to be any civil
government, or commonwealth at all; because there would be peace
without subjection.
And that 5. Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should
continually. last allthe time of their life, that they be governed, and directed
by one judgment, for a limited time; as in one battle, or one war.
For though they obtain a victory by their unanimous endeavour
against a foreign enemy; yet afterwards, when either they have no
common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by
another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference
of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a war amongst
themselves.

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 OF COMMONWEALTH CHAP. I7
6. It is true, that certain living creatures, as bees, and ants, live Why certain
sociably one with another, (which are therefore by Aristotle num- creatwes
Dithout
bered* amongst political creatures;) and yet have no other direction, reason, or
than their particular judgments and appetites; nor speech, whereby speck, do
one of them can signify toanother, what he thinks expedient for the neertheless
common benefit: and therefore some man may perhaps desire to live in
know, why mankind cannot do the same. To which I answer, sociely,
7. First, that men are continually in competition for honour and cOercive
dignity, which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst poper.
men there ariseth on that ground, envy and hatred, and finally war;
but amongst these not so.
8. Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the common good
differeth not from the private; and being by nature inclined to their
private, they procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose
joy consisteth in comparing himself with other men, can relish
nothing but what is eminent.
9. Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of
reason, do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration
of their common business: whereas amongst men, there are very [87]
many, that think themselves wiser, and abler to govern the public,
better than the rest; and these strive to reform and innovate, one this
way, another that way; and thereby bring it into distraction and civil
war.

10. Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of
voice, in making known to one another their desires, and other
affections; yet they want that art of words, by which some men can
represent to others, that which is good, in the likeness of evil; and
evil, in the likeness of good; and augment, or diminish the apparent
greatness of good and evil; discontenting men, and troubling their
peace at their pleasure.
11. Fifthly, irrational creatures cannot distinguish between in
jury, and damage; and therefore as long as they be at case, they are
not offended with their fellows: whereas man is then most trouble
some, when he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his
wisdom, and control the actions of them that govern the common
wealth.
12. Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is natural; that of
men, is by covenant only, which artificial: and therefore it is no
wonder if there be somewhat else required (besides covenant) to

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 PART 2 OF COMMONWEALTH

make their agreement constant and lasting; which is a common

power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the
common benefit.
The 13. "The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able
generalion
to defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of
ofa one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their
commonDealth.
own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish
themselves and live contentedly; is, to confer all their power and
strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may
reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will: which is
as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear
their person; and every one to own, and acknowledge himself to be
author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person, shall act, or
cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace
and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will,
and their judgments, to his judgment. This is more than consent, or
concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person,
made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as
if every man should say to every man, I authorize and give up my
right ofgoverning myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this
condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his
actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one
person, is called a cOMMONWEALTH, in Latin cVITAS. This is the
generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more rever
ently) of that Mortal God, to which we owe under the Immortal God,
our peace and defence. For by this authority, given him by every
[88] particular man in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much
power and strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is
enabled to conform* the wills of them all, to peace at home, and
mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the
The essence of the commonwealth; which (to define it,) is one person, of
definition ofa phose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one pith another,
commonpealth.
have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the
strength and means of them al, as he shall think expedient, for their
peace and common defence.
Sovereign, 14. And he that carrieth this person, is called sOVEREIGN, and said
and subjecl, to have sovereign power, and every one besides, his SUBJECT.
what.
15. The attaining to this sovereign power, is by two ways. One,
by natural force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit
themselves, and their children to his government, as being able to
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 OF COMMONWEALTH CHAP. I8

destroy them if they refuse; or by war subdueth his enemies to his

will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other, is when
men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some man, or assembly
of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against
all others. This latter, may be called a political commonwealth, or
commonwealth by institution; and the former, a commonwealth by
acquisition. And first, I shall speak of a commonwealth by institu
tion.