CONTENTS

SYSTEMS SUMMARIES

1. General
2. Air Systems
3. Anti-Ice, Rain
4. Automatic Flight
5. Communications
6. Electrical
7. a. Engines (GE)
b. Engines (RR)
c. APU
8. Fire Protection
9. Flight Controls
10. Flight Instruments, Displays
11. Flight Management, Navigation
12. Fuel
13. Hydraulics
14. Landing Gear
15. Warning Systems

© Hales - Last Update: FCOM Rev 47 - 5 June 2014 Title

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1. General

Note: This section is highly abridged, based on likely Tech Exam questions only.

Dimensions: Span is always most limiting, not Nose-Tail length.

Length: -200’s 63.8m; -300’s  73.9m

Wing span: RR  60.9m; GE  64.8m
Tail Ht: All Pax  18.6m 777F  18.8m
Min Pavement Width 180°: -200s  48.0m -300’s  56.5m.

Other Ground Handling Particulars:

ICAO Aerodrome Reference Code: 4E (LiDo GEN ADR 5.1.1 & 5.1.3)
FAA Airplane Design Group: V (LiDo GEN ADR 5.1.2 & 5.1.3)

Main gear track width: 11m (NB: no taxiway width limits are published)

Width between pods: 22m (with roughly 1m gap beneath GEs)

Wheelbase: 25.9m (-200s); 31.1m (-300s)
Min Nose clearance for turn away from object: 12.2m (-200s); 8.8m (-300s)

Signs and Lighting:

 Fasten Seat Belt & Return to Seat:
o AUTO – Fasten Seat Belt and Return to Seat will auto-illuminate whenever…….
 Ac Altitude < 10000ft.
 Landing Gear not up and locked.
 Flap Handle not UP.
o Regardless of Switch Position – Fasten Seat belts will always illuminate (but Return to Seat will
extinguish) whenever Pax O2 is deployed.

 Storm Light: Storm light - ON overrides normal controls and sets following lights at max……..
o All illuminated indicator lights.
o Glareshield flood lights.
o Instrument panel flood lights.
o Aisle stand flood lights.
o Dome lights.
o It does not affect display brightness settings.

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 External Lights:
o Landing Lights: Can be illuminated with gear up or down, except……
 Nose light (optimised for approach) will not illuminate with gear retracted.
 Wing root lights (optimised for flare and ground roll) will illuminate at dim level only.
o Camera lights:
 Illuminate when Nose Gear down and locked and BEACON switch is ON
o Taxy Lights:
 Installed on non-steerable portion of nose strut.
 Illuminate when Nose Gear down and locked.
o Runway Turnoff Lights:
 Installed in wing roots and illuminate area in front of main gear.

 Emergency Lighting System: Emergency Lighting System comprises……..

o Dedicated Remote batteries:
 Charged and maintained by aircraft electrical system.
 15mins capacity.
o Escape Slide Emergency Lights: As it says on tin.
o Interior Emergency Lights: Essentially aisle lights to exits.

o Flightdeck Switch:
 OFF - Emergency Lights OFF irrespective of power availability, to avoid battery drain.
 ARMED - Emergency Lights ON if all DC power failed (Both Main DC buses).
 If doors are armed, and door handle is moved to open, emergency lights will illuminate.
 ON - Emergency Lights ON, irrespective of AC power availability.
 EICAS EMERG LIGHTS displayed if…………..
 Emergency Lights switch not in ARMED position, or
 Emergency Lights ARMED, but lights activated by Cabin Emergency Lights Switch.

o Cabin Emergency Lights Switch - Door L1:

 ON - Emergency lights ON, bypassing Flightdeck Switch position. Indicated on flight deck
by EICAS EMERG LIGHTS.
 OFF - Emergency lights controlled by Flightdeck Switch position.

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Oxygen Systems:
 Flt Crew Oxygen:
o Bottled gaseous oxygen.
 Pressure displayed on Status page.
o EICAS CREW OXYGEN LOW  Crew oxygen pressure is low.

 Pax (plus Pax-variant CRC) Oxygen:

o Provided by individual chemical oxygen generators - not gas bottle!
o O2 lasts 22mins.
o Auto deploys at 13500ft cabin altitude, or if PASSENGER OXYGEN switch is ON.
 Once deployed, there is no means of reset
o EICAS PASS OXYGEN ON  Pax oxy system activated (auto or manual).

 777F CRC and Supernumerary Area Oxygen:

o Bottled gaseous oxygen.
 There are no chemical oxygen generators on 777F.
 Pressure displayed on Status page.
o Auto deploys at 13500ft cabin altitude, or if SUPRNMRY OXYGEN switch is ON.
 Oxy can be reset by reselecting SUPRNMRY OXYGEN switch to RESET
o EICAS SUPRNMRY OXYGEN ON  Supernumerary oxy system activated (auto or manual)

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Doors & Windows:

 Limits:
o Do not operate Entry or Cargo doors with
wind at door > 40K.
o Do not keep any door open when gusts
> 65K.

 Doors - Pax Variants:

o 8 x passenger entry doors.
o -300s  2 x additional overwing exits.
o 3 x cargo doors.

 Doors - Freighter:
o 2 x crew entry doors.
o 4 x cargo doors.

 Flight Deck Door – Pax Variants Only:

o Flightdeck Access Panel:
 LED – Door locked or system switched off.
 LED – Correct Emergency Access Code entered.
 LED – Door Unlocked.

o Deadlock incorporated with a key lock:

 Rotate both concentric deadlock levers to horizontal  deadlocks door, key useless.
 Rotate forward deadlock lever only  deadlocks door, but allows key to unlock.

o Normal Access:
 ‘1’, ENT
 Single flight deck chime.

o Emergency Access:
 Entry of correct Emergency Access Code (Refer to CCEM 519) causes….
 Continuous flight deck chime until 30sec timer expires.
 Flashing AUTO UNLK light on centre pedestal until timer expires.
 LED on Access Panel.
 MEMORY ITEM: Flight Deck Door Lock Selector – Rotate to DENY and hold for 1
second  prevents further emergency access for 10 mins.

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 Flight Deck Number Two Window:

o Can be opened in flight provided that……..
 Aircraft unpressurized.
 Speed < VREF+80K.
o Is locked provided that….
 Orange band not visible beneath release button.
 WINDOW NOT CLOSED placard not visible.
 EICAS WINDOWS or EICAS WINDOWS FLIGHT DECK L, R not displayed.

 Passenger Entry Doors:

o 8 x translating, plug-type pax entry doors – equipped with Slide/Rafts.
o -300s only  2 x translating, plug-type overwing exit doors – equipped with Slide only.
o All doors include vent panel connected to door handle.
 To prevent pressurisation to unsafe level if door not fully closed, latched and locked.

o Entry Door Flight Lock:

 Auto-locks door handles when IAS >80K.
 Allows limited handle movement to partially open door vent, but no further.
 Spring-loaded to unlock if power removed / failed.

o Emergency Exit Operation: Placing the mode select lever in the ARMED position………
 Arms the emergency power assist system.
 Engages the girt bar on entry doors.
 Arms the escape slide/rafts.
 Manual inflation handle at base of door frame.

o Overwing Escape Slide:

 Dual lane slide contained in wing-body fairing.
 Manual inflation handle overhead door frame, unlike entry doors.
 Inboard spoilers retract if deployed.
 Must be disarmed for ditching, as not usable as raft.
 Pax must walk along wing to liferafts.
 Wing attachment point outboard of engine pylon.

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2. Air Systems

Relevant Bulletins:
 Nil identified.

Air Supply (ie Pneumatics in MEL): Engine Bleed Valves:

 Armed when Engine Bleeds selected ON and
Bleed Air: Comes from……. open when bleed pressure sufficient.
 Engines:  Bleed valves close: if…….
o LP Stage during high power settings. o During start.
o HP Stage supplemented during descent and o Bleed Source Loss.
low power ops. o Bleed Overtemperature.
 APU: o Bleed Overpressure.
o Up to 22000ft. o Bleed Air Duct Leak.
o Check valves prevent reverse flow. o Engine Fire Switch pulled.
 Ground Air: Check valves prevent reverse flow o Ground Air Supply supplying air.
from ducts to connectors. o They don’t close if a demanding service fails
(such as Air C1/C2), as plenty more still
Is used for…… need the air!
• Air Conditioning.
• Pressurisation.
• WAI & EAI.
• APU & Engine Start.
• Aft Cargo Heat.
• Hydraulics:
o Air Demand C1, C2.
o Reservoir Pressurisation.
• Potable Water Tank pressurisation.
• TAT Probe Aspiration.

Pneumatic Supply - Order of Priority:

 Ground Air
o via Left Wing Duct.
 Engines
 APU
o via Left Body Duct.

Left Pneumatics supplies FD plus Zones A, C, E.

Right pneumatics supplies Zones B, D & F

(Allegedly! Not found in FCOM)

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Air Conditioning System:

Air Conditioning Summary:

 PACKS cool bleed air. Trim Valves add hot (uncooled) bleed air to taste.
 Conditioned bleed air and recirculated cabin air temperature controlled by Cabin Air Conditioning &
Temperature Control System (CACTCS) and provided to:
o Pax: 7 cabin zones only (F/D plus A to F).
o 777F: 6 cabin and cargo zones (F/D, SUPNUM, Upper FWD/AFT, Lower FWD/AFT).

Note 1: F/D (and SUPNUM) receives 100% fresh conditioned air at slight overpressure from left Pack and
Left Bleed Trim.
Note 2: Air exhausted from Pax Cabin (or main cargo deck) is either captured by Upper Recirc sys, or
flows to lower deck. Air from lower deck is either captured by Lower Recirc sys or exhausted overboard
through Outflow valves.

Air Synoptic Golden Rule

 Air flow displayed is generated by displayed valve positions, switch positions, and pack status.
 It does not display actual air flow, therefore the display may not represent actual system operation.

Target Temps displayed when:

• At least one pack is operating, and
• Temperature control not in backup
mode (

Pack Status:
Green Oval – Operating
White Oval – Not operating or
status invalid
Amber, ‘X’ed Oval - Failed

Duct Pressure:
White – 11 psi or greater
Amber - < 11 psi

Valve General Rules:

White circle, bars in line - Open
White circle, bars across duct – Closed
Amber ‘X’ed, bars in line – Failed open
Amber ‘X’ed, bars across – Failed closed-
Empty white circle – Position data unavail.

Exceptions to Rules:
L, C, R ISLN and APU Bleed: Amber ‘X’ed, bars across = Selected Closed.
WAI: Amber ‘X’ed = Not as commanded.

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Air Conditioning Packs:

• Packs COOL bleed air from Engines, APU & Gnd HP Air.
o Output temp based on zone with lowest commanded temperature.
• Duplex controllers, each with duplex control channels.
o Automatic fault and overheat detection with auto shutdown. AIR COND RESET may
reset some faults.
o Flow increased to compensate for high pack demand (eg Single Pack or failed (or
switched off) Recirculation Fan)
o Flow decreased during peak Bleed Air demand, (eg Gear retraction) and for inflight fuel
economy.
• Single or twin pack operation on ground incurs identical fuel consumption.
o Single pack operation more noisy on ground.
• In event of either:
o CACTCS control failure, or
o Total loss of all Engine and APU electrical power………
Pack Flow Control reverts to control by Pressurisation Controllers.
o Pack flow modulated to maintain 5-43°C outlet temp.
o All ECS controls disabled except Pack switches.

• STANDBY COOLING MODE: Happens if……

o [ ] PACK MODE L/R
o STBY COOLING on AIR synoptic.
o If one pack only affected: Pack in STBY mode shuts down at lower alts / high OAT due
to ineffectiveness of STBY mode.
o If both packs affected (or one STBY + one inop): packs operate regardless of alt / OAT.
o See Air Conditioning Non-Normals

The Miniature Air Synoptic is displayed whenever:

• LANDING ALTITUDE – Pulled (Manual)
• Either OUTFLOW VALVE - MAN
• Any parameter Abnormal (Amber) or Excessive (Red)
• AIR synoptic selected
• With following EICAS: [ ] CABIN ALTITUDE
[ ] CABIN ALTITUDE AUTO
[ ] LANDING ALTITUDE
[ ] OUTFLOW VALVE AFT, FWD
Above Normal Excessive

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EQUIP COOLING:
 AUTO: Auto.
 Off: Causes the following.........
Equip Cooling Fans shutdown.
Override Valve Opens.
Fwd Cargo Heat Valve Closed.
Nitro System (NGS) shutdown.
OVRD Illuminated (ie not Off).
 OVRD: Happens if any of ………
Both Cooling Fans failed.
Smoke detected in cooling system.
Off selected.
CARGO FIRE ARM - FWD - ARMED
FLT DECK TEMP:
 AUTO: Auto 18 – 29°C. Mid pos’n 24°C.
 MAN: Spring loaded to 6 o’clock.
C (Cool) closes F/D Trim valves.
W (Warm) opens F/D Trim Valves.
If selected temp unavail to Pack Temp Controller,
last set or 24°C mean cabin temp set instead. AIR COND RESET: If pushed……..
 Attempts to reset any closed Pack or Trim Valve
L/R PACK:
if closed by overheat, control failure or valve
 AUTO: Auto Pack control.
failure.
Outlet temp controlled by Zone with lowest
 Attempts to reset failed Recirculation Fan
commanded temp.
 Off: (AUTO not visible). CABIN TEMP: Serves as Master Reference.
Pack Flow Control Valve commanded closed.  AUTO: Auto 18 – 29°C. Mid pos’n 24°C.
 OFF: Pack FCV is closed. Happens if…….  Modified control +6°C via Purser’s CMS panel.
FCV has failed closed. If selected temp unavail to Pack Temp Controller,
Pack / Compressor outlet temperature high. last set or 24°C mean cabin temp set instead.
Bleed Pressure inadequate.
R PACK FCV closed for APU to PACK takeoff. UPPER / LOWER RECIRC FANS: To assist constant
PACK switch pushed Off. ventilation rate thru cabin and recycle conditioned air:
 ON: Recirc Fans controlled automatically.
L/R TRIM:  ----: Recirc Fans Off.
 ON: Master Trim Air Valve commanded open Lower fans auto off if either CARGO FIRE ARM – ARMED
Zone Trim Air Valves auto-controlled (See ‘Cargo Fire Det/ Extinguish’ & ‘Eng(GE)-EEC Idle Sel’n’)
 Off: (ON not visible).
GASPER: To supply seat gasper vents:
Master TAV commanded closed.
 ON: Gasper Fan operates.
 FAULT: Happens if…….
 ----: Gasper Fan Off
Master TAV failed closed.
Master TAV commanded closed for zone In event of either: CACTCS control failure or total loss of all
o’heat. Engine and APU electrical pwr, Pack Flow Control reverts to
TRIM switch pushed Off. control by Pressurisation Controllers. Pack flow modulated to
If L or R Trim is off, CACTCS maintains all zones, incl F/D maintain 5-43°C outlet temp. All ECS controls disabled except
at mean selected temp, 18-29°C. Pack switches.

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Air Conditioning Non-Normals:

[ ] PACK L + R:
 Condition: Both Packs are inoperative.
 OFF x 2 on overhead panel.
 Wait 2 mins then try Air Conditioning Reset. If EICAS remains, must descend as will now slowly
depressurize. Aircraft interior will become hot from avionics, IFE, passengers.

[ ] PACK L,R:
 Condition: Associated Pack inoperative.
 OFF on overhead panel.
 Wait 2 mins then try Air Conditioning Reset. If EICAS remains, turn affected PACK switch OFF.

[ ] PACK MODE L,R:

 Condition: Associated Pack is in Standby Mode
 See Standby Cooling Mode

[ ] TRIM AIR L,R:

 Condition: Associated Trim Air Valve is closed.
 FAULT on overhead panel.
 Wait 2 mins then try Air Conditioning Reset. If EICAS remains, turn affected TRIM AIR switch – Off.

[ ] CABIN TEMPERATURE: [777F Only]

 Condition: Flight deck or cabin temp is excessively hot or cold. The temp may cause incapacitation.
 A long checklist, dependent on whether too hot or too cold.
 In either case:
o Both TRIM AIR switches – Off
o Descend to 10000ft in order to be able to turn both PACK switches – OFF.

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Electrical & Electronic (E&E) Cooling:

1. Forward Equipment Cooling:

Internal fans and valves draw air from cabin and vent warm exhaust into forward outflow valve or forward
cargo compartment:

Normal Configuration:

Primary Fan runs,

whilst Backup Fan on
standby
Non-Normal Configurations:
 EICAS EQUIP COOLING  On Gnd Only - Forward equipment cooling is inoperative.
o Ground crew call horn in the wheel well sounds  Take prompt action!
o MEL No Dispatch.

 Override Mode:
o EICAS [ ] EQUIP COOLING OVRD
o EQUIP COOLING OVRD illuminated.

Auto Override happens if any of the following occur ………

 Both Cooling Fans failed, or
 Smoke detected in cooling sys, or
o (Note: 777F only - EICAS [ ] SMOKE EQUIP COOLING)
 EQUIP COOLING – Off, or
 CARGO FIRE ARM - FWD - ARMED. …this alone directly affects the exact Override config.

WARNING: Override Mode relies on differential pressure. Equipment and displays will begin to
fail after 30mins at low altitudes or low differential pressures. Complete approach prep at higher
altitudes and minimise holding delays lower down descent.

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Override mode when CARGO FIRE ARM - FWD switch NOT ARMED:
 Vent valve opens.
 Both supply fans shut down.
 Forward cargo heat valve closes.

Override mode when CARGO FIRE ARM - FWD switch ARMED:

 Vent valve remains closed.
 Both supply fans shut down.
 Forward cargo heat valve closes.
 Cabin differential pressure draws air through the flight deck panels and into the E & E equipment
compartment to create a reverse flow of air across the equipment, then through the override valve to
an overboard vent.

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2. Aft Equipment Cooling (and Lavatory / Galley Ventilation):

 Aft Equipment Cooling and Ventilating System provides cooling / ventilating air for the aft
electronic equipment and ventilating air for the lavatories and galleys.
o Conditioned air is supplied to the galleys from the air distribution system.
 2 x aft ventilation fans (primary and backup) draw air…….
o Through the aft electronic equipment and
o From the galleys and lavatories.
 Warm exhaust discharged overboard through Aft Outflow Valve.

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Cargo Temperature Control:

Passenger Fleet: FWD: (Holds 1&2) Heated by Equipment Cooling Air outflow  no direct cockpit
control. Fwd E/E Vent hidden behind Fwd Outflow Valve door.

AFT and BULK: (Holds 3&4, 5) Heated by independent Bleed Air Heating Sys.
Air drawn across temp sensors by Galley/Lav Vent Fans. If these fail, so does heating
 OFF: Off
 LOW: 4-10°C
 HIGH: 18-24°C. For Bulk, dedicated vent fan ops continuously (for livestock).
 Aft Hold separated from Bulk Hold by Insulating curtain.

777F:
ALTN VENT: To provide air flow to F/D and SUPNUM when both packs inop
and ac not pressurised. Air drawn by fans from AFT Outflow valve. No effect
if ac pressurised.
 ON: Alternate Ventilation Sys fan operates and Alternate Vent Shutoff
Valves open
 Off: ON not visible  Alt Vent System off & valves closed
 FAULT: Happens if….… Alternate Ventilation Sys has failed
o EICAS ALTN VENT SYS

Main Deck Air Flow Rate (M/D FLOW):

 NORM: Pack airflow is controlled automatically.
 HIGH: All operating packs are configured to high flow.

MAIN DECK CARGO TEMP:

FWD & AFT both regulated by
conditioned air:
 C to W sets 4-27°C.
 Mid position sets 16°C.

FWD Lower Cargo : Full Aircon (also heated by Equip Cooling Air outflow):
 A/C: C to W sets 4-27°C. Mid 16°C.
 OFF: Aircon Off. Temp unregulated.

AFT Lower Cargo : Full Aircon (or Heated by Bleed Air Heating System):
 A/C: C to W sets 4-27°C; Mid 16°C. Bleed Air Heat is not operating.
 L: Bleed Air heating maintains 4-10°C. A/C is not operating.
 H: Bleed Air heating maintains 18-24°C. A/C is not operating.
 OFF: Presumably everything off(?). FCOM does not state.
 Note: There is a Bulk Door on 777F but zone is combined with Aft Cargo
with respect to Aircon (though not Fire Suppression – Ref Simon Lawrence)

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Cargo Heat Non-Normals:

ALTN VENT SYS: [777F Only]

 Condition: Alternate ventilation system is inoperative.

CARGO A/C LWR AFT: [777F Only]

 Condition: Aft lower cargo aircon inoperative.

CARGO A/C LWR FWD: [777F Only]

 Condition: Forward lower cargo aircon inoperative.

CARGO HEAT AFT: [ALL]

 Condition:
o Aft cargo heat inoperative, or
o AFT CARGO TEMP SELECT - OFF

CARGO HEAT BULK: [Except 777F]

 Condition:
o Aft cargo heat inoperative, or
o BULK CARGO TEMP SELECT – OFF

MAIN DECK A/C: [777F Only]

 Condition: Main deck cargo aircon inoperative.

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Pressurisation:

 2 x Outflow valves (Fwd/Aft). Most outflow usually via aft (for better ventilation or smoke removal),
but full auto operation possible with one.
 2 x Positive Press Relief Valves / 4 x Negative Press Relief Vents.
o Max Positive differential: 9.1psi
o Relief Valves give at 9.4psi

+ _

 Three Cabin Altitude Controller modes: Climb Cruise, Descent.

o Planned level segments ‘blended’ into continuous climb schedule.
o Descent phase begins at T/D or first 1000ft descent from cruise
 Max Scheduled Cabin Altitude: 8000ft (vs Max Takeoff/ldg Alt: 8400ft)
 EICAS [ ] CABIN ALTITUDE occurs when cabin altitude exceeds 10000ft (Note: Referenced to 1013)

 Small Positive pressure (ie Lower Cabin Alt) applied for Takeoff/Landing (Max 0.11psi)
 If a depressurisation event occurs, the CAC controls the outflow valves to preserve cabin pressure.
o Cabin Altitude Limiter closes both outflow valves if Cabin Altitude exceeds 11000ft
 Both Outflow valves fully open on touchdown.

By reference to EICAS [ ] CABIN ALTITUDE AUTO NNC, below table is representative of expected
pressurisation schedule.

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LDG ALT: Push/Pull:

 Pushed In  Auto setting from FMS.
o AUTO on mini Air Synoptic.

 PULL ON  Manually set in 100ft increments

o -1000  14000AMSL.
o Baro correction from CM1’s altimeter setting.
o MAN on mini Air Synoptic.

 EICAS [ ] LANDING ALTITUDE happens if…….

FWD/AFT OUTFLOW VALVE: o FMC cannot supply landing altitude, or
 AUTO  Outflow valve control automatic. o LDG ALT selector PULL ON.
 MAN  Outflow valve control manual.
o Cabin altitude limiter bypassed.  If CRZ ALT not available from FMS, controllers
o M beside related Outflow on Mini synoptic. assume 39000ft.
 If Landing Altitude not set via either Auto or Man,
pressurisation controllers assume 2000ft.

EICAS [ ] OUTFLOW VALVE AFT, FWD if….

o Auto control of the outflow valve is inop, or
o Outflow valve switch is in MAN. L/C/R BLEED ISLN:
EICAS [ ] CABIN ALTITUDE AUTO if…..  AUTO: Auto ISLN valve control.
o Auto pressurisation control has failed, or o L/R usually open.
o Both outflow valve switches are in MAN o C usually closed except during Eng Start or single
source bleed.
 Off: (AUTO not vis). Valve commanded closed.
 CLOSED: Happens if…..
ISLN valve closed due duct leak/bleed loss.
APU Fire Switch pulled.
ISLN valve has failed closed.
ISLN switch pushed OFF.

EICAS BLEED ISLN CLOSED C,L,R 

EICAS BLEED ISLN OPEN C,L,R  Valve failed Open.

APU: L/R ENG:

 AUTO: Bleed valve opens when APU Bleed Air  ON: Bleed valve opens when Eng Bleed Air available
available  Off: (ON not visible). Valve commanded closed.
 Off: (AUTO not vis). Valve commanded closed.  OFF: Bleed valve is closed.
 OFF: Bleed valve is closed. Happens if…....
Happens if….... Engine not running.
Bleed duct overheat. Bleed o’heat, o’pressure, bleed ctrl sys failure.
Valve failed closed. Valve failed closed.
APU FIRE switch pulled. L ENG BLEED closed for APU to PACK takeoff.
Switch pushed Off. Engine Fire Switch pulled.
Switch pushed Off.
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Duct Leak and Overheat protection:

1. EICAS [ ] BLEED LEAK BODY or [ ] BLEED LEAK L,R:

o No initial pilot action required, iaw NNC.
o Detection and isolation takes place over several automatic steps lasting between 3 minutes for
LEAK BODY and 5 minutes for LEAK L or R:
o ENG and APU Bleed switch OFF lights and L/C/R ISLN CLOSED lights illuminate and
extinguish as diagnostic sequence runs its course.

o If temperature in affected duct area cools:

 EICAS [ ] BLEED LEAK……… extinguishes.
Note: This will probably be because diagnostic Isolation sequence has successfully
narrowed down source of leak and closed it off, but could also be due to a faulty sensor
self-correcting!

o Once diagnostic sequence has completed, expect EICAS [ ] BLEED LOSS BODY, …..BODY
L,R, ….WING L,R as appropriate (except in case of faulty sensor self-correcting).
o Pilot action now required iaw BLEED LOSS NNC.

2. EICAS [ ] BLEED LEAK STRUT L, R:

o Diagnostic sequence takes only 1 minute.
o Potentially left with engine on affected side restricted to Idle for rest of flight and a FLAPS 20
approach and ldg.

Note: Any LEAK or LOSS EICAS constitutes an ‘MEL No Dispatch’

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Miscellaneous Air Systems:

Shoulder Heaters: Foot Heaters:

OFF to HIGH: Electric Heater heats Inhibited when Plate Temp > 18°C
conditioned air at shoulders.  OFF, LOW, HIGH: As described!
Available in flight only.  Available in flight only.

APU to Pack Takeoff – GE Only: Left Pack only is operating

Note: Procedure is available up to max Airport Altitude 6900ft – Stated by OPT only if higher attempted

Follow FCOM SP7.7:

Before Engine Start: On the THRUST LIMIT Page, select the following takeoff thrust rating:
 Takeoff bump (TO B)
 Enter “APU” into the scratchpad and line select to the “SEL-APU” field.
o “APU” appears in small font representing the armed mode.
o Bleed Air system will reconfigure approx 1 minute after second engine start.

APU to Pack Configuration:

 L ENG BLEED valve closed.
 L ENG OFF light is illuminated.
 APU bleed supplies Demand Pump C1 and L PACK.
 C ISLN closed.
 R ENG bleed supplies Demand Pump C2.
 R PACK Valve closed.
 R PACK OFF light illuminated.

Auto Re-configuration to Normal Ops:

Whichever occurs first……
 Thrust reduced to climb thrust.
 Approximately 10 minutes after takeoff.
 AC above 11,400 feet altitude.
 APU to Pack configuration cannot be continued
because of failures in other systems. Also see Engines (GE): ‘APU-to-Packs TO’
 APU to pack mode deleted manually.

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3. Anti-Ice, Rain

Relevant Bulletins:
 EAD-60R3  New Ice-shedding procedures for Trent 800 in FZFG.
 EAD-99  Engine AI valve sticking due to debris  Recycle up to 5 times, 5secs in between.
 EKIB-47  Ice Crystal Icing.

Summary: The anti–ice and rain systems include:

• Icing conditions detection • Flight deck window heat
• Engine anti–icing • Windshield wipers
• Wing anti–icing • Probe heat

Anti-Icing Systems:
 EAI and WAI from engine bleed air provided to engine inlets and mid-section of wing leading edges.

Icing Conditions Detection:

 2 x probes on fwd fuselage detect engine nacelle inlet icing conditions and wing icing conditions in flt.
o [ ] ICE DETECTORS  Detection system has failed.

Engine Anti–Icing:
 EAI valves opened by engine bleed air. EAI displayed on 1ry EICAS
display (and AIR synoptic).
o Note: Approach Idle selected by EEC.
o My Caution: If using EAI – ON after landing, aim to reselect AUTO prior to shutdown to
avoid valves remaining stuck open (due to lack of LP air to reposition them) and
corresponding Status Message that engineers need to investigate. (No FCOM guidance re this)

EAI Non-Normals:

[ ] ANTI-ICE LEAK L,R  If an engine anti–icing duct leak (anti-icing or starter duct) is detected, the
respective EAI valve closes.

[ ] ANTI-ICE ENG L,R  Valve closed when commanded open.

ANTI-ICE LOSS ENG L,R  Anti-icing bleed not available.

[ ] ANTI-ICE ON  Anti-ice ON, but TAT > 10°C, and icing conditions do
not exist.

ICING ENG  Icing conditions exist but EAI selector OFF.

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Wing Anti–Icing:
 When a WAI valve is open, WAI displayed on 1ry EICAS display (and AIR synoptic).
 If TAT > 10°C, WAI (Auto or Manual) is inhibited until Takeoff + 5mins.
 Auto WAI inhibited from TOGA selection until Takeoff + 10mins.
 If a Bleed source is unavailable, but no bleed duct isolation has occurred, then WAI continues to work.
o By inference, if any duct isolation has occurred, asymmetric WAI will not be allowed by sys logic.
o [ ] ANTI-ICE WING  If one WAI valve sticks closed, other valve will be locked closed.
 ICING WING  Icing conditions exist but either WAI selector OFF or Auto WAI inhibited after takeoff.

Flight Deck Windows:

Forward Windshields:
 Anti-icing Exterior Coating
 Anti-fogging Interior Heating
 Auto-backup Anti-fogging System
 WINDOW HEAT L,R …FWD,SIDE  Fault or overheat condition.
Side Windows:
 Anti-fogging Interior Heating o Window heat disconnected.
o INOP illuminated on affected switch.
o Recycle WINDOW HEAT - Off (for 10secs), then ON, to reset
controller.
 WINDOW HEAT  2 or more WINDOW HEAT switches are Off.
o INOP displayed.

 Note: Not obvious from FCOM, but Window Heat works

automatically/continuously whenever AC power available  that’s
why HOT WX OPS SP16.14 recommends Window Heat is turned off
on ground in between flights, to minimise cockpit heating.

Probe Heating:
 3 x Pitot-static (L, C, R) and 2 x AOA probes electrically heated whenever either engine is
operating.
o HEAT PITOT L,C,R or ….L+C+R  Probe heating failed.
 1 x TAT probe electrically heated in flight.

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4. Automatic Flight

Relevant Bulletins:  Also see 11. Flight Management, Navigation for related bulletins

 EAD-88R2  Un-commanded turns in LNAV  Push HDG SEL - DIRECT TO – LNAV

 EAD-98  Control Panel (MCP) Altitude Window changing without pilot action  Possibly static
discharge. Action: Confirm all settings, periodically recheck, use VNAV to max extent possible,
and always return Altitude Increment Selector to AUTO following use in 1000s position.
 EAD-102R2  Uncommanded Autothrottle Movement during Cruise Flight  Often accompanied by
erroneous EICAS FUEL LOW TEMP. Briefly set FMC to L or R, then back to AUTO prior to
engine start. Affects RR with AIMS-1 BP v14 or v15  A6-EMD thru A6–EMX.

 EAD-108  Altimeter setting while in VNAV  When in VNAV and capturing an altitude at or near the
transition level/altitude, select FLCH, V/S or Altitude HOLD prior to making the barometric
setting change. Then reengage VNAV if desired.

 EKIB-26  Overweight Autoland  Don't!

 EKIB-28  AFDS MCP faults  Switches un-selectable or incorrect function.

 EKIB-54  Procedure for “Course Reversal” type approach entries  Use basic lateral modes.
 EKIB-55R1  FMC Cruise CG  to enhance operational flexibility when required, crew may insert as CRZ
CG value into the FMC the more Forward (ie lower) of ZFW CG or TOW CG

Autopilot Summary:
 Autopilot Flight Director System (AFDS) comprises:
o 3 x Autopilot Flight Director Computers (AFDCs) plus Mode Control Panel (MCP)

 Autopilot functions in NORMAL Flight Control Mode only:

o Autopilot inputs fed directly to PFCs.
o Autopilot controls Elevators, Flaperons, Ailerons and Spoilers throughout envelope, but Rudder
only in following circumstances:
 During > LAND 2 < / LAND 3, and during ROLLOUT
 The only time rudders can kick out AP is when either > LAND 2 < or LAND 3 is
annunciated. (See Flt Ctrls: ‘Autopilot’).

 All pilot flight controls move to provide feedback of Autopilot commands.

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Glareshield & MCP Functions: Essentially obvious, however…………………

 AP DISENGAGE Bar  If disengaged, Bank Angle Protection is also disabled.

o See Flt Ctrls: ‘Bank Angle Protection’.
 CLB/CON – Inoperative < 400ft on T/O.
 LNAV – Engages >50ft if <2.5Nm of active leg, or arms if >2.5nm, provided on intercept heading.
 VNAV – engages > 400ft AAL, measured by FMC at 100K during takeoff.
 BANK LIMIT:
o Has no effect in LNAV, only in TRK/HDG SEL.
o AUTO – Limit varies 15-25°, TAS dependent.
o 5, 10 etc – Limit as set, regardless of TAS.

Mode Control Panel

AP and FD Mode Degradations:

 When an engaged AP mode degrades, AP reverts to inertial-stabilising mode.

o If degradation persists: Line drawn through affected FMA: VNAV.
o If degradation continues: EICAS AUTOPILOT displayed.

 When an FD mode degrades, FD provides inertial-stabilised command.

o If degradation persists, affected magenta FD bar occults.

 Note: Activation of Stall and Overspeed Protections will cause FDs to occult.
o See Flt Controls: ‘Overspeed Protection’ and ‘Stall Protection’.

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Autoland Status:

Note: Electrical System reconfigures for Autoland when APP is selected on MCP (even at FL360!)

 LAND 3:
o 3 APs engaged and ops normal for autoland.
o Fail Operational  Single fault cannot prevent AFDS from completing autoland.
o Reversion to > LAND 2 < inhibited below 200ft Alert Height.

 EICAS NO LAND 3 (Advisory pre LAND 3; Caution post LAND 3):

o Condition: System does not have triple channel autoland redundancy.
o Autoland possible provided no further redundancy is lost.
o Expect FMA reversion to > LAND 2 <,. (See Electrical: ‘Autoland Elec Reconfiguration’)
 Reversion inhibited below 200ft Alert Height.

 > LAND 2 <:

o AFDS redundancy reduced.
o Possibly only 2 AP available (but not necessarily).
o Fail Passive  Single Fault cannot cause significant deviation from flight path.

 EICAS NO AUTOLAND (Advisory pre >LAND 2< or LAND 3; Caution post >LAND 2< or LAND 3):
o Condition: Unable Autoland.
o EICAS NO AUTOLAND can occur at any altitude down to tarmac and means go around!
o ie N.A.S.A.

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Autothrottle Summary:

 The autothrottle can be operated without using the flight director or the autopilot.
o Operates in either the THR REF, SPD, HOLD or IDLE modes.

 During a manual landing, thrust reduces to IDLE at 25 feet radio altitude when:
o FD is OFF, or
o Pitch mode is V/S, FPA, G/S, or any VNAV mode (VNAV SPD, VNAV PTH, or VNAV ALT).

The autothrottle does not automatically retard if the pitch mode is TO/GA or FLCH.

 Wakeup:
o With the autothrottle armed, the A/T automatically activates if:
 No AP or FD is active, or
 FD is active, or and
 An AP or FD is in VNAV XXX, ALT, V/S, or G/S,

 Speed less than an FMC calculated value for one second.

 Thrust below reference thrust.
 Airplane >100ft RA on approach, or >400 AAL (Baro) on takeoff.

Note: When the pitch mode is FLCH or TOGA, A/T will not automatically activate.

 Stall Protection:
o The autothrottle can support stall protection when armed and not activated.
o If speed decreases to near stick shaker activation:
 EICAS AIRSPEED LOW, and
 A/T automatically activates in the appropriate mode (SPD or THR REF) and advances thrust
to maintain either:
 VMIN MAN (approx. top of amber band), or
 Speed set in MCP, whichever greater.

Note: During a descent in VNAV SPD, A/T may activate in HOLD and will not support stall protection.

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 TO/GA Switches:

On the ground:

 Push < 50K (and flaps out of up)  Activates A/Thr in THR REF at selected THRUST LIMIT.
o If not pushed < 50 knots, A/Thr inhibited until 400 feet
 Push >80K  LNAV and VNAV disarmed.

In flight:

 Push after lift-off:

o With TO thrust limit displayed  removes T/O & CLB derates.
o With A/T in HOLD  Activates A/T in THR REF.
o Disarms LNAV and VNAV, if armed.
 50 - 400 feet  selects TO/GA Roll.
 > 400 feet  selects TO/GA Roll and Pitch
 First Push on approach (with flaps out of up or GS captured):
o Activates A/Thr in THR mode with GA thrust limit……FMC aims for 2000fpm ROC.
o Selects TO/GA Roll and Pitch…………….ie Go Around.
o (As installed) Arms LNAV  Engages at 50ft.

 Second Push on approach:

o Activates A/Thr in THR REF……FMC now aims for max climb available.

 Note: In preparation for possible Go Around, THRUST REF transitions to G/A when:
o Flaps first moved from UP, or
o GS Capture.

 Autothrottle Thrust Lever Operation:

o The A/T system moves either or both TLs to provide speed or thrust control, depending on the
active mode.
o TL can be manually positioned without disconnecting the A/T.
 After manual positioning, A/T repositions TLs to comply with the active mode.
 A/T does not reposition TLs while in HOLD mode.

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 Autothrottle Disconnect:
o A/T system can be disconnected manually by:
 Pushing either TL A/T disconnect switch (except during conditions that cause A/T to auto-activate), or
 Manually positioning both A/T ARM switches to OFF, or
 Individually, by positioning left or right A/T ARM switch to OFF.

o A/T disconnect occurs automatically:

 If a fault in the active A/T mode is detected, or
 When either reverse thrust lever is raised to reverse idle, or
 If TLs are overridden during manual ldg, after A/T has begun to retard the TLs to idle, or
 When both engines are shut down.

Autothrottle Non-Normals:

AUTOTHROTTLE DISC  Both Autothrottles are disconnected.

o Alert sounds when A/T is manually or automatically disconnected.
o EICAS caution and aural alert inhibited if disconnect occurs because of reverse thrust.

[ ] AUTOTHROTTLE L,R  One autothrottle is inoperative.

o Initial fault detection causes EICAS AUTOTHROTTLE DISC.
o CAT 3B prohibited until operative A/T reengaged via completion of NNC.
o If A/T is active and remaining A/T is armed, FMA shows L or R preceding the Thrust Mode,
ie:
 L, R SPD
 L,R THR / THR REF.

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ILS Signal Interference Monitor: (Ref combined from FCOM 4.20.3 and 10.10.12-19)

 Short-term signal interference:

o AP disregards signal & maintains inertial-stabilised attitude
o FD bars remain stable despite erratic ILS needles.

 Persistent Interference:
o Affected annunciation (LOC or GS) amber lined. LOC or GS.
o Affected magenta FD bar occults.

 Loss of GS and/or LOC Signal:

o Initially:
 G/S and/or LOC needles occulted, but scales remain visible (as ILS remains tuned in FMS)
 FD bars will remain visible and centred.
 BEWARE.
o Only after significant delay:
 G/S and/or LOC flags display on PFD / ND.

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5. Communications

Relevant Bulletins:

 EAD-94  Possible nuisance STATUS: PASSENGER ADDRESS 

o Check all speakers; if all working, consider nuisance and dispatch. Write-up on landing.
 EAD-97R1  Latching Dual FMC Failures  during ACARs downlinks.
o (Affects AIMS-2 with BP v16 only)
o Before any flight using downlink, check POS REF 3/3 Check which FMC is (PRI). Set FMC
Selector to same side. Reset to AUTO at end of flight.
 EAD-105  Loss of Datalink 
o VHF radio selected to DATA can revert to non-data frequency during transition from one ground-station
to another, resulting in EICAS Comms Message • ATC . Simply reset DATA in Active window.
o Affects AIMS BP v17 only (until corrected by v17.1).
 EAD-107  Loss of Pos’n Data from GPS to the ATC Transponder Affecting ADS-B Out Comms
o If the GPS input to the selected transponder is lost, ADS-B Out position reporting is lost or degraded,
and ATC is alerted. Simply select other transponder.

Note: This section is highly abridged, based on likely Tech Exam questions only.

Summary:

 PILOT TRANSMIT  In flight - VHF or HF keyed >30 secs

 Stuck Mic on Gnd Auto Inhibit – 35 secs, then need to release Tx Switch to reset inhibit.

 3 x VHF. Simultaneous TX and Rx.

o Data on C, R only.
o To select Data, tune out of normal VHF frequency range (hi or lo).

 2 x HF radios. Simultaneous receive, but only single transmit.

o HF Tuning – tuning tone longer than 7secs means tuning failure.
o HF Memory – 100 recent frequencies held, so tuning tone may be so quick as not to be
heard.
 Examples of ATC requested reports:
o LEAVING FL330
o LEVEL FL330
o PASSING SEA
o But not MAINTAINING FL330

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6. Electrical

Relevant Bulletins:
 EAD-71R1  Gen OFF light remains lit post-engine start, with no EICAS message  Call engineer!
 EKIB-4  Electrical Power Transfers, APU to EXT  Follow FCOM: Connect 1ry EXT, then 2ry EXT.
 EKIB-8R2  Simultaneous EICAS ELEC BUS ISLN L and R during engine start, pushback or taxy
 Reset permitted (but if at all possible whilst in contact with MCC).
 EKIB-25  Unpowered Right Transfer Bus following LAND 3 at 1000ft.  In event of any weird
captions >1500ft, try selecting APPCH twice to reset. Below 1500ft, need AP+FD OFF, then
ON before reselecting APPCH.

Electrical Load Management System (ELMS):

 ELMS manages the Electrical Distribution System in normal and abnormal situations
 The ELMS also controls the display of EICAS messages relating to the use of and power to the
Centre Fuel Tank Pumps. See Fuel System: ‘Centre Fuel’.

The B777 Electrical System is comprised of four elements or sub-systems:

1. AC (Colour coded Green for ease of identification)

2. BACKUP AC
3. DC and Flight Controls ( -------------------Blue-------------------------------------)
4. STANDBY

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EICAS ELEC BATTERY OFF: EICAS [ ] MAIN BATTERY DISCH: EICAS [ ] ELEC GEN OFF APU:
 Battery Switch – OFF  Main battery discharging, or  APU Gen control breaker
 OFF on switch  Hot Battery Bus unpowered. open, or
 APU GEN switch - OFF
 OFF on switch
EICAS ELEC IFE/SEATS OFF or
EICAS ELEC CABIN/UTIL OFF:
 Associated Switch – OFF
 OFF on switch
EICAS ELEC BUS ISLN L,R:
 L,R BUS TIE Switch – AUTO,
but Bus Tie Breaker isolated, or
 L,R BUS TIE Switch – Off
 ISLN on switch

EICAS [ ] ELEC GEN OFF L/R :

 Gen Control Breaker is open
 OFF on switch. EICAS [ ] ELEC AC BUS L,R:
Note: 1 reset per flt permitted  AC Bus unpowered.

EICAS [ ] ELEC BACKUP GEN L,R:

EICAS [ ] ELEC GEN DRIVE L,R:  Backup Gen failed, or
 IDG drive oil pressure low.  Backup Gen switch – OFF
 DRIVE on switch. Notes:
 OFF displayed if Eng Shutdown
or Eng Fire Switch pulled.
 Both OFF displayed if Gen
Convertor Failed.
ie EICAS [ ] ELEC BACKUP SYS

EICAS GND HDLG BUS :

 Gnd Handling Bus relay
failed.

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1. AC Electrical System:

The AC Electrical System comprises the following MAIN AC power sources:

 2 x Engine Integrated Drive Generators (IDGs) :

o Each automatically powers onside AC Main Bus after engine start – auto-disconnecting any
previous power source.
o Each can be electrically disconnected via L, R GEN CTRL switch (or by reconnecting an
External source prior to engine shutdown).
o Each can be irreversibly mechanically disconnected from Engine by L, R DRIVE DISC switch.
 EICAS [ ] ELEC GEN DRIVE L, R:
 Condition: IDG Oil Pressure is low.
 Accompanied by DRIVE on affected DRIVE DISC switch.
 Manual disconnect required, leading to consequential EICAS ELEC GEN OFF L, R
 Note: High drive temperature causes the IDG to disconnect automatically.

 1 x APU Generator (electrically identical to Engine IDGs):

o Available throughout entire flight envelope (NB: Bleed only to 22000ft).
o Starts automatically in flight if both AC Transfer busses unpowered.

 Primary & Secondary External Power :

o Battery must be ON to enable connection of Primary EXT.
o Primary and Secondary can individually power both Left and Right Main Busses.
o Either Primary EP or Battery must be on to enable connection of Secondary EXT.
o AVAIL means EXT is connected and power quality is acceptable.

Important Note:
According to FCOM, the entire airplane AC electrical load can be supplied by any two MAIN AC
power sources; however……...

If only one AC power source remains ( 1 x IDG or APU or Both Backup Gens) the aircraft must
be landed at the nearest suitable airport. (Ref QRH CI.2.3)

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AC Distribution:
 2 x AC Main Buses:
o Powered in flight (in order of preference) by:
 Same-side IDG.
 APU Gen.
 Opposite IDG.
o Each Main Bus (except during Autoland) powers associated:
 AC Transfer Bus. Each AC Transfer Bus in turn powers associated:
 DC TRU.
 AC Standby Bus (left side only).
AC Transfer Bus Notes:
1. If Offside IDG is powering Main Bus, the Backup System powers Transfer Bus instead.

2. By deduction rather than specific FCOM statement, L Transfer Bus is switching source for Normal Gear
Extension, as Transfer Buses are only AC buses that have immediate backup generation source.
Furthermore, Autoland reconfiguring only effects Right Transfer Bus, so it is logical that left system is
more reliable. There is also no Annunciated Electrical NNC that requires ALTN gear extension,
whereas loss of Transfer Buses through Unannunciated Dual Engine Failure or Total Electrical Failure
does require ALTN GEAR EXTENSION. (See ‘Normal Gear Extension’ and ‘Standby Power
Scenarios’)

 Utility Bus.
 Galley Bus.
 Ground Service Bus (Right Side Only).
 1 x Ground Service Bus:
o Powered (in order of preference) by:
 R Main Bus.
 APU Gen.
 Primary EXT (ie Secondary EXT possible via R Main Bus).
o Note: Ground Service Bus is sole routing for Battery chargers.
 See ‘DC Electrical System: Main & APU Batteries

 1 x Ground Handling Bus:

o Powered (on ground only) by:
 APU Gen.
 Primary EXT.
o In turn provides power for:
 Cargo handling.
 Refuelling/defueling.
 Other ground-only equipment.
o EICAS ELEC GND HDLG BUS  Handling Bus relay has failed.

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The EXT PWR Picture Pre and Post APU Start: (See FCOM 6.20.2 for full range of variations)

1. If Primary and Secondary EXT are connected:

Pre APU start, Pri and 2ry EXT power

right and left Main Buses.

Post Start, APU Gen automatically

displaces Secondary EXT on Left Main
Bus.

2. If only Primary EXT is connected:

Pre APU start, Pri powers both right and

left Main Buses.

Post Start, APU Gen automatically takes

over Left Main Bus, but Primary
continues with Right Main Bus.

3. If only Secondary EXT is connected:

Pre APU start, Secondary powers both

right and left Main Buses.

Post Start, APU Gen automatically takes

over both right and left Main Buses.

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Post First Engine Start:

 Whenever an engine starts, with the associated GEN CTRL switch – ON, the IDG automatically
powers the onside Main Bus, and the previous power source (ie APU or EXT) is disconnected from that
bus.
 If the APU is powering the Offside Main Bus, the APU will remain connected until the other engine is
started.
 If, however, 1ry or 2ry EXT is powering the Offside Bus, then, iaw Main Bus Order of Preference (ie
Onside IDG, APU, Offside IDG), it would appear that the IDG will take over the Offside Main Bus as well,
disconnecting the EXT.
o Note: By inference only. The FCOM is not specific for this scenario.

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Main AC System Non-Normals:

[ ] ELEC AC BUS L,R:

 Condition: Main AC Bus is not energised.
o OFF displayed on affected GEN CTRL switch.
o Attempt only one reset per flight  ‘Item Override’ if fault reoccurs during same flight.
o Consequential EICAS ELEC GEN OFF L,R if no reset.
o Further consequential EICAS if APU fails to recover bus:
 EICAS HYD PRESS PRI L,R (ie Loss of power to either C1 or C2 Primary Pump)
 EICAS WINDOW HEAT. (Loss on just affected side??)

ELEC BUS ISLN L,R:

 Condition: Bus tie breaker is open.
o It’s probably open for a reason!

Note: See EKIB-8R2 - Simultaneous EICAS ELEC BUS ISLN L and R during engine start, pushback
or taxy  Reset permitted (but if at all possible whilst in contact with MCC).

[ ] ELEC GEN DRIVE L,R:

 Condition: IDG Oil Pressure is low.
o DRIVE displayed on affected DRIVE DISC switch.
 Manual disconnect required, leading to consequential EICAS ELEC GEN OFF L,R
o Action is irreversible
o APU replaces missing GEN.

Notes:
1. High drive temperature causes the IDG to disconnect automatically.
2. Fuel Penalty for APU use: 2.5% of Flight Planning Fuel (ie Original TOF + 2.5%) + 90kg/hr
Inflight and 240kg/hr on ground.

[ ] ELEC GEN OFF APU:

 Condition: APU Gen Ctrl Breaker is open.
o OFF displayed on APU GEN switch.
o Attempt only one reset per flight

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[ ] ELEC GEN OFF L,R:

 Condition: Gen Ctrl Breaker is open.
o OFF displayed on affected GEN CTRL switch.
o Attempt only one reset per flight
o APU replaces missing GEN.

Note: Fuel Penalty for APU use: 2.5% of Flight Planning Fuel (ie Original TOF + 2.5%) + 90kg/hr
Inflight and 240kg/hr on ground.

GND HDLG BUS:

 Condition: Fault in Gnd Hdlg Bus.
 See Electrical Systems: ‘Ground Handling Bus’.

ELEC CABIN/UTIL OFF:

 Condition: CABIN/UTILITY power switch is OFF.
o Items lost:
 Ground Service Bus, except:
o Main/APU Batt Chargers
o Left Fwd AC Fuel Pump
 Utility Buses, including:
o Galleys, including:
 Forward galley heater.
 Chiller boost fan.
o Gasper fans.
o Flight deck Foot and Shoulder Heaters.
o Door area heaters.
o Lavatory water heaters and shaver sockets.
o Fluorescent cabin lighting.
o Beacon, Logo and Wing Lights.
o However, the following are provided:
 Night and supplemental night lights.
 Reading lights.
 Attendant work lights.
 Some galley/crew rest lights.

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ELEC IFE/SEATS OFF:

 Condition: IFE/SEATS power switch is OFF.
o Items lost:
 All IFE components.
 Passenger seat electrics, including:
o Seat motor power.
o PC Outlets.
o Telephones.

Circuit Breakers and Switches: (Ref QRH CI.2.4)

 Resetting In flight:
o Flight crew reset of a tripped circuit breaker is not recommended. However, a tripped
circuit breaker may be reset once, after a short cooling period (approximately 2 minutes), if
in the judgment of the captain, the situation resulting from the circuit breaker trip has a
significant adverse effect on safety.

 Resetting On the Ground:

o Flight crew reset of a tripped circuit breaker should only be done after maintenance has
determined that it is safe to reset the circuit breaker.

 Cycling (pulling and resetting):

o Cycling a circuit breaker to clear a non-normal condition is not recommended, unless
directed by a NNC………………….there are none currently.

 Attempt only one reset per flight:

o When NNC directs flight crew to attempt only one reset of a switch per flight, a second
reset should not be done until maintenance has cleared the malfunction. Flight crew should
select ITEM OVRD for any additional checklist steps directing the flight crew to attempt a
reset of the same switch.

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2. BACKUP AC Electrical System: (FCOM 6.20.8)

The BACKUP AC Electrical System comprises:

 2 x Backup Gens (one on each engine ; variable speed, variable freq output , converted to 400Hz):

o Each Backup Gen contains 2 x Permanent Magnet Generators (PMGs) to supply Flight Control
DC electrical System.
o Only one Backup Gen can supply the Convertor at any time.
o Both must be serviceable to be counted as a single AC Generator Source (Ref QRH CI.2.3)

 Backup system auto powers one or both Transfer Busses when:

o Only one Main Gen (IDG or APU) is available.
o One or both Main AC Busses is/are unpowered.
o APP mode is selected for Autoland ( R Transfer Bus powered)
o Briefly during post-engine start BIT.

 Items lost when on BACKUP AC (ie if both IDGs and APU Gen are inoperative):
o TCAS. o All exterior lights except Nose Ldg Lt.
o SATCOM. o Most cabin lighting.
o Right HF. o Cabin Temp Control (maybe degraded mode,
o Centre Tank fuel (or transfer/ jettison of). controlled by Pressurisation Controllers - FCOM unclear)

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Backup AC System Non-Normals:

[ ] ELEC BACKUP GEN L,R:

 Condition: The backup gen has failed.

o OFF displayed on affected Backup Gen switch.
o Attempt only one reset per flight
 Backup system no longer qualifies as an AC source for continuation of flight.
o ie QRH CI.2.3 says both need to be operational to count as source.

[ ] ELEC BACKUP SYS:

 Condition: The Backup System has failed.

o OFF displayed on both Backup Gen switches.
o Attempt only one reset per Backup Gen per flight
 Backup system no longer qualifies as an AC source for continuation of flight.

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3. DC Electrical System: (FCOM 6.20.11)

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The DC Electrical System Comprises:

 4 x TRUs (Left, Right, C1, C2), powered by AC transfer Busses:

o Left TRU powers left DC Main Bus, which in turn provides second source for:
 Left Flight Control Power Supply Assembly (PSA).
 Right DC Main Bus.
o Right TRU powers left DC Main Bus  which in turn provides second source for:
 Right Flight Control Power Supply Assembly (PSA).
 Left DC Main Bus.
o C1 TRU powers Battery Bus and Capt’s Flight Instrument Bus  which in turn provides
second source for:
 Centre Flight Control PSA.
 CM2 Flight Instrument Bus.
o C2 TRU powers FO’s Flight Instrument Bus  which in turn provided second source for:
 Capt’s Flight Instrument Bus.
 2 x Batteries :
o 1 x Main Battery, which provides standby power to: (See ‘Standby Electrical System’)

 Hot battery bus.

 Battery bus.
 Capt’s flight instrument bus.
 Left and Centre flight control PSAs.
 Standby inverter.
 Towing Bus - Gnd Only - with TOWING POWER – BAT
 The Main Battery can power the Standby system for a minimum of 10 mins.

o 1 x APU Battery – to supply APU electric starter only. Other APU start functions sourced
from Main Battery.

Battery Charging:
 Ground Service AC Bus (itself supplied from R Main AC Bus) is sole direct power source for
both battery chargers.
o Main Battery:
Ground Service Bus  Main Battery Charger  Hot Battery Bus  Main Battery

o APU Battery:
Ground Service Bus  APU Battery Charger  APU Battery Bus  APU Battery

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Arriving at completely unpowered Aircraft:

 BATTERY – ON for first time connects the following:

o APU Controller
o DC Fuel Pump (in Left Main Tank)
o See Fuel: ‘APU Fuel’

Towing Power: (On Ground Only)

 Permits towing operations without AC power.

o TOWING POWER switch – OFF:
 Main battery disconnected from Towing Bus.
o TOWING POWER switch – BAT:
 Main Battery power provided via Hot Battery Bus to DC systems required for towing:
 Position lights.
 Flight interphone.
 Captain’s instrument panel flood lights.
 Brake accumulator pressure indicator.
 Brake source light.
 ON BAT illuminated.
 Also provides back-up if AC power (ie APU Gen) is lost during towing.

DC Electrical System Non-Normals:

BATTERY OFF:

 Condition: BATTERY switch is OFF.

[ ] MAIN BATTERY DISCH:

 Condition: Main Battery is discharging or Hot Battery Bus not energized.
 The Main Battery can power the Standby system for a minimum of 10 mins.

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4. Flight Control DC Electrical System:

The Flight Control DC electrical system is a dedicated power source for the primary flight control
system, comprising:
 4 x PMGs (2 per Backup Gen), feeding DC to 3 x (L, C, R) Power Supply Assemblies (PSAs):
o PSAs also fed indirectly from L/R and C1 TRUs as backup.
o Left and centre PSAs also fed from Hot Battery Bus.
o PSAs in turn provide DC to 3 x flight control DC busses.

Each PSA includes dedicated but limited capacity battery to prevent power transfer interruptions.

 Backup Power supply :

o L & R DC Main Buses are initial backup for L & R PSAs.
o Capt Flt Inst Bus is backup for C PSA.
o Hot Battery Bus provides Standby Power for L & C PSAs, sourced from either:
 Main BATT, or
 RAT powering C1 and C2 TRUs).
 Only Left and Centre PSAs (and Left and Centre Flight Control Busses)
operational when operating under Standby Power.
 See ‘Standby Power Scenarios’.

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4. Standby Electrical System:

The Standby Electrical System comprises:

 Main battery - certified to power Standby System for 10mins.
 Standby Inverter.
 RAT Generator and its associated GCU – which in turn feeds C1 and C2 TRUs
 C1 and C2 TRUs.

The Standby Electrical System supplies DC, & via the Standby Inverter, AC, to selected………….
 Flight instruments (Capts if Batt-only / Both Capt & FO if Batt+RATcombined).
 Comms.
 Navigation systems.
 L & C Flt Ctrl System – via L & C PSAs.

Until RAT deploys, or if RAT sheds

electrics in order to prioritise C HYD, the
FO loses all instruments. Captain = PF!

Standby Inverter powers Standby Bus

whenever Left Transfer Bus unpowered

RAT deploys when…….

 Both AC Transfer Buses unpowered, or
 Dual Eng Fail and Low Centre Hyd Pressure  [ ] HYD PRESS SYS C , or
 All Hyd Pressures low  HYD PRESS SYS L+C+R

Note 1: C HYD is the RAT’s priority, not Electrics (See ‘Hyd – RAT’)
Note 2: APU will also auto-start if both Transfer Buses unpowered (See ‘APU’)

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Standby Power Scenarios:

Two Scenarios will lead to (brief) reliance on Standby Power, until the APU is started:
1. Dual Engine Failure……. (see Dual Eng Fail / Stall - GE or Dual Eng Fail / Stall-RR).
 [ ] ENG FAIL L and
 [ ] ENG FAIL R ……… plus all the resulting EICAS cautions.

2. Total Loss of Engine Electrical Power (ie 2 x IDGs & 2 x Backup Gens [and 4 x PMGs]).
 [ ] ELEC GEN L  [ ] ELEC BACKUP GEN L
 [ ] ELEC GEN R  [ ] ELEC BACKUP GEN R
 Or [ ] ELEC BACKUP SYS
……plus all resulting cautions

 Prior to RAT extension, the Main Battery will supply for a minimum of 10 minutes…………..
o Hot Battery Bus & Battery Bus, and in turn…….
 Standby Inverter via Battery Bus.
o L & C Flt Ctrl Buses.
o Captain’s Flt Inst Bus:
 PFD & ND.
 Standby Instruments.
 EICAS.
 Left CDU.
o In this state, the aircraft is ‘landable’ (including dead stick) via:
 Secondary Flight Control Mode (due to loss of Pitot Heat). (Secondary Flt Ctrl Mode)

 Alternate Gear Extension (switched off Hot Batt Bus). (Alternate Gear)

 Dual Eng Failure  due to loss of C Hyd and loss of L Transfer Bus.
 Total Electrical Fail  Loss of L Transfer Bus = No power to Gear Lever.
 No Flaps/Slats (if Dual Eng Failure), or else Normal (via C Hyd). (Primary Flaps/Slats)

 Post RAT Extension – Automatic ~25secs - the following additional capability is regained…….
o First Officer’s Flt Inst Bus.
o Main Battery charging.
Note: If RAT is forced to shed electrical loads due to high Hyd demand, the situation reverts to the
Batt-only arrangement.
o In this state, the aircraft is ‘landable’ as above, but with more time to spare (subject to
overheating of displays issues).

(Continued next page)

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 Post APU Start – Automatic ~90secs………….

o The overhead panel is now lit and the FD and AP can be used.
 AP requires flight controls to be in Normal mode – which requires a reset of the
PFC DISC switch iaw QRH Dual Eng Fail/Stall NNC.
o APU can provide all essential electrical power to aircraft in flight (subject to Load
Shedding).
o In this state, the aircraft is ‘landable’ (including dead stick) via:
 Normal or Secondary Flight Control Mode, subject to PFC DISC Reset.
 Possibly Alternate Gear Extension (if Dual Engine Failure), or else Normal.
 There should now be electrical power to C1 & C2 Primary pumps, (though no Centre Air
Demand pumps until post L or R engine start). In theory, Normal Extension should now
work (?Check?)
 Possibly Secondary Flaps/Slats (if Dual Eng Fail), or else Normal (Secondary Flaps/Slats)

 Same reasoning as for Gear Extension.

 Post Electrical Recovery (or following first engine start)……………..

Most consistent clue is idling N1, especially for RR, as EPR will remain blank for RR until EEC Mode
switches are recycled from Soft ALTN back to NORM.

Expect to need to………….

1. Finish Dual Eng Fail/Stall NNC, including reset of PFC DISC.
2. Re-activate and execute RTE 1.
3. Re-enter PERF REF and ZFW figures.
4. Recycle EEC Mode switches.
5. Continue with relevant EICAS checklists as if Unannunciated:
 Electrical interrupt may well have reset all Checklists to Pre-flight stage:
 ENG FAIL L or R for remaining engine.

Standby System Non-Normals:

ELEC STANDBY SYS:

 Condition: Fault detected in Standby Power System.

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Autoland Power Distribution:

Autoland Electrical Reconfiguration:

 Electrical reconfiguration for autoland takes place as soon

as APP selected on MCP, no matter where or how high it
is pressed (provided an ILS is tuned).

 The built-in test and subsequent EICAS NO LAND 3 (if

test fails) occurs only at roughly 1500ft.
 See Autoflight: ‘Autoland Status’.

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7a. Engines (GE)

777-200LR, 777F: GE90-110B1L  110000lbs Thrust

777-300ER, -300ER/ULR: GE90-115BL  115000lbs Thrust

Relevant Bulletins:
 EAD-69R1 - GE  Fuel flow blanking, at or near min idle during descent.
 EAD-99 - All  Eng AI valve sticking due to debris  Recycle up to 5 times, 5secs in between.
 EKIB-2 - All  Loss of engine control (and use of ENG LIM/SURGE/STALL memory items).
 EKIB-22R1 - GE  GE90 In-Service Observations:
 Bowed Rotor - N2 Vibration at start
 No start & delayed N2 rotation - [ ] ENG AUTOSTART L/R possibly with [ ] ENG START VALVE L/R
 Oil Gulping or Hiding.
 EKIB-47 - All  Ice Crystal Icing  Power Loss / Engine Damage.
 EKIB-49 - All  Volcanic Ash Encounters.

FCOM Limitations & Handling:

 All  Maximum and Minimum limits are Red. Caution Limits are Amber.
 GE  Start engines individually.
 GE  FMC – Manually select CLB De-rate for ATOW > MLW.
 GE  For ground ops (exclusive of takeoff):
o Tailwinds and crosswinds 30-45 knots: Engine power should be limited to maximum 70% N1.
o Tailwinds and crosswinds > 45 knots: Avoid thrust levels above that req’d for normal taxi ops.
 GE  For start: no Oil T limits stated, unlike RR.
 GE  For takeoff:
o Oil T above bottom of temperature scale (Ref NP.21.39).
o Recommended to run engines for > 3 minutes.
 GE  After Landing: Run engines > 3 minutes at thrust setting usually used for taxi ops.
 GE  Cold Weather:
o When Eng AI is required and OAT < 3°C, takeoff preceded by static eng run-up:
 Ops in icing conditions may result in VIB indications higher than normal during ice shedding.
 Run up as high as practicable. Confirm stable op and ensure VIB < 4 units before start of
takeoff roll.
o Moderate to severe icing conditions encountered:
 If prolonged period N1 < 70%, or fan icing suspected due to high engine VIB, fan blades
must be cleared every 15 minutes, one engine at a time. Reduce thrust toward idle then
increase to > 70% N1 for 10-30 secs.
 Operation in icing conditions may result in displayed vibration levels up to and exceeding the
normal operating range. Extended operation at high vibration levels in icing conditions will
not result in engine damage.

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Indications:
Primary Engine Indications: Do not vary with EEC mode.
 N1:
o N1 Operating limit.
o Maximum N1.
o Gauge arc, pointer & boxed digital turn Red if Op Limit reached.
 Box remains red after return to normal range, until CANCEL/RECALL.
o Thrust Reference / Target N1. Digital always shows Reference.
 EGT:
o Maximum Takeoff EGT.
o Maximum Continuous EGT.
 Displayed but not applicable for Takeoff.
 Amber Inhibit extended to 10mins if SE.
o Gauge arc, pointer & boxed digital turn Amber / Red as Max CON or
Takeoff limits reached.
 Box remains red after return to normal range, until CANCEL/RECALL.
o Maximum for Start shown as additional red band until start complete.

Secondary Engine Indications: 2ry indications appear if….

 Initial electrical power up.
 FUEL CONTROL switch  CUTOFF in flight.
 ENG FIRE switch  PULLED in flight.
 2ry parameter exceeded.
 N2 sub-idle in flight.

Red line Op Limits for N2, Oil P and Oil T:

 If limit reached, gauge arc (for N2), pointer & boxed digital turn RED.
 For N2, box remains red after return to normal range, until CANCEL/RECALL
 Oil P: If low oil pressure  digital display replaced by LO .

Compact Digital Display: Displayed if…………

 Engine synoptic selected (Auto or manual) but lower MFD failed, unpowered or occupied with EICAS.

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EEC Modes and Non-Normals:

 Normal – Full Authority:

o N1 controlling parameter, based on thrust lever position.
o Maximum N1 (continuously calculated) = max available with TLs full forward.

 Soft Alternate:
o EICAS [ ] ENG EEC MODE L,R.
o N1 still controlling parameter.
o Auto reversion if EEC loses required signals  ie Switch remains NORM.
 At fixed TL position, thrust does not change. Autothrottle remains engaged.

 Hard Alternate:
o EICAS [ ] ENG EEC MODE L,R.
o N1 still controlling parameter.
o Switch to ALTN:
 Thrust may increase (but never decrease) during switch.
 Autothrottle remains engaged.

 In either Soft or Hard Alternate:

o Thrust Protection  Not functional in Alternate Mode:
 Maximum N1 (= Maximum Rated N1) reached at less than TL full forward. Exceed
in emergencies only.
 EICAS [ ] ENG LIMIT PROT L,R if TL pos’n commanding in excess of Maximum N1.
o Overspeed Protection  N1 and N2 Operating Limit protection functions in all EEC
Modes:
 Fuel flow reduced to prevent overspeed.
 EICAS ENG RPM LIMITED L,R.
o If one engine must be ALTN mode, recommended both set to ALTN to avoid TL stagger.

 EICAS ENG CONTROL L,R:

o Condition: An EEC system fault occurs.
o Nil drills.
o MEL No Dispatch.

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EEC Idle Selection: What decides Minimum or Approach Idle?

Approach Idle is…….. Set If…..  Because….

 EAI On  to compensate for reduced effective thrust.

 Flaps commanded > 25  on final Appch!
o Note Difference: VNAV Approach Mode kicks in as soon as Flaps not UP.
 Either C1 or C2 Hyd Demand pump inoperative, and Flaps not UP  gear/flaps retraction now slower
in the event of go around.
 Opposite ENG Bleed Air Valve closed  Single engine, or two engines but one working harder to
provide all bleed air.
 Either CARGO FIRE ARM switch ARMED  Lower Recirculation Fans switch off (to minimise air flow
and increase extinguisher effect in Cargo area), therefore
Packs go to High Flow, which in turn causes increased load
on engine. (See ‘Air Conditioning’ & ‘Cargo Fire Detection &
Extinguishing’)

GE-specific Engine Attributes & Operating Procedures:

Engine Intermix – GE Only: New-fitted engine always adjusted to match incumbent. Max Continuous
EGT (Amber band) may differ.

APU-to-Packs Takeoff – GE Only: APU supplies left pack during TO; Right Pack shut down.
 For full description, refer to Air Systems: ‘APU-to-Pack TO’

Takeoff Bump (TO B) – GE Only:

o All -200LR, 777F and -300ER/ULR (but only -300ER as fitted).

o Selected on THRUST LIM page. TO B displayed as Thrust Reference above primary
gauges.
o T/O Bump limited to: Runway pressure altitude -2000  3000 feet, OAT 32-53°C.

Auto-Relight and Flameout Protection – GE Only: See ‘Engine Start & Ignition’

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Engine Start & Ignition:

Auto Start: EEC does the work……
Starter
Fuel Control Switch - RUN:
Motor  Opens Spar Fuel Valve
Bleed Air Start  Arms Engine Fuel Valve
Source: Valve N2 Turbine  Arms Ignitors
APU
Ext Cart
Manual Start: Pilot does the work…..
Start Valve

Crossbleed
Opened

Fuel Control Switch - RUN:

Engine Fuel
 Opens Spar Fuel Valve

Spar Fuel
Ignitors

Valve

Valve
 Opens Engine Fuel Valve
 Fires Ignitors

Either way, Fuel Control Switch – CUTOFF:

 Closes both Fuel Valves
2 x Ignitors, alternated each gnd start  Isolates Ignitors
 Unlocks Engine Fire Switch
Power: Main AC (Backup Stby AC)

Auto or Manual: EEC commands Starter cutout at Idle N2.

Autostart On Ground: On ground, Autostart is cancelled by EEC (at any time up to Idle) in event of…….

 Hot start  Starter shaft failure  Start time exceeds the

 Hung start  No N1 rotation starter duty cycle timer.
 No EGT rise  Insufficient air pressure
 Compressor stall for starter
Note: EEC does not monitor Oil P or Oil T  Pilot instigates Abort Engine Start L/R Memory Items.

In event of Hot, Hung, no EGT rise or Stall: the following auto sequence occurs…
If N2 less than starter cutout speed: If N2 greater than starter cutout speed:
 Fuel / Ignition turned off.  Fuel / Ignition turned off.
 Engine motored 4 secs  Starter valve closed.
 Engine spooled down to <30% N3.
Then…….
 EEC attempts 2nd start using both Ignitors.
If second attempt fails:
 EEC attempts 3rd start after motoring, adjusting fuel flow.
If third attempt fails:
o Fuel / Ignition turned off.
Also see EKIB-22R1 – GE90 In-Service
o Engine motored 30 seconds. Observations/Differences, regarding No-
o Starter valve closes (switch  NORM) Start Condition following either no or
delayed N2 rotation.
o EICAS [ ] ENG AUTOSTART L,R  Memory Items!
For faults other than Red Items, no motoring or 2nd attempts. Just EICAS [ ] ENG AUTOSTART L,R.

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Other Start Sequence Non-Normals:

[ ] ENG START VALVE L,R  Start valve position not as commanded.

[ ] ENG STARTER CUTOUT L,R  Start/Ignition Selector stuck in START, or Start Valve stuck open.

In-flight Start:

Always uses both Ignitors.

In-flight Start Envelope: Start envelope for displayed FL (current or

max, whichever less). Displayed, provided Eng Fire Switch IN,
when…..
 Fuel Control Switch – CUTOFF or
 N2 < Idle

DUCT PRESS: Displayed on Secondary Gauges when…..

 Fuel Control Switch – CUTOFF and
 N2 < Idle

X - BLD: Displayed on Secondary Gauges when………

 In-flight start Envelope displayed, but

 Airspeed too low for windmill start.

Autostart In-flight: For airborne starts, if …….

 Preset limit between Start and Takeoff Redline EGTs is reached.
 Hung start.
Then…..
 Start interrupted. (No other details provided).
o Continuous attempts made - never aborted automatically.
o Aborted only by Fuel Control Switch CUTOFF (and Start Switch NORM, if Assisted).

Auto-Relight and Flameout Protection – GE Only: Continuous ignition (both Ignitors) is provided until
3 seconds after flameout condition has been cleared, whenever……

 Start Selector – NORM, and

 Flameout detected (ie rapid decrease in N2 or sub-idle N2), provided that (though this is unclear)
o Flap Lever not UP, or
o EAI - ON

Notes:
1. Inhibited on ground whenever N1 < 55%.
2. If sub-idle stall detected, fuel cut off for 1 second to clear stall.
3. FCOM 7.20.15 is unclear whether auto-relight function is limited to only when Flap-Lever not Up or
EAI ON. Later paragraph does not make such a distinction.

See ‘GE-specific Engine Attributes & Operating Procedures’

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Engine Fuel System:

Tank Pumps to…………

Spar Fuel Valve to ……..
1st stage Eng Pump to……..
2nd Stage Eng Pump to………
Fuel/Oil Heat Exchanger (for preheating/anti-icing) to………
Filter to…….. If impending bypass, EICAS [ ] ENG FUEL FILTER L,R
Fuel Metering Unit to……..
Engine Fuel Valve to………….
Engine.

If either fuel valve disagrees with commanded pos’n  EICAS [ ] ENG FUEL VALVE L,R

Engine Oil System:

Reservoir to…..
Eng Oil Pump to…
Oil Filter to…… If blocked: bypassed and EICAS [ ] ENG OIL FILTER L,R
Fuel/Oil Heat Exchanger to……..
Backup Gen Oil/Eng Oil Heat Exchanger to ……..
Main Eng Bearings / Gears / Accessory Drives to…….
Scavenge to……………
Reservoir

Notes:
 No minimum oil quantity limit, but low quantity
causes LO
 No flight crew procedures based solely in
response to low quantity.
 Oil P and Oil T measured prior to Engine.

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Thrust Reverser:

Hydraulically activated, fan air thrust reverser:

 Left Hydraulics  Left reverse.
 Right Hydraulics  Right reverse.

Deployment:
 Reverse Thrust Levers can be raised to Interlock Position only when ……
o Forward Thrust Levers are positioned at idle.
 REV - Reverser Isolation Valve opens and Reverser will subsequently deploy
provided that………
o Ac on ground and associated engine running (otherwise EEC inhibits Isol
Valve).
 REV - Interlock Position also causes ………………
o Autothrottle disengagement.
o Auto speedbrake deployment (if not already deployed by Armed Speedbrake).
 REV - Interlock releases when Reverse fully deployed, thus allowing………..
o Reverse Thrust Lever full range (ie Max reverse).

Stowage:
 Pushing reverse Thrust Levers full down retracts and stows reversers:
o Thrust Levers cannot be advanced until Reverser Thrust Levers fully down.
o Beware slamming down:
 May cause inadvertent forward thrust.

Reverser Non-Normals:

[ ] ENG REV LIMITED L,R or ENG REV LIMITED L,R  displayed if……
 Reverser cannot deploy when commanded, or
 Reverser can deploy only with Reverse limited to idle.

ENG REVERSER L,R  displayed on ground only if ……

 Reverser system fault.

Note: Not all faults are detectable before TR selection. For those conditions, Reverse Thrust
levers will not move beyond Interlock Position.

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Vibration Monitoring:

 Primary purpose = engine condition monitoring.

 Secondary purpose for fault analysis.
 No specific VIB limits, therefore………..
o Except for Fan Ice Removal (SP.16.9) no flight crew procedures or EICAS messages
based solely on High VIB……though both Lim, Surge, Stall and Severe Damage Separation NNCs cater for it.
o High VIB will however cause Secondary Engine parameters to display.

 Vibration level will be displayed as contrast inverted: eg 7.4

 Source of Vibration:
o N1 or N2 displayed by gauge if source known.
o BB (= Broadband  ie average) displayed if not determined.
 Tactile Feedback:
o High N1 likely accompanied by tactile vibration.
o Not likely with high N2.
o May be accompanied by other engine anomalies and will likely respond to TL adjustment.
 See FCTM 8.7 for further advice regarding high vibration.

Engine Failure Alert System:

The engine failure alert system provides alerts when actual engine performance is less than commanded
during a part of the takeoff and for other phases of flight:

1. ENG FAIL on PFD + Aural “ENGINE FAIL” and Master WARNING: displayed if………….
 Airspeed between 65 knots and V1 - 6K.
o (After V1-6K, see EICAS ENG THRUST L,R)
 Actual thrust less than commanded thrust. (See ‘Warning Systems – PFD Alerts’)

2. EICAS [ ] ENG FAIL L,R: displayed if………….

 Engine unexpectedly decelerates to less than idle speed.
 Remains displayed until engine recovers or Fuel Control Switch - CUTOFF.

3. EICAS ENG THRUST L,R: displayed if………..

 Actual thrust significantly less than commanded thrust, and
 Actual thrust not increasing to commanded thrust, and
 Airspeed > V1 -6 knots or greater.

4. Dual Eng Fail / Stall: UNANNUNCIATED = [ ] ENG FAIl L AND [ ] ENG FAIL R
 Refer to ‘Standby Power Scenarios’ for how to land aircraft if no engines restart.

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7b. Engines (RR)

777-200: Trent 877  76900lb Thrust

777-200ER, -300: Trent 892  90000lb Thrust

Relevant Bulletins:

 EAD-60R3 - RR  Ice-shedding procedures in FZFG < 300m visibility.

 EAD-62R1 - RR  False engine-out indication for RR, following loss of N3 indication.
 EAD-99 - All  Engine AI valve sticking due to debris  Recycle up to 5 times, 5secs in between.
 EKIB-2 - All  Loss of engine control (and use of ENG LIM/SURGE/STALL memory items).
 EKIB-17 - RR  EICAS ENG IDLE DISAGREE and slow engine accel’n during In-flight Starting
 EKIB-46R1 - RR  Flight Deck Effects of Thrust Reverser Inner Wall failures.
 EKIB-47 - All  Ice Crystal Icing  Power Loss / Engine Damage.
 EKIB-49 - All  Volcanic Ash Encounters.

FCOM Limitations & Handling:

 All  Maximum and Minimum limits are Red. Caution Limits are Amber.
 RR  Start engines simultaneously.
 RR  FMC – CLB De-rate auto-selected for all weights.
 RR  For start: Oil T > -40°C
 RR  For takeoff:
o Oil T > 50°C (ie above lower amber band – Ref NP.21.39).
o Recommended to run engines for > 5 minutes, if engines shutdown > 1.5 hrs.
o Recommended to run engines for > 2 minutes, if engines shutdown < 1.5 hrs.
 RR  After Landing: Run engines > 1 minutes at thrust setting usually used for taxi ops.
 RR  Cold Weather:
o When Eng AI is required and OAT < 3°C, takeoff preceded by static engine run-up:
 Run up > 50% N1. Confirm stable operation before start of takeoff roll.
o Moderate to severe icing conditions encountered:
 If fan icing suspected due to high engine VIB, fan blades must be cleared of ice, one engine
at a time. Quickly reduce thrust to idle for 5 secs then restore required thrust. If vibration
persists, advance TL to 90% N1 momentarily.
 RR  After a rejected take-off (RTO) is performed where thrust reversers were deployed, take-off is
prohibited until maintenance action is complete.

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Indications:

Primary Engine Indications: EPR & N1 vary with EEC Mode.

 EPR:
o Maximum EPR. No change of gauge colours if this limit reached.
o Thrust Reference / Target EPR. Digital always shows Reference.
o Alternate Mode:
 Pointer and digital display occult if Alternate EEC Mode.
 N1:
o N1 ‘Red Line’.
o Gauge arc, pointer & boxed digital turn Red if Op Limit reached.
o Hard Alternate Mode:
 N1 ‘Red Line.
 Maximum N1.
 Reference / Target N1. Digital always Reference.
 EGT:
o Maximum Takeoff EGT.
o Maximum Continuous EGT.
 Displayed but not applicable during takeoff.
 Amber inhibit extended to 10mins if SE.
o Gauge Arc, pointer and boxed digital turn Amber / Red as MAX CON
and TAKEOFF limits reached.
o Maximum for Start also shown as red band until start complete.

Secondary Engine Indications: 2ry indications appear if….

 Initial electrical power up.
 FUEL CONTROL switch  CUTOFF in flight.
 ENG FIRE switch  PULLED in flight.
 2ry parameter exceeded.
 N3 sub-idle in flight.

Red line Op Limits for N3, Oil P and Oil T:

 If limit reached, gauge arc (for N3), pointer & boxed digital turn RED.
 For N3, box remains red after return to normal range, until CANCEL/RECALL
 Oil P: If low oil pressure  digital display replaced by LO .

Compact Digital Display: Displayed if…………

 Engine synoptic selected (Auto or manual) but lower MFD failed, unpowered or occupied with EICAS.

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EEC Modes and Engine Control Non-Normals:

 Normal – Full authority.

o EPR controlling parameter, based thrust lever position.
o Maximum EPR (continuously calculated) = max available with TLs full forward.

 Soft Alternate:
o EICAS [ ] ENG EEC MODE L,R.
o N1 becomes controlling parameter. EPR gauge blanks, but no additional N1 symbology.
o Auto reversion if EEC loses required signals  ie Switch remains NORM.
 At fixed TL position, thrust does not change.
 Autothrottle remains engaged.

 Hard Alternate:
o EICAS [ ] ENG EEC MODE L,R.
o N1 gauge enhanced.
o Switch to ALTN:
 Thrust may increase (but never decrease) during switch.
 Autothrottle remains engaged.

 In either Soft or Hard Alternate Mode:

o Thrust Protection  Not functional in Alternate Mode:
 Maximum N1 (= Maximum Rated N1) reached at less than TL full forward. Exceed
in emergencies only.
 EICAS [ ] ENG LIMIT PROT L,R if TL pos’n commanding in excess of Maximum N1.

o Overspeed Protection  N1, N2 and N3 Operating Limit protection functions in all EEC
modes.
 Fuel flow reduced to prevent overspeed.
 EICAS ENG RPM LIMITED L,R.

o If one engine must be ALTN mode, recommended both set to ALTN to avoid TL stagger.

 EICAS ENG CONTROL L,R:

o Condition: An EEC system fault occurs.
o Nil drills. MEL No Dispatch.

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 Unannunciated NNC Engine Response: RR Only

o Condition: One or both engines do not reach commanded thrust or roll back, and fuel
system icing is suspected
o Aim: To clear ice from the fuel system by reducing engine fuel flow while descending.

EEC Idle Selection: What decides Minimum or Approach Idle?

Approach Idle…….. Set If…..  Because….

 EAI On  to compensate for reduced effective thrust.

 Flaps commanded > 25  on final Appch!
o Note Difference: VNAV Approach Mode kicks in as soon as Flaps not UP.
 Either C1 or C2 Hyd Demand pump inoperative, and Flaps not UP  gear/flaps retraction now slower
in the event of go around.
 Opposite ENG Bleed Air Valve closed  Single engine, or two engines but one working harder to
provide all bleed air.
 Either CARGO FIRE ARM switch ARMED  Lower Recirculation Fans switch off (to minimise air flow
and increase extinguisher effect in Cargo area), therefore
Packs go to High Flow, which in turn causes increased load
on engine. (See ‘Air Conditioning’ & ‘Cargo Fire Detection &
Extinguishing’)
RR-specific Engine Protections:

Thrust Control Malfunction Protection – RR Only: EEC protects against high thrust malfunction if….
 Ac on ground………….. and
 Thrust Lever at Idle ……but
 Engine above idle and not decelerating normally.
Expect [ ] ENG FAIL L,R once EEC successfully shuts down engine.

Auto-Relight and Flameout Protection – RR Only:

 No manual or auto continuous ignition function, however
 Engine flameout protection provided for auto–relight and rain/hail ingestion.

Auto–relight function (Both Ignitors) activated whenever……..

 Fuel Control Switch – RUN, and
 Engine at or below idle.
 Flameout detected (presumably rapid drop in N3 or sub-idle N3):

If no recovery and N3 falling < 35%:

 Fuel /Ignition shutoff.
 Auto–relight function disabled.
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Engine Start & Ignition:

Auto Start: EEC does the work……
Fuel Control Switch - RUN:
Starter
Motor  Opens Spar Fuel Valve
Bleed Air Start  Arms Engine Fuel Valve
Source: Valve N3 Turbine  Arms Ignitors
APU
Ext Cart
Manual Start: Pilot does the work…..
Start Valve

Crossbleed
Opened

Fuel Control Switch - RUN:

Engine Fuel
 Opens Spar Fuel Valve

Spar Fuel
Ignitors
 Opens Engine Fuel Valve

Valve

Valve
 Fires Ignitors

Either way, Fuel Control Switch – CUTOFF:

 Closes both Fuel Valves
2 x Ignitors, alternated each gnd start
 Isolates Ignitors
Power: Main AC (Backup Stby AC)  Unlocks Engine Fire Switch

Auto or Manual: EEC commands Starter cutout at 50% N3

Autostart on Ground: On ground, Autostart is cancelled by EEC (at any time up to Idle) in event of…….

• Hot start • Starter shaft failure • Start time exceeds the

• Hung start • No N1 rotation starter duty cycle timer.
• No EGT rise • Insufficient air pressure
• Compressor stall for starter

Note: EEC does not monitor Oil P or Oil T  Pilot instigates Abort Engine Start L/R Memory Items

In event of Hot, Hung, no EGT rise or Stall (and N3 less than starter cutout speed): the following auto
sequence occurs…….
 Fuel / Ignition turned off.
 Engine motored 20-30secs
 Once EGT <100°C, EEC attempts restart using both Ignitors.
If second attempt fails (and N3 less than starter cutout speed):
o Fuel / Ignition turned off.
o Engine motored 30 seconds and until EGT <100°C.
o Starter valve closes (& switch releases to NORM)
o EICAS [ ] ENG AUTOSTART L,R  Memory Items!

For faults other than Red Items, no motoring or 2nd attempts. Just EICAS [ ] ENG AUTOSTART L,R.

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Other Start Failures:

[ ] ENG START VALVE L,R  Start valve position not as commanded.

[ ] ENG STARTER CUTOUT L,R  Start/Ignition Selector stuck in START, or Start Valve stuck open.

In-Flight Start:

Always uses both Ignitors.

In-flight Start Envelope: Start envelope for displayed FL (current

or max, whichever less). Displayed, provided Eng Fire Switch IN,
when…..
 FUEL CONTROL switch – CUTOFF or
 N3 < Idle

DUCT PRESS: Displayed on secondary Gauges when…..

 FUEL CONTROL switch – CUTOFF and
 N3 < Idle

X Bld: Displayed on Secondary Gauges when………

 In-flight start Envelope displayed, but

 Airspeed too low for windmill start.

Autostart In-flight: For airborne starts, if ……

 Takeoff Redline EGT reached.
 Hung start.
 No start (ie No EGT rise).
Then…..
 Start interrupted.
 Engine windmilled for 30 secs. (NB: windmilling used even if a Starter Assisted start)
 Once EGT < 200°C, fuel and ignition reintroduced.
o Continuous attempts made - never aborted automatically.
o Aborted only by Fuel Control Switch CUTOFF (and Start Switch NORM, if Assisted).

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Engine Fuel System:

Tank Pumps to…………

Spar Fuel Valve to ……..
1st stage Eng Pump to……..
Fuel/Oil Heat Exchanger (for preheating/anti-icing) to………
Filter to…….. If impending bypass, EICAS [ ] ENG FUEL FILTER L,R
2nd Stage Eng Pump to………
Fuel Metering Unit to……..
Engine Fuel Valve to………….
Engine.

If either fuel valve disagrees with commanded pos’n  EICAS [ ] ENG FUEL VALVE L,R

Oil System:
Reservoir to…..
Eng Oil Pump to…
HP Oil Filter to…….
Air/Oil Heat Exchanger to……..
Fuel/Oil Heat Exchanger to……………
Main Eng Bearings / Gears / Accessory Drives to…….
Scavenge Pump to……………
Scavenge Filter to……(If blocked, bypassed – but no EICAS)
Reservoir

Notes:

 No minimum oil quantity limit, but low quantity causes LO

 No flight crew procedures based solely in response to low quantity.
 Oil P measured prior to Engine.
 Oil T measured post engine, prior to reservoir.

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Thrust Reverser:

Hydraulically activated, fan air thrust reverser:

 Left Hydraulics  Left reverse.
 Right Hydraulics  Right reverse.

Deployment:
 Reverse Thrust Levers can be raised to Interlock Position only when ……
o Forward Thrust Levers are positioned at idle.
 REV - Reverser Isolation Valve opens and Reverser will subsequently deploy
provided that………
o Ac on ground and engine running (otherwise EEC inhibits Isol Valve).
 REV - Interlock Position also causes ………………
o Autothrottle disengagement.
o Auto speedbrake deployment (if not already deployed by Armed Speedbrake).
 REV - Interlock releases when Reverse fully deployed, thus allowing………..
o Reverse Thrust Lever full range (ie Max reverse).
o

Stowage:
 Pushing reverse Thrust Levers full down retracts and stows reversers:
o Thrust Levers cannot be advanced until Reverser Thrust Levers fully down.
o Beware slamming down:
 May cause inadvertent forward thrust.
 RR Only: May cause Translating Sleeve inner wall damage (Ref EKIB46R1).

Reverser Non-Normals:

[ ] ENG REV LIMITED L,R or ENG REV LIMITED L,R  displayed if……
 Reverser cannot deploy when commanded, or
 Reverser can deploy only with Reverse limited to idle.

ENG REVERSER L,R  displayed on ground only if ……

 Reverser system fault.

Note: Not all faults are detectable before TR selection. For those conditions, Reverse Thrust
levers will not move beyond Interlock Position.

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Vibration Monitoring:

 Primary purpose = engine condition monitoring.

 Secondary purpose for fault analysis.
 No specific VIB limits, therefore………..
o Except for Fan Ice Removal (SP.16.9) no flight crew procedures or EICAS messages
based solely on High VIB. ……though both Lim, Surge, Stall and Severe Damage Separation NNCs cater for it.
o High VIB will however cause Secondary Engine parameters to display.

 Vibration level will be displayed as contrast inverted: eg 7.4

 Source of Vibration:
o N1, N2 or N3 displayed by gauge if source known.
o BB (= Broadband  ie average) displayed if not determined.
 Tactile Feedback:
o High N1 likely accompanied by tactile vibration.
o Not likely with high N2 or N3.
o May be accompanied by other engine anomalies and will likely respond to TL adjustment.
 See FCTM 8.7 for further advice regarding high vibration.

Engine Failure Alert System:

The engine failure alert system provides alerts when actual engine performance is less than commanded
during a part of the takeoff and for other phases of flight:

1. ENG FAIL on PFD + Aural “ENGINE FAIL” + Master WARNING: displayed if………….
 Airspeed between 65 knots and V1 minus 6K.
o (After V1-6K, see EICAS ENG THRUST L,R)
 Actual thrust less than commanded thrust. (See ‘Warning Systems – PFD Alerts’)

2. EICAS [ ] ENG FAIL L,R: displayed if………….

 Engine unexpectedly decelerates to less than idle speed.
 Remains displayed until engine recovers or Fuel Control Switch - CUTOFF.

3. EICAS ENG THRUST L,R: displayed if………..

 Actual thrust significantly less than commanded thrust, and
 Actual thrust not increasing to commanded thrust, and
 Airspeed > V1 minus 6 knots or greater.

4. Dual Eng Fail / Stall: UNANNUNCIATED = [ ] ENG FAIl L AND [ ] ENG FAIL R
 Refer to Standby Power Scenarios for how to land aircraft if no engines restart.
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7c. APU

 Starting and Operating Envelope: Ground to Max certified altitude.

o For each of the electric starter motor and air turbine starter, 3 start attempts in a 60 minute
period.
o Wait 1 minute between successive starts using the same starter (ie Air or Electric).
 Electrical power has priority over bleed air:
o Bleed Air available up to 22000ft.
o Electrical power available throughout envelope.
 APU auto-starts in event that both AC Transfer Buses fail
o RAT auto-deploys for same reason  See ‘Elec - Standby Power’ and ‘Hyd – RAT’
o In event of Dual Engine Failure leading to dead-stick landing, the APU Gen is the only
means to extend Slats/Flaps

Arrival at Aircraft: Selecting Battery Switch – ON, when no other power source is available, connects
the following:
o APU Controller.
o DC Fuel Pump (Left Main)

Starting: Sequence automatic with APU Switch - START.

 Two starters: Air Turbine or Electric, selected automatically:
o Air Turbine has priority when bleed air available (Engine or Ground Cart).
o Electric Starter powered by dedicated APU Battery.
 Main Battery powers:
o Inlet door
o APU fuel valve
o Fire Detection
o (APU controller)
 Fuel:
o From left manifold, via any operating AC pump (or DC pump in Left Main Tank).
 With AC power and APU Switch – ON, FWD LEFT AC pump operates continuously.
o Start also possible on ground without any fuel pumps.
 Sequence:
o APU switch – START.
o Inlet door opens, then Starter engages. Fuel and Ignition On at undefined speed.
o At approx 50%  Starter disengages & Ignition Off.
o At nominal speed: Memo APU RUNNING
o If Start fails: EICAS [ ] APU SHUTDOWN

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Shutdown Sequence:
o APU Switch – OFF.
o APU Bleed Valve shuts.
o APU continues running for cool down period (unless shutdown due to fault):
 Memo APU COOLDOWN (No temp limit stated)
 Shutdown may be cancelled at any time Memo remains displayed.
o APU shuts down.
Note: Shutdown after an autostart achieved by cycling APU switch to ON, then OFF.

Unattended Mode:
 At all times on ground whenever neither engine running / starting.
 Immediate (No Cooldown) auto shutdown (+ EICAS [ ] APU SHUTDOWN) whenever…………
o APU Fire / inlet over-temperature. [ ] FIRE APU  Auto extinguisher firing
o Overspeed/loss of overspeed protection. (See APU Fire Detection)
o APU controller failure.
o Speed droop.
o High EGT.
o Low Oil P.
o High Oil T.
o Generator oil filter approaching bypass.
o Intake door failure.
o No combustion on start.
o No acceleration on start.

Attended Mode:
 At any time either engine is running or starting.
 Immediate (No Cooldown) auto shutdown (but not extinguishing) (+ EICAS [ ] APU SHUTDOWN)
whenever…………
o APU fire/inlet over-temperature. [ ] FIRE APU  requires manual extinguisher firing
o Overspeed/loss of overspeed protection. (See APU Fire Detection)
o APU controller failure.
o Speed droop.
 EICAS [ ] APU LIMIT, but continued operation whenever……….
o High EGT.
o Low Oil P.
o High Oil T.
Note: There will be no cool down once APU shutdown manually.

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8. Fire Protection

Relevant Bulletins:
 EAD-90R1  Nuisance Visual/Aural Smoke Alarms in Cabin (After power transfers).
 EAD-91R1  Nuisance EICAS: SMOKE BBAND UPR DR2.
 EKIB-38R1  Non-Fire related Fire Warnings - ie following insecticide spraying.
 EKIB-51  Kidde Smoke Detector false alarm during power transfer.

Engine Fire Detection & Extinguishing:

 2 x Detector Loops per nacelle, each providing fire & overheat detection.
o Both loops must detect fire / overheat to trigger warning, unless single loop fault.
o No EICAS for single loop fault, but EICAS DET FIRE ENG L,R for double failure.
 2 x Fire Extinguisher Bottles – cross-linked to both engines.
o EICAS BOTTLE 1, 2 DISCH ENG  Bottle pressure low (ie discharged).

 EICAS [ ] FIRE ENG L,R  Fire detected:

o Fire Bell + Master WARNING.
o ENG FIRE SWITCH unlocks and illuminates.
o Fuel Control Switch illuminates.
o Pulling ENG FIRE SWITCH…………
 Arms both Fire bottles.
 Closes associated Eng & Spar Fuel Valves.
 Closes associated Eng Bleed Valves.
 Trips associated Generators OFF.
 Shuts off Hyd Fluid to associated Eng-driven Hyd pump and depressurises pump.
 Electrically isolates Thrust Reverse Isolation Valve.

 EICAS [ ] OVERHEAT ENG L,R  Overheat detected:

o Caution beeper + Master CAUTION.

 Engine Tailpipe Fire L, R  Unannunciated. Due to fuel pooling – occurs on ground only.

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APU Fire Detection & Extinguishing:

 2 x Detector Loops, for fire detection only (ie not overheat).

o In flight: Both loops needed to trigger warning / auto shutdown, unless single loop fault.
o On gnd, Unattended: Either loop sufficient to trigger warning, shutdown & automatic
extinguisher firing.
o Single loop fault  No EICAS.
o Double loop fault  EICAS [ ] DET FIRE APU.
 1 x Fire Extinguisher Bottle.
o EICAS BOTTLE DISCH APU  Bottle pressure low (ie discharged).

 [ ] FIRE APU  Fire detected: (See APU Unattended Mode or Attended Mode)

o Fire Bell + Master WARNING.

o APU FIRE SWITCH unlocks and illuminates.
o Pulling APU FIRE SWITCH……..
 Arms APU Fire Bottle.
 Closes APU Fuel Valve.
 Closes APU Bleed Valve.
 Closes APU Inlet Door.
 Trips APU Gen Field & Breaker.
 Shuts down APU (if not yet achieved)

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Cargo Fire Detection & Extinguishing:

-200s / - 300s:

 Smoke detectors in both Fwd & Aft compartments.

o Each compartment divided into 3 zones (200s) / 4 zones (300s).
o Smoke in any one zone triggers fire warning.
 [ ] FIRE CARGO FWD, AFT
 Fire Bell + Master WARNING.
 Minimum time EICAS will display is 2mins. It will also persist 2mins after condition
has cleared.
o DET FIRE CARGO FWD, AFT  Smoke detection failed in respective compartment.
o Notes:
 System is highly reliable, but detectors work by detecting airborne particulate
matter. Therefore, insecticide in sufficient concentration may well set off a Fire
warning. Beware Australian flights.
 Halon is a gaseous, not particulate. It will not set off false Fire warning.
 Warning will probably remain on even if fire is extinguished, because smoke will
remain trapped in hold.
 According to Expanded QRH (and Boeing), crews will probably smell cargo smoke
before detectors detect it.

According to Boeing, no Boeing aircraft has lasted more than 23 minutes.

If fire is not under control within 4 minutes, too late!

In all cases, assume the worst! Descend  Divert  Evacuate

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 5 x Fire Bottles (-200s, -300s) / 6 x Fire Bottles (-300ER, ER/ULR)::

o Linked to either compartment, selectable by FWD / AFT CARGO FIRE ARM.
o Arming CARGO FIRE ARM – FWD or AFT……..
 Arms all bottles.
 Arms selected compartment extinguisher valve.
 Turns off both lower recirculation fans. (See ‘Air Con’ & ‘Eng(GE) – EEC Idle Sel’n’)
 Shuts down cargo heat.
 Commands packs to provide minimum air flow required for pressurization.
 Shuts down bulk cargo compartment ventilation (AFT cargo fire only).
 Shuts down lavatory/galley vent fans.
 Sets Equipment Cooling to Override mode (FWD cargo fire only)
 Shuts down Nitrogen Generation System [-200LR (as installed), -300ER/ULR (as installed)]
o Firing CARGO FIRE DISCH will shut down IFE. (Ref Boeing, post Urumqi Incident – not in FCOM)

o 2 x Rapid Discharge – immediate on pressing CARGO FIRE DISCHARGE switch.

 DISCH on switch illuminates as soon as first bottle begins to discharge.
 EICAS BOTTLE DISCH CARGO  Both Rapid Discharge bottle pressures low (ie
both fully discharged).

o 3 x Reduced Flow. Fired after time delay, unless earlier landing (in which case one fires at
reduced rate on touchdown).
 If CARGO FIRE - DISCH switch pushed on ground, only one Reduced Flow fires
after time delay (20 minutes).

According to Boeing, the IFE is designed to switch off whenever Cargo

Fire bottles are fired. Do not misconstrue as a symptom of an electrical
fire!

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777F:

 Lower deck fire detection and extinguishing systems identical to those of passenger models.
 Main deck cargo compartment is classified as Class E ( defined in Emergency Response Guide):
o DET FIRE CARGO MAIN  Smoke detection failed on Main Deck.
o [ ] FIRE CARGO MAIN DECK  Smoke detected.

 Pushing MAIN DECK CARGO FIRE ARM ……..

o Configures one pack off, the other to low flow.
 Subsequently pushing DEPR/DISCH …………
o Initiates controlled depressurisation to 21,000ft Cabin Alt,
with aircraft at 23,000ft.
o The higher pressure inside the aircraft promotes fume
evacuation. The low absolute pressure starves fire of O2.

Main Wheel Well Fire Detection:

 2 x Detector Loops, for fire detection only.

 No fire detection for nose wheel well.
o [ ] FIRE WHEEL WELL  Fire detected:
o Fire Bell + Master WARNING.
 QRH directs immediate deceleration to 270/.82 in order to lower landing gear. The fastest means to
slow using MCP is ALT HOLD plus Speed Intervention. (Ref QRH NNCs and FCTM 8.28)

 Gear down for minimum 20mins after warning extinguished.

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Lavatory and Cabin Fire Detection:

 1 x smoke detector in each lavatory:

o SMOKE LAVATORY  Smoke detected in lavatory.
 1 x extinguisher in each waste bin:
o No flight deck indication of firing.
 If smoke detected……………..
o Aural alert in lavatory and cabin.
o Flashing Lavatory Call Light outside lavatory.
o Master Call Light at associated Flt Attendant Panel.
o EICAS SMOKE LAVATORY
 Note: Failing Recirculation Fans have (allegedly) been a common cause of Cabin Smoke –
that’s why they are turned off so early on in Smoke/Fire/Fumes NNC

Fire and Overheat Detection System Fault Test:

See FCOM 8.20 for details. We don’t touch it, even as part of NNC!

Other Fire System Non-Normals:

[ ] SMOKE BBAND UPR DR2  Nuisance Warning.

[ ] SMOKE COMPT UPR DR2  (200LR only) Smoke detected in a compartment.

SMOKE CREW REST F/D  (777F only) Smoke detected in Crew Rest Area

[ ] SMOKE REST UPR DR 4, DR 5  Smoke detected in CRC (DR 4 -200LR, DR 5 -300ER/ULR).

[ ] SMOKE EQUIP COOLING  (777F only) Smoke detected in cooling system.

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9. Flight Controls

Relevant Bulletins:
 EKIB-9  Use of Rudder.
 EKIB-12  EICAS [ ] TAILSTRIKE.
 EKIB-15  Inadvertent Overspeed  EICAS OVERSPEED.
 EKIB-44R4  Lightweight landings in 777F / -200LR.
 EKIB-52  Upset Recovery  Disconnect AP & AT, then recover manually iaw QRH NNMs.

Overhead Panel:

PFC Disconnect Switch:

DISC  Sets DIRECT Mode.
 Disconnects PFCs.
 DISC illuminates.
 EICAS [ ] PRI FLIGHT CONTROLS (See ‘DIRECT MODE’)
Thrust Asym Comp: AUTO  Sets NORMAL Mode.
AUTO  TAC operational.  Auto fault reversion to SECONDARY or DIRECT Modes.
OFF  TAC disconnected.

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 Pitch:
o 2 x Elevators.
o 1 x Moveable Horizontal Stabilizer (powered by C+R Hyd). (see Stabilizer Cutout Switches)

 Roll:
o 2 x Flaperons (located between inboard and outboard flaps).
o 2 x Ailerons.
 Ailerons droop for takeoff with Flaps 5, 15 & 20.
 Locked out during high speed flight.
o 14 x Spoilers.
 Numbered 1 to 14 (Port to Starboard).
 5 and 10 locked out in cruise during high speed flight. As Speedbrakes, operate
only on ground in NORMAL Mode.
 4 and 11 mechanically controlled. Operate only as Speedbrakes if S/B Lever UP.
 4, 5, 10 and 11 locked out as Speedbrakes in SECONDARY and DIRECT Modes.

 Yaw:
o 1 x Rudder.
 Effective at 60kts
o 1 x Partial Span Tab with twice deflection of main rudder.

 High Lift Devices:

o 4 x Flaps.
o 2 x Flaperons (extend proportionally with main flaps).
o 14 x Slats
o 2 x Krueger Flaps (two-position: to create seal between inboard slat and engine nacelle).

Note: Flaps and Slats are considered as ‘High Lift Devices’, not ‘Flight Controls’.

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Flight Control Modes:

Pitch  Manoeuvre demand:

 Feedback variable with speed.
Actuator
Roll  Proportional deflection:
Control
 Ailerons and Flaperons, followed by spoilers
Control Electronics Flight
(ACEs) x4  Feedback not speed variable.
Wheel, Control
Rudder Actuators Yaw  Proportional deflection:
 Rudder Ratio Changer reduces proportional deflection as
Primary Flight speed increases.
Autopilot Computers  Feedback not speed variable.
(PFCs) x3
‘Augmented’ Flight Control Functions……..
 Autopilot
 Auto Speedbrakes
NORMAL MODE  Envelope Protection: Overspeed, Stall and High Bank Angle
 Gust Suppression (GE Variants Only)
 Tail Strike Protection (GE Variants Only)
 TAC

PFCs  In NORMAL MODE:  Yaw Damping

 Are redundant  Wheel to Rudder Cross Tie

 Contain enhanced control  Manual Rudder Trim Cancel Switch
features
 Pitch compensation for:
 Generate ALL control surface
o Thrust & configuration changes.
demands.
o AOB up to 30° - (above 30°, pilot has to help with
backpressure)
o Turbulence

Autopilot – NORMAL Mode only: (See Autoflight: Autopilot Summary)

 Autopilot functions in NORMAL Flight Control Mode only:

o Autopilot inputs fed directly to PFCs.
o Autopilot controls Elevators, Flaperons, Ailerons and Spoilers throughout envelope, but Rudder
only in following circumstances:
 During > LAND 2 < / LAND 3, and during ROLLOUT
 The only time rudders can kick out AP is when either > LAND 2 < or LAND 3 is
annunciated.
 Trimming:
o Control Wheel Trim and Aileron Trim are both inhibited during Autopilot operation.
o ALTN Pitch Trim Levers will move Stabilizer, but they should never be used during AP.
o Rudder Trim always works during AP.

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Pitch  Proportional elevator deflection:

Actuator  2-stage feedback based on Flaps UP or Extended.
Control Roll  Similar to NORMAL Mode, but…..
Control Electronics Flight  Spoilers 5 & 10 locked out.
Wheel, (ACEs) x4 Control Yaw  Similar to NORMAL Mode, but…..
Rudder Actuators  Rudder Ratio Changer limited to 2 fixed ratios:
o Flaps UP response less than with Flaps
Primary Flight extended.
Autopilot Computers
(PFCs) x3 Remaining ‘Augmented’ Flight Control functions…….
 Degraded or Inoperative Yaw Damping
 Manual Rudder Trim Cancel Switch
SECONDARY MODE
(See Flt Mgmt: ‘EICAS [ ] NAV AIR DATA SYS’ for one possible
EICAS [ ] FLIGHT CONTROL MODE
cause)

PFCs  In SECONDARY MODE

 Operate using simplified laws due to either internal fault or lack of required info from
other airplane systems.
 They still generate ALL control surface demands, just as for NORMAL MODE.

Pitch  As SECONDARY Mode.

Actuator
Control Roll  As SECONDARY Mode.

Control Electronics Flight Yaw  As SECONDARY Mode.

Wheel, (ACEs) x4 Control

Rudder Actuators Remaining ‘Augmented’ Flight Control functions……..
 Nil
Primary Flight
Autopilot Computers
(PFCs) x3

DIRECT MODE
EICAS [ ] PRI FLT COMPUTERS (See ‘PFC Disconnect Switch’)

Remaining ‘augmented’ functions……

Control
Mechanical Link
Flight  Nil
Wheel, Control
Rudder Actuators
Cables to Stabilizer and Selected Spoilers (4 & 11):
 Solely to allow S&L flight following total electrical failure,
MECHANICAL BACKUP until electrical system is restarted.

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Other Flight Control Non-Normals:

[ ] FLIGHT CONTROLS:
Condition: One or more of these occur:
 2 or more flight control surfaces are inoperative.
 Other faults in flight control system are detected.
Note: Land at nearest suitable and do not accomplish following checklist: [ ] SPOILERS

[ ] PITCH DOWN AUTHORITY:

Condition: Pitch down authority is restricted.
 ie Only limited elevator pitch down authority, so avoid speedbrake use and rapid thrust increases.

[ ] PITCH UP AUTHORITY:
Condition: Pitch up and flare authority is restricted.
 ie Only limited elevator pitch up authority.
 Worst case: this may lead to a Flaps 5 and VREF+40 approach and landing .

FLIGHT CONTROL VALVE:

Condition: One or more of these occur:
 One or more flight control shutoff valves are failed closed
 One or more flight control shutoff switches are in shutoff
See Hydraulics: ‘Flight Control Hydraulic Power’.

[ ] SPOILERS:
Condition: One or more spoiler pairs are failed.
 Roll rate may be reduced.
 Speedbrake effectiveness may be reduced in flight and during landing.

Jammed Flight Controls: UNANNUNCIATED

Condition: Flight controls are jammed or restricted in roll, pitch or yaw.
 Use maximum force to overcome restriction.

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Flight Envelope Protections – NORMAL Mode only: (see ‘Normal Mode’ Summary)

 Stall Protection:
o Think of as a three stage process: Trim Limitation followed by A/T
active response, followed by A/P active response.

STAGE 1:
o VMIN MAN = minimum speed to which the airplane can be trimmed (via
switch or lever).
o Note: Moving the alternate pitch trim levers during stall or overspeed
protection does move the stabilizer, but does not remove column
forces (Ref FCOM 9.20.11). ie Trim authority will always be limited.
o IAS < VMIN MAN  EICAS AIRSPEED LOW (~ ½ amber band).
o Control column force increased to higher than normal for equivalent
out-of-trim condition.
STAGE 2:
o Augmented by autothrottle if armed and not activated:
 A/T activates just prior to stick shaker / Pitch Limit Indicators.
 SPD or THR REF mode to maintain VMIN MAN.
 If Pitch Mode FLCH or TOGA: wakeup inhibited <400ft AAL (T/O); <100ft RA (Ldg).
o Augmented by Autoslat with Flaps 1 to 20 (Primary Mode only)
STAGE 3:
o Stick shaker activates at Barber’s Pole, …….which also triggers AP active response of……….
 FD occultation, ……………and, if no recovery attempt made and no A/T wakeup…..
 Autopilot Pitch Mode degradation (if autopilot engaged):
 EICAS AUTOPILOT plus _ ALT _ or VNAV PTH
 Autopilot will now pitch down ac in attempt to regain VMIN MAN
 Cycle of shaker followed by AP pitch down repeats until pilot response or crash.
 See Autoflight: ‘AP & FD Mode Degradations’.

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 Bank Angle Protection:

o Kicks in for bank angles exceeding approximately 35° by applying countering wheel force to
return to 30° AOB.
o AOB Indicator turns amber.
o Force can be overridden  Max wheel deflection will always produce max surface deflection.
 Pilot must apply back pressure to maintain level flight above 30° AOB.
 Up to 30° AOB, ac auto-trims.
o Note: Rate of roll recovery back to 30° AOB is proportional to rate at which pilot exceeded it in
first place. Rapid exceedance = Rapid recovery, and vice-versa.
o Disabled by AP Disengage Bar on MCP. (See Autoflight: ‘AP Summary’)

 Overspeed Protection:
o Think of as a two stage process: Trim Limitation followed by AP active response.

STAGE 1:
o IAS > VMO / MMO  EICAS OVERSPEED.
o VMO / MMO = Maximum IAS / Mach to which the airplane can be trimmed nose down (via switch or
lever).
 Note: Moving the alternate pitch trim levers during stall or overspeed protection does move
the stabilizer, but does not remove column forces (Ref FCOM 9.20.11). ie Trim authority will
always be limited.
 A/T logic provides for more aggressive control of speed as ac approaches VMO/ MMO.
However, some conditions beyond capability of A/T system to prevent short term
overspeeds. (FCTM 8.23)

 As airspeed increases above VMO, forward column pressure must be maintained to remain
above VMO. Release pressure and the airplane will pitch up iaw trimmed speed. (FCTM 7.2)

STAGE 2:
o Active response by autopilot occurs at VMO + 25K (ie quite high overspeed) and causes FDs to
occult and aircraft to pitch up more aggressively (compared to simple out-of-trim condition) to
regain VMO/MMO. It can still be overridden by pilot.
 See Autoflight: ‘AP & FD Mode Degradations’.
o Technique: Leave AP engaged unless not correcting. Use partial speedbrake rather than thrust
idle.

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‘Augmented’ Functions – NORMAL MODE only: (see ‘Normal Mode’ Summary)

 Tail Strike Protection (GE Variants Only):

o PFCs limit elevator deflection if tail strike imminent.
o No feedback to control column.
o Note: All Variants  EICAS [ ] TAIL STRIKE if tail strike detected by blade proximity
sensors.
o See: Ldg Gear: ‘Tail Skid’.
And: Warning Systems: ‘Tail Strike Detection System’.

 Thrust Asymmetry Compensation (TAC):

o > 70knots on Ground  Detects thrust difference of > 10%.
o Before T/O: TAC provides partial compensation only, to allow recognition of failed engine.
o After T/O: TAC attempts to provide full compensation.
o Unavailable during Thrust Reverse or following loss of engine thrust data.
o EICAS [ ] THRUST ASYM COMP:
 Condition: TAC is failed or OFF.
 See Flt Management: ‘EICAS [ ] NAV AIR DATA SYS’ for one possible cause.
o Warning: TAC may disengage in event of severe engine damage or surge if it is
unable to determine accurate thrust level.

 Wheel to Rudder Cross-Tie:

o Allows initial control of effects of engine failure through control wheel alone.
o Operative in flight < 210K.
o Cross-tie deflects rudder up to 8°.

 Gust Suppression:
o Reduces effects of lateral gusts through combination of roll and yaw commands.
o No control feedback.

 Yaw Damping:
o Turn coordination and Dutch roll damping.
o Limited capability in some cases in Secondary Mode.

 Manual Trim Cancel Switch:

o Returns trim to zero at High Rate.
o Has no effect on TAC rudder trim inputs.

For all Slat / Flap related protections, see later sub-section………………

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Trim:

Pitch Trim Switches (Control Wheel):

 Spring-loaded to neutral  both must be pressed to operate.
 NORMAL Mode in flight  changes Trim Reference Speed (TRS).
 Elevator moves iaw set TRS and then Stab auto adjusts in order to streamline elevator
 NORMAL Mode on ground 
Always moves stabilizer directly.
 SECONDARY & DIRECT Modes 
 Control Column does not move with pitch trim operation in any mode.
 Inhibited with AP engaged.

ALTN Pitch Trim Levers (Control Stand):

 Levers hard-wired to Stabilizer actuators  Levers override switches.
 Spring-loaded to neutral  both must be moved.
 NORMAL Mode in flight  changes TRS and moves stabilizer directly.
 NORMAL Mode on ground 
Always moves stabilizer directly.
 SECONDARY & DIRECT Modes 
 Control Column does not move with trim operation in any mode.
 Will move Stab when AP engaged. Do not use (or during Stall / Overspeed Protection).

Aileron Trim Switch:

 Spring-loaded to neutral  both must be pressed.
 Moves ailerons, flaperons, spoilers directly.
 Control Wheel does move.
 Inhibited with AP engaged.
Rudder Trim Selector:
 Spring-loaded to neutral  Higher trim rate past first detent.
 Rudder pedals do move.
 Manual Trim Cancel operates in NORMAL & SECONDARY only.
Takeoff Trim Green Band: Displays allowable takeoff trim based on………
o Gross Weight.
o Takeoff Thrust.
o CG.
 Defaults to mid-range when:
o No information.
o V1 not selected or entered.
 Greenband and pointer occult if Stabilizer signal not present or invalid.
 EICAS [ ] STAB GREENBAND: (Also see Warning Systems: ‘CONFIG STABILIZER’)
o Condition: Nose gear pressure oleo disagrees with computed stab greenband

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Stabilizer (STAB) Cutout Switches:

NORM  C & R Hydraulics supplied to related STAB Trim Control Module (TCM).
 Auto shutoff if unscheduled STAB motion or other failure detected.
 EICAS STABIIZER C
 EICAS STABILIZER R
 EICAS [ ] STABILZER if both failed or auto shutoff.
CUTOUT Respective C or R Hydraulic source shutoff to related STAB TCM.
 EICAS [ ] STABILZER becomes STABILIZER CUTOUT if both Stabilizer Cutout Switches are in
CUTOUT

Note: In NORMAL MODE only, via Pitch Trim Switches only (not ALTN Levers), pitch trim remains available
following Stabilizer failure. This is the only mode that moves Elevators for pitch trim. All other modes (and in all
modes if using Alt Trim Levers) the Stabilizer is moved directly and hence will not work.

Speedbrake:

‘Fail-safes’ on Ground: EICAS SPEEDBRAKE EXTENDED:

Condition: The speedbrakes are extended
Either Thrust Lever  TO/GA …………………. and one or more of these occur:
 Speedbrake Lever moves DOWN.  The radio altitude is between 15 and
800ft
 All spoilers (1 to 14) retract.
 The flap lever is in a landing setting
Either Reverse Thrust Lever  Reverse Idle Detent ………  A thrust lever is not at idle.
For Autoland (ie NASA), it doesn’t mean any
 Speedbrake Lever moves UP. of the above, but is warning that S/B may
 All spoilers (1 to 14) extend. extend during balked landing due to fault.
Hence Go Around.

Automatic Speedbrakes:
EICAS [ ] AUTO SPEEDBRAKE:
Operate on Landing, provided S/B Lever - ARMED …
Condition: Auto speedbrake fault has
 Speedbrake Lever moves UP. occurred:
 All spoilers (1 to 14) extend.
 Do not pre-arm in flight.
Note: Not available in SECONDARY or DIRECT  Manually extend after landing
Modes.
See Flt Management: ‘EICAS [ ] NAV AIR
DATA SYS’
Which Spoilers act as Speedbrakes?

 NORMAL Flight Control Mode: Spoilers 5 & 10 operate as Speedbrakes on ground only.
 SECONDARY or DIRECT Modes: Spoilers 4, 5, 10 & 11 locked out from use as Speedbrakes.

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High Lift Devices – Flaps & Slats:

Three Modes of Slat / Flap Operation:

1. PRIMARY: Via Flap Lever.

o Slats & Flaps hydraulically operated by C Hyd.
o Position Indicator:
 From instant Flap Lever moved out of UP, until Retraction + 10 secs.
 Shows continuous motion.
 Commanded position = MAGENTA; Actual = GREEN
o Protections:
 Inadvertent Deployment – altitude & speed cap.
 Flap/Slat Asymmetry Detection.
 Uncommanded Flap/Slat Motion.
 Autoslats.
 Flap Load Relief  EICAS LOAD RELIEF. (See ‘Flaps/Slats Load Relief’)
 Note: Slat Load relief not necessary due to 2-stage extension.

2. SECONDARY: Via Flap Lever.

o Slats and/or Flaps electrically operated if…………..
 Hyd operation fails: [ ] FLAPS PRIMARY FAIL and/or [ ] SLATS PRIMARY FAIL, or
 As an opening gambit in the event that Uncommanded motion detected:
 If Uncommanded motion persists, then expect [ ] FLAPS DRIVE or [ ] SLATS DRIVE
 Powered by Main (Eng or APU) or Backup Gens, never by Standby Elec Sys.

o Expanded Position Indicator appears as soon as fault condition detected.

 Outline and fill turns amber A/R for: [ ] FLAPS DRIVE or [ ] SLATS DRIVE
 White outline only if position information lost.
 Full slats and flaps remain available, however…..
 Flaps 20 used for Ldg in event of [ ] FLAPS PRIMARY FAIL, only to provide for
better Go Around performance, rather than position limitation.

o Remaining Protections:
 Inadvertent Deployment – altitude & speed cap.
 Flap/Slat Asymmetry Detection.
 Uncommanded Flap/Slat Motion.
 No Autoslats  Slats always extend to full (IAS permitting), even if Flaps alone are
degraded to 2ry Mode. (See Note 1 below)
 Slat-only Load Relief  EICAS LOAD RELIEF (See Note 2 and ‘Flaps/Slats Load Relief’)

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Notes re Secondary Mode Protections:

1. Slats always extend to full to avoid danger of rapid stall onset, (during extension if the Slats are
degraded, or during retraction if the Flaps are degraded), whereby too little Slats versus Flaps
(especially at Flaps 25/30) will result in precarious CL MAX / Alpha curve.

2. Note: Needed because of full (ie Single Stage) slat extension.

3. ALTERNATE: Via ALTN FLAPS ARM and Selector.

o EICAS [ ] FLAP/SLAT CONTROL
 Condition: The flap/slat electronics have failed
o Slats & Flaps electrically operated (sources same as Secondary Mode).
 Max FLAP 20.
 Max Slat Midrange.
 Simultaneous extension, but Slat retraction inhibited until Flaps UP.
 As with Secondary Mode, but probably less acute, this is to prevent an undesirable situation whereby too
little Slat is deployed versus Flap.
o Remaining Protections: Nil

Loss of Position Information:

Whichever the Flaps/Slat Mode in effect, loss of position information will result in Position Indicator
becoming white outline only, with no white fill, and no MAGENTA (commanded) or GREEN (actual)
position lines.

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Flaps/Slats Extension Schedule:

 Slats always extend first and retract last, to maintain safe lift curve.
 Flap extension is limited to Flaps 20 if slats are not fully extended. (Not in FCOM but FCTM 8.12)

o This limit is reflected in [ ] SLATS DRIVE NNC.

Lever Flaps
Position
Slats Flap Lever Detents:
UP UP UP  FLAP 1  to avoid inadvertent
1 UP Slat retraction.
5 5  FLAP 20  to avoid inadvertent
Midrange
15 15 Flaps retraction beyond G/A
20 20
position.
25 25
Full
30 30

Notes:
 2-position Krueger Flaps extend with Slats.
 Secondary Mode: Autoslat unavailable 
Slats always extend to Full (unless speed
exceeds 215-256K (variant dependent)

ALTN FLAPS ARM Switch:

 (Blank)  Flap Lever controls Slats / Flaps.
 ALTN  If pressed…….
o Arms Alternate Flap Control Mode.
o Arms Alternate Flaps Selector.
o Disables Primary & Secondary Slats/Flap operation.
o Disable Flap Lever.
o Functions Lost:
 Asymmetry/Skew protection.
 Uncommanded Motion protection.
 Autoslat.
 Flap / Slat Load Relief.

Alternate Flaps Selector:

 RET / EXT - Slats & Flaps electrically retracted or extended.
 OFF - Alternate Flaps deactivated. Flap Lever is ‘live’.

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Slat/Flap Protections (PRIMARY & SECONDARY Slat/Flap Modes):

 Protection against Inadvertent Deployment  Altitude & Speed Cap:

Flap/Slat deployment inhibited……..
o Above approx. 20000ft, or
o At speeds exceeding 250-275K (variant dependent).

 Flap / Slat Asymmetry Detection:

If asymmetric slat/flap extension or retraction detected………..
o Appropriate drive shutdown:
 EICAS [ ] FLAPS DRIVE, or
 EICAS [ ] SLATS DRIVE, as appropriate.
o Note: loss of all but the outermost slats is detected (according to FCOM 9.20.22)
o Do not use ALTERNATE MODE, as you will lose all further asymmetry protection.

 Uncommanded Flap / Slat Motion:

If Uncommanded or contrary slat/flap motion detected…………….
o PRIMARY Mode:
 Auto reversion to SECONDARY Mode:
 EICAS [ ] FLAPS PRIMARY FAIL, or
 EICAS [ ] SLATS PRIMARY FAIL, as appropriate.
o SECONDARY Mode:
 If motion continues, appropriate system shutdown:
 EICAS [ ] FLAPS DRIVE, or
 EICAS [ ] SLATS DRIVE, as appropriate.
o Do not use ALTERNATE MODE, as you will lose all further asymmetry protection.

 Autoslat:
o PRIMARY Mode:
 Armed with FLAPS 1 to 20.
 Activated by stall warning system.
 Slats auto-extend from Mid-range to Full-range.
 Auto retract to Mid once stall signal removed.
o SECONDARY Mode:
 Autoslat not available  instead, slats always extend to Full, provided speed not
exceeding 215-256K, variant dependent.

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 Flap/Slat Load Relief:

o PRIMARY Mode:
 Flaps-only Load Relief:
 Flaps 15 to 30: Auto flap retraction to appropriate setting for speed (Min Flaps 5)
 EICAS LOAD RELIEF
 Auto re-extension to commanded flap position as soon as IAS allows.
 Slat load relief is un-necessary in PRIMARY (or ALTN) Modes.
(See ‘Primary Mode’)

o SECONDARY Mode:
 Slats–only Load Relief:
 Slats retract to Mid-range if IAS exceeds 215-256K (variant dependent)
 EICAS LOAD RELIEF.
(See ‘Secondary Mode’)

Notes:
 Slat Load Relief is required in 2ry Mode because Slats move straight to Full for all Flaps
settings in Secondary Mode, even if the surface degraded to 2ry Mode is Flaps, not Slats.
 This is to avoid danger of rapid stall onset, (during extension if the Slats are degraded, or
during retraction if the Flaps are degraded), whereby too little Slats versus Flaps (especially
at Flaps 25/30) will result in precarious CL MAX / Alpha curve.
 ALTN mode prevents a similar situation by ensuring Slats do not retract from Midrange until
Flaps have fully retracted to UP.

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10. Flight Instruments, Displays

Relevant Bulletins:
 EKIB-24  Magnetic Variation Differences Event 
o With switch in MAG, magnetic bearing differences seen between LEGS and FIX pages. 
o Fault disappears with switch in TRUE. 
 EKIB-30  TCAS Operation and Display of Traffic.
 EKIB-35R1  Excessive Ground Returns – Rockwell Collins Wx Rdr
 EKIB-39  Momentary EICAS TCAS OFF indications.
 EKIB-43  Undetected erroneous radar altimeter  Keep hand on TLs during approach.
 EKIB-50  Multiscan Wx Rdr Operation.

Note: This section is highly abridged, based on suggested Tech Exam questions only.

Display Sources: (GE Models shown)

Normally: …… & following EICAS [ ] NAV ADIRU INERTIAL:

The display system automatically reconfigures to compensate for most faults. The instrument display
source select panels provide manual switches for the pilots to use if certain faults are not corrected
automatically.

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Flight Instruments, Displays - Non-Normals:

[ ] ALTN ATTITUDE:
 Condition: Both pilots’ AIR DATA/ATT source switches are in ALTN.
o SAARU providing Attitude data to both PFDs (and to Standby AI for RR models).
o Also see ‘NAV AIR DATA SYS – Amplified Procedures’.

BARO SET DISAGREE:

 Condition: The captain’s and FO’s barometric settings disagree.

DISPLAY SELECT PNL:

 Condition: L, C or R CDU control of the display select panel is used.

[ ] EFIS CONTROL PANEL L,R:

 Condition: Either the EFIS control panel is failed, or CDU control of the EFIS is used.

SGL SOURCE AIR DATA:

 Condition: Both PFDs use the same (single channel) air data source.
o ie Both using single channel ADIRU or single channel SAARU data.
o See ‘ADIRU’ and ‘Flight Management, Navigation - Non-Normals’
 No Autoland.
o Autoland is not technically feasible in this condition, and is thus not listed as prohibited at
LIM.10.11. Instead, we would expect to see EICAS Advisory NO AUTOLAND.

[ ] SGL SOURCE DISPLAYS:

 Condition: Some or all display units use a single source of display data.
o Usually displays are supplied by separate graphics generators.
 No Autoland:
o Autoland technically feasible, but prohibited by LIM.10.11, due to inability to crosscheck
data.  See ‘Flight Management, Navigation - Non-Normals’.

SGL SOURCE RAD ALT:

 Condition: Both PFDs use the same radio altimeter source (out of the 3 fitted)
 No Autoland:
o Autoland technically feasible, but prohibited by LIM.10.11, due to inability to crosscheck
data.  See ‘Flight Management, Navigation - Non-Normals’.

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SINGLE SOURCE F/D:

 Condition: Both PFDs use the same flight director source (out of the 3 AFDCs fitted)
 No Autoland (?):
o Autoland with only one AFDC is not technically feasible, and is thus not listed as
prohibited at LIM.10.11. Instead, we would expect to see EICAS Advisory NO
AUTOLAND.
o See ‘Flight Management, Navigation - Non-Normals’.

Assorted Trivia:

 Landing Altitude Indication appears on PFD at……………………after 400NM, or halfway to

destination, whichever occurs first.

 ‘L’ or ‘R’ next to PFD Barometric reading indicates which EFIS control
panel is providing the barometric setting reference for the AP and/or FD.

 POS switch on EFIS displays GPS and ADIRU positions and VOR raw
radials.
o  GPS Position.
o  ADIRU Position.

 Glideslope Deviation Alert:

o Occurs at low radio altitude after Glideslope capture, with AP or FD engaged:
 GS scale turns amber.
 GS pointer flashes.

 Pitch Limit Indicators appear when, either:

o Flaps not UP, or
o Flaps UP, at slow airspeed.

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 Weather returns can be displayed on the following ND formats:

o MAP – Centred and Expanded.
o VOR and APP – Expanded only (as centred display would be too
cluttered)
o Never PLN Format.

 Turbulence Display:
o Old Radar – Honeywell RDR-4:
 Turbulence displays only with ND display ranges of 40nm or less.
o New Radar - Rockwell Collins RDR-4000:
 Turbulence displays with any selectable range scale, but shows only to 40nm.

Rockwell Collins RDR-4000 Multiscan Radar:

 For detailed System and Operating information, refer to EKIB-50 – ‘MultiScan Wx Rdr Operation:
Difference between AUTO & MAN operation’ (and also EKIB-47 – ‘Ice Crystal Icing’).

 Overflight protection:
o Weather returns down to 6000ft below aircraft are displayed from memory to give conservative
overflight protection.
o Multiscan has “coast” feature, allowing pilot to switch momentarily to manual tilt. Provided
Auto is reselected within 38secs, the radar remembers the settings and will not reinitialise.

 Ground Clutter (GC):

o GC button is inoperative whilst Manual Tilt selected.

 Radar Shadow:
o Never fly into radar shadow!

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 Predictive Windshear Symbol can be displayed on the following ND formats:

o MAP – Centred and Expanded.
o VOR and APP – Expanded only (as centred display would be too cluttered)
o Never PLN.

 Airspeed Trend Vector displays 10sec prediction.

 Position Trend Vector  each dash represents 30, 60 & 90 secs ahead.
o 20nm scale shows only 2 segments; 10nm scale shows only 1.

 Green Range Arc is based on VS and GS, but not IAS.

 Position Update (On ND next to right Navaid tuning) – indicates the system
providing FMC position updating.

 VNAV Path Deviation Scale:

o Descent only
o Displays + 400ft as needle and then just numerical data

 Map Source Annunciation:

o Displays ND source on ND if:
 CDU is selected on respective NAV Source select switch, or
 Both FMCs fail, or
 Manually selected FMC fails.
o In effect, CDU (via ALT LEGS, RAD NAV & PROG) instead of FMC now responsible for
navigation

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11. Flight Management, Navigation

Relevant Bulletins:

 EAD-88R2  Un-commanded turns in LNAV  Push HDG SEL - DIRECT TO – LNAV

 EAD-92R1  Setting STEP Size to Zero When No Further Step Climbs Planned.
 EAD-95R1  Conflict with Duplicate Wpts with Same Ident in Nav Database.
 EAD-96  FMC Distance to Waypoint Anomaly  When executing DIRECT TO first waypoint
 EAD-97R3  Latching Dual FMC Failures (AIMS BPv16)  Before any flight using downlink, check
POS REF 3/3  Check which FMC is PRI. Set FMC Master to PRI side. Reset to AUTO
during entry of arrival procedure, and prior to TOD.
 EAD-98  MCP Altitude changing without pilot action.
 EAD-102R2  Uncommanded Autothrottle Movement during Cruise Flight  Often accompanied by
erroneous EICAS FUEL LOW TEMP. Briefly set FMC to L or R, then back to AUTO prior to
engine start. Affects RR with AIMS-1 BP v14 or v15  A6-EMD thru A6–EMX.
 EAD-109  Multi-Mode Receiver (MMR) ILS Frequency Disagreement  EICAS NO LAND 3 and
‘ambered’ ILS frequency and horizontal line on PFD for affected side. See bulletin for full
verification procedure and subsequent Autoland capabilities.
 EKIB-10R5  Alternate CG takeoff performance  Explanation of theory.

 EKIB-24  Magnetic Variation Differences Event.

o With switch in MAG, magnetic bearing differences seen between LEGS and FIX pages. 
o Fault disappears with switch in TRUE. 
 EKIB-33R4  Use of Barometric VNAV for Instrument Approach Operations using DA.
 EKIB-41R4  AIMS BP V14 and V15 description.
 EKIB-43  Undetected erroneous radar altimeter  Keep hand on TLs during approach.
 EKIB-53  Honeywell Smart Rwy and Smart Ldg System: Reasons for EICAS RUNWAY POS
and EICAS RUNWAY SYS advisories.  They are there for correct technical reason, but don’t
worry about them.

 EKIB-55R1  FMC Cruise CG  In order to enhance operational flexibility when required, crew may insert the
more forward of a) ZFW CG or b) TOW CG as CRZ CG value into the FMC.

GPS:

 2 x GPS Receivers – L & R.

o GPS Data can be disabled on POS REF PG 3/3.

Radio Navigation:

 Rad Nav Inhibit  INIT REF  NAV DATA.

ILS:

 Three Multi Mode Receivers (MMRs) receivers, usually auto-tuned by FMC.

o Backup manual tuning available by Left and Right CDUs (not Centre).
 See ILS Signal Interference Monitor………..moved to Autopilot section, though strictly part of FCOM Chapter 11.

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ADIRU:

 ADIRU supplies primary flight data, inertial reference, and air data.

 ADIRU alignment takes 6-15mins, latitude dependent. Mean is 10mins.

o EICAS MEMO ADIRU ALIGN MODE
o Complete alignment recommended whenever total expected time in NAV mode >24hrs.
o Scratchpad ALIGNMENT REINITIATED appears if position entry fails internal check twice.

 ADIRU is fault–tolerant and fully redundant.

 ADIRU Data Sources include:

o 3 x Pitot-Static Systems (L, C, R), provided by 8 Air Data Modules in total.
o 2 x AOA Vanes.
o 1 x TAT Probe.
 Note: Static air temperature, displayed on the CDU PROGRESS page, comes from the
ADIRU, using total air temperature probe information. If the ADIRU value is invalid, the
SAARU computed value is used instead.

 ADIRU and SAARU receive identical data from the 3 x sources but crunch independently.
o Air data is valid when two or more sources agree in the ADIRU, SAARU, or both.

 In flight, system logic prevents ADIRU depowering if switch inadvertently switched off.

 Wheel Bay Warning Horn:  sounds if………………..:

o ADIRU - On, and
o Primary Power removed from AC, and
o Battery Switch OFF
o ON BAT illuminates & ADIRU remains connected to HOT BATT BUS  Battery drain.

SAARU:

 SAARU = 2ry source of critical flight data for displays, flight control systems, and other systems.
o If ADIRU fails, SAARU automatically supplies attitude, heading, and air data – but not Inertial!
o SAARU heading must be manually slewed to Standby Compass magnetic heading periodically.

 SAARU is only Attitude source for Standby AI.

 SAARU power-up completed automatically at airplane power up.

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Flight Management, Navigation - Non-Normals:

[ ] FMC:
Ref EAD97-R1 – Dual Latching Failures:
 Condition: One of these occurs:
If operating with the FMC Selector in L or R
o The FMC selector is in L and the left FMC is failed. and the selected FMC fails, move the FMC
o The FMC selector is in R and the right FMC is failed. Selector to the opposite FMC to restore FMC
functionality.
o Both FMCs are failed. Bizarrely, the [ ] FMC NNC does not include
this as first step!
 See ‘FMC – Amplified Procedures’ .

FMC L, R:
 Condition: An FMC is failed.

[ ] GPS:

 Condition: Both GPS receivers are failed.

o A single failure would cause only a GPS Status.
 FMC uses inertial updating only, unless Radio updating is enabled.
o NNC offers choice of re-enabling radio updating  but MEL actually requires it.
 SP.20.3 details navigation capability remaining:
o Terminal RNAV1 or 2 (SID, STAR, Trans) permitted provided radio updating assured.
o FMS rwy position updating during takeoff provides 15mins of RNAV1 capability.
o CPDLC/ADS ops not possible, as at least 1 GPS required.
o No RNAV approaches.

[ ] ILS ANTENNA:
 Two or more ILS receivers do not use the correct antenna
 AFDS may have difficulty capturing LOC or GS
 Ac may be lower than indicated on GS!
o Best to execute a Non-ILS approach, though not expressly directed by NNC.
o EICAS NO AUTOLAND is likely.

[ ] NAV ADIRU INERTIAL:

 Condition: ADIRU cannot supply correct attitude, position, hdg, trk and GS data.
 See ‘NAV ADIRU INERTIAL – Amplified Procedures’ .

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[ ] NAV AIR DATA SYS - or [ ] AIR DATA SYS (with AIMS BP v17):
 Condition: The three air data sources (ie L, C, R) disagree (within both ADIRU and SAARU).
 Information from the air data sources is no longer being combined for display.
 See ‘NAV AIR DATA SYS – Amplified Procedures’ .

[ ] NAV UNABLE RNP:

 Condition: Actual navigational performance is not sufficient.

 Double check whether routing includes specific RNP alerting requirement. ATC may require
rerouting.

SGL SOURCE AIR DATA:

 Condition: Both PFDs use the same (single channel) air data source.
o ie Both using single channel ADIRU or single channel SAARU data.
 No Autoland.
o Note: FCOM LIM.10.11 only lists Single Source EICASs prohibiting Autoland where
otherwise autoland remains technically feasible. ie:
 [ ] SGL SOURCE DISPLAYS  See ‘EICAS SGL SOURCE DISPLAYS’.
 SGL SOURCE RAD ALT  See ‘EICAS SGL SOURCE RAD ALT’.
 SINGLE SOURCE ILS  See ‘EICAS SINGLE SOURCE ILS’.
o Autoland is not technically feasible in this condition, and is thus not listed. Instead, we
would expect to see EICAS Advisory NO AUTOLAND.

SINGLE SOURCE ILS:

 Condition: Both pilots’ displays use the same ILS source.
 No Autoland:
o ILS Cat 1 only.
o Autoland not feasible if only one operative ILS. Also prohibited by LIM.10.11.

[ ] VNAV STEP CLIMB: (with AIMS BP v17 ac only)

 Condition: A FMC-predicted or manually-entered VNAV step climb point has sequenced and the
climb has not started.
 Objective: To update the VNAV profile so the FMC fuel and ETA predictions are accurate.

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EICAS [ ] FMC  Amplified Procedure: (ie following Dual AIMS FAIL)

AUTOPILOT THR REF LNAV VNAV PTH

Dual FMC Failure – What’s Available?
[ ] FMC
LNAV, but not VNAV.
1. If FMC Selector was in L or R, try opposite position to
restore functionality. Or else……… (Ref EAD97R3)
ADIRU, but not GPS Navigation. IINERTIALI
2. [ ] FMC Non-normal Checklist  See ‘[ ] FMC’.
Both CDUs, but ALTN pages only.
3. Autopilot remains engaged in Basic Modes.
4. ALT pages available as follows: LOC/APP AP modes are still available.
 ALTN NAV LEGS
 ALTN NAV PROG
 ALTN NAV RADIO
 displayed on ND to show that CDU, rather than FMC, responsible for nav.

5. Check LEGS to view ALTN NAV LEGS pg. NAV inputs require 13 char LAT/LONG.
 N5345.1E05034.2
o CDU retains original route except for conditional wpts, which are replaced with DISCONs.
o Lat/Longs (plus Fix Identifiers included in original route) are only acceptable modifications.
o Track to first Wpt is Magnetic (°M). Subsequent Wpt tracks are True (°T).
o Mods do not appear across both CDUs until modification is executed.
6. Select an alternative Roll Mode - eg HDG SEL
7. Reselect LNAV. VNAV cannot be engaged.
8. If Arrival was not already entered in CDU:
 Too late now – must manually tune ILS and fly with ND in APP Mode to see DME data.
 No VREF or VFLAPS calculated  need to calculate from OPT (or QRH PI) & [ ] FMC Checklist.
 Ldg Altitude - set manually.
9. GPS:
 GPS doesn't fail, so GS and Wind still displayed on PFD; however, no way to use GPS within
navigation solution. All navigation now based on INS positions from ADIRU.
10. Tuning: Via ALT NAV RADIO
 Left CDU to tune left and centre ILS (must tune both); and left VOR. Both CDUs
 Right CDU to tune right ILS; and right VOR. must match
 EFIS must be set to APP Mode for DME to tune ILS-paired DME, otherwise will pair VOR.
11. Approach:
 Fly SOP ILS appch with autopilot, but with ND set to APP mode, else no DME info displayed.
 VREF30 from OPT.
12. Predictions:
 No fuel predictions  Use DIST / OFP GS x FF.
 No cruise recommendations.
 No App Ref information  Use QRH or OPT and table from NNC
13. Contingencies:
 Unable NATS MNPS (Ref SP.22.5)
 Able long range navigation, but unable RNP/RNAV (Ref SP.20.2)
 Able RVSM, as we can remain at correct FL using ALT HOLD or VS/FPA (Ref SP.21.1)

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EICAS [ ] NAV AIR DATA SYS  Amplified Procedure: ([ ] AIR DATA SYS with AIMS BP v17)
 Condition: The three air data sources (ie L, C, R) disagree (within both ADIRU and SAARU).
o Both ADIRU and SAARU data invalid.
 Single channel operation of PFDs:
 CM1 from ADIRU Left Channel.
 CM2 from SAARU Right channel.
This is an instrument failure. Divert to good wx for FLAPS 20, manually flown, Raw Data Appch.

 Ramifications include:
o [ ] FLT CONTROL MODE  See Flt Ctrls: ‘Secondary Mode’.
o [ ] AUTO SPEEDBRAKE  See Flt Ctrls: ‘EICAS [ ] Auto Speedbrake’.
o [ ] THRUST ASYM COMP  See Flt Ctrls: ‘EICAS [ ] THRUST ASYM COMP’.
o AUTOPILOT + No Flight Directors
o NO AUTOLAND
o AUTOTHROTTLE
 Combined together, these mean:
o Flaps 20, Raw Data, manually flown approach – but magenta line remains on ND MAP Mode.
o FPV can be displayed, but do not use.
o Manual Thrust Wind Additives = (½ x Steady Headwind) + (1x Gust Increment)(Up to Max 20K)
o Apply OPT ‘FLT CONTROL MODE’ NNC, as there is no OPT NNC for NAV AIR DATA SYS.
o No Envelope protections and simplified control laws (due to Secondary Mode):
 Degraded Yaw damper capability remains.
o No TAC.
o No PFD Flap Manoeuvring Speeds:
 Use OPT to determine VREF30 and NNC table to calculate other MNVR speeds.
 Prepare figures in advance on scrap paper.
o Go Around with Flaps 20, manually set TO/GA. Call: “Go Around. Set Go Around Thrust”
 AIR DATA / ATT Switches:
o Refer to QRH PI ‘Flight with Unreliable Airspeed’ to assess data sources.
o May be switched to ALTN if related PFD appears to show erroneous air data.
o Logically, as PFDs are using separate sources, this allows good data to be shared, and bad
data to be dismissed.
 Affected PFD will ‘borrow’ the same single channel air data source being used on the
opposite side. ie Right PFD would borrow L ADIRU data / Left PFD would borrow R
SAARU data. In either case, SAARU, rather than ADIRU, will now provide ATT data.
 If both AIR DATA / ATT switches set to ALTN, expect EICAS [ ] ALTN ATTITUDE.
 This would be a pointless exercise, simply redistributing any erroneous data.
 See EICAS [ ] ALTN ATTITUDE.

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EICAS [ ] NAV ADIRU INERTIAL  Amplified Procedure:

 Condition: ADIRU cannot supply correct attitude, position, Hdg, Trk and GS data.
o SAARU supplies ATT data to PFD and 3 mins of hdg based on ADIRU hdg prior to failure.
o GPS continues to give position and track  so follow magenta line using HDG/TRK SEL.
 Tell ATC performance is degraded (See SP.20.3 for flt phase requirements)

 If Oceanic, regularly plot GPS.

o CDU POS INIT page 1 displays the SET HDG prompt 3 minutes later.
 Use SET HDG prompt to periodically set the SAARU heading to the standby
compass magnetic heading. There are no other prompts.
This is an instrument failure. Divert to good wx for Raw Data approach, using Hdg/VS Mode AP.

 Following functions impacted by failure of inertial reference portion of the ADIRU:

o EICAS NO AUTOLAND
o Inoperative AFDS Modes:
 LNAV/VNAV  LOC/GS.
 FPA.  TRK HOLD.
 TO/GA  But Autothrottle does work, so press TO/GA for thrust, then climb away
using basic modes.

o Inoperative Navigation Functions:

 FMC VNAV pages.
 FMC Performance Predictions.
 ND Wind Direction and Speed (wind arrow).
o Inoperative PFD and ND Functions:
 Flap Manoeuvre Speeds  use OPT VREF30 and table in NNC
 Prepare figures in advance on scrap paper.
 PFD heading (unless Stby Compass Hdg set on POS INIT page)
 ND will reference TRK only.
o Autobrake inoperative.
o Transponder ALT SOURCE must be set to ALTN  to use SAARU data.

 Following additional functions lost if GPS information also lost:

o ND Map  Use ND VOR Mode.
o CDU Active Course and Distance  VOR point to point is all you’ve got!
o CDU Direct-to Waypoint
o FMC ALTN  ‘Divert Now’.
o FMC NAV RAD Auto-tuning.  Manually tune navaids.

Provided SAARU Heading is updated/restored, worst-case navigation remains possible via ND

VOR Mode, utilising manually-tuned Rad Nav data.

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12. Fuel

Relevant Bulletins:

 EAD-69R1 - GE  Fuel flow blanking, at or near min idle during descent  No flight crew action
required, provided fuel flow indication blanking occurs only at or near min idle thrust.
 EAD-89R1  Fuel quantity fluctuating/blanking  Pre-flt fuel gross error cx (5% or +2000/-1000kg).
Increasing discrepancies >500kg in 30min = fuel leak
 EAD-106R1  Invalid fuel spar indication following left engine inflight start, or power interrupt to left
Main AC bus  Fuel synoptic will show invalid data. Do not use (on any display) for SA.
 EKIB-5R1  Erroneous use of fuel cross-feed  Only open cross-feed when EICAS says so.

FCOM Limitations:

 Maximum Fuel T = 49°C.

 Minimum Fuel T prior takeoff = -40°C or FP+3°C, whichever higher.
 Minimum In-flight Fuel T = FP + 3°C. (Fuel System Icing Inhibitor additives do not change limit).
 Main tanks must be scheduled to be full if centre tank fuel is loaded.
o Centre tank may contain up to 1360kg with less than full main tanks provided centre fuel plus
AZFW does not exceed MZFW and CG limits are observed.

Fuel Capacity:

Mains Centre Total Centre Empty by

-200 28300 37700 94300 7000

-200ER / -300 29100 79300 137500 16000

-200LR / -200F / -300ER+ULR 31300 82900 (Aux 5700) 145500 (151200) 36000

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 1 x DC pump in Left Main Tank.  Engine Fuel Valve – Armed by Fuel Control Switch - RUN, but
 Auto-runs on ground whenever: opened by EEC during NORM Start.
o APU Switch – ON  Spar Fuel Valve – opened by Fuel Control Switch - RUN.
o No AC power available.
 Auto-runs in flight whenever:  2 x AC pumps in each Main Tank.
o Dual Engine Failure and  A single pump is sufficient to supply
o No AC power available. a single engine under all conditions.
 EICAS FUEL PUMP FWD,AFT L,R
and PRESS on affected switch if switch
Off.

 1 x Jettison Pump in
each Main Tank.
 Not usually pictured,
except during jettison.

Fuel Temp turns amber

when approaching Min
Fuel °T set in CDU.

 2 x AC ‘Override’/Jettison pumps in Centre Tank. Higher pressure  2 x Crossfeed valves.

than Main pumps to ensure centre fuel used first. o Either one allows engine fuel feed from
 Dual Role: Also serve as Jettison pumps, provided they are turned opposite tank.
on during jettison. (See ‘Fuel Jettison’)  Valve failure denoted by:
 On Ground: o EICAS [ ] FUEL CROSSFEED FWD,AFT
o With 2 Elec sources, both operate. o VALVE on affected switch.
o Only 1 Elec source, only one operates (ie Pre-start 1st engine).
PRESS on affected switch lit, but EICAS inhibited.
 EICAS FUEL PUMP CENTER L,R (ie Pump Output Low P) and
PRESS on either switch inhibited if pump switch Off.

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Fuel Indications:

a. Normal:

1
b. Expanded:
Expanded Fuel Indications are displayed if…..
1. Either crossfeed valve open, or
2
2. Any quantity indication inoperative, or
3. EICAS FUEL IN CENTER, or
4. EICAS [ ] FUEL QTY LOW, or
5. EICAS [ ] FUEL IMBALANCE 3
6. Airplane is on ground with one or both engine(s) off.
Notes:
“Fuel Balancing may be done in any phase of flight” (FCOM12.20.4)
4
But also refer to FCTM 8.17 for essential considerations when performing fuel
balancing procedures. ie Always use NNC, but beware that unnecessary balancing when
not near imbalance limit increases risks of errors.

5
 is displayed against lowest side if Main Tank imbalance:
o > 500kg, or
o >100kg AND crossfeed open.
Note: These values alone are insufficient to trigger expanded fuel display.

 + EICAS [ ] FUEL IMBALANCE are displayed, instead of , if:

o Fuel imbalance exceeds a trigger value dependent on total fuel remaining.
o flashes if balancing is going in wrong direction.

 FUEL QTY changes briefly (5 secs) to flashing FUEL BALANCED when imbalance reduces <100kg.
o Caution: Prompt very easy to miss, so always time rebalancing – should take roughly 1min per
200kg imbalance, at cruise thrust settings.

c. During Jettison:

(See Fuel Jettison for further detail)

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Scavenge System:

 Scavenge system operates (to transfer residual Centre Tank fuel to Main Tanks ) whenever:
o Main Tank Pumps ON -200 -200ER/-300 All GE
o Either Main Tank quantity less than: 9100 13100 23900
o Centre Tank quantity less than: 4100 15900 15900
o Centre Tank empty by (Total Fuel): 7000 16000 36000
 EICAS [ ] FUEL SCAVENGE SYS:
o [RR] Either main tank <6400kgs and centre tank >200kgs for 15mins.
o [GE] Either main tank <8200kgs and centre tank >200kgs for 15mins.

Centre Fuel  When Should Centre Pumps be turned on before start?

Strictly according to FCOM………
 All RR (as installed) – whenever “centre tank fuel is available”.
 -200 (as installed) – whenever Centre Tank quantity >3.4T.
 -200ER & -300 (as installed), and all GE – whenever Centre Tank quantity > 4.8T.

In reality, follow the ‘During Flight’ advice – simply follow the EICAS FUEL IN CENTER and FUEL LOW
CENTER messages.

Note: The ELMS controls related EICAS Messages and power to the Centre Fuel Pumps to ensure Fuel
Pumps do not run in dry tank. (See Electrical System: ‘ELMS’)

Suction Fuel Feed:

 EICAS [ ] FUEL PRESS ENG L,R

 If both pumps in same main tank fail, affected engine suction fed via line bypassing
pumps………………….however:
o 200kg of fuel remains unusable in affected tank.
o At high altitudes (>38000ft), dissolved air released from fuel collects in line and restricts
fuel flow  Possible thrust deterioration or flameout.
o Risk remains until dissolved air depletes (Rate dependent on alt, Fuel T and Fuel spec).
 NNC Solution:
o At altitudes > 38000ft, open either crossfeed valve and descend.
o Fuel pressure maintained in main tank with failed pumps via pressure of the operative
pumps in the other main tank…………..however, a steady fuel imbalance will develop.
o Once at or below 38000ft, close crossfeed valves and return to suction feed.

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APU Fuel:

 APU fuel provided from left main tank / fuel manifold.

o Any single AC or DC pump in Left Main Tank sufficient.
 On ground:
o When Main Battery first connected on cold aircraft, APU Controller and DC pump are
connected, ready for start.
 See Electrical: ‘Arriving at Unpowered Aircraft’.
o Dedicated DC pump in left main tank runs automatically if:
 APU Switch ON, and
 No AC power available.
o Left FWD AC pump runs automatically (regardless of switch position) if:
 APU Switch ON, and
 AC power available.
 Note: The DC pump also runs automatically in flight following loss of both engines and all AC
power, to allow faster Right Engine Restart.

Nitrogen Generation System (NGS): (Selected GE models only)

 Nitrogen enriched bleed air fed to centre tank during flight and briefly after landing.

 NGS auto-shutdown if…….

o Engine Out, or …………………..to reduce bleed demand off remaining engine.
o Equipment Cooling OFF, or ………to…?REASON?
o Cargo Fire Arm switch ARMED. ………to….?REASON?

 EK currently possesses a mixed-mod fleet re: operation of centre pumps:

o Some RR models (all variants) are un-modded
 EICAS FUEL LOW CENTRE  Manual switch off of centre pumps required.
 This worst case defines our current SOP.
o Remaining RR & all GE models are modded
 Centre pumps auto switch off after 15 seconds continuous low pressure (except
during jettison).
 EICAS drill is redundant.

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Fuel Jettison:

 Fuel is jettisonable from all tanks (in flight only), by means of………
1. 1 x Main Tank Jettison Pump in each Main Tank.
2. 2 x Override/ Jettison Pumps in Centre Tank.
3. 2 x Fuel Jettison Isolation Valves in Centre Tanks.
4. 2 x Fuel Jettison Nozzle Valves inboard of each aileron.

 The jettison ‘route’ for all tanks is via the Refuelling Gallery. However……….
o Turning off one or other of L/R nozzles will have no effect (either way) on main tank
balance, as all it will achieve is to reduce overall jettison rate. Both Main Tanks Jettison
pumps will continue to run, pushing fuel into the gallery at equal rates from their respective
tanks.
o The only method to balance fuel is via the approved QRH NNC [ ] FUEL IMBALANCE.

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1. FUEL JETTISON ARM Switch – ARMED:

 Auto-sets TO REMAIN to MLW fuel quantity.
o Note: Manual setting via FUEL TO REMAIN knob. MAN appears next to value.
 TO REMAIN replaces FUEL TEMP on EICAS (and appears on Fuel Synoptic)
 JETT TIME displays on Fuel Synoptic.
o Note: Time increases with altitude.
 NOTHING ELSE HAPPENS!

2. FUEL JETTISON NOZZLE – L+R – ON………………causes:

 Both Jettison Nozzle Valves to open (in flight only).
 Both Main Tank Jettison Pumps to operate.
 Both Centre Tank Override/Jettison to operate (provided Centre Tank Pumps ON).
 Both Centre Tank Jettison Isolation Valves to open.

NOTE (All variants except -200): If ac is heavy and near forward CG limit, centre tank is
jettisoned first and main tank jettison pump operation is delayed.

3. Jettison stops automatically when…………..

 Value just above TO REMAIN reached, or
 5200kg (or 3800kg – as installed) is remaining in each Main Tank.
In either case:
 Main Tank Jettison Pumps stop.
 Centre Tank Jettison Isolation Valves close………….Unless……………………….

4. EICAS [ ] FUEL AUTO JETTISON:

 Condition: Either…….
o The total fuel quantity remaining is less than or equal to the Fuel-to-Remain and a
jettison nozzle is open, or
o The fuel jettison auto-shutoff has failed.
 Manually close valves when desired jettison complete.

Fuel Jettison Rates: (Ref TBC)

 1 Nozzle Valve Open:
o Jettison Pumps Only – 1224kg/min
o Jettison & Override Pumps – 1587kg/min
 2 Nozzle Valves Open:
o Jettison Pumps Only – 1406kg/min
o Jettison & Override Pumps – 2449kg/min

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13. Hydraulics

Relevant Bulletins:
Left and Right Systems identical –
 Nil specific
differing only in components they power.

FCOM Limitations: ALTERNATE Brakes – Any Centre Pump

 Nil Specific RESERVE brakes – ELEC C1 pump only

Summary:

Note: Eng Fire

Switch closes
SOV and Eng
Pump, but does
not affect
Demand Pump
supply.

System Pressures x3: Reservoirs x3: (Details also shown on Status Page):
 Output (psi) of pump with Reservoirs pressurized by Bleed Air.
highest pressure.
 1.20  Over-full OF, but likely due to drained accumulator if either
 Any one system can provide
adequate aircraft controllability. C or R systems. (Note: OF inhibited during flight)
 1.00  Full.
 0.78  Refill required RF. (Note: RF inhibited during flight)
 0.40  Low Quantity LO. EICAS [ ] HYD QTY LOW L, C, R
 0.00  Contents at standpipe level.

As a rule of thumb (but not in FCOM):

 The Primary pump for any reservoir is always fed from a standpipe (as it’s a common leak
source). Note: Logic suggests that this does not apply to ELEC C1 pump – ie RSV BRAKES.
 The Demand pump always feeds from the bottom of the reservoir, as it is less worked and thus a
less likely leak source.

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RAT:
 PRESS – RAT deployed and Centre
PFC pressure >1500psi.
 UNLKD – RAT not stowed.
 RAT supplies Centre Primary Flt Ctrls
only, not high lift devices.

Primary Pumps x 4:
L/R ENG & C1/C2 ELEC

 Off: Pump off (& Eng pumps

depressurised).
 ON:
o L/R ENG pumps operate if
associated engine rotating.
Electric Pumps o C1/C2 ELEC pumps operate.
 ON GND, pre-start, with only
single AC source (incl APU),
only C1 runs.
 IN FLT, C2 may be shed if:
 All other elec pumps op.
 Single elec power source.
 Gen capacity exceeded.
 FAULT:
o Low pump pressure or
o Excessive pump fluid temp or
o Pump selected Off.

Demand Pumps x 4:
L/R ELEC & C1/C2 AIR
 OFF: Pump off.
 AUTO: Pump runs when….
o System or 1ry Pressure low, or High demand anticipated.
o On Gnd, R ELEC runs continuously.
o For Takeoff & Ldg, L & R ELEC run continuously.
o For Takeoff, C1 & C2 AIR run from 60K until gear UP
 ON: Pump runs continuously.
o Note: Even if both C1 & C2 selected ON, only one will ever
run at any given time. This does not apply to AUTO.
 FAULT:
o Low pump output pressure or
o Excessive pump fluid temp or
o Pump selected OFF.

Flight Control Hydraulic Power:

Maintenance Use Only - for isolating flight control actuators  No flightdeck procedures involve use.
Centre system switches electrically isolated during flight  (By inference, L & R system switches not isolated!)

See Flt Controls: ‘EICAS FLT CONTROL VALVE’’.

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Hydraulic Non-Normals:

System Failure Rules of Thumb:

 [ ] HYD PRESS SYS L + R on a non-dry runway results in longest landing distance, because of loss of
both Reversers.
 [ ] HYD PRESS SYS L + C result in the most degraded handling, ie the most failed flight controls.

 [ ] HYD PRESS SYS L is the only single loss that results in NO AUTOLAND. This is because of loss
of elevator redundancy, as Left System alone feeds both sides of the elevator.

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Centre Hydraulic System Non-normal Operation: (See RESERVE Brakes & Nose Wheel Steering (NWS))

 If C HYD fluid quantity is sensed to be low:

o Expect EICAS [ ] HYD QTY LOW C.
o Logical next step is likely to be EICAS [ ] HYD PRESS SYS C.

 If IAS > 60K, the following services are isolated:

o ALTERNATE brakes  but still operable on Reserve Fluid (ie Fluid below standpipe level in reservoir).
o Nose gear actuation and steering.
o Slats  Inoperable in Primary (Hyd) mode, but still operable in Secondary (Elec) Mode.
 No Autoslat in Secondary Mode. Expect full slats at all flap settings (< load relief speed).
 NB: Both Flaps & Slats will be in Secondary Mode following HYD PRESS SYS C NNC.

 Slats reconnected (ie again operable in Primary (Hyd) Mode), if:

o C HYD fluid quantity recovers to normal for 5 secs and both engines running >30 secs.

 Nose gear actuation and steering reconnected, if:

o IAS < 60K, or
o C HYD pressure to Centre Flt Ctrls is low (ie system logic has recognised that leak is at Flt Ctrls), or
o Landing Gear selected down & both Engines running & both Eng Hyd pumps operating.

[ ] HYD PRESS SYS C (After NNC Step 6) [ ] HYD PRESS SYS C (Post ldg <60K)

Flaps/Slats: Primary Mode Inop

Flt Ctrls:
 Auto S/B inop
 Spoilers 1,7,8,14 inop
 ACEs centre source inop .

Main Gear:
 Altn Gear Extension only
 No Main gear steering

Pumps: All except ELEC C1

turned off to preserve RSV
BRAKES.

Quantity:
 <0.4  [ ] HYD QTY LOW C
 0.0  Fluid at standpipe
level.

Pressure: Displays whatever ELEC C1

can produce from remaining fluid.

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Ram Air Turbine (RAT):

 When deployed, the RAT provides – throughout the flight envelope:

o Hydraulic power only to the Centre System Primary Flight Controls.
o Electrical Power only to the C1 & C2 TRUs, which in turn
provide the backup power source to the STANDBY Electrical
System, which in turn powers selected ………….
RAT:
 Flight instruments.
 PRESS – RAT deployed and Centre.
 Comms.
PFC pressure >1500psi.
 Navigation systems.
 UNLKD – RAT not stowed.
 L & C Flt Ctrl Systems.
 RAT supplies hyd pressure to
Primary Flt Ctrls only, not High Lift
devices.
 In flight, the RAT deploys automatically (in ~25secs) if:
o Both Engines failed and C Hyd system pressure is low, or
o All three hydraulic system pressures are low, or (See ‘APU’ and)
o Both AC transfer busses unpowered …...also causes APU auto-start ‘Elec – Stby Pwr’)

 Load Shedding may occur during periods of high C HYD demand. In such an event, Electrical loads
are taken over by either:
o Main Battery……but note that FO loses all flight instruments, or
o APU Gen, if it has successfully started.

 The RAT can be deployed manually by:

o Pushing the RAM AIR TURBINE switch, but……..
 Either Hot Battery or APU Battery bus must be powered.
 C HYD system does not need to be pressurised / powered.

 RAT is deployed by a compressed spring.

o Once deployed, cannot be stowed until on gnd.
o EICAS RAT UNLOCKED

Autoland:
EICAS [ ] HYD PRESS SYS L is the only single Hyd system failure that will prevent an Autoland, though
not mentioned in NNC.
This is because of reduced Elevator redundancy for flare, as L Hyd supplies both sides:
 L & R Hyd supply Left Elevator.
 L & C Hyd supply Right Elevator.

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14. Landing Gear

Relevant Bulletins:
 EAD-101  Delayed Release of Landing Gear Lock.
 EKIB-12  Continued Flight After Tail Strike During TO when no EICAS [ ] TAIL STRIKE displayed.
 200s  Accomplish TAILSTRIKE NNC and land.
 300s  Continue.

 EKIB-23  EICAS CONFIG GEAR STEERING  Axle should lock in <5 secs.

Wheel Brake Temp:

0.0 to 9.9 – Relative Brake T. Air/Ground Sensing:
Sensors located on
< 3.0.
each main landing
3.0 to 4.9 – Hottest brake on gear beam.
each main gear.

5.0 to 9.9 – Overheat.

+ EICAS [ ] BRAKE TEMP

Brake Faults:
 ASKID – Antiskid fault on
associated wheel.
 BRAKE – Brake deactivated on
associated wheel.

Gear DOOR Status:

Not Closed.

CLOSED Closed.
D

Indication Inop.

Tyre Pressure: 0 to 400psi

 190 – Normal.
 100 – Abnormally Hi or Lo, or excess diff on same axle.
+ EICAS TIRE PRESS. Inhibited if Indication Inop.
 100 – Indication Inop.

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NORMAL Gear Operation: ALTERNATE Gear Operation:

 Controlled by Lever.  Controlled by ALTN GEAR switch
o By deduction, switched off Left (or, less o Switched off Hot Batt Bus.
probably, Right) AC Transfer Bus.  Lever position has no effect.
 Doors opened hydraulically (C HYD).  Switch releases all door and gear uplocks.
 Uplocks released (C HYD).  Doors and Gear lowered by free-fall.
 Gear lowered by free-fall. o Main trucks do not tilt.
o Main trucks tilt to flight position.  D’locks locked by C HYD (Dedicated DC Pump)
 Downlocks powered by C HYD.  Raised only by NORMAL System if available.
 Raised by C HYD Pressure. o Lever must be recycled DOWN, then UP.
 Hydraulically activated doors Close.  All doors remain Open.

LOCK OVRD Switch:

 Push – releases the landing gear lever lock.

ALTN GEAR Switch:

 NORM – the landing gear lever operates normally.
 DOWN – landing gear extends by alternate extension system.
o Free-fall extension (the switch is powered off Hot Batt Bus).
o Downlocks engaged by dedicated DC Hyd pump using C Hyd Fluid.
o All gear doors remain open.

Note 1: ALTN extension selectable with Landing Gear Lever in any position.

Note 2: Gear can be raised following ALTN extension by closing switch guard,
and then recycling Gear Lever through DOWN and then UP.

AUTOBRAKE Selector:
 OFF – deactivates &resets autobrake system.
 DISARM – disengages autobrake system / releases brake pressure.
 1, 2, 3, 4, MAX AUTO – selects desired deceleration rate.
 RTO – Auto max braking pressure when TLs retarded to idle above > 85K GS.

Note 1: On dry rwys, maximum autobrake in landing mode is always less than that produced by full pedal braking.

Note 2: Autobrake activates after landing once both TLs IDLE and wheels have spun up..

Note 2: Autobrakes disarmed by………..

 Moving Speedbrake Lever from UP position.
 Pressing toe brakes  override effort proportional to current brake pressure.
 Rotating Selector to DISARM / OFF.

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Gear Position Indicator:

 Normal Display:
o DOWN – All gear down & locked.
o __UP__ – All gear up & locked (disappears after 10secs)
o Cr – One or more gear in transit.
o - All gear indicators inoperative.
 Non-Normal Expanded Display:
o Same individual meaning as Normal Display.
o Appears if ALTN GEAR extension or if normal gear events do not occur
within normal transit time:
 EICAS [ ] GEAR DISAGREE:
 Any gear not up & locked, or
 Any gear not locked down (by both side & drag braces)
 EICAS [ ] MAIN GEAR BRACE L,R:
 Only one brace (side or drag) locked.
 EICAS [ ] GEAR DOOR:
 Any hydraulically activated door not closed.

Main Gear and Aft-Axle Steering:

 Steering Tiller :
o + 70°.
o Main Gear Aft Axle steering slaved to tiller. Adjusts for deflections > 13°.
o Overrides (not compliments) rudder pedal steering.
 Rudder Pedals:
o +7°.
o Main gear steering not activated.

Note 1: EICAS CONFIG GEAR STEERING:

o Main gear aft axles not centred and locked when Takeoff Thrust applied (>60% N1).
o Disappears after several seconds once thrust reduced.
o See Warning Systems: ‘Takeoff Configuration Warnings’.

Note 2: EICAS MAIN GEAR STEERING:

o Main gear steering actuators not centred and lcoked when commanded.
o Common if hydraulics depressurised prematurely prior to towing to stand.
o Refer to NP.21.63 for correct procedure.

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Semi-Levered Gear  – 300ER / ER/ULR Only:

 Additional hydraulic actuator connecting forward of main gear truck to main shock.
 Takeoff: Locks to restrict aft rotation of main truck during rotation. Increases tail clearance.
 Landing: Unlocked to permit full movement. Provides additional damping.

Note: It is extremely important to remember that -300 (ie RR) does not have semi-levered gear. Be
very aware of tailstrike risk.

Tailskid  – 300, – 300ER / ER/ULR Only:

 Extends and retracts with ldg gear.

 To protect pressure hull.
 EICAS TAIL SKID if not in correct position.
 See: Warning Systems: ‘Tail Strike Detection System’.
And: Flt Ctrls: ‘Tail Strike Protection’

Note: Tailskid will not be fitted with effect from deliveries mid-2014. Instead, protections will be
provided by enhancements to Flight Control logic.

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Brake System:

 Multiple Carbon Disc brakes on each main wheel.

 In effect, the 777 braking system has 4 levels of redundancy:

1. NORMAL Brake System:

 R HYD System.
 Antiskid via individual wheel.
 Autobrakes.
 Taxi Brake Release.

2. ALTERNATE Brake System:

 C / RESERVE HYD System via any Centre Pump.
 Automatic selection / reversion if R HYD P low – no pilot input required.
 Antiskid via tandem wheel pairs (Fwd, Ctr axle); Individual wheels (Rear axle).
 Nil Autobrakes.
 Nil Taxi Brake Release.

3. RESERVE Brakes & Nose Wheel Steering (NWS): See Hydraulics: ‘C HYD System Non-Normal Operation’.
 RESERVE Brakes = ALTERNATE Brakes, but using protected Reserve fluid in C HYD Reservoir.
 RESERVE HYD = C HYD Reservoir contents below standpipe level.
 C1 Air Demand Pump only (……….the only C or R pump left running by [ ] HYD PRESS SYS R+C NNC):

o ALTERNATE Brake system, and

o Nose Wheel Steering, provided that…………
 IAS < 60K, or.
 C HYD pressure to Centre Flt Ctrls is low (ie presumably RAT winding down after landing), or
 Landing Gear selected down & both Engines running & both Eng Hyd pumps operating.

4. Brake Accumulator:
 Part of NORMAL Brake System  Charged by R HYD.
o Principal Purpose…………………..
 To extend Parking Brake holding time.
 To stabilise NORMAL Brake transients (ie initial application and during ASKID cycling).
o But also……
 To provide Hyd source for several brake cycles (or Parking Brake application) if both R
and C/Res HYD P low.
 EICAS [ ] BRAKE SOURCE, and
 BRAKE SOURCE light.

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Antiskid Protection: Is available with…………

 NORMAL & ALTERNATE Brakes, or

 Using Accumulator pressure only.
 In all cases:
o NORMAL = Individual ASKID protection to each main wheel.
o ALTERNATE = ASKID protection to tandem wheel pairs axle (Fwd & Ctr) and individual wheels
(Rear Axle).
o Touchdown and hydroplaning protection via Inertial GS.
o Locked wheel protection via other wheel comparison.
o EICAS [ ] ANTISKID displayed if…………
 Antiskid fault affecting brake system in use, or
 Parking Brake Valve not fully open with Parking Brake released, or
 System inoperative.

Taxi Brake Release: Is available with……..

 NORMAL Brakes Only.
 One axle pair on each gear released each brake application, except during or if…..
o Wheel speed > 45K, or
o Heavy braking, or
o Landing rollout, or
o Parking brake setting.

Parking Brake: Is available with……..

 NORMAL & ALTERNATE Brakes, or
 Using Accumulator pressure only.
 When set  EICAS Memo PARKING BRAKE SET.
 EICAS CONFIG PARKING BRAKE (and aural) if……….
o Either engine set to takeoff thrust, and
o Parking Brake Set.

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Autobrake System: Is available with………

 NORMAL Brakes Only.

 EICAS Memo displays selected A/B setting  eg AUTOBRAKE 3, AUTOBRAKE RTO.
 EICAS AUTOBRAKE displayed if…….
o Autobrakes disarmed or inoperative, or
o Autobrake solenoid valve pressure high when not commanded on.

 Autobrake RTO: Maximum braking pressure commanded if…………….

o Ac on ground, and
o Both thrust levers retarded to idle, and
o Groundspeed > 85K.
Or else RTO Autobrake function does not operate.
o Autobrake RTO disarmed after takeoff  Selector moves to OFF.

 Autobrake Landing: Autobrake application begins after landing when…….

o Both TLs retarded to idle, and
o Main wheels spun up.
o If AUTOBRAKE MAX AUTO, autobrake limited to AUTOBRAKE 4 level until Pitch Angle < 1°.
o Autobrake disarmed if………..
 Pedal pressure applied.
 Either TL advanced after landing.
 Speedbrake Lever moved towards DOWN, after S/B have deployed.
 DISARM or OFF selected.
 Autobrake or NORMAL Antiskid fault.
 Loss of ADIRU Inertial data.
 Loss of NORMAL Brake pressure.
 In all cases, Selector moves to DISARM.

On a dry runway, maximum autobrake in landing mode (but not RTO) is always less than

that produced by full pedal braking.

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Brake System Non-Normals:

EICAS [ ] RESERVE BRAKES/STRG:

 Condition: One or more of the following may not be available;
o ALTERNATE Brakes from Reserve Hyd Source.
o NORMAL Nose Gear Extension.
o NWS.

EICAS [ ] BRAKE TEMP:

 Condition: One or more brake temperatures are high.
o In flight, hang gear for at least 8 minutes.

EICAS [ ] BRAKE SOURCE:

 Condition: Normal and alternate brake system pressures are low, and reserve hydraulic source for
alternate brake system is low. (See ‘Brake Accumulator’)

MEL - To Deactivate or To Cap a Brake Unit?

1. Deactivate?
o The deactivation tool is a pin with a small hole in it that allows a restricted flow of hydraulic fluid to
the affected brake unit in order to provide a restricted braking effect (principally to brake the wheel
before retraction). There is no return line however, and a small amount of hyd fluid is lost
overboard.
o The performance penalty is minimal and relates solely to Accelerate-Stop distance.
o The engineer can complete and write up a deactivation in ~20 mins.

2. Cap?
o Capping prevents any fluid being supplied to the affected brake unit. The engineer must drain the
affected brake line and pressurise to check for leaks in the capped line.
o There is no braking to the affected wheel, and the gear must remain down for 2mins after takeoff to
spin down the wheel before retraction.
 Spin down is required due to high precessional forces incurred if gear is retracted
whilst wheel is still spinning,
o The performance penalty is significant, and relates to Accelerate-Go performance, based on gear
stuck down.
o The engineer can complete and write up a deactivation in ~1 hour.

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15. Warning Systems

Note: This section is highly abridged, based on likely Tech Exam questions only.

Relevant Bulletins:
 EAD-94  Possible nuisance STATUS: PASSENGER ADDRESS Check all speakers; if all working,
consider nuisance and dispatch. Write-up on landing.

 EKIB-12  Continued Flight After Tail Strike During TO when no EICAS [ ] TAIL STRIKE displayed.
 200s  Accomplish TAILSTRIKE NNC and land.
 300s  Continue.

PFD Alerts:
Three versions, all presented similarly on PFD:
 ENG FAIL (See GE or RR Chapter)

 PULL UP (See ‘GPWS’ below)

 WINDSHEAR (See ‘Windshear’ below)

Windshear:
Predictive Windshear ‘within 3 miles and ahead’ during takeoff (ac <1200ft RA):

Aural: “MONITOR RADAR DISPLAY” PWS Inhibits during Takeoff: (Ref FCOM 15.20.40)
Visual: WINDSHEAR (on NDs only) 80KIAS  400ft RA – New PWS Cautions
100KIAS  50ft RA – New PWS Warnings
Red PWS sector displayed on NDs.
Immediate Windshear (GPWS) never inhibited
 Manoeuvre to avoid.
 NB: Predictive windshear requires Doppler returns from moisture or particulate matter. It will not
work in dry, clean air!

Predictive Windshear ‘close to and directly ahead’ during takeoff (ac <1200ft RA):

Aural: “WINDSHEAR AHEAD, WINDSHEAR AHEAD”

Visual: Master Warning + WINDSHEAR (on PFDs & NDs).

Red PWS sector displayed on ND, directly ahead.

 < V1 - Reject T/O.

 > V1 - Perform windshear escape manoeuvre.
o Rotate at normal rate to 15°, then follow manoeuvre.
o If windshear at or near to VR causes sudden speed decrease, and ac unable to reach
normal VR, rotate at least 2000ft before end of runway, anticipating higher pitch to unstick.

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Predictive Windshear (PWS) during Appch (<1200ft RA): (Ref QRH MAN 1.10)

Aural: “MONITOR RADAR DISPLAY” (ahead < 3miles) or

“GO AROUND, WINDSHEAR AHEAD” (directly ahead <1.5miles)

Visual: WINDSHEAR (on NDs only) or

Master Warning + WINDSHEAR (on PFDs & NDs).

Red PWS sector displayed on NDs for either caution or warning.

 Either manoeuvre as required to avoid, Or perform windshear escape manoeuvre / normal go

around (ie 2000fpm ROC) at pilots’ discretion.
 NB: Predictive windshear requires Doppler returns from moisture or particulate matter. It will not
work in dry, clean air!

Immediate Windshear (detected by GPWS) during Appch (<1500ft RA): (Ref QRH MAN 1.10)

Aural: Two-tone siren + “WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR. WINDSHEAR”

Visual: Master Warning + WINDSHEAR displayed on PFDs and NDs

Summary of Automatic Windshear Callouts (Ref QRH MAN 1.10 and FCOM 15.20.24)

Caution or Predictive or
Callout Enabled? Immediate Action
Warning? Immediate?

CAUTION Predictive During Takeoff

“Monitor Radar
(Any Stage of (PWS and Appch Manoeuvre as required to avoid
Display”
flight) Radar) <1200ft RA

“Windshear
Predictive
Ahead, WARNING During Takeoff <V1 – RTO
(PWS
Windshear (Takeoff) <1200ft RA >V1 – WS Escape Manoeuvre
Radar)
Ahead”

“Go-around, Predictive During T/O

WARNING WS Escape Manoeuvre or Normal G/A
Windshear (PWS and Appch
(Approach) (Pilot’s discretion)
Ahead” Radar) <1200ft RA

“Windshear,
WARNING
Windshear, Immediate < 1500ft RA
(Any stage of WS Escape Manoeuvre
Windshear” (GPWS) From rotation
flight)
+ 2-Tone Siren

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Tail Strike Detection System:

Refer to EKIB-12  Continued flight after tail strike during T/O when No EICAS [ ] TAIL STRIKE
message displayed.

Tail Strike Detection System comprises:

 -200 Series – 2-inch blade target and two proximity sensors on aft fuselage.
 -300 Series - 6-inch blade target and two proximity sensors on aft fuselage.
 EICAS [ ] TAIL STRIKE displayed when tail strike is detected.
 Also see: Landing Gear: ‘Tail Skid -300ER, ER/ULR’.
And: Flight Controls: ‘Tail Strike Protection’.

Takeoff Configuration Warnings:

Displayed if:
 Aircraft on ground with FUEL CONTROL switches in RUN, and
 Either engine thrust in takeoff range, and………..
 Thrust reversers are not unlocked or deployed, and
 Airspeed is less than V1, (or <80 knots for EICAS CONFIG GEAR STEERING)
o All Takeoff Config Warnings are inhibited from V1 (or 80K) or Rotation, whichever
first, until Landing.
 Warning will persist for 10secs after thrust reduced, to aid identification of condition.

The EICAS options are as follows:

 [ ] CONFIG WARNING SYS  A configuration warning system fault occurs.

 Radar Altimeter voice callouts and other aural alerts may
not be available.

 CONFIG DOORS  An entry, forward cargo, or aft cargo door is not closed,
latched, and locked during takeoff.
 ie Not E/E hatch or Bulk Cargo.

 CONFIG FLAPS  Flaps not in a takeoff position during takeoff.

 Or, by inference, slats.

 CONFIG GEAR STEERING  Main gear steering not locked during takeoff.
 Also see Ldg Gear: ‘Main Gear and Aft-Axle Steering’

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 CONFIG PARKING BRAKE  Parking brake set during takeoff.

 Commonly occurs if PF holds brake lever during brakes
release, such that the shuttle valve does not correctly
reposition.

 CONFIG RUDDER  Rudder trim not centred during takeoff.

 Not within 2 units of zero.

 CONFIG SPOILERS  SPEED BRAKE lever not DOWN during takeoff, or

 SPEED BRAKE lever extended beyond ARMED in flt with
climb thrust or greater (GE Models only).

 CONFIG STABILIZER  Stabilizer trim not in green band during takeoff.

 Also see Flt Controls: ‘Takeoff Trim Greenband’.

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Landing Configuration Warning:

EICAS CONFIG GEAR displayed if:

 Aircraft in flight, and
 Gear not down and locked (and GND PROX GEAR OVRD switch not pushed), and
 Either Thrust Lever closed (at RA < 800ft), or
 Flap Lever in 25° or 30° position.

Speedbrake Lever Extend Beyond ARM During Climb: GE-Models Only

EICAS CONFIG SPOILERS displayed if:

 SPEEDBRAKE lever is extended beyond ARMED, and
 Climb or higher thrust set on either thrust levers.

TCAS:

TCAS displayed in MAP, MAP CTR, APP, and VOR modes:

 Resolution Advisory (RA).
 Traffic Advisory (TA).
 ‘Proximate’ Traffic.
 ‘Other’ Traffic.
 Vertical motion arrow for climb/descent > 500fpm
 TRAFFIC / TRAFFIC  Displayed as appropriate for RA or TA.
 OFFSCALE / OFFSCALE  RA or TA beyond selected map range.
 RA 5.3 +03 / TA 8.9 -12  RA or TA data with no bearing.

GPWS: Pending

PWS: Pending

RAAS: Pending

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Alert Inhibits: All PWS Alerts:

1. Takeoff….. Inhibited >1200ft RA until
1200ft RA on approach

New STATUS Until Lift-off + 30min

TCAS TA / TCAS RA
Until 1000ft RA (See Note 2)

 New EICAS Advisories inhibited

 New Caution Lights and Beepers inhibited
New COM , o EICAS always displayed New Warning Lights, Bells & Sirens inhibited
except  New PWS Cautions  EICAS always displayed
CABIN ALERT
Until 400ft RA / 400ft RA
(See Note 1)
New PWS PFD
Warnings ENG FAIL
Until 50ft RA
New PWS

Note 1: Advisory, Caution and Warning Takeoff Inhibits end:

 400ft RA or Inhibit + 25secs, whichever first.
 400ft RA or Lift-off + 20secs, whichever first (or <75K IAS following RTO).
 COM inhibit 400ft RA or Lift-off + 20secs, whichever first.

2. Landing…..
TCAS RAs (See Note 2)

New STATUS TCAS RAs  Until 1000ft RA

New COM , except CABIN ALERT
PWS Cautions & EICAS
TCAS TAs & Voice Alerts
Cautions  Until 800ft RA
New PWS Cautions
TCAS TAs  Until 500ft RA
New Cautions
 Lights, Beeper & EICAS inhibited
 EICAS N.A.S.A always displayed
New PWS
Warnings
New PWS

Note 2: TCAS RAs:

 TCAS INCREASE DESCENT RAs – Inhibited from 1500ft RA, until 1500ft RA
on MAP
 TCAS DESCEND RAs – Inhibited from 1100ft RA, until 1100ft RA on MAP
 When RA selected on panel, TCAS switches automatically to TA-only mode. Note 3: There are no Landing inhibits for
TA ONLY displayed on ND. EICAS Warnings…..EVER!

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