Hazard: Any operation that could possibly cause
a catastrophic release of toxic, flammable or
explosive chemicals or any action that could
result in injury to personnel.
Operability: Any operation inside the design
envelope that would cause a shutdown that
could possibly lead to a violation of
environmental, health or safety regulations or
negatively impact profitability.
What is HAZOP?
Hazard and operability (HAZOP) methodology is a
Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) technique used for
studying the hazards of a system, and its operability
problems, by exploring the effects of any deviations from
design conditions.
HAZOP is one of the best and most rigorous techniques
for identification of hazard and operability problems in a
chemical plant.
Who carries out hazop?
HAZOP is carried out by a team. The usual team is as
follows:
Hazard study leader
Commissioning manager
Plant manager
Project engineer
Process engineer
Control/Electrical engineer
Research Chemist (if new chemistry is involved)
When to perform HAZOP?
The HAZOP study should preferably be carried out as early
in the design phase as possible. On the other hand; to carry
out a HAZOP we need a rather complete design. As a
compromise, the HAZOP is usually carried out as a final
check when the detailed design has been completed.
A HAZOP study may also be conducted on an existing facility
to identify modifications that should be implemented to
reduce risk and operability problems.
PREREQUISITES FOR HAZOP
As a basis for the HAZOP study the following information
should be available:
Process flow diagrams (PFDs)
Piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs)
Plant Layout diagrams
Material safety data sheets (MSDS)
Provisional operating instructions
Heat and material balances
Equipment data sheets
Start-up and emergency shut-down procedures
Phases of hazop
Pre-meeting phase
Collection of data about facility viz. PFDs, P&IDs,
Plant layout, Chemical hazard data
Identification of team members
Meeting phase
Division of plant in sections or nodes
Deviations, causes, consequences & protective
systems are identified
Post-meeting phase
Discussions are recorded
Actions are followed-up & report is issued
HAZOP procedure
1.
Divide the system into sections (i.e., reactor, storage)
3.
Choose a study node (vessel, line, operating instruction).
Describe the design intent of the study node.
4.
Choose a process parameter.
2.
6.
Apply a guide word to the process parameter to suggest
possible deviations.
Determine possible causes & find protective systems.
7.
Evaluate the consequences of the deviation (if any).
8.
Recommend action (what? by whom? by when?)
9.
Record all information.
5.
10.
Repeat procedure until all guide words, all applicable process
parameters & all study nodes have been considered.
Guide Words Used for the HAZOP
GUIDE
WORDS
MEANING
COMMENTS
NO, NOT, NONE
The complete
negation , ex. No
flow
No part of the design intention is achieved,
but of the intention nothing else happens.
MORE,
HIGHER,
GREATER
Quantitative
increase, ex. High
temp.
Applies to quantities such as flow rate and
temperature and to activities such as heating
and reaction.
LESS, LOWER
Quantitative
decrease, ex. Low
temp.
Applies to quantities such as flow rate and
temperature and to activities such as eating
and reaction.
AS WELL AS
Qualitative
increase
All the design and operating intentions are
achieved along with some additional activity,
such as contamination of process streams.
PART OF
Qualitative
decrease
Only some of the design intentions are
achieved, some are not.
GUIDE
WORDS
MEANING
COMMENTS
REVERSE
The logical
opposite of
Most applicable to activities such as flow or
chemical reaction. Also applicable to
substances, for example, poison instead of
antidote.
OTHER THAN
Complete
substitution
No part of the original intention is achieved
the original intention is replaced by
something else.
SOONER THAN
Too early or in the
wrong order
Applies to process steps or actions.
LATER THAN
Too late or in the
wrong order
Applies to process steps or actions.
WHERE ELSE
In additional
locations
Applies to process locations, or locations in
operating procedures.
ADVANTAGES
DISADVANTAGES
1. Structured and systematic
approach
2. Helpful when confronting
hazards that are difficult to
quantify:
Hazards rooted in human
performance
and
behaviours
Hazards that are difficult to
detect, analyse, isolate,
count, predict, etc.
3.
Built-in
brainstorming
methodology
4. Multidisciplinary study
5. Comprehensive methodology
6. More simple and intuitive
1. No means to assess hazards
involving interactions between
different parts of a system or
process.
2. Highly time consuming
3. Team members often divert
into endless discussions of
details.
4.
No means
to assess
effectiveness of existing or
proposed safeguards.
5. The success of a HAZOP study
depends greatly on the ability &
experience of the study leader
and the knowledge, experience
and interaction between team
members.
Hazop case study: example
Materials A and B are continuously transferred by pump
from their respective supply tanks to combine and form a
product C in the reactor.
Suppose that A always has to be in excess of B in the reactor
to avoid an explosion hazard. The part of the system selected
for examination is the line from the supply tank holding A to
the reactor, including pump A. The intent for this part is to
continuously transfer material A from the tank to the reactor
at a rate greater than the transfer rate of material B.
HAZOP Worksheet
GUIDE
WORD
ELEMENT
DEVIATION
POSSIBLE
CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
ACTIONS
REQUIRED
NO
Material A
No flow
Supply Tank No flow of A into Installation of a
A
reactor
low-level alarm on
is empty
tank A & low-level
Explosion
trip to stop pump
B
MORE
Material A
More flow
Filling
of Tank will overflow Installation
of
tank
into bounded area
high-level alarm
when
insufficient
capacity
exists
LESS
Material A
Less flow
Low level in Inadequate
net Low-level alarm on
tank
positive suction head tank A
Possible vortexing &
leading
to
an
explosion
Inadequate flow
TYPICAL HAZOP WORKSHEET
